One Kind of Absolutism and Three Kinds of Relativism About Morality
1. Normative Cultural Absolutism About Morality (NCA) = The view that one culture (typically
one’s own) has an infallible source of universal moral truths.
2. Descriptive Cultural Relativism About Morality = the purely descriptive claim that different
societies disagree on at least some moral judgments.
3. Metaethical Relativism = moral nihilism or
moral skepticism = the claim that there are no moral truths (moral nihilism) or
that human beings can never have any moral knowledge or any justified moral
beliefs (moral skepticism).
4. Normative Cultural Relativism About Morality = The normative moral claim that people ought
to comply with the moral norms of their own culture (or, at least, that it is
always morally permissible for them to do so).
Important Fact:
Everyone, even the Normative Cultural Absolutist, can agree that
descriptive cultural relativism about morality is true.
The AAA’s 1948 Defense of Normative Cultural
Relativism
The three central
propositions of the AAA Statement:
1. The individual realizes his personality
through his culture, hence respect for individual
differences entails a respect for cultural differences.
2. Respect for difference between cultures is
validated by the scientific fact that no technique of qualitatively evaluating
cultures has been discovered.
3. Standards and values are relative to the
culture from which they derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that
grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent
detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as
a whole.
Proposition 3 is a version of normative cultural relativism
about morality. In support of it, the
AAA offered a version of what we will call "the cultural imperialism
argument." There are many different
versions of this argument. What they all
have in common is that they begin from the claim that it was wrong for the
Western Europeans to impose their moral and religious norms on the American
natives and they conclude with an endorsement of Normative Cultural Relativism
(NCR).
A LOGICAL FLAW IN THE CULTURAL IMPERIALISM ARGUMENT
The AAA's Defense of
Normative Cultural Relativism is based in part on Cultural Imperialism
Argument. Important facts about the
Cultural Imperialism Argument:
(1) The Cultural Imperialism
Argument is incompatible with Moral Nihilism/Moral Skepticism. Why?
(2) Although the Cultural
Imperialism Argument has undeniable moral appeal, it is deeply incoherent. Its conclusion (NCR) is incompatible with the
claim that cultural imperialism is morally objectionable. To see why, consider the example of the
Spanish Conquistador and the American Native.
A COMPARISON OF FOUR NORMATIVE VIEWS
NA says:
SC says:
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ISW NAG |
YSW NAG |
ISW SCG |
YSW SCG |
ISFY WSCG |
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SCNCA |
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NANCA |
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NCR |
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NRNT |
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SCNCA = Spanish Conquistador
NCA
NANCA = Native American NCA
NCR = Normative Cultural
Relativism
NNRT = Non-Relative Norm of
Tolerance
WHAT THE EXAMPLE OF THE SPANISH CONQUISTADOR SHOWS
ABOUT ALL FORMS OF NORMATIVE MORAL RELATIVISM
One way of trying to state the conclusion of the Cultural
Imperialism Argument is to say that it should lead to the conclusion that all
moral points of view are equally valid.
But the example of the Spanish Conquistador illustrates a logical
problem with this conclusion: The
Spanish Conquistador does not believe that all moral views are equally
valid? Is the Spanish Conquistador's
view equally as valid as the view that all moral views are equally valid?
Two ways out: The Wishy-Washy Relativist
Response: The view that all moral points
of view are equally valid is only true for those who accept it.
The
Two Norms of Tolerance
Moral Wishy-Washiness
= the view that my moral judgments only apply to those who agree with them.
A Relative Norm of
Tolerance (Wishy-Washy
Tolerance): I should be tolerant of
other cultures, because my culture has a norm of tolerance, but that the norm
of tolerance does not apply to cultures that do not have such a norm. This view holds that there is only a relative
duty to be tolerant of other cultures.
It only applies to cultures that have it. This is the only duty of tolerance that
normative cultural relativism about morality could ever justify.
An alternative to Wishy-Washy
Tolerance would be a Non-Relative Norm of Tolerance. To formulate such a norm, it is helpful to
introduce some useful distinctions.
EPISTEMIC MODESTY AND
METAPHYSICAL IMMODESTY
EPISTEMIC IMMODESTY [Moral Infallibilism] = A claim to certainty or infallibility.
EPISTEMIC MODESTY [Moral Fallibilism]= An acknowledgment of
fallibility and the lack of certainty.
METAPHYSICAL IMMODESTY = A
claim that some moral judgments are objectively universall—that
is, they apply to all human beings, regardless of whether they agree.
METAPHYSICAL MODESTY = A
claim that no moral judgments are objectively universal. This covers Moral Nihilism, Moral Skepticism,
and all forms of unqualified Normative Moral Relativism. There are many varieties of normative moral
relativism—for example, the claim that our moral principles only apply to
members of our own species or our own linguistic community or own religion or
to those who accept our moral principles, etc.
Two Kinds of Practices and Two Kinds of Norms
Internal interactions or
practices are interactions or
practices that involve only members of the same culture.
External interactions or
practices are interactions or
practices that involve members of different cultures.
An internal norm is a
norm of a culture that applies to the culture's internal interactions or
practices.
An external norm is a
norm of a culture that applies to the culture's external interactions or
practices.
A Non-Relative Norm of
Tolerance = That
the members of each culture should follow their own internal norms (or at least
it is morally permissible for them to do so) and that all cultures (whether or
not they accept a norm of tolerance) should tolerate (not interfere with or
attempt to change) other cultures' internal norms. This view holds that there is a non-relative
duty to be tolerant of other cultures' internal norms. It applies even to cultures that have a norm
of intolerance toward other cultures.
