The Elements of Korsgaard's

Kantian Theory of Normativity

(In Which She Abstracts

from the Content of Moral Obligation)

(1) Self-conscious = reflective. Human beings are self-conscious animals.

(2) Reflective endorsement is the source of normativity. Nothing is normative without reflective endorsement.

(3) Each act and its motives are subject to reflective endorsement. Only if the act and motive receive reflective endorsement do they count as rational or justified: "'Reason' refers to a kind of reflective success"(93).

(4) To be free is to act on motives that survive reflective endorsement. So a free choice is a justified choice. Like reflective endorsement, freedom is a first-person not a third-person phenomenon. "Determinism is no threat to freedom"(95). Why not?

(5) A free choice must be based on some law. Why?

(6) So a free choice must accord with the Categorical Imperative = the Formula of Universal Law = Act only on a maxim that we could will to be a law.

What is the difference between a wanton, an egoist, and moral person.

(7) Moral law = law in the Kingdom of Ends (the law "ranges over every rational being"(99)).

(8) "The principle or law by which you determine your actions is one you regard as being expressive of yourself"(100). It is a principle you identify yourself with. To violate such a law is to risk a loss of identity.

(9) "Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what identity forbids"(101). Integrity is living up to one's own standards. "An obligation always takes the form of a reaction against the threat of a loss of identity"(102).

(10) But it is possible to violate obligations "just this once" without losing one's identity. "Even people with the most excellent characters can occasionally knowingly do wrong"(103). Think again of free riders in collective action problems.

(11) Reflection has authority, because "the acting self concedes to the thinking self its right to government"(104).

(12) The form of a maxim is its internal structure. A good maxim is good because of its internal structure. This is a version of procedural realism.

The Elements of Korsgaard's Theory of

The Content of Morality

(1) Recall Williams' discussion of thin and thick ethical terms. Thin ethical terms are concepts. Thick ethical terms are conceptions. They are both normative, which means that they must both survive reflection to be rational.

(2) "The mediation between concepts and conceptions comes by way of practical identity"(116-117).

(3) The Problem of Relativism. Korsgaard's worry here is that all reasons are agent-relative, because dependent on our practical identity—that is, on how we identify ourselves.

(4) The Solution to the Problem of Relativism: A Transcendental Argument. If anything has value, valuers (i.e., reflective endorsers (i.e., rational beings) (i.e., autonomous beings))) have value.

(5) "Valuing humanity in your own person rationally requires valuing it in the persons of others"(121). This is merely asserted in Lecture 3 and argued for in Lecture 4. "All value depends on the value of humanity"(121).

(6) "Moral identity is necessary"(122). Therefore, moral reasons apply to all rational beings.

(7) "It follows from this [transcendental] argument that human beings are valuable. Enlightenment morality is true"(123). Contrast the third-person perspective, from which we can only say that we find (or judge) ourselves to be valuable, with the first-person perspective, from which we judge that: there are reasons and there are values.

(8) Identities can conflict so obligations can conflict. For example, personal relationships can conflict with moral obligation.