European Influence and Economic Development

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Abstract

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape the economic institutions (e.g., property rights) which provide the necessary incentives for economic growth. The consensus in this literature is that *European influence* affects economic development, presumably via the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did *European influence* in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? While previous approaches rely on "language," "settler mortality," "legal origins," or the "number of European Settlers" as indirect proxies of European influence, we propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of constitutional dimension changes in all countries from 1800-2005, and find that nations experience growth spurts when they adopt features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of a colonial background. Our results imply that countries can overcome adverse initial conditions in the distant past by dialing up the European influence through the adoption of European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify exactly which dimensions of European constitutions matter for development.

I. Introduction

Growth determinants such as technical change and factor accumulation respond to economic institutions that provide incentives to invest and innovate.[1] The development accounting literature established that these economic institutions are in turn shaped by the structure and quality of political institutions.[2] Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, p. 283) succinctly summarize the consensus: "Differential economic development, therefore, is a consequence of differential political development." Geography, ethnic fractionalization, and inequality have also been shown to influence development, but the hallmark of the literature is that variations in *European influence* crucially affect institutions.[3] In this paper, we introduce a direct measure of European influence on political institutions and quantify the associated growth effects.

Hall and Jones (1999, p. 100) first suggested that countries with greater European influence develop better institutions because "One of the key features of the 16th through 19th centuries was the expansion of Western European influence around the world."[4] Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), and Easterly and Levine (forthcoming) provide specific examples of how European influence may have generated political institutions based on countries' *differential colonization experiences*. Indirect measures of colonial institutions, such as "initial factor endowments," "settler mortality," "population density" or "indigenous mortality", produce compelling empirical evidence but these proxies do not illuminate any specific channels through which colonial experiences have shaped particular political and economic institutions over the past 200 years.

North (1990) and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) provide specific hypotheses of how European influence resulted in differential political institutions based on legal origins. They suggest that the quality of political institutions is a function of the legal system, specifically common law and civil law. It is assumed that legal systems were firmly "transplanted" through

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[1] For the various approaches that link development and economic institutions see North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002).

[2] Approaches that link economic and political institutions are surveyed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).

[3] For geographic factors see, e.g., Diamond (1997), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Sachs (2003). For ethnic fractionalization see, e.g., Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997), while Easterly (2007) considers inequality.

[4] Hall and Jones use as measures of European influence the fractions of the population speaking English or a Western European language in 1990, respectively. Acemoglu et al. (2001) point to sizable literatures in economics, history, political science, and sociology that suggest European expansion after 1492 had profound impacts on the organization of many societies throughout the world. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that European influence is synonymous with settler introduced human capital creating institutions.

European conquest and colonization. La Porta et al. then use a *European legal origins* dummy (UK common law versus French/German/Scandinavian civil law) to proxy for the quality of countries' political institutions today. However, there is some discussion on why legal transplantation varied so enormously across conquests and colonies and how to account for the heterogeneity with which countries have overcome potentially disadvantageous legal origins (see Guerriero, 2016).

The approaches to identifying European influence on political and economic institutions thus share two stylized facts: (i) European influence is held to be a crucial determinant of political institutions and economic outcomes, and (ii) *exactly how* European influence has translated into different political institutions over the last 200 years remains unspecified and unquantified.[5] We provide a specific and direct mechanism by which countries' political institutions were affected by European influence. The mechanism is not only simple but also quantifiable: we track the degree to which countries adopted features of European constitutions. We focus on *European* constitutional features because they are grounded in European Enlightenment principles such as suffrage, separation of powers, justice, civil liberties, and government legitimacy through democratic means. The Enlightenment movement was also the first to outline duties of government such as protection of life, liberty, and property.

