PHIL 437A: Study Questions Week #4(Oct. 17-19): Necessary Connection
1. The puzzle of the necessary connection. Why does Hume think we cannot observe a necessary connection among objects?
2. Why does Hume think it is a mistake to take our experience of own willing of actions as a basis for an idea of causal efficacy? Does Hume's account of how we mistakenly come to believe in causes work for our belief in the efficacy of our choices?
3. Hume's solution to the puzzle involves understanding the role of the idea of cause in our inferences. Explain Hume's account of causal inference.
4. What is Hume's definition of cause? According to Hume, what is the simple impression from which the idea of the necessity of a causal connection is derived?
5. A circularity problem? In T 1.3.14.20 Hume's account of the source of the idea of cause is that our experience produces a new impression in us. Hume describes this feeling as a feeling of determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant (and later as a propensity to pass from the one object to the other. But note that Hume is using causal terms (e.g., produces, determination, propensity) to explain the origin of the idea of cause. This seems objectionably circular. Baier claims that it is not.
Why not? What do you think: Is it objectionably circular?
6. In T 1.3.14.25 Hume makes an analogy that you
may not understand if you are not familiar with Part 4 of the Treatise. The analogy is between causes and secondary
qualities, such as color.
7. Hume claims that all our beliefs about causes are the result of observed constant conjunctions and observations of temporal priority. Is this true? Do we have causal beliefs not based on observation of constant conjunctions? Do we have causal beliefs not based on observations of temporal priority (i.e., where we cannot distinguish in perception between the time the cause occurs and the time that the effect occurs)?
8. Does Hume contradict himself? In T1.3.14.31, Hume says "I perceive that such a relation [his version of causal relation] can never be an object of reasoning . . . ." But in the next section, he gives rules for causal reasoning. And earlier he had said that causal reasoning is a "true species of reasoning" (T 1.3.7.5 n. 20). How are we to understand this apparent contradiction?
9. The Normative Puzzle. In T 1.3.14, Hume is explaining our concept of necessary connection and its role in our reasoning. This is part of Hume's descriptive project. In the next section, Hume provides some rules by which we may know when objects are causally related. This is a normative project. (a) Explain why it is normative. (b) Explain why it was a mistake for Hume to use the word "know" in describing the project. What should he have said? (c) Does it make sense for Hume to make normative claims about causal reasoning? If causal reasoning is not really reasoning at all, but a kind of psychological determination of the mind, how could it make sense to recommend better ways of doing it?
10. Baier's solution to the normativity puzzle. Baier claims that Hume's idea of normativity is successful reflexivity. Alternatively, she says that Hume endorses those rules that pass the test of reflexive employment? What is this test? Why would Baier think that anything that passes the test would be endorsed by Hume?
11. In T 1.3.15.5 Hume says that like effects imply like causes. Is this true?
12. Hume says that like causes always produce like effects. But no two causes are exactly alike. So why would we ever expect any two causes to produce like effects?
13. Hume thinks that his theory is supported by the observation of non-human animals (beasts). According to Hume, how does the observation of animal behavior help us to draw conclusions about their minds? Why does Hume think his theory is the only one that can explain causal reasoning in both humans, including "children and the common people in our own species" and non-human animals?
14. Why is Hume's philosophy referred to as empiricist?
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17. According to Hume, the idea of causally necessary connection is derived from a feeling of determination in us. Baier argues that Hume also holds that the idea of logically necessary connection (e.g., the necessity of a triangle's having three angles) is also derived from a feeling of determination in us. Thus, she concludes that all necessity is derived from a feeling of determination in us. Do you agree with this interpretation of Hume? Why would this interpretation make it harder for Hume to persuade most people that the idea of causally necessary connection is derived from a feeling of determination in us?