

## **Discourse Theory and the Author-Reader Contract: The First-Person Drafts of *Crime and Punishment***

**Valentina Zaitseva**

"Gospodi!"-- skazal ia po oshibke,  
Sam togo ne dumaia skazat'.

'God!' I said inadvertently,  
not thinking of what I was saying.

O. Mandel'shtam

### **1.0 Introduction**

The change of the mode of narration from first person in the drafts to third person in the final version of Dostoevsky's novel *Crime and Punishment* has received surprisingly little attention from either literary critics<sup>1</sup> or linguists. Yet the first-person drafts contain episodes depicting the same events as in Dostoevsky's final text, providing perfect laboratory conditions for exploring both the linguistic and the literary implications of the change.

The reasons for the change of narrative mode are not immediately obvious. Dostoevsky employed first-person narration quite often. In some of his works the first-person narrator plays the marginal role of a chronicler or confidant who bustles between characters, listens to their confessions, collects facts and rumours and puts them together for the reader (*The Insulted and the Injured* and to some extent *The Brothers Karamazov*). In others, the first-person narrator is a main character; in Dostoevsky's first epistolary novel, *Poor Folk*, there are two of them. Here also belong *The Gambler*, *The Adolescent*, *The Meek One*, *Notes from Underground*, *White Nights*, *Netchka Nezvanova* and others. It is highly improbable that Dostoevsky, an experienced master of this form, has abandoned first-person narration for the technical reasons suggested by a commentator:

(...) third-person (narration), the voice of the author, was needed not only because of the immense broadening of material inaccessible to the character's observation,

(At this point, let us recall that such considerations did not stop Dostoevsky from using first-person narration in *The Adolescent*, a much longer novel than *Crime and Punishment* with a huge cast of characters and a complex web of interrelationships and secondary plots.)

but also to unfold his (the character's) psychology in a more complete, precise and realistic way. The intensity, complexity and, often, unaccountability of the inner life of the character required the perspective of an omniscient author. (v. 7, p. 313, transl. mine)

It is not clear that the psychological state of Raskol'nikov is more intense than that of the feverish narrator of *The Meek One* or more complicated than that of the Underground man. That the original first-person mode of *Crime and Punishment* was not a random choice can be seen from Dostoevsky's numerous notes on tone and type of narration concerning the drafts not only of *Crime and Punishment* but of other works as well, as for example *The Adolescent*:

NB. Main points. To write as self or as the author? (v. 16, p. 59)

(...) as *I* or *NOT*? (...) Without *I* a number of subtle and naive remarks would disappear (v. 16, p. 152).

Program. (as *I*.) (v. 16, p.178).

The important and decisive NB: if as *I*, then the adolescent could describe all the scenes between Lisa and the Prince sort of from the 3-d person: Lisa came (. . .), and then keep adding: "at the time I didn't know anything about it" (v. 16, p. 226). (transl. mine.)

The fact that Dostoevsky himself was dissatisfied with first-person narration long before he came to the final version in the third person is reflected in his several changes of motivation for Raskol'nikov's keeping a written record of the events. First it was conceived as a diary, then as a confession written while on trial, and later still as a memoir written eight years after the events. Dissatisfied with each subsequent variant, Dostoevsky still persisted in using the first person. If the first-person mode was so important to him, why did he find it necessary to switch to the third person? What kinds of problems did he encounter in employing the first-person narrative in this particular novel?

## 1.1 Theoretical problems

One of the possible answers to this question is that the first-person form is inherently related to aspects of meaning which proved to be in conflict with the author's intentions. Exploring this hypothesis, however, involves facing a host of other problems, central for both linguistic and literary theory: are there objective means of establishing the speaker's/author's intention? the speaker's/author's meaning? the narrator's perspective? See, for example, Barwise (1989: 59):

Where is meaning anyway, in the mind of the speaker or author, or in the world shared by a speaker and his audience and an author and his readers? There seem to be almost irresolvable conflicts in the facts of language use.

A glimpse into the debates which have been continuing for decades within literary theory would demonstrate that these questions are far from being resolved or even approached in any unanimous fashion:

(...) the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946);

(...) the inaccessibility of verbal meaning is a doctrine that experience suggests to be false, though neither experience nor argument can prove its falsity (Hirsch, 1967);

(...) meanings are not as stable and determined as Hirsch thinks, even authorial ones, and the reason they are not is because, as he will not recognize, they are the product of language, which always has something slippery about it (Eagleton, 1983).

The question of the accessibility of verbal meaning inevitably runs into the problems discussed in the framework of reader-response criticism: what is the relationship between the language and the text; between the author, the text and the reader? Does the reader "produce texts by reading them," while the author produces model readers (Eco, 1979)? "What does the text do" (Fish, 1970)?

The study of meaning and speaker-related linguistic phenomena has been treated for a long time with varying degrees of suspicion not only by literary theory, but within linguistics as well, where it was viewed as at best marginal, and in any case more

appropriate for language philosophy, psychology and other neighboring disciplines. However, the rapid and successful development of semantics and pragmatics in the past two decades made it possible to investigate linguistically the area which Mikhail Bakhtin, one of the most insightful students of Dostoevsky's prose, once classified as

(...) those aspects of the life of the word which—quite legitimately—fall outside of linguistics and which have not as yet taken their places within specific individual disciplines (Bakhtin 1963/1973: 150).

## 1.2 Framework of analysis

I will explore here the possibility of establishing authorial intentions, as well as some aspects of the author/reader relationship, through linguistic analysis of the literary text. In my comparison of passages from the first-person drafts and the third-person final text, I will apply a theoretical framework presented in Yokoyama 1986.