To quantify the effects of European influence, we utilize a novel dataset that contains detailed information on all constitutions and all revisions/amendments for 180 countries from 1800-2005. By tracking exactly how constitutions changed over the past 200 years relative to European reference constitutions, we find that countries that adopt more (less) European features experience significant growth accelerations (decelerations). In our baseline specification, a one standard deviation increase in European influence increases a country's average annual per capita income growth rate by 0.3 to 0.7 percentage points, depending on the time horizon considered. We find that these growth accelerations are observable in the short run (within 10 years) and they continue to have strong effects for up to 50 years. Moreover, our results show that growth accelerations occur only if a country is politically stable. Constitutional changes that

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[5] Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) survey the literature to highlight that the empirical support for theories relying on initial conditions leaves ample room for theories that explain how subsequent changes influenced development. In particular, the share of the variation in income per capita explained by initial conditions rarely surpasses 60% in regressions. For related papers that associate historical initial conditions with current social/civic capital or democracy see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2009), Tabellini (2010), Haber (2014), and Guiso et al. (forthcoming).

occur during times of political turmoil, i.e. frequent constitutional adjustments during a short time period, are not conducive to growth.

When splitting our sample into colonies and non-colonies, we find similar effects for both sets of countries. Increased European influence in the form of constitutional similarity thus even helped colonies to overcome unfavorable initial conditions to create growth accelerations over the past 200 years. The effect for colonies is slightly smaller but equally statistically significant. These results suggest that European influence on political and economic institutions was not uniquely determined by events in the distant colonial past; actively "adjusting" European influence has produced statistically and economically significant effects on development since 1800. This finding contradicts "book-end" type theories of development that focus on initial conditions (e.g., initial factor endowments, geography, legal rules transplantation, or conquests) as the sole determinants of economic fortunes today. Our results are in line with Easterly and Levine (forthcoming) who show that unfavorable initial conditions can be overcome if European settlements existed during colonization. However, Easterly and Levine explicitly emphasize that they cannot identify a potential channel through which initial European influence shaped long-run economic development; filling this void is exactly the point of our paper.

Our findings contribute to the literature by providing tangible evidence of the linkage between constitutional change and economic outcomes. Sweeney (2014) surveys the research on the economic benefits of constitutional change and laments the dearth of clear results, which perhaps is due to the fact that previous empirical analyses were limited by datasets which covered only changes in constitutional amendments (see, e.g, Lutz, 1994 and 1995, Ferejohn, 1997, and Rasch and Congleton, 2006). Our paper correlates all dimensions of constitutions as well as their changes with economic development. We thus provide an entirely novel and comprehensive avenue of assessing the economic impact of constitutional change and European influence on economic outcomes.

There exists a rich prior literature in economics on political institutions and development that focuses on the effects of democratization without clear notions of European influence.[6] These studies seek to explain growth effects in the most recent wave of democratization post

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[6] See, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2014), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Persson (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2006, and 2008), and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005).

1960. This literature uses dummy indicators derived from the POLITY dataset to examine transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes, or it employs proxies representing forms of government or electoral rules. Hence, their focus is narrower in terms of both the time period and the constitutional dimensions considered in this paper.

Empirically, our approach shares the methodological challenges of the previous literature. Good instruments are difficult to justify, particularly for democracy or democratic transitions.[7] Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) note that panel approaches must rely on restrictive and untestable identifying assumptions in the form of exclusion restrictions. Data problems of the previous literature are compounded in our dataset which spans over 200 years. To examine the robustness of our results, we report a number of different regression specifications which account in various ways for the potential presence of time-invariant country-specific and common time-varying development determinants.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys existing explanations of the impact of constitutional rules on policy outcomes, and discusses the constitution data. Section III lays out our empirical approach, and section IV presents our results. Section V concludes.

II. Measuring Political Institutions and European Influence

The previous literature has used a variety of aggregated proxies to measure the quality of political institutions. In their seminal work, Persson and Tabellini (2003) focus on contemporaneous economic outcomes induced by specific features of countries' political systems. They also examine how different forms of government and electoral rules affect the quality of economic institutions in democratic countries. The advantage of this approach is the clear mechanism by which political institutions affect economic outcomes, although Acemoglu (2005) laments that the narrow focus of the Persson and Tabellini analysis omits the potential

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[7] For instance, McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1989) explain the voting behavior of the US constitutional convention delegates by their economic backgrounds. In that sense, political institutions could be endogenous with respect to economic forces. Here we do not seek to explain the channels that give rise to constitutional changes as, for instance, in Voigt (1999). Our goal is more modest: we examine if countries experience growth accelerations when they adopt elements of European constitutions. Hayo and Voigt (2013) indicate that political institutions may well be endogenous, but find them to be influenced by political circumstances, not economic outcomes. We make every effort to purge our regressions from endogeneity considerations by following well-established first-difference and difference-in-difference approaches; see also Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005).

effects of a large number of political institutions. Notably absent are forms of executive and judicial constraints, as well as basic human and economic rights that might exert a substantial impact on the structure of political institutions. Moreover, Persson and Tabellini's approach does not set out to identify European influence.

