PHIL
240A. HANDOUT #9: MORAL EMOTIONS AND MORAL NON-COGNITIVISM
1. METAETHICS = Theories of the meanings of
normative moral terms and statements.
2. COGNITIVISM with respect to moral discourse
= Moral statements (i.e., particular moral judgments, moral rules and moral
principles) make reports or claims that are either true or false.
3. NON-COGNITIVISM with respect to moral
discourse = Moral statements are neither true nor false; they are rather
expressions of: sentiments (Hume), or
emotions (e.g., Ayer’s Emotivism), or attitudes (e.g., Stevenson’s
Attitude Theory), or commendation or condemnation (e.g., Hare’s
Prescriptivism).
4. MORAL
ANTI-REALISM (METAPHYSICAL RELATIVISM WITH RESPECT TO MORALITY) = No moral
judgments are true—that is, no particular moral judgments or moral rules or
moral principles are true—because there are no objective moral standards or
objective moral truths. There are two
varieties of moral anti-realism: (a)
Cognitivist Anti-Realism: The view that
all moral statements (i.e., all particular judgments, rules, principles) are
false. (b) Non-Cognitivist
Anti-Realism: The view that moral
statements are neither true nor false.
Strict
Universality: To claim that morality is
strictly universal is to claim that there are fundamental moral
principles that apply to all rational beings.
Historicism: A historicist about morality claims
that because moral principles and judgments are the result of a process of
historical development, none are strictly universal.
Conventionalism: A conventionalist about morality
claims that moral principles and judgments are merely the product community
agreement; none are strictly universal.
CONTRAST
BETWEEN THE JUSTICE AND CARE PERSPECTIVES IN ETHICS
|
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE |
CARE PERSPECTIVE |
|
PARADIGM:
CONTRACTS |
PARADIGM:
CARING RELATIONSHIP (e.g. Parent-Child Relationship) |
|
EMPHASIS ON |
EMPHASIS ON |
|
1.
REASON and LOGIC |
1.
EMOTIONS |
|
2.
EXPLICIT PRINCIPLES |
2.
RESPONSIVENESS TO
SITUATIONS |
|
3.
IMPARTIALITY |
3.
PARTIALITY |
|
4.
FAIRNESS |
4.
COMPASSION, SYMPATHY OR
EMPATHY |
|
5.
AUTONOMY |
5.
INTER-CONNECTEDNESS |
|
6.
RIGHTS/OBLIGATIONS |
6.
RESPONSIBILITIES |
|
7.
GOVERNS RELATIONS
AMONG EQUALS |
7.
GOVERNS RELATIONS AMONG
UNEQUALS |
|
8.
COMPETITION (CONFLICTING
INTERESTS) |
8.
COOPERATION (COMMON INTERESTS) |
|
9.
SELF-RELIANCE |
9.
TRUST |
TWO
COMMUNITARIAN VERSIONS OF THE EUTHYPHRO QUESTION
For a moral statement statement S (e.g., the
statement that torturing children is wrong) made in a community C in which
there is general agreement that S is true/appropriate: Is S true/appropriate because the community
agrees that S is true/appropriate; or does the community agree that S is
true/appropriate because S is true/appropriate?
The Normative Cultural Relativist version uses
the word "true" wherever there is a choice.
The Communitarian Non-Cognitivist uses the word
"appropriate" wherever there is a choice.
TRUTH/APPROPRIATENESS
MAKING ANSWER: S is true/appropriate
(if it is true/appropriate) because the community C agrees that S is
true/appropriate. (Agreement among the
members of C makes S true/appropriate.)
TRUTH DETECTION ANSWER: Where S is true, the community C agrees that S is true/appropriate because S is true. (The community detects (though not infallibly) the truth of S.)