Any two individuals will share at least some common knowledge. However, at any given moment only some part of a person's knowledge is activated. These activated knowledge subsets constitute "the matter of current concern" for two interlocutors. Yokoyama's Transactional Discourse Model (TDM) treats every discourse exchange between two individuals (each viewed as a large set of knowledge with a smaller subset of current concern) as the speaker's act of relocation of knowledge items from his/her set of current concern to that of the addressee (rather than as "sending a message" as in the structuralist tradition). Knowledge of communicative procedures obliges the speaker to assess the state of the content of the addressee's knowledge sets (motivated by the "Relevance Requirement") at every moment of discourse; as a result, both interlocutors accumulate mutual knowledge of the discourse situation. According to Yokoyama, "just as a complete lack of the CODE totally rules out verbal communication, a completely wrong assumption about the interlocutor may also render communication impossible." The knowledge of the CODE and that of the discourse situation constitute what Yokoyama calls *metinformatinal knowledge*. This is the aspect of her theory that will especially concern us here, since it can be shown to be precisely the level at which the author-reader relationship operates. The aspects of TDM which have to do with relocation of metinformatinal knowledge have far-reaching implications for literary analysis and in particular reader-response theory:

What is perhaps one of the most important facts for a theory of interpersonal communication is that *metinformatinal knowledge is encoded into every utterance*, and not just into explicitly metinformatinal ones (...)

For an utterance to provide this information, however, it is necessary that the grammar according to which the utterance is constructed have the means to convey both kinds of knowledge, informational and metinformatinal. It follows that the structure of the linguistic code itself must contain unambiguous mechanisms for conveying metinformatinal knowledge. These mechanisms are legitimate objects of the study of verbal communication: they are regular, for otherwise the addressee would not be able to decode them; their existence is universal in the sense that every grammar, in order to serve effectively for communication, must have them; and the ability to use them is part of what can be called "communicational competence" (Yokoyama 1986:149).

Yokoyama's theory can be used in support of Bakhtin's insights about "the dialogical nature of a word," but it also proves him to be wrong in thinking that

(...) in language as the subject matter of linguistics there are and can be no dialogical relationships: they are possible neither among elements in a system of language (among words in a dictionary, among morphemes etc.) nor among elements of a "text" in a strictly linguistic approach (Bakhtin 1963/1973:151).

In a way, the model answers Bakhtin's wildest dreams, providing on the one hand a unique and rigorous tool for the study of the "dialogical nature of the word", and avoiding on the other the inadequacies of the Saussurian model, which Bakhtin criticized so aptly (and which have been inherited by both structuralism and Chomskian linguistics). The suitability of TDM for text analysis becomes especially evident through a brief look at Bakhtin's critique of Saussure's model of communication, a critique directed not so much at the concepts of addressor and addressee as at the roles assigned to them in that model, in which only the addressor is the active party, while the addressee is supposed to play the role of passive recipient of the message:<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, the hearer, while perceiving and understanding the verbal meaning of speech, simultaneously takes an active position in response to it: either agreeing or disagreeing (completely or partly), adding something to it or preparing to act upon

it, etc. This mental response of the hearer is building during the entire process of listening and understanding, starting from its very beginning, sometimes literally from the very first word of the speaker. (...) Any understanding is pregnant with an answer and produces it in this or that form, for the hearer then becomes the speaker. (Bakhtin 1953/1986:260. *The Problem of Speech Genres*, trans. mine)

At first glance, the application of a discourse model designed for ordinary interpersonal communication to a literary text seems to be problematic, especially given TDM's procedural rules for successful communication, rules which must be followed by both interlocutors, the speaker performing the act of assessment, and the addressee the act of acknowledgement. The speaker is obliged to assess as accurately as possible the presence and location of a knowledge item in the interlocutor's knowledge sets. When the speaker's assessment is correct, the intended transmission of informational knowledge proceeds unhindered. In such a case, the addressee must acknowledge the fact that the information has been registered. This may be acknowledged by non-verbal means, "such as eye contact, nodding etc., or vocal, ranging from grunts to linguistic structures: 'Yeah', 'I see' etc." On the other hand, a misassessment by the speaker obliges the addressee to help the speaker to correct the mistake. How can all this be achieved in literary discourse, in the addressee's physical absence?

In Yokoyama 1986, the author-reader relationship is mentioned only briefly, as a relationship based on a "conventional" contract between the two:

The reader gives his/her consent, at the very beginning of the series of transactions, that s/he will accept all of the assessment errors and impositions. By being "ultra-cooperative" in this way, the reader allows the author to feel "ultra-secure", enabling the author to achieve an extensive and one-sided relocation of knowledge in a smooth fashion, and eliminating the need for the addressee's metinformatinal response. (Yokoyama 1986:144)

Schematically, this can be represented as in (1):

(1) Yokoyama's rules of metinformatinal procedure.

**interpersonal discourse:**

<u>the speaker's obligations:</u>		<u>the addressee's</u>
a) correct assessment	----->	a) acknowledgement
[if misassessment]	----->	b) correction

[if imposition]

----->

c) adjustment

**literary discourse:**

the author's obligations:

none

the reader's:

adjustment for and acceptance  
of all misassessment and  
impositions

**1.3 The author's end of the author/reader contract**

Remaining within the framework of Yokoyama's model, my analysis will nevertheless show that the author's security is not unbounded. My study of Dostoevsky's drafts and comparison of them with the final text of Crime and Punishment will demonstrate that no matter how ultra-cooperative the reader is, the transmission of knowledge is either incomplete or fails altogether unless the author follows certain rules for relocating knowledge. In literary discourse, I suggest, the author must follow the procedures schematically presented in (2):

(2) Suggested amendments for literary discourse:

the author's obligations:

- a) correct assessment and prediction of the reader's inference;
- b) acknowledgement of the reader's provisional inference.

As my analysis will demonstrate, there is strong evidence that by breaking the rules for metinformational procedures the author hinders the relocation of the information itself.

