HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES 

 

       A HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE [i.e., an imperative based on inclination or desire] declares "a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will)"(267).

 

       A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE [i.e., an imperative based on reason alone]  is one that represents "an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end"(267).

 

Because morality holds independently of what we desire or of any other facts about us, moral imperatives must be categorical imperatives that apply with absolute necessity to all rational beings and can be known a priori (i.e., by reason alone, independent of experience).

 

 

 

KANT'S ACCOUNT OF AUTONOMY AND HETERONOMY

 

       HETERONOMOUS CHOICE = a choice based on a desire [e.g., based on a hypothetical imperative + desire].

 

       AUTONOMOUS CHOICE = a choice not based on any desire [e.g., based on a categorical imperative].

 

       A person making a HETERONOMOUS CHOICE is said to have a HETERONOMOUS WILL. 

 

       A person making an AUTONOMOUS CHOICE is said to have an AUTONOMOUS WILL.  For Kant, an autonomous will is a moral will, the good will.  It is good in itself, not because of any good results that it brings about.

 

 

 

 

 

KANT'S ANTI-CONSEQUENTIALISM

 

       Action from inclination, even if morally right, has "no genuinely moral worth"(260).

       Like actions based on honor, it deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem (260).

 

 

       Why isn't happiness an adequate ground for morality?  No determinate principles, only empirical counsels[WJT1] .  Thus, no necessity.

 

       "The problem of determining certainly and universally what action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble"(269).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE THREE VERSIONS OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

 

 

No. 1.  [Universalizability Formula] "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"(270).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kant's Examples

 

Initial example:  Making a false promise (262).

 

"I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying"(262).  Why not?

 

Four Illustrations

 

1.  Suicide.

 

2.  Borrowing money knowing that one will not pay it back.

 

3. Neglecting one's natural gifts.

 

4.  Refusing to help others in great need whom one could easily help.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What is the contradiction in our will?

 

 

       "The contradiction that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law and yet subjectively should not hold universally but should admit of exceptions"(272).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 2:  [Ends-in-themselves Formula] "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end"(274).

 

Consider the four examples again.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 3:  [Kingdom of Ends Formula]   Act on maxims that could be legislated as universal law in the Kingdom of Ends [the Ideal World of Ends-in-Themselves].

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nozick on Moral Side Constraints

 

 

Morality as Side Constraints vs. Morality as an End or Goal

 

What is Nozick's idea of a "utilitarianism of rights"(239)?

 

How does this idea help to explain why a side constraints view fits with Kant's idea of morality as categorical imperatives rather than hypothetical imperatives?

 

How does Nozick's understanding of the Ends-in-Themselves Formula differs from Kant's?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gauthier's Thesis:  "Morality is a system of principles such that it is advantageous for everyone if everyone accepts and acts on it, yet acting on the system of principles requires that some persons perform disadvantageous acts"(94).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

              COLUMN CHOOSER

 

 

 

 

C

 

 

D

 

ROW       

CHOOSER   

 

C

 

2,2

 

 

4,1

 

 

 

 

D

 

1,4

 

3,3

 

2-PERSON PRISONERS' DILEMMA

(from Gauthier, p. 96).

Lower numbers represent higher ranked (more preferred) outcomes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I.  Terminology

 

       1.  INDIVIDUALISTICALLY RATIONAL (IR) = to Maximize One's Expected Return (Total Expected Benefits Less Total Expected Costs).  This sense of rationality is the twentieth-century development of the concept of INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY.  It is the notion of rationality that is employed in economics.  (Note that to be INDIVIDUALISTICALLY RATIONAL does not require that one be an egoist.)

 

       2.  COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM = A situation in which everyone (in a given group) has a choice between two alternatives and where, if everyone involved chooses the alternative act that is Individualistically Rational (IR), the outcome will be worse for everyone involved, in their own estimation, than it would be if they were all to choose the other alternative (i.e., than it would be if they were all to choose the alternative that is not IR).

 

       By convention, in any Collective Action Problem, the IR alternative is referred to as "Defection" ("D"); and the non-IR alternative is referred to as "Cooperation" ("C").

