Potential Objections to Korsgaard, Lecture 3:

 

1.  The Relativity Problem.  Morality depends on self-identity/self-conception.  Eugenics:  involuntary sterilization.

Maxim survives reflection because it is in accordance with their self-identity.

       (a) Different cultural understandings of morality.

       (b) Reflective psychopaths.  Al Harris example.

 

2.  Integrity.  Is integrity maintaining self-identity? 

 

3.  Difference between categorical imperative and moral law.

 

4.  A good maxim is an intrinsically normative entity.  Is this a version of substantive realism? 

 

5.  Can I make a mistake about which acts are consistent with my identity?   What about rationalization, if it convinces us?  Is that enough to survive reflective endorsement?  Most people reflectively endorse what they do, even if others would think that what they did was wrong.   For example, stealing from the rich. 

or the "slightly more attractive sensible knave".

 

6.  Can there be better and worse reflective ability?

 

7.  Obligations and self-identity.  Some choices involve loss of identity no matter what is done.   Is there a right choice?  If so, what determines it?

 

8.  Is it ever permissible to value valuers by killing them? 

 

9.  What about euthanasia for humans with severe brain impairments, severe enough to lose the capacity for reflective endorsement?  What about young children with birth defects that make them ugly? 

       Is reflective endorsement necessary for identity?

 

10.  Can you have changes in identity that you on reflection reject?

 

11.  Trolley problems:  Can you justify swerving the trolley to hit an old evil person to save a young good person?  Issue is:  valuing one valuer over another.

 

12.  Is there a basis on which we could say that someone is evil? 

 

13.  Could someone reflectively endorse doing something because it will stop them from being a reflective endorser?

 

14.  Paternalism.  Forcible conversions.  Is this a case of failing to value valuers as a valuer?

       What if a valuer has a pathological or unhealthy self-identity? 

 

15. Question about first-person point of view.  Consider two people who disagree about what is justified?  How to determine which one is making a mistake, or are they both right?   One kind of disagreement would be a moral disagreement. 

 

16.  Is Korsgaard's account of autonomy as reflective endorsement adequate?  Suppose someone needs to be compelled to go through detox and commits a crime with the result that they are ordered into detox.  After detox, they have changed their identity.  This raises a similar issue to Chinese "reeducation" camps.  Or what about Hare Krishna and deprogramming.  Are all these people autonomous?  If not, what's the difference?   

 

17.  Consider the example in 16.  Suppose they commit the crime with the intention of being ordered into detox. 

 

18.  Moral obligation and self-identity.  Since she allows for exceptions.  How many exceptions are required to lose our moral self-identity?