**2.0 Metinformational and informational knowledge in the first-person drafts of *Crime and Punishment*.**

In Jakobson 1957 personal pronouns are described as "a complex category where code and message overlap." According to Jakobson, the first-person pronoun as a code item indicates that one and the same person is referred to as the participant of the speech event (P<sup>s</sup>) and, simultaneously, the participant of the narrated event (P<sup>n</sup>). Thus, in the first-person drafts, Raskol'nikov's "I" plays the double role of a P<sup>s</sup> and of a P<sup>n</sup>. The author's indication of which level (speech event or narrated event) is meant where involves relocation of metinformational knowledge. The level of speech event—"I, Raskol'nikov, am writing in a diary"—is indicated by explicit "stage directions" ("June 6,"

etc., v. 7, p. 6), or by the present tense or past perfective referring to the present, and divides the "now" time of writing from the "then" time of described events.

Description of the inner world of the speaker, then, would automatically belong to the level of speech event. In this respect, first-person narration seems to be the best medium for detailed depiction of one's inner world. Who knows better what is on a person's mind than the person in question? Nevertheless, in the drafts of *Crime and Punishment* this well-tested mode proves totally unequal to the task of describing faithfully each step of Raskol'nikov's actions and at the same time his psychological state. Let us consider the draft passage in (3), in which Raskol'nikov describes, three days later, his escape from the scene of the crime:

(3) (...) po ulice. Kak `eto u menja na `eto sily xvatilo! Sily do togo bystro ostavljali menja, čto ja vpadal v zabyt'e. Vspominaja teper' v podrobnosti vse, čto proisxodilo tam, ja vižu, čto ja počti zabyl, ne tol'ko kak proxodil po ulicam, no daže po kakim ulicam. Pomnju tol'ko, čto ja vorotilsja domoj sovsem s protivupoložnoj storony. Ja ešče pomnju tu minutu, kogda dobralsja do <Voznesenskogo prospekta>, a dal'se už ploxo pomnju. Kak skvoz' son, pomnju čej-to oklik podle menja: "Iš', narezalsja" Dolžno byt', ja byl očen' bleden ili šatalsja. Ja opomnilsja, kogda stal vxodit' v vorota našego doma. Nikogo ne bylo. No ja uže počti ne v sostojanii byl bojat'sja i brat' predostorožnosti. Ja uže i prošel bylo na lestnicu, no vdruk vspomnil pro topor. Ego ved' nadobno bylo položit' nazad, i `eto bylo samoe važnoe delo, a ja daže i ob `etom zabyl, tak byl razbit.

(...) along the street. I don't know how I managed to keep my strength for all that! My strength was leaving me so quickly that now and then I was lapsing into oblivion. Recalling now in detail everything that was going on there, I see that I almost forgot not only how I was passing the streets, but also which streets they were. I remember only that I returned home from a completely opposite direction. I also remember the moment when I got to/made it to Voznesensky Avenue, but after that I remember little. As in a dream, I remember somebody's voice near me: "See how sozzled he is!" Perhaps I was very pale or staggered. I came to my senses at the moment of entering the gates of our house. There was no one there. But I was already unable to fear and to take precautions ... I already started to ascend the stairs, when suddenly I remembered about the axe. It was necessary to



put it back, and it was the most important thing, but I forgot even about this, I was broken/worn out to that extent. (v. 7, p. 5)<sup>3</sup>

What strikes the reader of this passage is that the narration is caught in a vicious circle of "I remember"—"I forgot", which are metainformational predicates. They are underlined in the quoted passage, and continue to swarm throughout the first draft. For example, the first chapter ends in the following way:

Kločki i otrivki myslej tak i kišeli v moej golove celym vixrem. No ja ni odnoj ne pomnju ...  
Bits and pieces of thoughts swirled in my mind like a whirlwind. But I do not remember a single thought ...(v. 7, p. 6).

Raskol'nikov's apparent effort to give a full description of what happened to him three days earlier yields very little information. What is the reason for such a failure?

Both aspects of Raskol'nikov's "I" (as P<sup>s</sup> and P<sup>n</sup>) are united by the same poor physical and psychological state, from which Raskol'nikov had still not recovered by the time of writing his account, and his loss of memory is supposed to testify to that state. However, it inevitably reunites the "I" of the speech participant with the "I" of the participant in the narrated events and erases the distinction between the "now" of the narration and the "then" of the events. Let us consider now what kind of information we get about the events themselves. The passage can be grouped into semantic units as in (4), and I am going to examine them in terms of their affiliation with informational and metainformational knowledge:

(4) Semantic centers in the draft passage:

#### MEMORY

##### Narrated Event ("then")

ja vpadal v zabyt'e  
I was lapsing into oblivion ...  
ja opomnilsja, kogda stal vxodit'  
I came to my senses at the moment of entering  
vdrug vspomnil pro topor  
suddenly I remembered about the axe...  
<a ja daže i ob `etom zabyt'>

##### Speech Event ("now")

vspominaja teper; ...  
Recalling now in detail everything ...  
ja vižu, što ja počti zabyt'  
I see that I almost forgot ...  
pomnju tol'ko, što ja vorotilsja  
I remember only that I returned...  
ja ešče pomnju tu minutu

but I forgot even about this...

I also remember the moment...

a dal'se uže ploxu pomnju

but after that I remember little

kak skvoz' son, pomnju

as in a dream, I remember ... voice

<a ja daže i ob `etom zabył>

but I forgot even about this...

#### SPATIAL SCOPE

##### Narrated Event

po ulicam

along the street.

kak proxodil po ulicam (...) po kakim ulicam

how I was passing the streets ... which streets

vorotilsja domoj s protivopoložnoj storony

I returned home from the opposite direction

dobraljsja do V<oznesenskogo> prospekta

I got to Voznesensky Avenue

oklik podle menja

somebody's voice near me

stal vxodit' v vorota

entering the gates

prošel (...) na lestnicu

started to ascend the stairs

##### Speech Event

/ all the narrated events from this unit occur in the complement clauses

introduced by Ps, through predicates like remember/forgot /

#### PHYSICAL STATE

##### Narrated Event

sily ostavljali menja

My strength was leaving me

**dobraljsja do**

I got to/ made it (to Voznesensky Avenue)

"Iš', narezalsja"

(voice near me:) "See how sozzled he is!"

##### Speech Event

Kak ... sily xvatilo!

how I managed to keep my strength

sily (...) do togo bystro, čto...