Our proxies of European influence go beyond forms of government or electoral rules. With our focus on all constitutional dimensions, we eliminate much of the guess work as to how European influence may have led to particular transmission patterns of political institutions across countries. We simply trace countries' adoptions of European constitutional features and correlate them with subsequent growth outcomes. This approach allows us to exploit the rich time dimension of constitutional changes since 1800 and to gauge their effects on development.

II.1 Fundamental Features of European Constitutions

The basic tenets of all European constitutions are the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke (British), Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (French), and Kant (German). These philosophers promoted democracy, justice, individual liberty, equality, and an optimistic view of democracy. Montesquieu (1748) explicitly suggested a separation of powers into branches of government. John Locke (1690) outlined the nature of government and the basis of its legitimacy through governing by consent. Locke also described the duties of government, in particular its responsibility to protect the rights of the people, including life, liberty, and property.

These European Enlightenment principles were first written into the US Declaration of Independence, then into the US constitution of 1788, and subsequently adopted by all European constitutions (Berman, 1992). Not only were the authors of the US constitution (as well as the authors of all preceding US state constitutions) European-born or of European descent, they were also steeped in Enlightenment thought. As the first adopter of Enlightenment principles, the US constitution serves as a convenient reference in our empirical analysis below. In addition to providing us with the longest constitution time series, the US also maintained a position at the productivity frontier throughout the sample period. While our benchmark results feature the US as reference point, the findings are qualitatively similar when we use instead the constitutions of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, or a composite of all colonizers.[8] To

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[8] Results weaken when there are frequent constitutional changes in the reference country during the sample period (e.g., in the case of France). All reference country results are reported in the Appendix; see Tables A.4-A.17.

acknowledge the US as our benchmark reference constitution, we use the term "Neo-European" from now on.

II.2 Quantifying Neo-European Influence

To identify Neo-European influence, we compile a panel dataset of similarity measures between countries' constitutions and their Neo-European counterparts based on the information provided by the Comparative Constitutions Project (2015). The Project's data contains an exhaustive set of coded constitutional questions that we convert into unambiguous dummy variables.[9] Overall, our constitution dataset includes 13,831 observations at the country-year level for 180 countries with information on 200 constitutional rules.[10] This extensive documentation of constitutional provisions allows us to examine the evolution of countries' political institutions over the past 200 years at an unprecedented level of detail. Table A.1 in the Appendix documents the available constitution time series for each country, and Table A.2 provides an overview of the constitutional rules, their detailed definitions, and summary statistics across all observations.

To identify Neo-European influence, we compute a similarity measure between each constitution and our Neo-European reference constitution. Since the constitution variables are binary in nature, we generate binary similarity coefficients based on cross-tabulations of country i's and reference country j's constitutional provisions. Parameter a in Table 1 indicates the number of common constitutional features, while parameters b, c and d count the respective constitutional mismatches due to the absence of a constitutional rule in either country i, country j, or in both countries. To establish a meaningful comparison with the reference constitution, we focus on the vector of constitutional features that is observed in the reference country.[11]

Table 1: Tabulation of Constitutional Features in Country i and Reference Country j

		obs. j	
		1	**0**
obs. i	**1**	a	b
	0	c	d

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[9] For instance, the variable *WARAP* ('Who has the power to approve declarations of war?') was originally coded categorically with multiple possible answers. After recoding, it answers the question 'Does the executive have the power to approve declarations of war?' The Appendix documents the reasons for recodings for all affected variables.

[10] We exclude Project variables that are ambiguous or extraneous to our analysis (see Appendix for details). For example, we omit questions such as 'in what language is the constitution written,' or 'who translated the constitution.' We document for all affected variables the reason for exclusion in the Appendix.

[11] We also exclude years in our analysis below that coincide with changes in the reference constitution.

