Varieties of Realism
and Anti-Realism
1. Moral Realism and Anti-Realism (e.g., Moderate Humeanism)
Moral Realism (MR):
There are normative truths about what one morally ought or ought not to
do. (There is some disagreement among
moral realists on whether or not these truths depend on one's situation). These truths apply to all rational beings (at
least, when they are in relevantly similar situations).
Moral Anti-Realism (MAR):
There are no normative truths about what one morally ought or ought not
to do. (The advocate of MAR typically
provides an explanation of why it seems to us that there are such truths).
2. Practical Reason
Realism and Anti-Realism
Practical Reason Realism (PRR): There are normative truths about what it is
rational to do (which typically depend on one's situation). These truths apply to all rational beings (in
relevantly similar situations).
Practical Reason Anti-Realism (PRAR) (Extreme Humeanism): There
are no normative truths about what it is rational to do. (The advocate of PRAR typically provides an
explanation of why it seems to us that there are such truths.) PRAR implies MAR.
3. Theoretical Reason
Realism and Anti-Realism
Theoretical Reason Realism (TRR): There are normative truths about what it is rational
to believe (which typically depend on one's situation). These truths apply to all rational beings (in
relevantly similar situations).
Theoretical Reason Anti-Realism (TRAR): There are no normative truths about what it
is rational to believe. (The advocate of
TRAR typically provides an explanation of why it seems to us that there are
such truths.)
4. Normative
Anti-Realism (NAR): There are no
normative truths. NAR implies TRAR,
PRAR, and MAR.
OBJECTIVE
PRESCRIPTIVITY
AND OBJECTIVE VALUES
A. Non-Moral Properties
Objective Non-Moral To-Be-Pursuedness
[or Not-To-Be-Pursuedness]: This would be a property of goals that it
would be irrational, though not necessarily immoral, not to pursue [or to
pursue] or a non-moral constraint on the goals to be pursued. For example the Strong or Weak Norm of
Transitivity is a potential norm of Non-Moral To-Be-Pursuedness,
because it is a rational constraint on preferences (goals).
Objective Non-Moral To-Be-Doneness [or
Not-To-Be-Doneness]: This would be a
property of actions that it would be irrational, though not necessarily
immoral, to fail to perform [or to perform], in the appropriate
circumstances. For example, the
Instrumentalist Norm is a potential norm of non-moral to-be-doneness.
B. Moral Properties
Objective Moral To-Be-Pursuedness
[or Not-To-Be-Pursuedness]: This would be property of goals that everyone
morally should [or should not] pursue.
For example, act utilitarians believe that the
goal of maximizing overall utility is a moral goal that everyone should pursue.
Objective Moral To-Be-Doneness [or Not-To-Be-Doneness]: This would be a property of actions that
everyone morally should perform [or should not perform]. For example, Kant thought that his
categorical imperative was a moral norm that all rational agents should obey,
regardless of whether they had any inclination to do so.
C. Epistemological
Properties
Objective To-Be-Believedness
[Not-To-Be-Believedness]: This would be a property
beliefs that everyone should believe [or should not believe] in the
appropriate circumstances. For example, Occam's Razor is a potential norm
of to-be-believedness.