My strength (was leaving me) so

quickly that

Dolžno byt', ja byl bleden ili šatalsja

Perhaps I was very pale or staggered.

<uže počti ne v sostojanii byl bojat'sja>

I was already almost unable to feel fear

daže i ob `etom zabył, tak byl  
 razbit  
 broken/  
 extent

forgot even about this, I was  
 worn out to that

### FEAR

<No ja uže (...) ne v sostojanii byl bojat'sja...>

But I was already unable to feel fear ...

In this passage, the largest semantic unit, MEMORY, has only three instances belonging to the narrated events, the rest (seven) belonging to the speech event. While narrated events may constitute both informational and metainformational knowledge (when it matters whether the interlocutor is or is not in possession of certain information), speech events belong exclusively to the metainformational level. The overwhelming amount of metainformational knowledge in this passage not only exceeds the informational, but is practically ousting it from the narration. Elements of informational knowledge are meager in the units PHYSICAL STATE and FEAR, while the unit SPATIAL SCOPE presents a notable exception. However, the complements of the informational verbs "returned", "got to," "began entering", "passed through", merely imply disjointed points in time and space, indirectly testifying to glimpses of Raskol'nikov's consciousness. Thus they are linked to the unit MEMORY. There is also a triple repetition of "along the streets," which adds no specific information, because the propositional knowledge of "walking" implies knowledge of its term "somewhere"; and since we already know that Raskol'nikov walks in the city, "along the streets" has no more informational value than "somewhere." Apart from having low informativeness, "along the streets" also functions as an illustration and proof of the loss of MEMORY by Raskol'nikov as P<sup>n</sup>. As it is, the excessive amount of metainformational knowledge not only leaves little room for the informational, but also blurs the distinction between different semantic units of informational knowledge.

#### 2.1 The reason why P<sup>n</sup> and P<sup>s</sup> merge: too short a time span?

No matter how hard Raskol'nikov tries to separate the "then" of the event from the "now" of the writing, they seem unavoidably to be reunited. Dostoevsky apparently tried to cure the problem by increasing the time span between Raskol'nikov's writing and his

crime. Thus appears the next variant, which starts with the chapter *Pod sudom* 'On Trial' and ends with the note:

A new plan. The tale of a criminal 8 years later. (In order to put him aside completely.) (v. 7, p. 144).

Even this considerable increase in time between the crime and its recording did not work. However, the short span between events and their description had not caused any problems for the first-person narration in *The Gambler*, on which Dostoevsky was working simultaneously with *Crime and Punishment*:

(5) Glava VI

Vot ue dva dnja prošlo posle togo glupogo dnja. I skol'ko kriku, šumu, tolku, stuku! I kakaja vse `eto besporjadica, neurjadica, glupost' i pošlost', i ja vsemu pričinoju. A vpročem, inogda byvaet smešno -- mne po krajnej mere. Ja ne umeju sebe dat' otčeta, čto so mnoj sdelalos', v isstuplennom li ja sostojanii naxožus', v samom dele, ili prosto s dorogi soskočil i bezobrazničaju, poka ne svjažut. Poroj mne kažetsja, čto u menja um mešaetsja. A poroj kažetsja, čto ja ešče ne daleko ot detstva, ot škol'noj skamejki, i prosto grubo škol'ničaju.

Chapter VI

Two days have already passed since that silly/stupid day. And how much outcry, noise, fuss and stir there has been! And what a mess it all is, what confusion, stupidity and vulgarity—and I have caused it all. Well, sometimes it looks funny; at least it does to me. I don't know how to explain to myself what is going on with me, whether I am in a frenzied state, indeed, or have simply jumped out of bounds and am behaving outrageously until they tie me up and put a stop to it. At times it seems to me that I am going out of my mind. And at another time it seems that I am still not far away from my childhood, from school days, and that I am simply playing crude schoolboy pranks. (v. 5, p. 233, tr. mine)

Here we also have a diary, and only two days between the event and its description (in the passage quoted in (3), Raskol'nikov had three). Although the first-person character in *The Gambler* is also in an abnormal psychological state, there is no problem of merging of the levels of speech and narrated events. The main difference is immediately evident:

it lies in the highly subjective tone of the narrator, full of judgmental, evaluative elements which broaden and emphasize the space of "now", the temporal scope of writing.

By contrast, the first-person narrative space of *Crime and Punishment* is totally void of judgmental elements. The draft passage in (3) is representative of the entire text of the first six chapters, inasmuch as the dispassionate tone of the narrator is reinforced throughout by the compositional principle. Even when he contrasts "now" and "then" he does it only to add a detail missed in the initial presentation, trying to reconstruct the chronological sequence of events:

Potom uže, razmyšljaja ob `etom, ja vspomnil, cto i poluprosypajas', v žaru, krepko-krepko stiskival `eto v ruke i opjat' zasypal.

Later on, going through this in my mind, I recalled that whenever I half awoke in my fever I would find myself still clutching the thing firmly, very firmly in my hand, and then would fall asleep again (v.7, p. 12).

Despite the confessional form of the first person, the lack of judgmental evaluative expressions creates the impersonalized tone of a chronicler, which reduces the level of "now" to a minimum and leaves the inner emotional world of Raskol'nikov completely impenetrable, no matter how accurately and meticulously he records all his actions and movements. Thus the reader has no chance to get involved in the story either at the level of the narrated events or at the level of the speech event.

Why, then, in the final text does the same detailed account of Raskol'nikov's movements and the same lack of judgmental elements produce a drastically different effect?