Numerous binary similarity measures have been developed based on the cross-tabulations in Table 1; see Choi et al. (2010) for a survey. Since we are not interested in rough correlations but actual matches between constitutional features, we do not apply correlation-based (Pearson) or distance-based (Euclidian) similarity measures. Instead, we use the most common binary similarity index developed by Hamann (1961), which assigns equal weights to agreements and disagreements in constitutional rules between countries i and j in year t:[12]

$$s_{ij,t} = \frac{(a+d)-(b+c)}{a+b+c+d} \quad .$$
(1)

The Hamann similarity coefficient is defined over the interval [-1,1], where higher values indicate greater similarity.

Figure 1 plots the kernel density of the Hamann similarity coefficients for all countries in our benchmark US sample over different time periods. We observe a distinctly bimodal distribution in the early 1800s, and the mass of dissimilar countries shrinks over time as Neo-European influence rises. Over the entire time period from 1800-2005, the median/mean similarity score is 0.04/0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.30. Figure 2 produces a histogram of the magnitude of all 523 constitutional changes in our sample. Positive values represent shifts towards the reference US constitution. The mean/median is positive (0.07/0.04), but Figure 2 also highlights the existence of ample constitutional events that represent significant shifts away from the US constitution. We will exploit this variation to examine how changes towards (away from) Neo-European constitutions increased (decreased) subsequent GDP per capita growth rates.

We obtain our GDP per capita data from the Maddison Project Database (2013). Missing GDP observations were updated using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Barro and Ursúa (2010), and Bulmer-Thomas (2014).[13] With the similarity measures and growth data in hand, we obtain a first qualitative impression of the effect of Neo-European influence on development by pooling countries and plotting the average relative growth rates before and after constitutional events. Figure 3 shows the average growth differentials between

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[12] We experimented with several alternative binary similarity coefficients and found very similar results. Rogers and Tanimoto (1960) double the weight on disagreements, and Sneath and Sokal (1962) double weights on agreements. Results for the other measures are available upon request.

[13] We also impute missing GDP per capita data for individual years. Our results remain robust when omitting these observations.

country *i* and the reference country (US) 20 years prior and post constitutional events. Countries with increases (decreases) in Neo-European influence experience growth accelerations (decelerations). Countries without constitutional change do not register any growth effects. Aggregating constitutional changes in an event study fashion along the lines of Figure 3 is suggestive but a formal analysis of these trends is required. Below we explore the relationship further and also examine whether the 20-year time horizon is sufficient to inform us about the growth effects of Neo-European influence.

III. Estimation Approach

Tracing the effects of constitutional changes across 180 countries and two centuries imposes considerable demands on the data. Most importantly, the long time horizon limits the covariates for which data is readily available. Country-specific factor endowments, geography or colonial status may well influence growth, but due to data limitations we can only include fixed effects to capture the systematic impact of such variables. We also must be mindful of the caveat that the panel structure has proven to be difficult in the constitution and development context (see, e.g., Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005). The previous literature covered a 40-year time period and we follow the same identification approach in our 200-year panel.

We will rely on the assumption that the effects of constitutional change are not systematically correlated with the occurrence of constitutional change itself. This assumption is violated if countries self-select into constitutional changes based on existing or expected growth differentials. As in Persson and Tabellini (2008), we find the time series exploration of this issue to be beyond the scope of this paper due to data constraints. We take comfort, however, in the results of Hayo and Voigt (2013) who investigate the potential endogeneity of constitutional change. They find that political institutions may be endogenous, but they are influenced by political and not economic conditions.

III.1 Panel Regressions

Our dependent variable is average annual per capita income growth in country *i* relative to average annual per capita income growth in the reference constitution country *j* from year *t* to the end of a given event horizon, *T*: $\tilde{y}_{ij,t+T} = \hat{y}_{i,t+T} - \hat{y}_{j,t+T}$. The use of the reference constitution

country's growth rate as a normalizing factor helps us to purge our long time series from the effects of worldwide growth trends. Results with time dummies are qualitatively similar (and available upon request). To trace the effects of constitutional changes on growth, we then correlate the evolution of each country's similarity measure in year t, $s_{ij,t}$, with the subsequent relative annual growth differential for different event horizons, T:

$$\tilde{y}_{ij,t+T} = \alpha + \beta \, s_{ij,t} + c_i + c_j + c_{ij} + u_{ij,t} \quad . \tag{2}$$

