COHERENTISM
I. Dancy's Coherence
Theory of Justification
1.
Justification is symmetric
Why is justification asymmetric for the
Foundationalist?
What does a coherence theory look like from
the point of view of the regress problem?
[See Fumerton (216).] Why is this a mistaken way of thinking about
a coherence theory?
Why is the notion of inference
asymmetrical?
2.
A set of beliefs is coherent to the extent that the members are mutually
explanatory and consistent.
3.
The full account: If a's belief
set is more coherent with the belief that p as a member than without it or with
any alternative, a is (or would be) justified in
believing that p.
Why is this account of justification
holistic?
II. Dancy's
Coherence Theory of Truth:
A proposition is true ó It is a member of a
coherent set.
The plurality objection.
Fumerton argues that this makes truth relative (217).
Why not combine the Coherence Theory of
Justification with the Correspondence Theory of Truth?
Fumerton’s Objections to a
Coherence Theory of Justification
1. Fumerton argues that on a coherence
theory of justification is arbitrary.
Why?
2. Fumerton also
argues that we must distinguish between the coherence of a set of beliefs and the subject’s apprehension of that
coherence. What is this problem?
3. Fumerton argues that justification does not require logical
consistency: the Lottery Paradox.
But the biggest problem of all is
this:
III. The Input Problem
for Coherence Theories of Empirical Justification
According to the coherentist,
empirical justification is solely a product of relations of mutual support
among beliefs. So for the coherentist, empirical justification does not require any
connection to the way the world actually is.
But there are many different coherent sets of propositions that are
incompatible with each other. Coherentism provides no rational basis for preferring any
of them over any of the others. But it
is hard to see how empirical justification could be this disconnected from the
real world. For empirical beliefs to be
justified, it seems necessary that there be some appropriate process by which
the world can affect those beliefs. This
would be an additional constraint on empirical justification, in addition to
any coherence considerations.
III. Dancy's
Reply: Antecedent and subsequent
security
Pure coherentism
vs. weak coherentism
(Is
weak coherentism a form of foundationalism?)
Genetic asymmetry vs. justificatory
asymmetry
Justificatory symmetry: Equal antecedent security for all beliefs
What is Dancy's
final response to the Input Problem?
The coherentist can be an empiricist. Is this correct?
What would Dancy
say about Fumerton's example of back pain?
IV. The Problem of Too
Much Coherence: Berkeley’s Theory of
Perception or the Paranoid Schizophrenic
Perhaps the coherence theory is not a
complete theory of justification.
Perhaps it is only a theory of reasoning. The claim would be that all reasoning fits an
equilibrium model.
If this is true, then, on the usual
understanding of the term, there are, reasoning is not inferential. Strictly
speaking, there are no inferences.
Inferences are one way. Reasoning is
multi-directional.