## 2.2 The author-reader relationship in the final text

From the second line on, the draft and final texts describe the same situation, namely Raskol'nikov's escape home after committing the murder:

(6) Final text of Crime and Punishment:

Nikogo na lestnice! Pod vorotami toe. Bystro prošel on podvorotnju i povernul nalevo po ulice. On očen; xorošo znal, on otlčno xorošo znal, čto oni, v `eto mgnovenie, uže v kvartire, čto očen' udivilis', vidja, čto ona otperta, togda kak sejčas byla zaperta, čto oni uže smotrjat na tela i čto projdet ne bol'she minuty, kak

oni dogadajutsja i soveršenno soobrazjat, čto tut to'ko čto byl ubijca i uspel kuda-nibud' sprjatat'sja, proskol'znut' mimo nix, ubežat'É dogadajutsja, požaluj, i o tom, čto on v pustoj kvartire sidel, poka oni vverx proxodili. A meždu tem ni pod kakim vidom ne smel on očen' pribavit' šagu, xotja do pervogo povorota šagov sto ostavalos'. "Ne skol'znut' li razve v podvorotnju kakuju-nibud' i pereždat' gde-nibud' na neznakomoj lestnice? Net, beda! A ne zabrosit' li kuda topor? Ne vzjat' li izvozčika? Beda! beda!"

Nakonec vot i pereulok; on povorotil v nego polumertvyj; tut on byl uže napolovinu spasen i ponimal `eto: men'se podozrenij, k tomu že tut sil'no narod snoval, i on stitalsja v nem, kak pesčinka. No vse `eti mučenija do togo ego obsessilili, čto on edva dvigalsja. Pot šel iz nego kapljami; šeja byla vsja smočena. "Iš' narezalsja!"- kriknul kto-to emu, kogda on vyšel na kanavu. On ploxo teper' pomnil sebja; čem dal'se, tem xuže. On pomnil odnako, kak vdrug, vyjdja na kanavu, ispagalsja, čto malo narodu i čto tut primetnee, i xotel bylo povorotit' nazad v pereulok. Nesmotrja na to, čto čut' ne padal, on vse-taki sdelal krjuku i prišel domoj s drugoj sovsem storony. Ne v polnoj pamjati prošel on i v vorota svoego doma; po krajnej mere on uže prošel na lestnicu i togda tol'ko vspomnil o topore. A meždu tem predstojala očen' važnaja zadača: položit' (...) (v. 6, p. 70)

No one was on the stairs, nor in the gateway. He passed quickly through the gateway and turned to the left in the street. He knew, he knew perfectly well that at the moment they were at the flat, that they were greatly astonished at finding it unlocked, as the door had just been fastened, that by now they were looking at the bodies, that before another minute had passed, they would guess and completely realize that the murderer had just been there, and had succeeded in hiding somewhere, slipping by them and escaping. They would guess most likely that he had been in the empty flat, while they were going upstairs. And meanwhile he dared not quicken his pace much, though the next turning was nearly a hundred yards away. 'Should he slip through some gateway and wait somewhere at an unknown staircase? No, hopeless! Should he fling away the axe? Should he take a cab? Hopeless, hopeless!'

At last he reached the turning. He turned down it more dead than alive. Here he was half-way to safety, and he understood it; it was less risky because there was a great crowd of people and he was lost in it like a grain of sand. But all these torments had so weakened him that he could scarcely move. Perspiration ran down him in drops, his neck was all wet. 'Properly sozzled, aren't you?' someone shouted

to him when he came out on the canal bank. He was only dimly conscious of himself now, and the farther he went the worse it was. He remembered, however, that on coming out on to the canal bank he was alarmed at finding few people there and so being more conspicuous, and he had thought of going back into the lane. Though he was almost falling from fatigue, he went a long way round and came home from quite a different direction. He was not fully conscious when he passed through the gateway of his house; he was already on the staircase before he recollected the axe. And yet he had a very grave problem before him, to put it back (...).

The third-person narration completely changes the reader's perception. The reader's involvement in each step of Raskol'nikov's escape is total and unquestionable. How does the text do it? The third-person text can be grouped into almost the same semantic units or centers as in (4). All of the elements of these units relocate informational knowledge. SPATIAL SCOPE is here only for Raskol'nikov's running, walking, or barely moving in order to escape and it connotes DANGER and FEAR. (In the draft SPATIAL SCOPE, like all the rest of the units, is related only to the MEMORY). FEAR is presented as a reaction to DANGER and increases to PANIC (units absent from the draft). The shock and torment of PANIC and FEAR cause a poor PHYSICAL STATE. The loss of MEMORY is presented, with one exception, exclusively as half-fainting, thus connecting and uniting FEAR and PHYSICAL STATE. All the motives develop and grow simultaneously and merge in one powerful, polyphonic accord.

Now, how is it that in the draft the same semantic units refuse to connote anything but the loss of MEMORY? Consider the following examples from the quoted passages contrasted in (7):

(7) Draft: Kak u menja na `eto sily xvatilo! Sily do togo bystro ostavljali menja, čto ja vpadal v zabyt'e (v.7, p.5).

I don't know how I managed to keep my strength for all that! My strength was leaving me so quickly that now and then I fell into oblivion.

Final text: No vse `eti mučenija do togo obsessilili ego, čto on edva dvigalsja (v. 6, p.70).

But all these torments so weakened him that he could scarcely move.

In the draft, the exclamation *Kak `eto u menja na `eto sily xvatilo!* 'I don't know how I managed to keep my strength for all that!' presents the speaker's self-pitying and is relocated into the reader's set of current concern as speech event. The identical locus of the identical knowledge item can be encoded grammatically, through pronominalization. Since the repeated noun *sily* 'strength' in the second sentence describes P<sup>n</sup>'s physical state and indicates the narrated event, it is not identical to the first one. Even if it had the same grammatical number, this noun could not be pronominalized, because this *sily* by now is not located in the same knowledge set. According to Yokoyama, misassessment of the location of the knowledge item in the addressee's sets of knowledge results in the author's *imposition* and requires an extra procedure on the addressee's part, which she calls the addressee's *adjustment*. The adjustment consists of the interlocutor's mental effort of bringing into his/her set of current concern a knowledge item possessed but not activated. This extra procedure in processing the information breaks the interconnection between the semantic units in the draft and prevents the build-up of the reader's identification with Raskol'nikov.