The discovery of a non-relative norm of tolerance enables us
to formulate a new, qualified form of moral relativism:
Normative Cultural Relativism About
Internal Norms (NCRAIN) = the claim that there is no moral basis for the
members of one culture to criticize the internal norms of another culture. Every culture ought to respect every other
culture's internal moral norms.
Although the 1947 AAA statement explicitly appeals to
normative cultural relativism, it is most plausibly understood as advocating a
Non-Relative Norm of Tolerance of the internal norms of all cultures—that is,
as a defense of NCRAIN. Next week we
will consider whether NCRAIN is adequate.
First, I want to focus on one striking fact about NCRAIN: It is metaphysically immodest.
Combining Metaphysical Immodesty With
Epistemic Modesty: How is it Possible?
One of the First Advocates of NCRAIN:
Bartolomé de las Casas.
1. A universal moral standpoint: The original position behind the veil of
ignorance. A
standpoint from which to make fallible but universal particular moral
judgments.
2. An example of taking the
universal moral standpoint to evaluate an external norm:
a. Las Casas'
criticism of the Western European treatment treatment
of the American natives.
3. The role of empathic understanding and
bottom-up reasoning in moral judgment.
4. How moral blindspots
can be supported by socially enforced, self-serving reasons.
When a justification for a
conclusion is self-serving, it is not the case that the conclusion is accepted
because the justification is accepted; rather, the causal relation is reversed,
and the justification is accepted (at least in part) because it supports the
desired conclusion.
Examples
from the debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda; Dred Scott; Senator James O. Eastland.
What do all of these
self-serving reasons have in common?
They are paternalistic.
HOW TO AVOID BOTH MORAL WISHY-WASHINESS AND MORAL
IMPERIALISM
Paternalistic intervention =
intervention to force the target to do something for his/her own good, though
the target does not believe that the intervention is good for him/her. In paternalistic intervention, the target's own judgment about what is good for him/her is
overruled by the person intervening.
Moral Imperialism= the view of
someone who holds either that anyone who disagrees with me on a moral question
is mistaken (epistemic immodesty) or that I am permitted to intervene
paternalistically to force others to act in accordance with my moral views for
their own good (moral paternalism).
Moral Wishy-Washiness
= the view that my moral judgments only apply to those who agree with
them. It is a form of moral relativism.
A simple example of a
position that is metaphysically immodest but not morally imperialistic: the epistemically modest advocate of the
following as a universal moral norm:
"Moral imperialism is always wrong."
WAS LAS CASAS A MORAL IMPERIALIST?
Las Casas was a moral imperialist
for most of his life. Why?
Surprising Fact: Near
the end of his life, Las Casas gave up his moral
imperialism.
Las Casas may have been the first
proponent of NCRAIN. Did Las Casas discover human rights?
A PUZZLE ABOUT NCRAIN
NCRAIN allows that it is possible
to morally criticize a culture's external norms. How is this possible?
(1) The Contrast Between the Personal
Point of View and the Moral Standpoint:
The Example of Bartolomé de Las Casas.
(2) Understanding the Moral Standpoint as the Harsanyi/Rawls Original Position behind the Veil of
Ignorance.
(3) The Importance of Empathic Understanding.
(4) The Problem of
Self-Serving Justifications: Believing
What One Wants to Believe.
(5) The Problem of Socially Enforced Self-Serving Justifications.
The Result: Not all moral
opinions are equally valid.
THE PUZZLE: If external norms can be supported by
socially enforced self-serving (paternalistic) justifications, why not internal
norms?
THREE POTENTIAL DEFENSES OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM ABOUT
INTERNAL NORMS
1. The Infallibility Thesis
2. The Incommensurability
Thesis
3. The Claim of Distorting
Bias.
Objective Universality of Moral Judgment
Objective Universality of a
Moral Norm or Principle:
To understand a moral norm or
principle as universal is to believe that it applies to all human beings, whether
or not they do or would agree.
Objective Universality of a
Particular Moral Judgment: To understand
a particular moral judgment (e.g., that the Western European treatment of the
American natives was wrong) as universal is to regard it as true from any point
of view, regardless of whether everyone would agree.
SUBJECTIVELY UNIVERSAL RIGHTS vs.
OBJECTIVELY UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Subjective universality is universality based on agreement. Human rights norms would be subjectively
universal if their universality depended on their being accepted by all moral
traditions or cultures.
Objective universality is universality that does not depend on
agreement. Objective human rights norms
would be norms that should be respected in virtue of the characteristics we
share as human beings, regardless of whether the rights are accepted by all moral
traditions or cultures.
Are there any objectively
universal human rights? What do you
think?
NCRAIN and the Possibility of Subjectively Universal
INTERNAL Rights Norms
1. Why NCRAIN could never support objectively
universal internal human rights norms.
2. Charles Taylor's hope for an
"overlapping consensus" where different justifications are given for
roughly the same internal rights norms.
The good news: The
prospects for an overlapping consensus on internal rights norms are better than
you might have thought: Many different
traditions have been hospitable to some of the main human rights ideas.
(a)
(b) Wiredu on Akan society;
(c) the Dalai Lama
on Human Rights
Why does the idea of an
"overlapping consensus" on subjectively universal rights fit with the
top-down model of moral reasoning?
The bad news: There are significant limits to the
consensus. Can you think of any examples
of traditional norms that are still accepted today that conflict with human
rights norms?
Is there a standpoint from
someone could criticize traditions that don't endorse basic human rights
without being a moral imperialist?
Why does the bottom-up model
of moral reasoning make it possible to think that there might someday be
general agreement on objectively universal human rights, even if there is no
"overlapping consensus" on them today?