PHIL 440A: Study Questions on Korsgaard Lecture 4

1. In footnote 3, Korsgaard says that the distinction between 'private' and 'public' reasons is roughly the same as the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. Explain how the second distinction applies to the first and explain why the two distinctions are not exactly the same.

2. What is the view Korsgaard calls 'publicity as shareability'?

3. Korsgaard follows Wittgenstein in arguing that there could be no essentially private language for referring to conscious states (the "private language argument")? What is Korsgaard's use of the argument? Note that the argument is an argument about whether something can be essentially private. What is the difference between something being essentially private and something being non-essentially private?

4. The crucial move in Wittgenstein's argument is that normativity requires the possibility of being mistaken? Why would this be true? Does the argument imply that normative predicates (e.g., good, just, rational) cannot be true of God (if there is one), because God cannot make a mistake? Does Korsgaard believe that normativity requires the possibility of being mistaken?

5. Korsgaard wants us to consider how other people influence us without going through our own desires. Pay close attention to Korsgaard's examples of how one person can intrude on the consciousness of another. Is there any reason to think that such intrusions would receive reflective endorsement by all rational creatures? How would the sensible misanthrope respond, on reflection?

6. What is the example in which Korsgaard says: "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" supposed to show? Is it successful? Does it show that the Golden Rule leads to morality? Is it logically impossible for someone to believe that their tormenting others gives others a right to torment them, thereby satisfying the Golden Rule without recognizing moral restraints?

7. Why does Korsgaard think Nagel was right to characterize the egoist as a practical solipsist? Why can't the egoist believe in the existence of lots of other egoists?

8. Why is pain an objection? Is it the privacy of pain or the normativity of pain that is an objection (or both)? What is Korsgaard's response to this objection? What, according to Korsgaard is pain? Do you agree that if we could just relax, we could enjoy pain? Why does lying down sometimes help to relieve pain?

9. If pains are reasons, how can animals, non-reflective beings, have pains? What if an animal is in pain caused by electrodes in its head, not by anything that is harming it? Does it have any reason to relieve that pain? Do we? What does Korsgaard say? What if you had electrodes in your head that were stimulated to cause you the kind of pain you would have with a broken arm? On reflection, why would you feel pain, if you realized that your arm was not injured?

10. Do we have duties to plants? Why or why not?

11. What is a complete normative skeptic? Is a complete normative skeptic making a mistake? Does the normative skeptic have to commit suicide?

12. How is immoral action possible, if the immoral person reflectively endorses the action?