In the sentence from the final text in (7), on the other hand, *mučenija* 'torments' is the author's label, confirming the reader's conclusion on the basis of the previous text. Let us return to the beginning of passage (6): *Nikogo na lestnice!* 'There is no one on the stairs!' (The implication for the reader is: FEAR. This is pure luck! Thank God!) *Pod vorotami tože.* 'Nor in the gateway.' (Connotation: FEAR. The luck is holding. Will it last?) The quick change of scene from stairs to gate depicts quick motion with almost cinematographic vividness and connotes *BYSTRO* 'quickly' even before we read the next sentence: *Bystro prošel on podvorotnju i povernul nalevo po ulice.* 'Quickly he went through the gates and turned to the left into the street.' The fact that the author assessed correctly the presence of *BYSTRO* 'quickly' in the reader's set of current concern, and that he proceeds upon this assumption, is signaled by the word order: *Bystro prošel on* and not *On bystro prošel* -- switching the topic he/Raskol'nikov to *bystro*, shared by both the author and the reader and, as a result, topicalized.

By now we have enough evidence to support the hypothesis about procedural rules for the author-reader knowledge relocation presented in (2). All the steps of the analysis of (6) suggest that the author must confirm the reader's inference. This substitutes for the addressee's metinformational act of acknowledgement in the addressee's absence.

### 3.0 The means of the author's acknowledgement and its function



The author's acknowledgment of the reader's inference can be traced throughout the passage. It is performed at various levels, ranging from the author's verbalizing the inference on the lexical level (as with *bystro*) to doing so by grammatical means (the word order in the same example). Let us examine the means of the author's acknowledgement in the rest of passage (6).

In contrast to the two previous sentences with their emphatically visual scenes, *Bystro prošel on podvorotnju i povernul nalevo po ulice* stresses motion and not looking. The quick walk, without looking right or left, is a vivid picture of FEAR. This kind of inference is based on our general knowledge of the world and can be safely assumed to be made by the reader. The reader's inference that Raskol'nikov is quickly walking away without looking and the reader's labeling of this inferred picture as FEAR are also confirmed connotatively, by the compositional device of focusing Raskol'nikov's mind on what must be taking place in the apartment he has just left—they will have realized that the murderer is not far away. Raskol'nikov's mental picture of the actions and guesses at the scene of the crime makes the DANGER more obvious. In the next sentence, the author confirms it: *A između tem ni pod kakim vidom ne smel on očien' pribavit' šagu.* 'And meanwhile he dared not quicken his pace much.' The choice of the conjunction *a* 'and/but'<sup>4</sup> rests on the reader's inference DANGER and becomes equivalent to "in spite of the danger". The FEAR advances crescendo. Now Raskol'nikov's feverish and disconnected thoughts are rendered as direct speech.

Raskol'nikov's internal monologue is expressed in a series of impersonal and nominative sentences. The metinformatinal features of the repeated nominal sentence of his "monologue"—*Beda!* 'Trouble!'—deserve our special attention. The peculiarity of this type of sentence (*Moroz.* 'Freezing cold.' *Osen.* 'Fall.' *Vecer.* 'Evening.') is that it blends the features of existential and predicational knowledge in Yokoyama's sense. According to her outline of the implicational relationship between different kinds of knowledge, both existential and predicational kinds **imply scope and require its specification**.

From this point of view, sentences like *Na ulice byl moroz* 'It was freezing outside' (spatial scope specified) or *Zavtra budet moroz* 'It will be freezing tomorrow' (temporal scope specified) fully corresponds to the requirement. Note that the past and future tenses imply I the speaker and you the hearer (the knowledge of past or future events implies somebody). The present tense of the nominal sentence *Moroz*, by contrast, does not have such an implication: the speaker, and therefore the hearer, is dropped from the current set of DEIXIS, i.e. *I, you, here, now*. The "now" of the DEICTIC set gets promoted and transforms the unspecified, implied "somewhere" into deictic "here." This is the dynamic mechanism behind the shift of the speaker's focus onto the narrated

experience, the "close-up" of the narration, the highest point of the reader's identification with the narrated experience. The noun of the nominal sentence names what exists HERE and NOW and becomes **an extended spatial scope**.

Thus in *Beda!* what exists HERE, NOW for both the reader and Raskol'nikov is nothing but an overwhelming sense of PANIC. The final *Beda! Beda!* indicates that FEAR reaches its culminating point; any further increase of this emotion is beyond human STRENGTH. This tension and suspense is relieved by *Nakonec vot i pereulok; on povorotil v nego polumertvyj* 'At last he reached the turning; he turned down it more dead than alive'–*polumertvyj* 'half-dead' is linked both with FEAR and with loss of physical STRENGTH. By this time the reader is quite prepared for the author's label *vse eti mucenija* 'all these tortures.'

Thus, one of the functions of the metinformational mechanism "reader's inference/author's acknowledgement" emerges as involving the reader in identification with the narrated events. In the final text it affects our perception to the extent that we are not looking at Raskol'nikov—following his actions—we are looking at the world, although through his eyes.

### 3.1 The role of the author's acknowledgement in relocation of informational knowledge

In literary discourse the act of authorial acknowledgement fulfills several functions. The one I am going to examine in this section is the relocation of connotative knowledge by means of acknowledgement. Yokoyama defines connotative knowledge as "unintended (connotative) changes, which increase the knowledge of the state and content of the interlocutor's knowledge set." (For example, "I returned" connotes a previous absence; "*Ja lingvist*" connotatively communicates "I speak Russian.") However, in a literary discourse the author plans and controls the reader's inferences about the motives of the character's actions or the significance of presented events. Technically it is realized through the author's confirming one of the possible "links." Yokoyama defines a link "as an item of informational knowledge that is related to another item of informational knowledge either by identity, or by association." The speaker "adheres to a link when continuing after other utterance," thus satisfying the Relevance Requirement. Let us examine from this point of view one more episode from the draft.

The first-person draft passage presented in (8) depicts the episode in which Raskol'nikov is getting ready to go to police headquarters after receiving the official letter.

