PHIL 450

End of Class Questions

Sept. 26, 2007: Consider the following proposition: TB à K. Is it true? Explain.

Sept. 28, 2007: Use examples to explain the difference between top-down and bottom-up reasoning in epistemology.

Oct. 1, 2007: Explain why seeming to see a chair is a strongly self-presenting state.

Oct. 3, 2007: Explain what makes Chisholm's epistemology foundationalist.

Oct. 5, 2007: What is the Givenist's Dilemma?

Oct. 8, 2007: What is the difference between a coherence theory of justification and a coherence theory of truth?

Oct. 10, 2007: As you are looking at the wall in Condon 135 today, what, according to Haack, is the content of your C-experience (i.e., your experiential C-evidence)?

Oct. 12, 2007: What part of Haack's theory are students most likely to misunderstand in their papers?

Oct. 15, 2007: Why does Haack specify the content of C-experience in terms of what a normal perceiver would perceive?

Oct. 17, 2007: Explain why almost any statement can be contextually basic in the sense in which Annis uses the term.

Oct. 19, 2007: Give an example from Kant of a statement that he regards as analytic and explain why he thinks it is analytic.

Oct. 22, 2007: Give the best example you can of something that is justified a priori.

Oct. 24, 2007: Test of a priori insight.

Oct. 26, 2007: What determines which reasoning is good reasoning? Explain.

Oct. 29, 2007: Midterm take-home exam. No end-of-class question.

Oct. 31, 2007: No end-of-class question.

Nov. 2, 2007: Use an example to explain world-to-belief reliability.

Nov. 5, 2007: Use an example to explain belief-to-world reliability.

Nov. 7, 20007: Explain the example of Mr. Truetemp without drawing any epistemological conclusions about it. Just summarize the important facts.

Nov. 9, 2007: Consider a racist who has forgotten all evidence against his racist beliefs and remembers only evidence that supports them. When asked for his reasons for those beliefs, he sincerely gives all of his evidence and all of it supports his racist beliefs. Are those beliefs epistemically justified? Explain.

Nov. 14, 2007: Explain the two elements of a complete theory of empirical justification for BonJour and identify the internalist constraint on each element.

Nov. 16, 2007: Explain the Lake Woebegone Effect.

Nov. 19, 2007: None.

Nov. 21, 2007: None.

Nov. 26, 2007: According to BonJour, why can the naturalized epistemologist not be justified in believing that there are reasons for his/her view?

Nov. 28, 2007: What was Kant's Copernican Revolution in epistemology?

Nov. 30, 2007: How would a naturalist respond to Talbott's theory of sensitivity to universal concepts or universal principles of good reasoning?