(a) K à JTB


(b) JTBà K


#1:  Smith gets the job.


#2  Brown goes to Barcelona


If the Gettier counterexamples are successful, which claim of implication is false? 
















Internal Conditions:  Belief

       What makes this condition internal?

(We will define this more precisely later.)


External Conditions:  Truth

       What makes this condition external?


What other necessary conditions are there?


EXTERNALISM = All the other necessary conditions are external conditions.


INTERNALISM = At least one additional necessary condition is internal.  [We will consider various definitions of "internal".]













K ó XTB, where X is an external condition (not a justification-condition).  What is X?


Goldman’s First Proposal:  A causal connection between the fact that p and the subject’s belief that p.


The example of perception, memory, and inference.




















A Problem for the Goldman’s First Proposal:

The Barn Example.


Goldman’s Response:

Begin with Perceptual Knowledge.  Make an addition to the Causal Condition


PK[Perceptual Knowledge] ó XTB


X = Causal Condition + Discriminability Condition


The Discriminability Condition for perceptual knowledge [This is a subjunctive condition]:  "there are no relevant counterfactual situations in which the same belief would be produced via an equivalent percept and in which the belief would be false."(151)

How does this handle the Barn Example?













Talbott's Simplification of Goldman's Conditions for Non-Inferential Perceptual Knowledge (cf. p. 150)


For S to have a non-inferential perceptual knowledge that p on the basis of percept P:

(1) p must be perceivable;

(2) p must be true;

(3)(A) Percept P must be caused by S's perceptual environment;

    (B) Percept P must noninferentially cause S to believe (or sustain the belief) that p;

    (C) There must be no relevant alternative q, such that if q were true:

(i) S would have a percept P* perceptually equivalent to P (from which it follows that S would noninferentially believe that p);

and (ii) p would not be true.







(1) Swain’s example of the candle at the end of the hall.


(2) The example of Henry and the papier-maché barn facsimiles.


(3) The example of the twins, Judy and Trudy.


(4) The example of Oscar and Dack the dachshund.



Goldman acknowledges that there are still some potential problems. They will lead him to an externalist justification condition.

















X = World-to-Belief Reliability Condition [a subjunctive condition] (Philosophical Explanations): 


World-to-Belief (W-to-B) Reliability:  A subject S’s belief B has World-to-Belief reliability just in case it is true and if it had been false, the subject would not have believed it.


Explain World-to-Belief Reliability by giving an example of someone who has a belief with W-to-B Reliability (and explain the example).



Both Goldman and Nozick proposed their conditions as replacements for the justified belief condition.


Later Goldman proposed an externalist account of the justification condition.






THE GOAL:  J ó [non-epistemic necessary and sufficient conditions that are appropriately deep or revelatory]


Failed proposals for the base clause:


(1) Truth guarantees belief:  Chisholm's self-presenting states.

(a) The example of the surgeon who artificially induces brain state B (which includes the belief of being in brain state B).

(b) "I am awake".


(2) Belief guarantees truth:  infallible or incorrigible beliefs.

The examples of Nelson and Humperdink. 


What are all of these examples supposed to show?  Answer:  Whether a belief is justified depends on how it is caused.




THE KEY IDEA OF GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT:  Justification = being caused (or causally sustained) in an appropriate way 


Examples of inappropriate causes:  confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization. 

Examples of appropriate causes:  perception, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection. 

What is the difference?  Reliability.


















Goldman's Analysis of Justification as

Belief-to-World Reliability


This is a condition of Belief-to-World (B-to-W Reliability):  Given only that S’s belief that p is due to process r, it is probable that p is true.


Base Clause (Unconditional Reliability Condition) = Being caused by an unconditionally reliable belief independent cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes). 


Recursion Clause (Conditional B-to-W Reliability Condition) = Being caused by a conditionally reliable belief-dependent cognitive belief-forming process, where the input beliefs to the process are themselves justified.


Goldman's is a historical theory, not a current time-slice theory. 


What if wishful thinking were reliable?  Goldman's move to explaining our beliefs about justification (rather than giving an analysis of "justification"). 




The "Available Process" Qualification to Both Clauses:  There is no other reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it been used by S would have resulted in S's not believing that p at t. 

       The example of Jones who is told by his parents that his actual memories are pseudo-memories.


Note:  What does Goldman's account imply for the beliefs of non-human animals and young children?  Can they have justified beliefs?





















X = World-to-Belief Reliability

JX = Belief-to-World Reliability


S knows that p iff:

       (1) S believes that p

       (2) S’s belief that p is W-to-B reliable.

       (3) S’s belief that p is due to a process r that is B-to-W reliable.

       (4) p is true.


This would be an externalist account of knowledge.  Why?













Against Externalism


Lehrer's general objection to all versions of externalism:  “A person who has no idea that her beliefs are caused or causally sustained by a reliable belief-forming process or who has no idea that she would not have believed what she did had it not been true might fail to know because of her ignorance of that”(279).


Lehrer's example of Mr. Truetemp and the tempucomp.

(Compare BonJour on the "cognitive thermometer".)


Cohen's Use of the Cartesian Demon


How would Goldman reply?


Lehrer also argues that justification does not depend on causal relations:  The example of Mr. Raco.  Do you agree with his conclusion about this example?








Call any condition that is necessary for a subject S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at time t) a J-factor with respect to S and p (at t). 


(Access Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification):  Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following:  For S to be epistemically justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that S have reflective access to the holding of all J-factors with respect to S and p (at t).  (For example, Steup requires that whether we are justified or not in believing that p be recognizable on reflection, at least "nearly always".) 