(8) "(...) Odnako začem že povestku? Net, pojdu, pojdu. Ja sam pojdu. Gospodi! " Ja bylo brosil'sja na koleni molit'sja, no vskočil i stal odevat'sja. "Nosok nadet", - podumal ja, - on ešče bol'she zatretsja i zagrzajzitsja, i sledy propadut". No tol'ko čto ja nadel, ja totčas že i sdernul ego. Soobraziv že, čto drugogo net, vzjal i nadel ego opjat'. Vpročem, strax pred predstojaščim poseščeniem kvartala vse pogloščal. Golova tože očen' kružilas' i bolela ot žaru.

'(...) Why this police summons? No, I will, I will go. I will go by myself. God!' I was about to fling myself on my knees to pray, but jumped up and started to dress myself. (It is better) to put on the sock, I thought, (the stains on) it will rub off and get dirty, and the stains will be gone. But as soon as I put (it) on, I immediately pulled it off. But after having realized that there wasn't any other (sock) I put it on again. Though/anyway, the fear before the forthcoming visit to the police headquarters absorbed everything. My head also swam and ached from fever.'

(v. 7, p. 13)

Raskol'nikov's exclamation *Gospodi!* 'God!' is not a real appeal to the divinity but rather an interjection expressing his agitation. Its semantic link with PRAY, precisely for this reason, is weak. Therefore, Raskol'nikov's next action, of flinging himself on his knees, is a total surprise to the reader, and its relation to *vskočil i stal odevat'sja* 'jumped up and started to dress' is obscure. The sentence is full of contradictory connotations and very disorienting: the conjunction *no* 'but' in *Ja bylo brosil'sja na koleni molit'sja, no* 'I was about to fling myself on my knees to pray, but' connotes that he did not perform this action. However, the following *vskočil* 'jumped up' unambiguously means that he did. It is not obvious what was the inner logic connecting the described chain of Raskol'nikov's actions. "Jumped up" could be interpreted either as: Raskol'nikov is dressing in a hurry, or as: he is restless. DRESSING provides the link with the SOCK, the sock with stains on it. Dostoevsky's intention to suggest a link with Raskol'nikov's disgust at putting on a sock spotted with the blood of his victims fails completely. The link is lost because it was on the connotative level, not confirmed by the author. Moreover, the next sentence returns the reader to the DRESSING, of which the SOCK is only a subset, strengthening this undesired lexical link. This series of dressing, putting on the sock, taking it off again,

does not produce the intended effect of Raskol'nikov's relating it to the link MURDER: the link is lost, the signal not received, the reader is disoriented. The speaker's following *vprocem* 'anyway' is equivalent to putting aside the reader's inference just made; since in fact there was no inference, it only adds to the reader's frustration. We do not know in spite of what Raskol'nikov's fear was dominant. In *strax vse pogloščal* 'the fear absorbed everything' "everything" represents a verbalized reference to the previous implied but lost link. However, the referent is missing—we do not know what is pronominalized. Let us turn now to the corresponding passage in the final text in (9):

(9) "I počemu kak raz segodnja?- dumal on v mučitel'nom nedoumenii. - Gospodi, poskorej by už!" On bylo brosil'sja na koleni molit'sja, no daže sam rassmejalsja, - ne nad molitvoj, a nad soboj. On pospešno stal odevat'sja. "Propadu tak propadu, vse ravno! Nosok nadet'! - vzdumalos' vdruk emu, - ešče bol'se zatret'sja v pyli, i sledy propadut. No tolko čto on nadel, totčas že i sdernul ego s otvraščeniem i užasom. Sdernul, no, soobraziv, čto drugogo net, vzjal i nadel opjat' - i opjat; rassmejalsja. Vse `eto uslovno, vse odnositel'no, vse `eto odni tol'ko formy, - podumal on mel'kom, odnim tol'ko kraeškom mysli, a sam droža vsem telom, - ved' vot nadel že! Ved' končil že tem, čto nadel!" Smex, vpročem, totčas že smenilsja otčajaniem. "Net, ne po silam..." - podumalos' emu. Nogi ego drožali. "Ot straxu" - probormotal on pro sebja. Glova kružilas' i bolela ot žaru.

'And why just to-day?' he thought in agonizing bewilderment. 'Good God, only get it over soon!' He was flinging himself on his knees to pray, but broke into laughter—not at the idea of prayer, but at himself. He began hurriedly dressing: 'If I'm lost, I am lost, I don't care. Shall I put the sock on?' he suddenly wondered. 'It will get dustier still and the traces will be gone.' But no sooner had he put it on than he pulled it off again in loathing and horror. He pulled it off, but reflecting that he had no other socks, he picked it up and put it on again -- and again he laughed. 'That's all conventional, that's all relative, merely a way of looking at it,' he thought in a flash, but only on the top surface of his mind, while he was shuddering all over, 'there, I've got it on! I have finished by getting it on!' But his laughter was quickly followed by despair. 'No, it's too much for me...' he thought. His legs shook. 'From fear,' he muttered. His head swam and ached with fever. (v. 6, p. 74)

In both passages there are identical semantic units: GOD, PRAY, DRESSING. In the final text, however, *Gospodi, poskorej by uz!* 'Good God, only get it over soon!' "God" is not just an interjection; by virtue of being in a sentence expressing a wish, it is an address to God. Of course the whole sentence is an exclamatory formula, but the wish itself is not formulaic: it is a desperate wish to be free of grave uncertainty. To wish very much for something to happen is equivalent in a speech formula to PRAYING for it. Thus *Gospodi!* is here strongly linked to PRAY by lexical, grammatical and empirical associations. Raskol'nikov's physical response to them *no daze sam rassmeqlsja* --literally, 'but even himself started to laugh'--functions as the author's acknowledgement. The semantic unit GOD (with all the array of ethical values attached to it) is introduced here as operating in Raskol'nikov's world at the instinctive, subconscious level. The half-automatic prayer form of his wish triggers Raskol'nikov's automatic motion, his instinctive urge to assume the prayer posture, and only when he checks this habitual motion does he become aware of its meaning. The reader's reaction of surprise at the murderer's attempt to turn to God is emphatically confirmed by *no* 'but', by *daže* 'even,' and by *sam* 'himself'. Raskol'nikov's sudden awareness of the latent work of his own consciousness, and his reaction to it, is information relocated on the connotative level and is entirely lost in the draft. Many of the other associative links in the final text are prompted by Raskol'nikov's subconscious, and they cannot be acknowledged by him as a speaker in the draft for precisely this reason.

