Korsgaard on the Public Character of Reasons

Issue: How does recognizing my humanity as a value commit me to recognizing the value of all human beings?

Two Mistaken Answers: (1) Hobbes's argument from self-interest. Free rider problem[WJT1] ; (2) Neo-Kantian arguments based on consistency, seem to be logically flawed[WJT2] .

Both mistaken answers assume that reasons can be essentially private. Korsgaard will argue that they cannot be, that they have a public character. Her argument is a close relative of Wittgenstein's famous private language argument.

IMPORTANT NOTE: In fn. 3, Korsgaard says that the public/private distinction for reasons corresponds roughly to the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction. So we will want to see if her argument supports the conclusion that reasons are public, in the sense of being agent-neutral. If so, it would seem that she would have to hold that no reasons could be agent-relative.

Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument: Against Essentially Private Objects

The argument depends on claims about the nature of language as normative:

(1) Linguistic meanings are normative.

(2) For meanings to be normative, it must be possible to make a mistake.

(3) For it to be possible to make a mistake it must be possible to correct a mistake.

(4) Only what is publicly accessible can be corrected.

Conclusion: Therefore, meanings must be publicly accessible and must concern what is publicly accessible. There are no essentially private meanings and no essentially private objects.

IMPORTANT NOTE: Wittgenstein's argument is quite controversial. I would guess that most philosophers would not think that it succeeds and even those who think that it succeeds disagree about what it shows.

Korsgaard's Adapation of the

Private Language Argument

to Apply to Reasons

(1) Reasons are normative.

(2) For reasons to be normative, it must be possible to make a mistake.

"There is no normativity if you cannot be wrong"(164). Could there be normativity for God?

(3) For it to be possible to make a mistake, it must be possible to correct a mistake.

(4) Only what is publicly accessible can be corrected.

Conclusion: Therefore, reasons must be publicly accessible. There are no essentially private reasons.

Question: Does Korsgaard's version of the Wittgensteinian argument establish that reasons are publicly accessible in the sense that they are agent-neutral? Consider the example of the person who has a reason to buy a Mother's Day gift for his mother.

"The myth of egoism will die with the myth of the privacy of consciousness"(144).

Korsgaard's Second Argument (Though She Does Not Distinguish Two Arguments):

Our Social Nature

(1) Thinking together. "The space of linguistic consciousness is essentially public, like a town square"(139-140). Is this true?

"If I call out to you, I stop you in your tracks. . . I am a law to you. By calling your name, I have obligated you. I have given you a reason to stop."(140).

Why does Korsgaard say nothing about reflective endorsement here?

(3) Reasoning together. "We do not seem to need a reason to take the reasons of others into account. We seem to need a reason not to"(140-141). The example of the student (141).

"Why not grant that practical reasons can be shared too?"(142). Notice how different this conclusion is from the conclusion that practical reasons are essentially public.

"Why shouldn't language force us to reason practically together, in just the same way it forces is to think together?"(142). Are we forced to reason together? What about reflective endorsement?

(4) Shared moral reasons. Nagel's example of the Golden Rule question[WJT3] . What does this show, according to Korsgaard? "Suppose you could say 'someone doing that to me, why that would be terrible! But then I am me, after all. . . . But the argument never really fails in that way"(143). Is she correct?

The Objection of Pain

Why is pain an objection to K's theory? Two potential objections:

(1) Pains are private.

(2) Pains are intrinsically normative.

Korsgaard's Reply:

Pains are not intrinsically bad.

"Pain wouldn't hurt if you could just relax and enjoy it"(147).

What is pain, if not a sensation? Pain is "your perception that you have a reason to change your condition"(148).

What do grief, rage, and disappointment have in common? "Don't say they're all horrible; that's just repeating yourself"(148). Recall her dissatisfaction with substantive realists such as Nagel.

"Pain is the unreflective rejection of a threat to your identity"(150). That is why it seems normative.

Why is pain nearly always bad? "Because the creatures who suffer from it object to it"(154).

Problem: In some cases, pain is the misperception of a reason.

Korsgaard argues that pain itself can be a threat to one's identity, so we have reason to alleviate it.

Puzzle: Why wouldn't the pain go away if, on reflection, we judged it to be a misperception of a reason?

The Objection of Obligations to Animals

Why does animal pain give us a reason to alleviate it?

The analogy to the argument that we must value human nature.

We must value animal nature.

What about animal pain that is the misperception of a reason? Could a non-reason give us a reason?

The Problem of Suicide

How is suicide ever justified for Korsgaard[WJT4] ?

How could suicide preserve your identity?

Could suicide be wrong on Korsgaard's account?

Could the denial of all value be a mistake?

How do we avoid normative skepticism?

What was Mackie's mistake? What are the queer normative entities?