TALBOTT (5 Credits/W Credit)
Do we know anything?
If so, what do we know and how do we know it? What is knowledge? What sort of justification is necessary for
knowledge? In the sense of justification
in which it is necessary for knowledge, are we justified in believing
anything? If so, what are we justified
in believing and how are we justified in believing it? Can we know or be justified in believing an
answer to any of the previous questions?
If so, on what basis? Do the answers to the previous questions
depend on one's political or other commitments?
In this course, we will consider various attempts to answer all these
questions. The course aims to
familiarize the students with some of the most important work in contemporary
epistemology and to develop their ability to understand it and to critically
evaluate it. The course will provide
students with an opportunity to develop their ability to explain difficult
philosophical readings and issues, to argue for their own views, and to take
seriously the views of those with whom they disagree.
The course readings will include readings on foundationalism,
coherence theories, pragmatism, virtue epistemology, rationalism, naturalism, internalism, externalism, relativism and non-relativism,
and feminist epistemology. The course
requirements include two papers (6-8 pages each), a Midterm Exam, and a Final
Exam. Students who successfully complete
the course will earn "W" credit for the course. Prerequisites: One previous
course in philosophy or the permission of the instructor. No freshmen. Meets I&S
requirement.
Text: Louis P. Pojman, The
Theory of Knowledge: Classical &
Contemporary Readings (3rd ed.) and a photocopied reader.
What is Epistemology?
A General Theory of Knowledge and Justified Belief.
Elements of the Theory:
1. Epistemic Principles. Two kinds:
(a) Logical analysis (not definitions!) of important concepts
(e.g., K à TB).
(b) Principles of Rational Belief, including Principles of
Rational Belief Change (e.g., It is irrational to have logically inconsistent
beliefs.)
2. Particular epistemic judgments: Judgments about particular cases of knowledge
and justified belief: What do we know and
what are we justified in believing?
The Application of the General Theory to Itself Raises
Two Further Questions:
The Metaphysics of
Epistemology: What is the metaphysical
status of epistemic principles and particular epistemic judgments?
The Epistemology of
Epistemology: How can we know or be
justified in believing epistemic principles and particular epistemic
judgments.
REASONING ABOUT REASONING
1. Top-Down Reasoning and the Proof Paradigm
Model of rational belief is
proof in mathematics.
Proceeds in
the direction of deductive implication, from the premises to the acceptance of
the conclusion. In many cases, the premises will include an
epistemic principle (e.g., EP1) and the conclusion will be an epistemic
judgment about a particular case, a particular epistemic judgment (e.g., PEJ2).
PREMISES:
EP1. Justified, True, Belief that pà Knowledge that p
PEJ1. I am justified in believing that I exist
PEJ2. I exist is
true
CONCLUSION: PEJ3.
I know that I exist.
The
Proof Paradigm. For most of
its history, Western philosophy has assumed that reasoning fits the Proof
Paradigm. On the Proof Paradigm, we must
have an infallible source of knowledge of the premises of our reasoning. Then reasoning about particular cases is
Top-Down, from principles to particular judgments.
2. Bottom-Up Reasoning. Model of rational belief
is theory confirmation in science.
Begins with judgments about
particular actual and hypothetical cases and uses them to support the
principles or generalizations that best explain those particular
judgments. Bottom-Up reasoning supports
principles or generalizations that explain our particular judgments and
undermines moral principles that do not.
Bottom-Up Reasoning in the Theaetetus:
Premise: (1) K ó TB
(2) In the example of the impressionable juror, the juror has
a true belief that p.
Conclusion: (3) In the example of the impressionable
juror, the juror has knowledge that p.
If we reject that conclusion,
it seems we must reject premise (1). This
is an example of an undermining reasons. What can we substitute for (1)?
(1’) K ó JTB
(1’) would explain the judgment
that the impressionable juror has a true belief that is not knowledge. This is
an example of a supporting reason.
3. Equilibrium Reasoning
Equilibrium Reasoning is both
Top-Down and Bottom-Up. In Equilibrium
Reasoning, our main reason for accepting an epistemic principle is usually that
it seems to provide a good explanation of particular cases. When we accept an epistemic principle on this
basis, we can then reason Top-Down from that principle to a particular
epistemic judgment, but the epistemic principle is not regarded as
infallible. If we discover a particular
epistemic judgment that the principle conflicts with, we must either give up
the particular moral judgment or give up the principle. The decision about which to give up is based
on what makes the most sense.
On this model, no logical
derivation from premises that we accept can compel that we accept the
conclusion, because we can always ask:
Does it make more sense to accept the conclusion or to give up one of
the premises?
Hume's Epistemology
Theory of What Reason Can and
Cannot Do
A. Reason can determine:
(1) Relations of Ideas
(Rational intuition).
(2) Deductive Reasoning
(3) Apply (1) and (2) to
current perception and memory.
B. Reason cannot do anything
else.
When these premises are
combined with other ancillary premises:
CONCLUSIONS: (1) Skepticism About
Causes. We have no good reason to
believe in causal relations. (They are
explained by Habit or Custom.)
(2) Skepticism About Physical Objects.
We have no good reason to believe in bodies—that is, things with continued and distinct existence. (What do
these two terms mean?) Constancy and coherence explain but do not justify such beliefs. (What do these
two terms mean?)
(3) Skepticism About Induction. We
have no good reason to believe anything about the future. (They are explained by Habit or Custom.)
A SAMPLE INDUCTION
(1) In the past, all observed
emeralds have been green.
(2) The future will be like
the past.
Therefore, in the future, all
observed emeralds will be green.
A RECONSTRUCTION OF HUME'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE CAN BE
NO INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION
PREMISES: (1) In the past, the future has been like the
past.
(2) [MISSING PREMISE: What is it?].
CONCLUSION: (3) Therefore, in the future, the future will
be like the past.
GOODMAN'S NEW RIDDLE OF
INDUCTION
(1) In the past, all observed
emeralds have been grue.
(2) The future will be like
the past.
Therefore, in the future, all
observed emeralds will be grue.
grue = green if
observed before Jan. 1, 2014; otherwise blue.
bleen = blue if
observed before Jan. 1, 2014; otherwise green.
Note that "blue"
and "green" can be defined in terms of "grue"
and "bleen".