Haack's Foundherentism
I. The Evolution of Fancier Forms of
Foundationalism and Compromising Kinds of Coherentism
(a)
Strong vs. weak foundationalism
(b) Pure vs. impure foundationalism
(c)
Egalitarian vs. inegalitarian forms of coherentism
II. The Main Ideas of
Foundherentism:
(1)
Allows the relevance of experience to empirical justification without
postulating any privileged class of basic beliefs or requiring that relations
of support be essentially one directional.
(2)
Two kinds of constraints on rational belief:
experiential anchoring and explanatory integration.
III. Haack's
Solution to the Boundary Problem:
Justification is a Double Aspect Concept, Partly Causal and Partly
Logical.
IV. First
Formulation: "A is more or less
justified, at t, in believing that p, depending on how good his evidence
is."(285)
(a)
The Double Aspect of the Concept of Evidence:
(i) "his
evidence" is a causal notion;
(ii) "how good"
is a logical or quasi-logical notion.
V. Double Aspect of Belief: Belief as a state in causal relations with
other states (S-belief); belief as a proposition in logical or quasi-logical
relations with other propositions (C-belief).
VI. Causal Aspect of Evidence (S-Evidence for S-Beliefs): S-evidence includes beliefs and experience (not wishes, hopes, fears). S-evidence includes both sustaining and inhibiting factors. Experience includes perceptions, introspection, and memories of perceptions and introspections.
VII. Logical Aspect of
Evidence (C-Evidence for C-Beliefs):
(a)
Where Beliefs are C-Evidence for Other Beliefs, the Evidential Relation is a
Relation Between the C-Beliefs
(b)
Where Experience is C-Evidence for Beliefs (Experiential C-Evidence), the
Evidential Relation is a Relation Between a
Description of the Experience (Which the Subject may not Believe) and the
C-Beliefs.
VIII. How is Experiential
C-Evidence to be Described?
Format: "A is in the sort of perceptual state a
normal subject would be in when seeing this or that in these or those
circumstances."(287)
IX. The First
Circularity Problem: How Can There be
Mutual Support Without a Vicious Circle?
The Analogy of the Crossword Puzzle.
X. The Smith Brown Examples
[CORRECT
THE FIRST EXAMPLE]
XI. Three necessary
conditions for A to be justified in believing p:
(a) A has some C-evidence for p.
(b)
A's C-evidence for p includes some (direct or indirect) experiential
C-evidence.
(c)
A's C-evidence for p meets minimal conditions of supportiveness, independent
security, and comprehensiveness.
XII. Ratification of
Foundherentism (contrast with BonJour's Meta-Justificatory Requirement): The Epistemological Part of the Crossword
Puzzle
Haack's
Strong Claim: "If any truth
indication is possible for us, the foundherentist
criteria are truth-indicative"(246).
Does
she need to make such a strong claim to fill in the epistemological part of the
crossword puzzle?
(1)
Is her Foundherentism sufficiently holistic?
INDEPENDENT SECURITY:
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ATOMISTIC AND HOLISTIC COHERENCE IN A CROSSWORD
|
S |
H |
U |
F |
F |
L |
E |
|
|
|
|
|
A |
|
O |
|
A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
C |
A |
R |
I |
N |
G |
|
|
|
|
|
K |
|
E |
|
G |
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
|
N |
|
U |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
R |
|
S |
* |
A |
* |
* |
|
|
|
|
|
|
I |
|
G |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
S |
C |
R |
E |
A |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLUE: Begin
When all entries are single words, coherence can be understood atomistically, because each word gets significant independent support from the other entries.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
H |
|
P |
|
|
|
|
|
|
A |
M |
B |
R |
O |
S |
I |
A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
T |
|
R |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A |
|
S |
P |
I |
T |
|
|
F |
|
* |
V |
* |
R |
* |
H |
* |
T |
O |
* |
|
U |
|
|
O |
|
|
|
O |
|
|
M |
|
|
J |
U |
S |
T |
D |
O |
I |
T |
|
|
B |
|
|
I |
|
|
E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For
multi-word entries, atomistic coherence is not adequate, because the individual
words of a multi-word entry get little or no independent support. Holistic coherence can favor combinations of
words (beliefs) that have little or no independent support when considered
individually.
