

Comments on “Buying Votes: Distributive Politics in Democracies”, Chapter 9

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Some Ruminations...

- Is the consolidation of programmatic distributive politics in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico a symptom of the destruction of the rural elite and the escalation of policies with a sharp urban bias introduced to forge a new political coalition?
- Is destruction of rural elites and urban bias solely an electoral phenomenon or also concerted political strategy by dictators and militaries?
- Is programmatic distributive politics in Latin America partially a symptom of unique model of quasi-authoritarian politics endemic to Latin America that democracies inherit?


Skepticism about key claim: *Neoliberalism equals return of clientelism*

“The key point from the perspective of the broker-mediated theory of clientelism is that when parties used clientelism to chase after potential defectors among their core constituents, the inefficiency that brokers typically imposed on machine politics was much attenuated. Under these circumstances, party leaders' interest in staunching an outflow of core constituents to the left coincided with brokers' perennial tendency to overspend on loyalists” (p. 348).


SOUTH AMERICA

In Argentina and Brazil, you have a temporary era of electoral populism, which ushered in programmatic policies in urban areas, followed by military governments that consolidated these policies rather than rescinded them.


The rooftops are dictatorships, the valleys are democracy



In Brazil, the military accelerates industrialization



In Argentina, the military doubles
down on industrialization




The flipside of industrialization is the destruction of the rural oligarchs and the advent of an urban based coalition that benefits from policies with a sharp urban bias.

Not sure this is class based. It is based on privileging labor in the formal sector, public sector unions and firms oriented towards the national market granted monopoly rights

BRAZIL



Brazil



Graphs by hmccode

Brazil



Public Spending on Unemployment, Disability, Pensions


But what about the rural poor?

Does the era of military tutelage (indirect elections for president between 1967 and 1985) also coincide with clientilism in the countryside?


YES (Aimes 1987, 1994; Mainwaring 1991).

ARGENTINA

ARGENTINA



Argentina




Argentine Programmatic Policies or Urban Bias?

Under both the military and civilian governments, huge, unfunded increases in social spending, generous transfers to unions and massive public sector investment required overvalued exchange rates and serious deficit spending.

Why not just stick with clientilism?

Why tolerate these costs?




Is this really a new neo-liberal model & return of clientilism?




MEXICO

You have a one party state that ushers in programmatic policies. But, again, is this just the destruction of rural oligarchs and a new political coalition forged by urban bias?


Mexico



Mexico



Mexico



Rural clientilism

A mix of different type of brokers:

PRI relied on local caciques and also PRI affiliated peasant leaders that were appointed and rotated.

There is variation to explore here?!

Does Urban Clientelism return in
the wake of the 1982 Debt Crisis
and the advent of neoliberal
policies?

Mexico

