PHIL 440A: Study Questions for Week #5. Three Objectors and Korsgaard's Replies.
On G.A. Cohen:
(1) Cohen points to two contradictory arguments in Hobbes, one concludes that we are bound by the laws we make and one concludes that we are not. What are the two Hobbesian arguments?
(2) Consider the second Hobbesian argument discussed in (1) above. Cohen thinks that Kant and Korsgaard would give different replies to that argument. According to Cohen, how would Kant reply to it? According to Cohen, why can't Korsgaard give the same reply as Kant? According to Cohen, how does Korsgaard reply to the second argument? What does Korsgaard say in response to Cohen on this issue?
(3) For Korsgaard, violating the moral law always represents a loss of identity. Why does Cohen disagree?
(4) Cohen questions whether reflective endorsement requires acting on a law or a principle. Use his distinction between universal and singular commands to explain his objection to Korsgaard. How does Korsgaard reply?
(5) What is the hard (protestant) version of the normative question? What is the mild version of the normative question? Why does Cohen think that Korsgaard's account fails to provide an answer to the hard (protestant) version?
(6) What do the German sentences on p. 181 mean?
(7) What is the example of the idealized Mafioso? What is it intended to show? How does Korsgaard reply? How does the example of the knavish lawyer in 2.5.3 illuminate her reply? How does the example of the Knight in 2.3.5 illuminate her reply?
(8) Ultimately, Cohen's target is Korsgaard's argument that moral identity is a necessary part of our identity. What are his objections to that argument?
(9) Cohen states
On Raymond Geuss:
(1) Like Cohen and Nagel, Geuss argues that the notion of practical identity plays no role in Kant's account of morality? Does Korsgaard agree? Explain.
(2) Geuss finds two conceptions of obligation in Korsgaard, a strong one and weak one. Use examples to explain the difference.
(3) Geuss believes that it is possible for me to allow that others have reasons that are reasons for them, without believing that they are reasons for me. How does the example of Salmon Rushdie illustrate this? What bearing does Geuss think this has on
Korsgaard's argument that reasons are public and shareable?
On Thomas Nagel:
(1) Like Cohen, Nagel asks why freedom requires accepting the categorical imperative. Explain the objection? How does Korsgaard reply?
(2) What does Nagel refer to as the "existentialist idea" at the heart of Korsgaard's position?
(3) What does Nagel mean when he says, "A natural question about this practical self-conception is, first, whether we are supposed to have some choice in the matter and, second, whether there is any right or wrong about it if we do have a choice"?
(4) How does Nagel think that Korsgaard has mischaracterized substantive moral realism?
(5) Why does Nagel think that Korsgaard has fallen prey to the "temptation to offer an egoistic answer to egoism"? What he example does he use to explain why this is a mistake? How does Korsgaard reply?
(6) In Euthyphro, Socrates asked a question, which, in updated form is: Is an act right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right. A version of the Euthyphro question that Nagel applies to Korsgaard is: Is an act right because not doing it is inconsistent with our practical identity or is not doing it inconsistent with our practical identity because it is right? Which answer does Nagel attribute to Korsgaard? Which answer does Nagel endorse? How does Korsgaard reply?