II. Haack's
solution to the Boundary Problem
(1) Which experiential states have
content? Why does ESP not count as
evidence on Haack's account?
(2) Because the subject need not have any
beliefs about the content of her evidence, the account is externalist. It could not provide an answer to a
philosophical skeptic. Is this a
problem?
(3) Is her account of the content of
experiential c-evidence adequate?
Haack's account of the content of experiential C-evidence has
implausible results in some circumstances.
Consider the red-green color-blind person S. Suppose S knows that red and grey are
different colors, but S has never seen anything red or grey before. T shows S a red wall and tells S that it is
red. What is the content of S's
experiential C-evidence looking at a red wall?
(1) I am in the sort of
perceptual state a normal subject would be in when seeing a GREY WALL in normal
lighting circumstances.
S also knows:
(2) Red is not the same color
as grey.
(3) T says that this is a red
wall.
Conclusion: Either T is not perceiving
normally or I am not perceiving normally.
But in this situation, S
would have no reason to believe that one of them was not
perceiving normally.
III.
The Second Circularity Problem: Is her
ratification of a theory of justification objectionably circular?
MACDOWELL'S HYBRID VIEW
KEY
IDEA (FROM KANT): "Thoughts without
content [from intuition] are empty; intuitions without concepts [from thought]
are blind."
CRUCIAL
CONTRASTS
|
Intuition |
Thought |
|
Content |
Concept |
|
Receptivity
(Passive) |
Spontaneity
(Active) |
|
Sensibility |
Understanding |
|
Input
(External
Rational Constraints on Belief) |
Reasoning
(Internal
Rational Constraints on Belief) |
|
The
Given (Foundationalism) |
Conceptual
scheme |
McDowell’s Kantian Hybrid
1. The foundationalist view of the Given as an unconceptualized
justifier.
2. The coherentist view
that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief”(Davidson).
3. McDowell’s Kantian Hybrid: Experience is both passive/receptive and
conceptual. Conceptual thinking must be
subject to “rational constraint from outside”(15).
Annis's Contextualism
(1) Contra Foundationalism: Denies there are basic statements or, if there were any, that they could justify the beliefs that we normally take to be justified.
(2)
Contra Coherentism:
Denies that coherence is sufficient for justification.
(3)
Being justified in holding a belief is being able to answer current objections
based on the current evidence available.
Objections must be expressions of real doubt (cf. Peirce and
Dewey), not an idle remark. Objections
are primarily local rather than global.
(4)
Two kinds of objections to S's claim that a statement h is true. We may object:
(A) that S is not
in a position to know that h or
(B) that h is
false.
(5)
Justification depends on the issue context.
(a) The issue context determines the level of
understanding and knowledge that S must exhibit and the appropriate objector
group.
(b) The issue context includes the importance of
accepting h when it is false or rejecting h when it is true.
(c) The issue context includes the current
social practices and norms of justification.
(6)
Annis's Contextualism
requires only contextually basic beliefs.
What are contextually basic beliefs?
(1)
Is Annis's Contextualism
too demanding? No, justified beliefs do
not have to be true:
(a) The example of Jones the partygoer and Jones the
police officer.
(b) The example of Jones returning the book to
Smith's twin brother.
(c) The example of the two scientists with
conflicting experimental results.
(2)
Is Annis's Contextualism a
form of relativism?
According to Annis, are there any universal non-context-relative constraints on justification?
Problem: The example of the Soothsayers Community.
(3) Is Annis's Contextualism a theory of how we show that our beliefs are justified rather than a theory of what makes them justified?