Moore on Defining "Good"

Why does Moore focus on "good" rather than "right"?

What is a "verbal" definition?

What kind of definition is Moore seeking? What does he mean by "describe the real nature of the object or notion"(52)?

What is the difference between a simple notion and a complex notion?

Two Analogies

What is the analogy between "good" and "yellow" according to Moore? Can you think of any disanalogies?

What is the analogy between "good" and "pleasure" according to Moore? Can you think of any disanalogies?

The So-Called "Naturalistic Fallacy[WJT1] "

What is a natural property? What is a non-natural property?

Moore's argument can be extended to any purely descriptive property (The "Descriptivist" Fallacy).

Moore thinks something is a mistake.

What is it?

Two possibilities:

Suppose someone says "Good = pleasure"

If they are providing a definition, they have said the same thing as "Pleasure = pleasure".

But we can see that they have not said the same thing, because if we ask:

Is pleasure pleasure? This question is not an open question.

Whereas if we ask: Is pleasure good? This question is an open question.

The argument has four steps:

(1) When an identity (e.g., A = A) is turned into a question, the question (e.g., Is an A an A?) is closed, not open.

(2) When a definition is substituted for one of the terms in an identity and the result is turned into a question, the question (e.g., Is a bachelor an unmarried man) is closed, not open.

(3) Whenever a naturalistic (or purely descriptive) term is substituted for the first occurrence of "good" in "Is good good?", the result (e.g., Is pleasure good?) is ALWAYS an open question, never a CLOSED question.

(4) Therefore, there is no naturalistic (or purely descriptive) definition for "good".

depends on the claim that when you substitute a definition for one of the terms of an identity,

Another example: "Good = that which we desire to desire"

Suppose we desire to desire A. The following is still an open question: Is it good to desire to desire A?

What does Moore's argument actually show?

Does it show that there cannot be naturalistic (or purely descriptive) necessary and sufficient conditions for "good"?

How would Moore answer the Normative Question?

Boyd's Naturalist Moral Realism:

The Analogy to Science

Boyd's aim is to "establish that moral realism is plausible and defensible"(121).

Boyd's Homeostatic Consequentialism

1. Important human goods understood naturalistically.

2. These human good are homeostatically clustered.

3. Moral goodness is defined by this cluster of goods and the homeostatic mechanisms which unify them. (Note 2: the homeostatic mechanisms are social.)

4. Homeostatic unity tends to mitigate conflicts between various individual goods.

The Role Of Reflective Equilibrium Reasoning In Both Science And Ethics

(1) For reflective equilibrium reasoning to be successful, we must start out with beliefs that are approximately true. Is this condition satisfied in ethics[WJT2] ?

What about the fact that there are many different and conflicting religious foundations for morals? (What is the analogy to Darwinism[WJT3] ?)

Why does Boyd think that our beliefs about the good would have to be at least approximately true[WJT4] ?

(2) For reflective equilibrium reasoning to operate, there must be something in ethics that plays the role of observation in science. What is it?

Boyd emphasizes that in ethics, as in science, "the theory dependence of observations and their interpretation"(124).

Also, moral intuitions, like scientific intuitions, are "a species of trained judgment"(125).

(3) We must be able to explain why moral properties require natural rather than conventional definitions.

What is a conventional definition?

What is a natural definition? Example: Water = H₂O.

What is the difference between conventional and natural definitions? Natural definitions must be discovered a posteriori. Why does Boyd think that "good" requires a natural definition[WJT5] ?

What is Boyd's response to Moore?

(4) Our ordinary moral terms must provide us with access to moral properties.

This is understood in terms of reference, not definition[WJT6] .

Are significant mistakes possible? The analogy to the Newtonian structure of space-time.

(5) Indeterminacy. How does Boyd explain hard cases and divergent views?

Disanalogies Between Science and Ethics

1. The Normative Question: Can natural facts be necessarily motivating?

What is Boyd's reply? The motivational role of sympathy.

2. The Necessity of Morality: Scientific laws are not necessarily true. Are moral laws necessarily true?