PHIL 440:  End of Class Questions

 

 

March 31, 2008:  The utilitarians claimed to have necessary and sufficient conditions for moral wrongness.

(1) What were they?

(2) Divide the double arrow into two single arrows (implications).

(3) Choose one of the two implications.  Say what it means and give a counterexample. 

 

April 2, 2008:  Is there objective to-be-believedness?  Explain.

 

April 4, 2008:  Explain the difference between the view that pain is an agent-relative disvalue (i.e., bad) and the view that pain is an agent-neutral disvalue (i.e., bad). 

 

April 7, 2008:  Suppose Adam's evolutionary explanation were true.  Morality is aimed at the flourishing of all species on earth.  How would Korsgaard challenge this explanation and raise a doubt about whether it would support a positive answer to the normative question? 

 

April 9, 2008:  What is the difference between substantive and procedural moral realism?

 

April 11, 2008:  Give an example of a collective action problem (CAP) and an example of free riding in that CAP.

 

April 14, 2008:  Consider the slightly more attractive version of Hume's sensible knave (86).  What would you do?  Explain your answer, including an explanation of why you would not do the alternative act.

 

April 16, 2008:  According to Korsgaard, what is the Categorical Imperative?

 

April 18, 2008:  Write a two-paragraph significant objection to something in Lecture 3.  In the first paragraph, explain the position that you will object to.  In the second paragraph explain your objection.

 

April 21, 2008:  According to Korsgaard, what are the weird ("queer") normative entities?

 

April 23, 2008:  Write a two-paragraph significant objection to something in Lecture 4.  In the first paragraph, explain the position that you will object to.  In the second paragraph explain your objection.

 

April 25, 2008:  Write out a question for Professor Korsgaard.  Begin with a brief summary of the part of her work that your question is about (include a citation), then state the question. 

 

April 28, 2008:  How could people who don't use exceptionless principles to guide their choices be autonomous in Korsgaard's sense?

 

April 30, 2008:  Explain the example of the idealized Mafioso.

 

May 2, 2008:  What do you think is the most significant objection to Korsgaard?

 

May 5, 2008:  Consider the following proposed definition:  Good = what we want to want.  Apply the Open Question Argument to that proposed definition.

 

May 7, 2008:  What is Boyd's response to Moore's Open Question argument?

 

May 12, 2008:  Blackburn says that the fundamental state of mind of one who makes an ethical commitment is not a belief.  What is his term for it?

 

May 14, 2008:  Is there objective funniness?  Explain.

 

May 16, 2008:  Do you find Harman's argument against objective normativity persuasive?  Explain.

 

May 19, 2008:  Explain the Owen Wingrave example.

 

May 21, 2008:  What is the skeptical argument from the nature of practical reason alone that Williams and Korsgaard agree on?

[Hint:  "SMS = null set" plays a role in the argument.]

[Second Hint:  The conclusion of the argument is:  Such a person would have no practical reason to do anything.]

 

May 23, 2008:  Is it possible for an egoist (or anyone else) not to be committed to any moral reasons (i.e., not to be committed to any public or agent-neutral moral reasons)?  Explain.

 

May 28, 2008:  What kind of moral realist is Rawls?  No explanation necessary.

 

May 30, 2008:  What is Scanlon's main objection to Harsanyi and Rawls? 

 

June 2, 2008:  Why does Habermas think that the philosopher who argues for moral skepticism is involved in a performative contradiction?

 

June 4, 2008:  Today in class, Professor Talbott explained how someone who believed that human beings were the product of a naturalistic, evolutionary process could believe in normative truths that are true in all possible worlds.  On such a view as Professor Talbott's, what are normative truths?

 

June 6, 2008:  Write a paragraph explaining the difference between Kant and Korsgaard on the categorical imperative.