TWO KINDS OF INTERNALISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Call any condition that is necessary for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at time t) a J-factor with respect to S and p (at t).

(Access Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification): Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following: For S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that S have reflective access to the holding of all J-factors with respect to S and p (at t). (For example, Steup requires that whether we are justified or not in believing that p be recognizable on reflection, at least "nearly always".)

(Psychological Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification): Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following: For S to be justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that all J-factors with respect to S and p be either necessary truths or propositions whose truth is determined by psychological facts about S.

STEUP'S ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge ó Degettierized Justified True Belief

Steup is an internalist about justification, not knowledge. Why?

STEUP'S ACCESS INTERNALISM ABOUT JUSTIFICATION

Epistemic justification is: (1) "nearly always" directly recognizable (Why "nearly always"); (2) deontological; (3) evidentialist.

What qualifies as evidence? "Perceptual, introspective, memorial states and states of rationally comprehending abstract matters, such as conceptual, arithmetical, or geometric connections, and of course beliefs."(314)

Why aren't causal connections also among the items on the list?

Is Steup too optimistic about direct recognizability?

Is Steup too optimistic about the truth-conduciveness of deontological justification?

PROBLEMS FOR INTERNALISM

1. What would be necessary to be able to determine on reflection whether a belief was justified? Can we do it?

2. If justification is nearly always transparent (directly recognizable on reflection), why is it so hard to find one's unjustified beliefs? Is it because we don't have any (or at least, not very many)?

The surprising answer from empirical psychology: Phenomena such as belief perseverance (discussed in the Stich article), the endowment effect, and other forms of motivated belief (discussed in the Gilovich excerpt) show that both justified and unjustified beliefs typically seem to be supported by good reasons from the inside. It usually requires external evidence to identify a person's unjustified beliefs.

BONJOUR'S EXTREME FORM OF ACCESS INTERNALISM

The Metajustificatory Requirement is in addition to the requirement of Access Internalism. Roughly, it is the requirement that those with epistemically justified beliefs be able to provide a non-question-begging answer to skeptical challenges. More precisely, it is the requirement: To be justified in believing that p, not only must one be able to show that one's belief that p satisfies certain epistemic standards (or criteria), one must also be able to show that those standards are truth conducive, that accepting beliefs in accordance with them is likely in the long run to lead to truth.

Gilovich on Biased Belief

(1) Cognitive ("Cold") Biases and Motivated ("Hot") Biases

(a) Cognitive: Availability Heuristic (Linda the bank teller)

(b) Motivated: Lake Woebegone Effect

(2) Kunda's Constraint on Biased Belief:

People's capacity to believe what they want to believe is constrained by their ability "to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if the can muster up the evidence necessary to support it." (Gilovich, 66)

(3) The Confirmation Bias: three aspects:

(1) Biased test: What evidence is there to support the (desired) belief?

(2) Biased selection of people to consult

(3) Biased end: "optional stopping".

(4) Studies of Depressives

Talbott's Addition to Gilovich:

Self-Serving Reasons

Consider a case in which a subject S believes that p. When asked for reasons, S produces beliefs r, s, and t, which stand in the correct logical or quasi-logical relations for justifying the belief that p. Is S's belief that p justified? There are two cases of interest:

(1) Good faith reasons. Beliefs r, s, and t are not due to bias. They are due to an impartial collection and evaluation of evidence. S's belief that p is justified.

(2) Self-serving reasons. The desire to believe that p is responsible (in part) for S's believing r, s, and t (e.g., via the confirmation bias or other such biases). That is, S probably would not have believed r and s and t, were it not for the fact that they could potentially justify p. In this case, the S's belief that p is not justified.