GETTIER COUNTEREXAMPLES

 

 

K ó JTB

 

(a) K à JTB

 

(b) JTBà K

 

If the Gettier counterexamples are successful, which claim of implication is false? 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONDITIONS ON KNOWLEDGE

 

Internal Conditions:  Belief

       What makes this condition internal?

 

External Conditions:  Truth

       What makes this condition external?

 

What other necessary conditions are there?

 

EXTERNALISM = All the other necessary conditions are external conditions.

 

INTERNALISM = At least one additional necessary condition is internal.  [We will consider various definitions of "internal".]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION?

 

K ó XTB, where X is an external condition (not a justification-condition).  What is X?

 

The Main Idea of Goldman's Answers: 

World-to-Belief Reliability

 

Goldman's first answer:  The Causal Analysis:  that the subject's belief that p be causally connected to the fact or state of affairs that p. 

Problem:  The Barn Example.

 

Goldman's second answer:  The Distinguishability or Discriminability Analysis:  "there are no relevant counterfactual situations in which the same belief would be produced via an equivalent percept and in which the belief would be false."(151)

How does this handle the Barn Example?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Talbott's Simplification of Goldman's Conditions for Non-Inferential Perceptual Knowledge (cf. p. 150)

 

For S to have a non-inferential perceptual knowledge that p on the basis of percept P:

(1) p must be perceivable;

(2) p must be true;

(3)(A) Percept P must be caused by S's perceptual environment;

    (B) Percept P must noninferentially cause S to believe (or sustain the belief) that p;

    (C) There must be no relevant alternative q, such that if q were true:

(i) S would have a percept P* perceptually equivalent to P (from which it follows that S would noninferentially believe that p);

and (ii) p would not be true.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GOLDMAN'S EXTERNALIST ACCOUNT OF JUSTIFICATION

 

K ó XJTB

 

THE GOAL:  J ó [non-epistemic necessary and sufficient conditions that are appropriately deep or revelatory]

 

THE KEY IDEA:  Justification = being caused (or causally sustained) in an appropriate way 

 

Examples of inappropriate causes:  confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization. 

Examples of appropriate causes:  perception, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection. 

What is the difference?  Reliability.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Goldman's Analysis of Justification as

Belief-to-World Reliability

 

Base Clause (Unconditional Reliability Condition) = Being caused by an unconditionally reliable belief independent cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes). 

 

Recursion Clause (Conditional Reliability Condition) = Being caused by a conditionally reliable belief-dependent cognitive belief-forming process, where the input beliefs to the process are themselves justified.

 

The "Available Process" Qualification to Both Clauses:  There is no other reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S would have resulted in S's not believing that p at t. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Against Externalism

 

Lehrer's general objection to all versions of externalism:  A person who has no idea that her beliefs are caused or causally sustained by a reliable belief-forming process or who has no idea that she would not have believed what she did had it not been true might fail to know because of her ignorance of this.

 

Lehrer's Mr. Truetemp Example

(Compare BonJour on the "cognitive thermometer".)

 

Cohen's Use of the Cartesian Demon

 

How would Goldman reply?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TWO KINDS OF INTERNALISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

 

Call any condition that is necessary for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at time t) a J-factor with respect to S and p (at t). 

 

(Access Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification):  Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following:  For S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that S have reflective access to the holding of all J-factors with respect to S and p (at t).  (For example, Steup requires that whether we are justified or not in believing that p be recognizable on reflection, at least  "nearly always".) 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

       (Psychological Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification):  Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following:  For S to be justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that all J-factors with respect to S and p be either necessary truths or propositions whose truth is determined by psychological facts about S.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STEUP'S ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

 

Knowledge ó Degettierized Justified True Belief

 

Steup is an internalist about justification, not knowledge.  Why?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STEUP'S ACCESS INTERNALISM ABOUT JUSTIFICATION

 

Epistemic justification is:  (1) "nearly always" directly recognizable (Why "nearly always"); (2) deontological; (3) evidentialist. 

 

What qualifies as evidence?  "Perceptual, introspective, memorial states and states of rationally comprehending abstract matters, such as conceptual, arithmetical, or geometric connections, and of course beliefs."(314)

 

Why aren't causal connections also among the items on the list? 

 

Is Steup too optimistic about direct recognizability?

 

Is Steup too optimistic about the truth-conduciveness of deontological justification?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PROBLEMS FOR INTERNALISM

 

1.  What would be necessary to be able to determine on reflection whether a belief was justified?  Can we do it?

 

2.  If justification is nearly always transparent (directly recognizable on reflection), why is it so hard to find one's unjustified beliefs?  Is it because we don't have any (or at least, not very many)?

 

The surprising answer from empirical psychology:  Phenomena such as belief perseverance (discussed in the Stich article), the endowment effect, and other forms of motivated belief (discussed in the Gilovich excerpt) show that both justified and unjustified beliefs typically seem to be supported by good reasons from the inside.  It usually requires external evidence to identify a person's unjustified beliefs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BONJOUR'S EXTREME FORM OF

ACCESS INTERNALISM

 

 

       The Metajustificatory Requirement is in addition to the requirement of Access Internalism.  Roughly, it is the requirement that those with epistemically justified beliefs be able to provide a non-question-begging answer to skeptical challenges.  More precisely, it is the requirement:  To be justified in believing that p, not only must one be able to show that one's belief that p satisfies certain epistemic standards (or criteria), one must also be able to show that those standards are truth conducive, that accepting beliefs in accordance with them is likely in the long run to lead to truth.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gilovich on Biased Belief

 

(1) Cognitive ("Cold") Biases and Motivated ("Hot") Biases

       (a) Cognitive:  Availability Heuristic (Linda the bank teller)

       (b) Motivated:  Lake Woebegone Effect

 

(2) Kunda's Constraint on Biased Belief:

       People's capacity to believe what they want to believe is constrained by their ability "to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if the can muster up the evidence necessary to support it." (Gilovich, 66)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(3) The Confirmation Bias:  three aspects:

       (1) Biased test:  What evidence is there to support the (desired) belief?

       (2) Biased selection of people to consult

       (3) Biased end:  "optional stopping".

 

(4) Studies of Depressives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Talbott's Addition to Gilovich:

Self-Serving Reasons

 

       Consider a case in which a subject S believes that p.  When asked for reasons, S produces beliefs r, s, and t, which stand in the correct logical or quasi-logical relations for justifying the belief that p.  Is S's belief that p justified?  There are two cases of interest:

       (1) Good faith reasons.  Beliefs r, s, and t are not due to bias.  They are due to an impartial collection and evaluation of evidence.  S's belief that p is justified.

       (2) Self-serving reasons.  The desire to believe that p is responsible (in part) for S's believing r, s, and t (e.g., via the confirmation bias or other such biases).  That is, S probably would not have believed r and s and t, were it not for the fact that they could potentially justify p.  In this case, the S's belief that p is not justified.

       Consider the example of Dr. Robert Bean reported by Stephen Jay Gould.

 

 

 

 

 

       Talbott's Argument Against Internalism About Justification:  Given any internalist constraints on justification, it is possible for biases to produce a set of self-serving beliefs that satisfy those constraints.  But self-serving beliefs are not justified.  So there must be a non-internalist constraint on justification.