 

N-Person Collective Action Problem

 

                                     Everyone else

 

 

Cooperates

(C)      

 

Defects

(D)

 

I Cooperate

(C)

 

+100,

  +100

 

-101,

  -99.9

 

I Defect (D)

 

+101,

  +99.9

 

-100,

  -100

 

 

       FREERIDING.  In an N-Person Collective Action Problem in which most agents choose to Cooperate, Defectors are referred to as FREERIDERS, because they benefit from the Cooperation of others, but are unwilling to reciprocate Cooperation. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gauthier's distinction:

       the prudent person, the "moral" (prudent but trustworthy) person, and the truly moral (trustworthy and fair) person.

 

 

 

                                                                                     2, 2

                                                                C

 

 

 

 


                          C

                                                                D

                                                                                      4, 1

                                                                                      1, 4

 

                                                           C

                     D

 

 


                                                                D

                                                                                        3, 3

Player #1                         Player #2

 

 

The Sequential Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma.

 

The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn

 

 

What does Huck's conscience tell him to do?  What does his reasoning tell him to do?

 

What opposes his conscience and his reasoning?

 

What moral should we draw from this example about the relation between reasons and feelings in morality?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nagel on Moral Luck

 

 

Kantian idea:  Moral judgment of an agent is only appropriate for things that are under the agent's control.

 

But we actually make moral judgments of agents that depend on things that are not under the agent's control.

 

"We may be persuaded that these moral judgments are irrational, but they reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is over"(299).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Four kinds of moral luck:

 

(1) luck in consequences

 

(a) Example of the truck driver's negligence in not checking his brakes. 

 

How harshly we judge the negligence depends on whether or not a child died.

 

(b) Example of attempted murder vs. successful murder.

 

(c) Examples under uncertainty:  "The outcome determines what has been done"(298).

 

Strict liability "seems irrational as a moral position"(298).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2) constitutive luck

 

Judgments of character (envious, conceited, etc.) are often based on factors that are beyond the control of the will.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(3) luck in one's circumstances

 

Example of the citizens of Nazi Germany.

 

 

 

(4) luck in antecedent circumstances

 

This is the problem of freedom of will.

 

What is the compatibilist solution?

 

What is Nagel's dissatisfaction with the compatibilist solution?

 

The internal vs. the external view of agents.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scanlon's Contractualism

 

What is philosophical explanation of morality?  What two questions does it answer?

 

(1) What is the subject matter of morality?

 

(2) Given an answer to (1), why would anyone care about it?

 

How does philosophical utilitarianism answer those two questions:

 

(1) Subject matter of morality:  individual well-being.

 

(2) Source of moral motivation:  Sympathy for the well-being of others.  Well-being is clearly something important.

 

 

 

 

 

 

What is Scanlon's contractualist answer to those two questions?

 

(1) Subject matter of morality:  the rules for regulating behavior that people would agree to if they were motivated to find rules that no one could reasonably reject. 

 

(2) Source of moral motivation:  Desire to be able to justify myself to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scanlon's Contractualist Principle

 

 

"An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as the basis for informed, unforced general agreement"(272).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Three Stages of the an

Original Position Derivation of Morality

 

(1) Moral principles must be impartially acceptable. 

 

(2) Moral principles are principles that would be chosen by rationally self-interested agents in ignorance of their position in society.

 

(3) Two ways of understanding the ignorance condition: 

(3R) The agent has no way of assigning probabilities to the different positions.

(3H) The agent assumes that he has an equal chance of occupying anyone's position.

 

Rawls accepts (3R).  He derives his two principles of justice, including the maximin rule (maximize the expectations of the least well-off group).

 

Harsanyi accepts (3H).  He derives the utilitarian rule of maximizing average expected utility (Average Utilitarianism).

 

Scanlon rejects the move from (1) to (2). He rejects the suggestion that the choice of a rational agent could tell us what the principles of morality are.  He rejects both Rawls's maximin principle (maximize the expectation of the least well-off group) and Harsanyi's Average Utilitarianism (maximize average expected utility).  He has no principle to substitute for theirs, because he does not believe that there is a way to analyze what is reasonable in terms of what is rational. 

 

What is the difference between Scanlon's Interpersonal Point of View and Rawls's Original Position?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 [WJT1]269