We could, of course, instead correlate constitutional similarity simply with the subsequent year's growth difference in $T=1$, but it is likely that constitutional changes take time to exert effects on the economy. Equation (2) includes country fixed effects, c_i and c_j, which capture time-invariant characteristics of both countries such as latitude, legal origin, colonial status, climate, and settler mortality. The country-pair fixed effects, c_{ij}, account for unobservable bilateral characteristics affecting the growth rate differential between countries i and j.[14]

IV. Results

The tacit assumption in the literature on political institutions and economic development has been that greater European influence aids development. We therefore expect $\beta > 0$ in (2), where the positive coefficient implies that increased (decreased) similarity closes (increases) the growth differential to the reference country. Persson and Tabellini (2003) report that over the period 1960-1998 the *age of democracies* influences development positively, which they measure as the number of years with uninterrupted democratic rule from 1800 to 2000, divided by 200. We have no priors on how fast or how long constitutional changes impact growth, and hence we vary below the event horizon T in 5-year increments from 5 to 50 years. In addition, instead of focusing on the effects of democratic institutions only, our analysis considers the evolution of all possible elements of countries' constitutions.

IV.1 Baseline Effects of Constitutional Change on Growth Rate Differentials

Table 2 reports our baseline OLS results when estimating equation (2). The similarity coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant at the one percent level for all event

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[14] Since the reference country is identical for all observations, the country fixed effect c_i absorbs the country-pair fixed effect, c_{ij}, in equation (2) while the fixed effect for reference country c_j is subsumed by the constant term.

horizons. The magnitudes imply substantial economic significance: a one standard deviation increase in similarity to the US constitution raises a country's relative compounded annual growth rate by 0.2 to 0.6 percentage points, depending on the event horizon. The magnitude of the similarity coefficient declines over time but is quite stable throughout. The results provide substantial support for the hypothesis that Neo-European influence, in the form of constitutional similarity, generates positive economic outcomes in the short and long term. More importantly, however, the results confirm that over the past 200 years countries had the opportunity to overcome unfavorable initial conditions by actively adopting positive Neo-European influence through constitutional changes.

IV.2 Accounting for Political Turmoil

Treisman (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson (2004, 2005) report positive effects of constitutional stability (*age of democracy)* on economic development without identifying a particular mechanism. Our dataset contains a natural measure of political (in)stability: frequent constitutional adjustments. As Figure 4 illustrates, countries with more frequent constitutional changes are also more likely to experience similarity reversals. We define such reversals as constitutional changes that are overturned within a decade. When gains of greater Neo-European constitutional influence are quickly reversed, we should not expect to find lasting, positive growth effects. To test this hypothesis, we define a political turmoil indicator which takes the value one if a country experiences another subsequent constitutional change within one decade of a given constitutional event, and zero otherwise.[15]

Table 3a reports our regression results that now also include the turmoil indicator and its interaction with the similarity measure. The two coefficients allow us to estimate separate effects of constitution similarity on turmoil and non-turmoil countries using the delta method. The coefficient on the similarity measure now represents the effect of Neo-European influence on the subsequent growth differential for non-turmoil countries, while the effect for turmoil countries is given by the composite of the similarity coefficient and the turmoil-similarity interaction. Table 3a indicates that countries in political turmoil experience substantially weaker, often statistically

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[15] Increasing the turmoil range beyond 10 years yields similar results, usually with increased significance. Strictly speaking, our turmoil definition does not directly address the issue of similarity reversals. However, as Figure 4 shows, frequent constitutional events alone signal substantial instability. When we narrow our turmoil definition to identify only similarity reversals, the results are of similar magnitude and significance but based on a smaller set of turmoil countries.

insignificant, and at times even negative growth effects due to increased Neo-European influence. The turmoil-similarity interaction, which provides the marginal effect for countries in turmoil, is negative throughout. Neo-European influence is only exerting significant positive effects beyond the 40-year event horizon when constitutional turmoil lies in the distant past. The estimated effects for non-turmoil countries are of a slightly greater magnitude than before but are otherwise essentially identical to the results in Table 2. Table 3a indicates the importance to account for the heterogeneity of Neo-European influence on growth. We therefore include turmoil controls in our regressions from here on.[16]

Figure 5 plots the economic growth effects of a one standard deviation increase in constitution similarity for non-turmoil countries across event horizons. The positive impact of increased Neo-European influence on the relative growth performance of countries ranges from 0.7 percentage points at the 5-year event horizon to 0.4 percentage points at the 50-year event horizon. Figure 5 nicely highlights how the effects of constitutional change start strong and decline somewhat to remain substantial over the entire 50-year period that we consider.

