Williams on Internal and External Reasons
1. Subjective Motivational Set (SMS) = desires,
dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties
and commitments.
2. Sound Deliberative Route. For Williams, practical reasoning includes instrumental
reasoning, but also includes other kinds of reasoning, including: thinking how the satisfaction of elements in
S can be combined; resolving conflicts of motivation; and finding constitutive
solutions.
3. Internal Reasons.
(a) Exclusions: Cases
where members D of the SMS give do not give rise to reasons
(i) D is dependent on a false
belief';
(ii) A's belief in the relevance of Ф-ing to D is false.
(b) A has reason to Ф iff
There are one or more members of A's SMS not excluded by (a) above from which
there is a sound deliberative route to Ф-ing.
Why does Williams think that
the example of Owen Wingrave makes it plausible that
all practical reasons are internal in his sense?
Korsgaard's
Defense of Reason as a Source of Motivation
Motivational
Skepticism vs. Content Skepticism about practical reason.
Korsgaard's Internalism
Requirement: Practical-reason claims, if
they are really to present us with reasons for action, must be capable of
motivating rational persons.
Does Korsgaard
mean by "internalist" the same thing that
Williams does?
Does the Korsgaard
Internalism Requirement require that rational
considerations always succeed in motivating us?
Korsgaard and the desire to be rational. Consider the analogous internalism requirement on theoretical reason.
Although Korsgaard
and Williams mean different things by "internalism"
about practical reasons, there are a number points of
agreement.
For example, they agree that
practical reasoning must begin with motivation in order to end with motivation. [What would be the corresponding requirement
on theoretical reason?]
This leads to a skeptical
argument from the nature of practical reason alone that Williams and Korsgaard agree on:
Let SMS(0)
= null set.
Williams and Korsgaard agree that a person with SMS(0)
would have no practical reason to do anything.
Do you agree?
Main Issue between Williams
and Korsgaard:
Are there any norms of
practical reason that apply to all human beings with a non-null SMS?
Her
dissatisfaction with attempts to make moral norms instrumental.
(1) Why Expected Utility
Theory requires objective norms.
(2) The Consequentialist Norm
= The Instrumentalist Norm.
What is the point of the
example of the curmudgeon?
Note that
Non-Moral Norms of To-Be-Pursuedness
(Rational Constraints on Preferences, Desires, or Goals)
Strong Norm of
Transitivity: One ought not to have intransitive
preferences—for example, one ought not to have preferences of the following
kind: A > B, B > C, and C > A.
Weak Norm of Transitivity: If one
discovers an intransitivity in one's preferences, one
ought to eliminate it.
In-Class
Questions
In
answering the following question, you should suppose that you have been
diagnosed with cancer and are given a choice between two treatment options,
surgery (S) or radiation therapy (R).
You should rank the two options based solely on the information
provided. The three possibilities
are:
(1)
S > R (you prefer surgery to radiation therapy); (2) R > S (you prefer
radiation therapy to surgery) or (3) S = R (you are indifferent between the two
forms of treatment).
1. You have a choice between Surgery (S) or Radiation Therapy (R):
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through
the post-operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are
alive at the end of five years.
Radiation
Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation
therapy all live through the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and
22 are alive at the end of five years.
In
answering the following question, you should suppose that you have been
diagnosed with cancer and are given a choice between two treatment options,
surgery (S) or radiation therapy (R).
You should rank the two options based solely on the information
provided. The three possibilities are:
(1)
S > R (you prefer surgery to radiation therapy); (2) R > S (you prefer
radiation therapy to surgery) or (3) S = R (you are indifferent between the two
forms of treatment).
2.
You have a choice between Surgery (S) or Radiation
Therapy (R):
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during
the surgery or the post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year
and 66 die by the end of five years.
Radiation
Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation
therapy, none die during treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by
the end of five years.
1. You have a choice between Surgery (S) or Radiation Therapy (R):
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through
the post-operative period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are
alive at the end of five years.
Radiation
Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation
therapy all live through the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and
22 are alive at the end of five years.
2.
