The Three Elements in
MacIntyre's Account of TheVirtues
(1)
Practices
(a) Internal and External Goods
(2)
The Good Life for Human Beings (Aristotle would add: In Groups)
(3)
Tradition
AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF
VIRTUE
1. Every function or activity can be performed
well or poorly.
2. Special Virtues: Corresponding to each type of activity X, there are special
(non-moral) virtues that are exercised in Xing well (e.g., the characteristics
of a good violinist, a good chess player, or a good doctor.)
3. Moral Virtues: The moral virtues are the most general virtues, because they
pertain to an activity that everyone engages in--the living of one's life. The moral virtues are those characteristics
required to live one's life well.
4. An Aristotelian Definition of Moral
Virtue: A moral virtue is a stable
disposition to respond (to act and feel) appropriately.
5. Virtues are developed by habituation. To develop a virtue, one must imitate the
responses (acts and feelings) of a virtuous person.
6. Aristotle's "Golden Mean" formula
for moral virtues: A moral virtue is
the mean between two vices, one of deficiency and one of excess.
7. Virtue is practical wisdom. It involves reason, though not in the way
that Socrates thought.
IS ARISTOTLE'S "GOLDEN
MEAN" FORMULA AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE PURELY DESCRIPTIVE NECESSARY AND
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR MORAL RIGHTNESS/WRONGNESS?
1. The problem of determining the
endpoints: "Virtue" is
defined in terms of "vice".
2. The problem of finding the "mean"
between the extremes: "mean"
is a metaphor.
3. The problem of conflicting virtues: for example, Antigone's dilemma.
4. The exceptions (e.g., adultery).
LOUDEN'S
CRITICISM OF VIRTUE ETHICS
1. PRACTICAL ETHICS: Virtue Ethics cannot supply very much useful advice on practical
moral questions.
2. TRAGIC HUMANS: Even the best person can make wrong choices.
3. MORALLY INTOLERABLE ACTIONS: Some prohibitions are absolute.
4. CHARACTER CHANGE: Need some way to assess which ones are morally good and which
ones are not.
5. SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROBLEM: Virtue ethics is not appropriate for the
modern world.
How
would Aristotle reply?
THE
ARISTOTELIAN VERSION OF THE EUTHYPHRO QUESTION: Is an act A virtuous (right) because a person with the proper
training (i.e, a person of practical wisdom or a reasonable person) would
choose it, or would a person with the proper training choose it because it is
virtuous (right).
THE TRUTH-MAKING
ANSWER: Act A Is Right Because A Person
With Proper Training Would Choose It.
(The practically wise person's choosing A makes it true that A is
right.)
TRUTH-DETECTION
ANSWER: A Person With Proper Training
Would Choose A Because It Is Right.
(The practically wise person detects the truth that A is right.)
ARISTOTLE'S
ANSWER: THE IMPORTANCE OF VIRTUE THAT
IS NOT BLIND
1.
According to Aristotle, what does moral training produce? Practical wisdom/moral judgment.
2.
What is practical wisdom/moral judgment? It cannot be understood in terms of "blind" dispositions. It involves reason or judgment.
3.
How could reason or judgment play a role in moral judgment, other than
by the explicit application of principles?
The difference between
EXPLICITLY APPLYING a principle/rule and being IMPLICITLY GUIDED by a
principle/rule. The Ken Griffey, Jr.
Example.
ARISTOTLE
ON VIRTUE IN THE STRICT SENSE
"For
all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some
sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control
or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as
that which is good in the strict sense—we seek for the presence of such
qualities in another way. For both
children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but
without reason these are evidently hurtful.
Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led astray by
them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of
its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a
difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be
virtue in the strict sense. Therefore,
as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and
practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue
and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical
wisdom. This is why some say that all
the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was
on the right track while in another he went astray. . . . All men, then, seem
somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which is in
accordance with practical wisdom. But
we must go a little further. For it is
not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that
implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical
wisdom is a right rule about such matters.
Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles
(for he thought they were, all of the, forms of scientific knowledge), while we
think they involve a rational principle."
(Nicomachean
Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch. 13, 1144b13-29.)
MORAL
PRINCIPLES vs. MORAL VIRTUES: TWO TYPES
OF PRIORITY
A. The MORAL PRIORITY of Virtue That is Not
"Blind" over non-virtuous EXPLICIT APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES [moral
priority = is regarded as having greater value, when evaluated from the moral
point of view]:
B. THE EXPLANATORY PRIORITY OF PRINCIPLES OVER
VIRTUES [Need principles to provide non-arbitrary explanation of the
distinction between right/wrong, or virtue/vice; otherwise, the distinction
would be arbitrary]
1.
It is possible to imagine a world of ideally virtuous
agents--saints--(who exercise practical wisdom/moral judgment) without
EXPLICITLY APPLYING any principles/rules.
2.
A world of EXPLICIT RULE APPLIERS without any of the virtues would be
far from morally ideal. Even simple
moral rules will be better SATISFIED by a virtuous person.
3.
Even if there are principles IMPLICITLY GUIDING the virtuous person, it
does not follow that EXPLICITLY APPLYING those principles could be a substitute
for virtue/practical wisdom/moral judgment.
ARISTOTLE
(AS INTERPRETED BY TALBOTT) AS THE MEAN BETWEEN KANT AND HUME:
PRACTICAL
WISDOM AS A COMBINATION OF REASON AND PASSIONS/SENTIMENTS
Virtue "in the
strict sense" is not blind. It is
an emotional and behavioral responsiveness IMPLICITLY GUIDED by principles
detected by REASON, though the principles generally may not be EXPLICITLY
FORMULATED and are not EXPLICITLY APPLIED.
Attempts
to Formulate the Principles Implicitly Guiding the Virtuous Person
1. The Two Versions of the Golden Rule
2. Kant's Deontological Principle: Be rational (in the Kantian sense) = Act on
maxims that can be universalized without contradiction.
3. The Act Utilitarian Principle
(Consequentialist): Maximize overall
utilility.
4. Rawls's Deontological Principle: Be reasonable (in the Rawlsian sense) = Be willing to cooperate on fair terms of
social cooperation.
a.
Example of Reasonableness:
Talbott’s
Universalizability Test = In a Collective Action Problem, Don't Freeride on the
Cooperation of Others.
NOTE WELL: Even if moral philosophers are successful in
formulating adequate principles, there will still be a big difference between
EXPLICITLY APPLYING them and being IMPLICITLY GUIDED by them.
(Recall
the difference between a professor of physics and Ken Griffey, Jr., as “fly
ball interceptors”.)
GENERAL
EUTHYPHRO QUESTION
For
a particular statement S and a given authority A: Is S true [or appropriate] because the relevant authority A
agrees that S is true [or appropriate]; or does the relevant authority A agree
that S is true [or appropriate] because S is true [or appropriate]?
TRUTH [OR APPROPRIATENESS] MAKING ANSWER: S is true [or appropriate] because the
relevant authority A agrees that S is true [or appropriate]. (Agreement of the relevant authority A makes
S true [or appropriate].)
TRUTH DETECTION ANSWER: The relevant authority A agrees that S is
true (or appropriate) because S is true.
(The relevant authority A detects (though perhaps not infallibly)
that S is true.)