IV.3 Differenced and System GMM Results

The alternative to the fixed effects panel approach above is to examine a differenced version of (2) to account for unobservable country-specific factors. In particular, we then compare the change in growth differentials T years before and after constitutional events:

$$\tilde{y}_{ij,t+T} - \tilde{y}_{ij,t-T} = \beta_D\left(s_{ij,t} - s_{ij,t-T}\right) + u_{ij,t} - u_{ij,t-T} \quad . \tag{3}$$

Estimating the differenced coefficient β_D has the advantage that equation (3) directly purges all time-invariant country and country-pair specific factors which could affect the growth differential around the time of a constitutional change. We report the estimation results for equation (3) in Table 3b. As expected, the findings are largely identical to Table 3a. Differences exist in the very short run (5 years) when the similarity coefficient is now insignificant and in the very long run (post 40 years) when the estimated effects are now greater than before. The

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similarity of the differenced results greatly reduces concerns about autocorrelation or spurious regressions in our long time series. Note that a constant term could be inserted in (3) to account for changes in global growth trends over time. We found the results to be qualitatively identical in that case. This outcome is most likely due to the fact that our dependent variable is already normalized using changes in the global frontier growth rate (as proxied by the growth rate of the reference country).

Autocorrelation can also be addressed by employing a dynamic panel estimator. Instead of using annual data, we now average the data over time periods, T, and control for initial conditions at time t:

$$\tilde{\bar{y}}_{ij,t+T} = \alpha + \delta(\bar{y}_{i,t} - \bar{y}_{j,t}) + \beta \, \bar{s}_{ij,t} + c_i + c_j + c_{ij} + u_{ij,t} \quad , \tag{4}$$

where the term in parentheses captures the initial difference in log GDP per capita between countries i and j at time t. The standard OLS or fixed-effects estimation of (4) generate biased estimates of the similarity coefficient β when $\delta \neq 0$ (see Nickell, 1981, and Baltagi, 2008). The Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) System-GMM approach is widely used to address this issue. That is, an unbiased estimate of the similarity coefficient can be generated when this equation is differenced and estimated using lags of the independent variables and the differences thereof as instruments. Following their approach, we employ the Kiviet (1995) correction in the canonical System-GMM setup to account for the potential bias of our previous fixed-effect estimates (see also Bruno, 2005a, and Everaert and Pozzi, 2007).[17]

Table 3c reports the bias corrected fixed effects estimates for equation (4) using the approach developed by Bruno (2005b) who extends prior work by Kiviet (1995, 1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003). Results are again remarkably similar to our benchmarks in Table 3a, both in terms of statistical and economic significance. We do experience, however, a substantial loss of power in longer event horizons as the demands on the instruments grow and the number of observations falls. The "convergence" parameter, δ, is negative, indicating that countries with larger initial incomes relative to the reference country experience slower convergence to the growth frontier. Since results for the differenced and the dynamic panel regressions are similar to

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[17] One downside of System-GMM estimation are issues related to "many" and/or "weak instrument" problems given that the number of instruments grows as the panel length increases.

the fixed effects approach in Table 3a, we continue below with the latter to leverage the maximum number of observations for our analysis.

IV.4 Neo-European Constitutional Influence on Former Colonies

Colonial history has been central to the debate surrounding political initial conditions, European influence, and economic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) provide two theories that link colonial experiences (settlement or extraction) to subsequent development paths. Empirical tests suggest these theories explain substantial development differences. The sample of former colonies has thus received intense attention in the literature and the Acemoglu et al. findings have remained largely robust to the inclusion of alternative candidate hypotheses, such as geography (e.g., McArthur and Sachs, 2001, and Sachs, 2003), ecological and agricultural conditions (e.g., Diamond, 1997, and Easterly and Levine, 2003), or trade (e.g., Rodrik et al., 2004).

