The Feature-φ Argument Applied to Talbott's Reconstruction of Chisholm

Consider my belief about my current apparent perception:

APWC = I am having an apparent perception of a white chair.

The Foundationalist account of my justification:

Apparent perception is a strongly self-presenting state. It is rational for me to be certain of APW. Therefore, my belief that APW is a basic empirical belief.

The Meta-Justificatory Requirement for the basic empirical (i.e., foundational) beliefs

I need an argument that beliefs about strongly self-presenting states are likely to be true.

(i)(a) I believe APWC

(i)(b) APWC is a description of a strongly self-presenting state.

(ii) Strongly self-presenting states are such that whenever someone believes that they are in a strongly self-presenting state, the belief is true.

Conclusion: Therefore, my belief APWC is certain to be true.

If my justification for believing APWC depends on the metajustificatory argument, then my belief APWC is NOT a basic empirical (i.e., a foundational) belief. Why not?

Why will the Foundationalist object to BonJour's Meta-Justificatory Requirement for basic empirical (or foundational) beliefs?