You have a choice between Surgery (S) or Radiation
Therapy (R):
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during
the surgery or the post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year
and 66 die by the end of five years.
Radiation
Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation
therapy, none die during treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by
the end of five years.
Strong Norm of Invariance Under Equivalent Descriptions: Let D1 be a
description of a choice situation of agent S.
Let D2 be an alternative description which is equivalent to D1 (i.e.,
they both contain the same information, simply stated differently). S's preferences should be invariant over the
two descriptions. For example, the
following is irrational: (1) Given only
information D1 about a choice satiation, S would prefer A to B; and (2) Given only information D2 about a choice situation, S would
prefer B to A.
Weak Norm of Invariance Under Equivalent Descriptions: Let D1 be a
description of a choice situation of agent S.
Let D2 be an alternative description which is equivalent to D1 (i.e.,
they both contain the same information, simply stated differently). If S knows that the two descriptions are
equivalent and that his/her preferences are not invariant over the two
descriptions, S should change his/her preferences 's
preferences to preserve invariance.
1. Moral Realism and Anti-Realism
Moral Realism (MR): There are normative truths about what one
morally ought or ought not to do.
(There is some disagreement among moral realists on whether or not these
truths depend on one's situation). These
truths apply to all rational beings (at least, when they are in relevantly
similar situations).
Moral Anti-Realism
(MAR): There are no normative truths
about what one morally ought or ought not to do. (The advocate of MAR typically provides an
explanation of why it seems to us that there are such truths).
2. Practical Reason Realism and Anti-Realism
Practical Reason Realism
(PRR): There are normative truths about
what it is rational to do (which typically depend on one's situation). These truths apply to all rational beings (in
relevantly similar situations).
Practical Reason Anti-Realism
(PRAR) (Extreme Humeanism): There are no normative truths about what it
is rational to do. (The advocate of PRAR
typically provides an explanation of why it seems to us that there are such
truths.) PRAR implies MAR.
3. Theoretical Reason Realism and Anti-Realism
Theoretical Reason Realism
(TRR): There are normative truths about
what it is rational to believe (which typically depend on one's
situation). These truths apply to all
rational beings (in relevantly similar situations).
Theoretical Reason
Anti-Realism (TRAR): There are no
normative truths about what it is rational to believe. (The advocate of TRAR typically provides an
explanation of why it seems to us that there are such truths.)
4. Normative Anti-Realism (NAR): There are no normative truths. NAR implies TRAR, PRAR, and MAR.
OBJECTIVE PRESCRIPTIVITY
AND OBJECTIVE VALUES
A. Non-Moral Properties
Objective Non-Moral To-Be-Pursuedness [or Not-To-Be-Pursuedness]: This would be
a property of goals that it would be irrational, though not necessarily
immoral, not to pursue [or to pursue] or a non-moral constraint on the goals to
be pursued. For example the Strong or
Weak Norm of Transitivity is a potential norm of Non-Moral To-Be-Pursuedness, because it is a rational constraint on
preferences (goals).
Objective Non-Moral
To-Be-Doneness [or Not-To-Be-Doneness]: This would be a property of actions that it
would be irrational, though not necessarily immoral, to fail to perform [or to
perform], in the appropriate circumstances.
For example, the Instrumentalist Norm is a potential norm of non-moral
to-be-doneness.
B. Moral Properties
Objective Moral To-Be-Pursuedness [or Not-To-Be-Pursuedness]: This would be
property of goals that everyone morally should [or should not] pursue. For example, act utilitarians believe that
the goal of maximizing overall utility is a moral goal that everyone should
pursue.
Objective Moral
To-Be-Doneness [or Not-To-Be-Doneness]: This would be a property of actions that
everyone morally should perform [or should not perform]. For example, Kant thought that his
categorical imperative was a moral norm that all rational agents should obey,
regardless of whether they had any inclination to do so.
C. Epistemological Properties
Objective To-Be-Believedness [Not-To-Be-Believedness]: This would be
a property beliefs that everyone should believe [or
should not believe] in the appropriate circumstances. For example, the Law of Non-Contradiction is
a potential norm of not-to-be-believedness.