As we have already seen, the subconscious link in the final text between *Gospodi* 'God' and PRAY is very strong. Raskol'nikov laughs at himself after realizing that out of lifelong habit he is turning to God for help in a hard moment. But the help he needs is by its nature help against God; he wants to escape the punishment of his crime. Thus God is ruled out: Raskol'nikov can rely only on himself. Hence the logical outcome--help yourself. DRESSING is an act of getting ready to FIGHT, to face the DANGER. The link FIGHT is associated either with victory or with DEFEAT and is acknowledged in Raskol'nikov's mental response: *Propadu tak propadu, vse ravno!* 'If I am lost, I'm lost, I don't care'--DANGER--FIGHT--act!--DRESSING--the SOCK--the sock is a CLUE against him, it has spots of blood on it: DANGER--FIGHT--all of this is an approximate chain of associations with the following *Nosok nadet!* 'I shall put the sock on!' The close proximity of DRESSING and SOCK, even separated from one another by Raskol'nikov's monologue, still suggests the treatment of the SOCK as a harmless subset of DRESSING. The author's emphasizing the suddenness of the idea of the SOCK (*vzdumalos' vdrug emu* 'he suddenly wondered') weakens this link and promotes the other, the CLUE--DANGER: FIGHT with DANGER! Destroy the CLUE! The nature of the CLUE--the

blood of his victims—MURDER—is verbalized through the author's comment *s ootvraščením i užasom* 'in loathing and horror,' which also supplies the motive for taking the sock off. Dostoevsky masterfully uses both links of the semantic unit SOCK: they connote Raskol'nikov's mental cheating in substituting one link for another as a continuation of the same logic which allowed him *krov' po sovesti razresit'* 'to rationalize the murder as morally permissible'. If the SOCK is just a part of DRESSING (and he has no other sock to put on), it is simply what people wear. The significance of this particular bloody sock could be discarded if all the values linked to GOD are mere conventions. The blasphemous defiance of the act *vzjal i nadel opjat'* 'put it on again,' Raskol'nikov's emphatically identical reaction to the implied link GOD: *i opjat' rassmejalsja* 'and again he laughed' make it evident that his fight is twofold—he dresses to face the POLICE, he rejects the significance of his victims' blood to fight GOD.

Dostoevsky's use of acknowledgement in the final text infinitely deepens our perception of the discourse situation and suggests that it is the metinformational procedure of acknowledgement that is underlying the stylistic effect of polyphony described by Bakhtin. In the final text we know not only what Raskol'nikov knew or remembered, but also what he did not know, what he started to realize, along with his unwillingness to accept this knowledge. Raskol'nikov suppresses the thought of GOD by mental chanting: *Vse uslovno, vse otnositel'no, vse `eto odni tol'ko formy* 'That's all conventional, that's all relative, merely a way of looking at it,' literally 'empty forms.' The author's words interrupting Raskol'nikov's internal speech, *podumal on mel'kom, odnim tol'ko kkraeškom mysli* 'he thought in a flash, but only on the top surface of his mind,' indicate Raskol'nikov's unwillingness to think the thought through, to be aware of the meaning of the reaction of his body and psyche to the link MURDER—GOD. The continuation of the author's remark, *a sam droža vsem telom* 'while he was shuddering all over' states the contradiction between Raskol'nikov's assertion that "everything" is mere "convention," "relative," "empty forms," and his instinctive reaction. What is "everything," that is "empty forms?" Obviously the set of ethical values connected with MURDER embodied in GOD. In the draft passage, analyzed above, it is this meaning of *vse* 'everything' that never reached the addressee.

### 3.2 Conclusion

Yokoyama's TDM provides a sensitive linguistic tool for literary analysis and can help to clarify such important aspects of literary theory as the establishment of authorial intention. My analysis shows that the character of Raskol'nikov as conceived by

Dostoevsky could not be presented in first-person narration. Raskol'nikov as the first-person narrator, who was not supposed to be fully aware of his own motives, was not in a position to perform the metainformational act of acknowledgement of the reader's inferences, which, in turn, completely blocked the relocation of the connotative knowledge. By prompting the reader to make these inferences and confirming them, the third-person mode of the final version produces the special Dostoevskian effect of the reader's full involvement with the text.

#### NOTES

1. To the best of my knowledge, the only work which directly addresses this change is Rosenshield 1978, who devotes to it his Chapter 2, "First vs. Third Person Narration" (pp.14-25).
2. Cf. Parret (1985: 165-66): "A familiar notion in contemporary linguistic theory and philosophy of language is that a theory of discourse is in fact a theory of the production of discursive fragments. The metaphors of transformational generative grammar and of speech act theory is clear on this point: generativity, productivity and 'creativity' are essential characteristics of discourse, and they are seen from the point of view of the speaker, not the understander. This has been the case in almost all powerful approaches to linguistic communication, from the traditional informational one to the most sophisticated intentional explanation of the meaning relation between an expression and its content." And further: "Cohesion in discourse and structure in dialogue are not based on rules governing sequences of acts. It is evident that one should go back to a general theory about the nature of interpersonal interaction, where interaction is more than and different from the double series of parallel speech acts of two speakers (67)." Though justified in rejecting the implications associated with the term "speaker" within other frameworks, Parret overlooks the same principles of interpersonal interaction in the process of coding.
3. All the passages from the final text of *Crime and Punishment* are translated by Constance Garnett; translations of the draft passages are mine.
4. See Yokoyama 1991 for detailed description of the speaker's perspective encoded in this conjunction.

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