Potential Objections to Korsgaard, Lecture 3:
1. The Relativity Problem. Morality depends on
self-identity/self-conception.
Eugenics: involuntary
sterilization.
Maxim survives reflection
because it is in accordance with their self-identity.
(a) Different cultural understandings of morality.
(b) Reflective psychopaths.
Al Harris example.
2. Integrity.
Is integrity maintaining self-identity?
3. Difference between categorical imperative and
moral law.
4. A good maxim is an intrinsically normative
entity. Is this a version of substantive
realism?
5. Can I make a mistake about which acts are
consistent with my identity? What about rationalization, if it convinces
us? Is that enough to survive reflective
endorsement? Most people reflectively
endorse what they do, even if others would think that what they did was
wrong. For example,
stealing from the rich.
or the "slightly more attractive sensible
knave".
6. Can there be better and worse reflective
ability?
7. Obligations and self-identity. Some choices involve loss of identity no
matter what is done. Is there a right choice? If so, what determines it?
8. Is it ever permissible to value valuers by killing them?
9. What about euthanasia for humans with severe
brain impairments, severe enough to lose the capacity for reflective
endorsement? What about young children
with birth defects that make them ugly?
Is reflective endorsement necessary for identity?
10. Can you have changes in identity that you on
reflection reject?
11. Trolley problems: Can you justify swerving the trolley to hit
an old evil person to save a young good person?
Issue is: valuing one valuer over another.
12. Is there a basis on which we could say that
someone is evil?
13. Could someone reflectively endorse doing
something because it will stop them from being a reflective endorser?
14. Paternalism.
Forcible conversions. Is this a case of failing to value valuers as a valuer?
What if a valuer has a pathological or
unhealthy self-identity?
15. Question about
first-person point of view. Consider two
people who disagree about what is justified?
How to determine which one is making a mistake, or are they both
right? One kind of disagreement would
be a moral disagreement.
16. Is Korsgaard's
account of autonomy as reflective endorsement adequate? Suppose someone needs to be compelled to go
through detox and commits a crime with the result
that they are ordered into detox. After detox, they
have changed their identity. This raises
a similar issue to Chinese "reeducation" camps. Or what about Hare Krishna
and deprogramming. Are all these
people autonomous? If not, what's the
difference?
17. Consider the example in 16. Suppose they commit the crime with the
intention of being ordered into detox.
18. Moral obligation and self-identity. Since she allows for
exceptions. How many exceptions
are required to lose our moral self-identity?