       Unless I specify otherwise, I will follow the literature and use “internalism” unqualified to refer to “access internalism”.







Knowledge ó Degettierized Justified True Belief


What kind of knowledge is Steup interested in?  [Hint:  Is it the kind of knowledge that young children and some other animals might have?]


Degettierization is an external condition.  Does that make Steup an externalist about knowledge?





















Epistemic justification is: 

(1) internalist:  "nearly always" directly recognizable—that is, recognizable on reflection;

(2) deontological (What is our epistemic duty?);

WE WILL IGNORE THE DOXASTIC INVOLUNTARISM OBJECTION THAT STEUP DISCUSSES ON PP. 315-318.  Steup’s epistemic deontology is based on an analogy between belief and action.  The analogy does not have to be perfect (no analogy is) to be useful.

(3) evidentialist:  Believe in accordance with our evidence. 


What qualifies as evidence?  "Perceptual, introspective, memorial states and states of rationally comprehending abstract matters, such as conceptual, arithmetical, or geometric connections, and of course beliefs."(314)


Why aren't causal connections also among the items on the list? 





Why is justification directly recognizable only “almost always”?  Exceptions:  culpable ignorance, conflicting reasons, and deformed (epistemic) character.



Is Steup too optimistic about direct recognizability?


Is Steup correct that we can recognize beliefs caused by wishful thinking on reflection?


Is Steup too optimistic about the truth-conduciveness of deontological justification?  Consider what he says in response to Alston’s cultural isolation objection.  Are the following flaws of reasoning directly recognizable: generalizing from small and non-representative samples, jumping to conclusions, trusting false authorities, and ignoring relevant background information?













       BonJour places two constraints on an epistemological theory:

       (1) Standards of Epistemic Justification:  To identify the standards of epistemic justification.  For BonJour, these standards must be internalist, in the access-internalist sense (with a qualification to be added shortly). 

       (2) Metajustificatory requirement:  To provide a metajustification for the standards themselves—that is, a showing “that the standards in question are genuinely conducive to the cognitive goal of truth”(9).  The meta-justification must be completely a priori. 


       The Metajustificatory Requirement is in addition to the requirement of Access Internalism.  Roughly, it is the requirement that those with epistemically justified beliefs be able to provide a non-question-begging answer to skeptical challenges. 









1.  What would be necessary to be able to determine on reflection whether a belief was justified?  Can we do it?


2.  If justification is nearly always transparent (directly recognizable on reflection), why is it so hard to find one's unjustified beliefs?  Is it because we don't have any (or at least, not very many)?



















Gilovich on Biased Belief


(1) Cognitive ("Cold") Biases and Motivated ("Hot") Biases

       (a) Cognitive:  Availability Heuristic (Linda the bank teller)

       (b) Motivated:  Lake Woebegone Effect


(2) Kunda's Constraint on Biased Belief:

       People's capacity to believe what they want to believe is constrained by their ability "to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if the can muster up the evidence necessary to support it." (Gilovich, 66)














(3) The Confirmation Bias:  three aspects:

       (1) Biased test:  What evidence is there to support the (desired) belief?

       (2) Biased selection of people to consult

       (3) Biased end:  "optional stopping".

       (4) Framing of the test:  Does the evidence permit believing (a desired belief) p vs. does the evidence compel believing (an undesired belief) q.


(4) Studies of Depressives


(5) Social Biases:  The Social Aspect of Epistemic Justification:  The example of history teaching.



You should be able to explain the following:

(1) belief perseverance

(2) the endowment effect

(3) the Lake Woebegone Effect

(4) the four aspects of the confirmation bias


How does the capital punishment experiment illustrate the confirmation bias?






Talbott's Addition to Gilovich:

Self-Serving Reasons


       Consider a case in which a subject S believes that p.  When asked for reasons, S produces beliefs r, s, and t, which stand in the correct logical or quasi-logical relations for justifying the belief that p.  Is S's belief that p justified?  There are two cases of interest:

       (1) Good faith reasons.  Beliefs r, s, and t are not due to bias.  They are due to an impartial collection and evaluation of evidence.  S's belief that p is justified.

       (2) Self-serving reasons.  The desire to believe that p is responsible (in part) for S's believing r, s, and t (e.g., via the confirmation bias or other such biases).  That is, S probably would not have believed r and s and t, were it not for the fact that they could potentially justify p.  In this case, the S's belief that p is not justified.

       Consider Talbott’s example of the racist White supremacist.

       Consider Lehrer’s example of Mr. Raco.





       Why biased belief and self-serving beliefs are a problem for Access Internalism About Justification:  Given any access internalist constraints on justification, it is possible for biases to produce a set of self-serving beliefs that satisfy those constraints.  But if self-serving beliefs are not justified, there must be a non-access-internalist constraint on justification.



Recall BonJour’s cognitive sanity condition on a priori justification.  (BonJour later adds a
Dogmatism and Bias” condition.)
  Explain why that is an externalist condition on justification.  Explain why, on BonJour’s account, we could never be justified in believing that we satisfy that condition.


Are our biases internally correctable?  The surprising results from empirical psychology:  Most of the biases recognized in the psychological literature were discovered by observations of others (in psychological experiments), not by introspection.  Self-serving beliefs cannot be discovered by introspection, because, from the inside, they look like justified beliefs.





Another kind of internalism about justification:


       (Psychological Internalism Concerning Epistemic Justification):  Any adequate theory of epistemic justification must imply the following:  For S to be justified in believing that p (at t), it is necessary that all J-factors with respect to S and p be either necessary truths or propositions whose truth is determined by psychological facts about S.  [The reliability of a cognitive process is not a psychological fact about S.]