The hallmark of the literature on European influence in colonies is its singular focus on initial conditions in the distant past that are assumed to have created differential development outcomes to this day. None of these approaches specifically outlines the mechanics of development that generate the income disparities we observe today. The implied corollary of this line of research is the absence of theories that show if or how unfavorable initial conditions can be overcome. To examine the separate effects of colonization and European constitutional influence, we introduce a colony dummy in Table 4a. The dummy takes on the value one if a country was ever colonized, and zero otherwise. We also introduce interactions of the dummy with the constitutional similarity and turmoil variables, respectively. Note that we only report results for the colony-interaction terms, since the colony dummy does not vary over time and hence assumes the role of a country fixed effect.

The top two rows in Table 4a report composite effects of constitution similarity on growth for colonies without and with political turmoil, respectively. The next two rows report the equivalent results for countries without a colonial history. In the absence of turmoil, colonies and non-colonies exhibit the same, positive impact of Neo-European influence on growth that we previously observed in the global sample. The key implication is that non-colonies *and* colonies alike have been able to overcome unfavorable initial conditions by dialing up European influence. The estimates in Table 4a imply that a one standard deviation increase in the similarity

measure increases subsequent annual growth by .2 to .7 percentage points for non-turmoil colonies, depending on the considered event horizon. We do not observe strong positive effects of Neo-European influence for colonies and non-colonies in political turmoil. For these groups of countries, most coefficients are either negative or statistically insignificant.

While the previous results do not differ qualitatively across reference constitutions, we find that the choice of the Neo-European reference country does somewhat influence the predicted growth effects when differentiating between colonies and non-colonies. Table 4b shows that we find positive and significant similarity effects across all reference constitutions and event horizons for non-turmoil colonies, except in the case of the Netherlands when the effect peters out after 30 years. For colonies in turmoil, on the other hand, Table 4b highlights that German, Spanish, French and Italian reference constitutions produce a positive growth impact, while the effects are mostly negative or not significant for the Netherlands, the US and the UK.

There is another stark implication of Table 4b: Adopting constitutional elements from the British, French and Dutch constitutions is not beneficial for non-colonies, whether they are in political turmoil or not. A potential explanation for the UK results may be the absence of a formal constitution in the country; instead of a single document, the constitution is a set of statutes, court judgments, works of authority, treaties and unwritten parliamentary conventions. This broad notion of a constitution may make it difficult for countries to identify and adopt UK constitutional principles. A similar situation exists in the Netherlands, whose political system is governed not only by a constitution but also the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which regulates political institutions. The French constitution is unique in our dataset as it features the most frequent changes out of all reference countries (15 since 1800). Russell (1993) suggests that changes in constitutions in democratic states do not come about without cataclysmic events such as revolutions, world wars, civil wars, or the threat of imminent breakup. Hence, it is not surprising that following French constitutional changes may not be the best guidance for developing countries. In contrast, the US, Germany and Italy feature significantly fewer constitutional changes in our data (5, 3, and 1, respectively). This observation points to significantly less instability on the part of the reference constitution, which seems to provide a better example for developing economies. For non-colonies without turmoil, the

influence of German, Italian, and Spanish reference constitutions is positive, similar to the US benchmark case.

IV.5 Which Constitutional Elements Deliver Growth?

Until now we aggregated constitutional dimensions into a single similarity measure to gauge Neo-European influence on growth. It may well be, however, that certain constitutional changes generate more profound effects than others. To examine which types of constitutional adjustments are more conducive to long-term development, we generate similarity sub-indices for six distinct dimensions of constitutions.

In the category *Judiciary Rules*, we include constitutional rules pertaining to constitutional design, legal processes and rights; *Elections* contains provisions related to electoral rules; and *Individual and Human Rights* reflect basic rights such as free speech, academic freedom, and health/poverty entitlements. *Executive Constraints* capture checks and balances on the executive and the legislative bodies; *Legislative Rules* cover legislative processes, powers, and impeachment procedures; and *Federalism* indicates powers of sub-national governments. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports all constitutional rules that comprise the six dimensions for our set of reference countries. Results for the growth effects of the individual categories are reported in Table 5a. For each event horizon, we regress the growth differential from equation (2) on all six constitutional dimensions and their respective turmoil interactions.[18] We include all six similarity measures at once in each regression to preempt omitted variable bias since constitutional events often involve simultaneous changes in multiple dimensions.

