Korsgaard's
Critics:
Ten Objections and One Question
Objection #1: How can we be bound by laws that we make?
(Cohen)
How does Korsgaard
reply?
Objection #2: Why does autonomy requiring acting on a law
or principle? (Cohen, Geuss, Nagel) How does Korsgaard
reply?
Objection #3: Can there be any answer to the hard
(protestant) version of the normative question? (Cohen) How does Korsgaard
reply?
Objection #4: Is there a necessary moral identity? (Cohen)
Consider the example of the
idealized Mafioso. What does Cohen think
that it shows? What does Korsgaard think that it shows?
Question: How does Korsgaard's
account of autonomy differ from
Objection #5: Korsgaard's account
depends on two kinds of obligation, but only one of them is strong enough for
violations to entail a loss of identity.
(Geuss)
How would Korsgaard reply?
Objection #6: Reasons can be public, but not agent-neutral. (Geuss) How does Geuss
think that the example of Salmon Rushdie illustrates this.
How would Korsgaard
reply?
Objection #7: Korsgaard's
position is a variant of existentialism, and thus a version of moral
anti-realism. (Nagel) How does Korsgaard
reply?
Objection #8: Korsgaard has
mischaracterized substantive moral realism.
(Nagel) How should
substantive moral realism be understood, according to Nagel.
Objection #9: Does Korsgaard make
the mistake identified by
Objection
#10. A New Version of the Euthyphro
Question: Is an act right because not
doing it is inconsistent with our practical identity or is not doing it
inconsistent with our practical identity because it is right? Which answer does Nagel attribute to Korsgaard? Which
answer does Nagel endorse? How does Korsgaard reply?
How would you answer this
version of the Euthyphro question?