End-of-Class Questions:

Jan. 5: Are you a Methodological Individualist (MI)? Explain your answer in a way that shows you understand what MI is.

Jan. 7: (Based on the sequential trade of potatoes and broccoli, which we analyzed in extensive form in class.) What factors would make it rational for the two farmers to exchange (i..e., each share) their produce? Explain.

Jan. 9: In the example of the potato-broccoli exchange as presented in the decision matrix on the overhead, explain why the outcome O3 [3,10] is Pareto optimal.

Jan. 12: Analyze a choice of yours as an implicit lottery. (Give a matrix and calculate the subjective expected utility of the alternatives.)

Jan. 14: Solve the matrix on the transparency (find all security levels and explain why the solution is a Nash equilibrium.)

Jan. 16: We calculated Row Chooser's equalizer mixed strategy in the Holmes-Moriarty game as {<2/3, r1>, <1/3, r2>}. Show that it is an equalizer mixed strategy (make sure in your answer that you show that you know what 'equalizer mixed strategy' means.)

Jan. 21: Explain why, in the Penny Game (as played by Gordon and Dustin in class), the following strategy, when adopted by both players, produces a Nash equilibrium combination of pure strategies: Take two pennies whenever you get a chance.

Jan. 23: For the Chicken Game, calculate each player's Equalizer Mixed Strategy (EMS). What is the value to each player of the Nash equilibrium combination of each player's EMS?

Jan. 26: Assume a discount factor of .99. Calculate the discounted utility of the following infinite sequence of utilities: 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 . . .

Jan. 28: Assume w =.99. Evaluate the infinite sum: 3w + 3w4 + 3w7 . . .

Jan. 30: Use the Exploiter-Exploited combination to explain why it Taylor makes a mistake when he claims on p. 78 [Reader, p. 24] that all other equilibria of the PD Supergame are either equivalent to or Pareto-dominated by at least one of those that he considers.

Feb. 2: Explain why the Schelling diagram drawn in class is a Multi-Person PD by Schelling's definition.

Feb. 4: Same as Feb. 2.

Feb. 6: Midterm Exam. No End of Class Question.

Feb. 9: What strategy would you choose in the N-Person PD Supergame discussed in class? Why?

Feb. 11: 20-Person PD Supergame with Selective Sanctioning.

(1) Draw a Schelling diagram for the following two supergame strategies:

(a) B(11)w/ss

(b) D-infinity

(2) Circle all Nash equilibrium strategy combinations.

(3) Identify the Game (e.g., is it an N-Person PD?)

(4) Explain why, when limited to the two strategies in (1) above, the game has a rational solution.

Feb. 13: Explain the following N-Person PD Supergame strategey:

C-CC(x)w/ss(infinity).

Feb. 18: Given an example of an S-Norm (traceable to an N-person PD Supergame) other than those discussed in class. Explain the role of selective sanctioning in making the norms stable.

Feb. 20: Use the data supplied by Frank to calculate one term of the Expected Utility of being IR in the two stage, one-shot PD described in class: 24/39[the expected utility for an IR agent of being (mis)identified as FC].

Feb. 23: From Homework #6: Use Frank's data to explain why IR agents might well have have higher Expected Utility than FC agents in the two-stage, one-shot PD described in class.

Feb. 25: Elster thinks that sanctions are always costly to the person who does the sanctioning. Does Pettit agree? Explain.

Feb. 27: Give an example from your own life of a case in which you were sanctioned in a way that did not involve intentional behavior of the sanctioner.

Mar. 2: What choices would you make in the following experiments:

(a) The first part of K, K, and T's Experiment #2: 18-2 or 10-10?

(b) The second part of K, K, and T's Experiment #2: Split $10 with E or split $12 with U.

(c) Experiment #1, the Ultimatum Game: What is the minimum you would accept?

Mar. 4: Answer the questions on the 'Pop quiz' Handout. (Click here to see the handout.)

Mar. 6: Consider the two following hypothetical choices:

(1) You have a potentially fatal illness FI1. (A)If FI1 is untreated, the probability that you will recover and live a normal life is 75%; the probability that you will die is 25%. (B) If treated, there is a 100% recovery rate.What is the maximum amount that you would pay for the treatment for this illness?

(2) You have a potentially fatal illness FI2. (A) If FI2 is untreated, the probability that you will die is 40% and the probability that you will recover and live a normal life is 60%. (B) There is a treatment, but it only cures 50% of the cases. If treated, the probability that you will die is reduced to 20% and the probability that you will recover is 80%. What is the maximum amount that you would pay for the treatment for this illness?

Mar. 9: What would you do in the following sequential one-shot anonymous PD:

You and another person have a choice between two buttons marked: "Give $50 to the other person" and "Give $20 to me". The other person has already chosen to give $50 to you. The other person also sent a note which says: "I assumed I could rely on you to reciprocate." What would you do?

Mar. 11: Give an example of empirical evidence that could reasonably be interpreted as evidence that we are on the Downward Spiral.

Mar. 13: Simply complete the course evaluation.