Hume on Justice and the Other Artificial Virtues
Book 3, Part 2, Section
1: Natural vs. Artificial Virtue
For Hume, why does virtue
have to be identified by the motive for it?
For Hume, why does the
motivation for justice have to be explained as something other than the desire
for justice?
Before saying what the motive
for justice is, Hume says what it is not?
Why does he think that it is
not public benevolence?
Why does he think that it is
not private benevolence?
Section 2: The Circumstances of Justice
Scarcity
and the instability of possession of external goods.
The solution: conventions of justice.
What is the motivation for
complying with the conventions?
Hume's three examples:
(1) Languages as conventions. The first collective action
problem.
(2) The two rowers. The iterated two-person
prisoners' dilemma.
(3) Respect for property
rights. An n-person
prisoners' dilemma.
Will self-interest yield the
results Hume claims in all three cases?
The free
rider problem.
What makes justice a virtue?
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF A ONE-SHOT
N-PERSON CONVENTION GAME
Everyone else
|
|
Speaks English |
Speaks French |
|
I Speak English |
+100, +100 |
-101, -99.9 |
|
I Speak French |
+101, +99.9 |
+100, +100 |
Matrix 1. In a
convention game, if I know that everyone else speaks English, self-interest
alone will motivate me to speak English.
No promise is necessary.
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF A ONE-SHOT
2-PERSON PRISONERS' DILEMMA
The Other Person
|
|
Cooperates (C) |
Defects (D) |
|
I Cooperate (C) |
+3, +3 |
+1, +4 |
|
I Defect (D) |
+4, +1 |
+2, +2 |
Matrix 2. In a one-shot
PD, self-interest alone will not motivate cooperation. However, in an iterated PD, mutual conditional
cooperation is a rational solution.
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF THE FORM OF A ONE-SHOT
N-PERSON PRISONERS' DILEMMA
Everyone else
|
|
Cooperates (C) |
Defects (D) |
|
I Cooperate (C) |
+100, +100 |
-101, -99.9 |
|
I Defect (D) |
+101, +99.9 |
-100, -100 |
Matrix 3. In a one-shot
n-person PD, self-interest will not motivate cooperation. Even in the iterated n-person PD,
self-interest is unlikely to motivate cooperation. Effective sanctioning of defectors is almost
always necessary to make cooperation rational.
The Three Fundamental Rules
of Justice: Property and Contract Rights
("stability of possession, transference by consent, and the performance of
promises" (T 3.2.6.1))
Section 3: The Arbitrariness of the Rules Determining
Original Property
Section 4: Transfer of property by Consent
Section 5: Promises
Why does Hume think promises are conventional?
Promise-keeping (performing on a contract) is a Collective
Action Problem. What kind?
The example of the surgeon and the robber.
Section 6: The Need for General and Inflexible
Principles of Justice (e.g., property and contract rights)
Section 7: The Origin of Government
Governments punish those who violate the conventions of
justice. Why, on Hume's account, are
systems of punishment necessary to enforce those conventions?
What else can governments do?
Solve other collective action problems.