Table 5a shows that the effect of the different constitutional dimensions on growth is remarkably diverse. Focusing on non-turmoil countries, European influence in terms of *Legislative* rules is positive and significant throughout, an effect that is similar across nearly all possible reference constitutions (see Tables A.18 and A.19 in the Appendix for breakdowns of results by reference constitutions). The similarity in results across reference constitutions highlights that the adoption of either Neo-European style parliamentary systems (where executives derive legitimacy from the legislature) or presidential systems (where executive and legislative branches are separate) can produce beneficial growth effects. The *Legislative*

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[18] We do not report coefficient estimates for the marginal effects (interactions) in Table 5a to conserve space. Complete results are available upon request.

dimension covers rules that regulate the legislature's involvement in constitutional changes, veto powers, the structure of the legislature, and disclosure and removal procedures for individual legislators (see Table A.2). The positive effects of the legislative dimension is therefore in line with the argument that Neo-European style checks and balances on legislative procedures promote high-quality institutions and better development outcomes.

We also find positive effects of *Human Rights* throughout in non-turmoil countries, a dimension which to date has not been discussed as a development determinant beyond general references to the effect of civil liberties. Knack and Keefer (1995) unsuccessfully examined an index of civil liberties as a potential determinant for "the quality of the institutions that protect property rights."[19] Barro (1997) finds the same civil liberties index to be correlated with the effect of democracy on growth, but he does not specify a channel through which civil liberties might influence development outcomes. In our data, *Human Rights* capture features of constitutions that stipulate freedoms of religion/assembly/association/discrimination, as well as the protection of private property. Our results are the first to indicate clear and persistent positive growth effects when non-turmoil countries' adopt human rights as specified in Neo-European constitutions.

The adoption of Neo-European *Federalism* features produces positive growth effects only for about 30 years in non-turmoil countries, while Neo-European *Judiciary* rules are insignificant throughout. Neo-European *Executive Constraints* are positive and significant only in the short and long run (< 15 years, > 35 years). However, the positive effects of Neo-European style *Executive Constraints* on growth are much more consistent throughout all event horizons for most other reference constitutions, except for the UK and the Netherlands (see Table A.18). These results are in line with the fact that *Executive Constraints* have long been identified as a crucial development determinant, dating back to Knack and Keefer (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). These studies argue that limits to power of political leaders in the form of checks on the executive and electoral competition are conducive to the provision of secure property rights. In the previous literature, executive constraints are approximated with an amalgam indicator from the Polity IV dataset that subjectively assigns values for countries' openness, competitiveness of chief executive recruitment, and constraints on executive authority. Our data

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[19] Their civil liberties measure aggregates indicators for free speech, rights to organize/demonstrate, and rights to personal autonomy (freedom of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights); see Gastil (1986–87).

on executive constraints provides a richer codification of constitutional elements, ranging from the type of chief executive (including its election) over replacement mechanisms to the power to declare war and states of emergency (see Table A.2).

In the US benchmark case, only *Human Rights and Federalism* also have partially positive and significant effects on development outcomes in turmoil countries. A similar pattern can be observed for most other Neo-European reference constitutions (see Table A.19). However, there is also one noteworthy distinction. When considering the results for turmoil countries after adopting Neo-European *Executive Constraints*, we find distinct positive effects for most event horizons and reference constitutions other than the US. Hence, adopting Neo-European style *Executive Constraints* spurs development, even during particular trying times of political turmoil.

Lastly, the results for the *Elections* dimension in non-turmoil countries are confounding. The adoption of Neo-European electoral rules has no growth effects in the short and intermediate term, and generates positive effects only in the very long run. Most surprising, however, are the negative, significant effects for the 15-25 year event horizons (and for even more extensive periods when considering other reference constitutions – see Table A.18). This finding is surprising for two reasons. First, Persson and Tabellini (2003) have established strong effects of electoral rules on economic outcomes (although in a much shorter panel). And second, the electoral rules in our US benchmark case cover utterly fundamental aspects of elections such as the right to vote, universal suffrage, and a congress elected by the people. We suspect that electoral freedom and democratic elections alone may not be sufficient to generate good development outcomes in the absence of adequate executive constraints. That is, free elections in a dictatorship are unlikely to produce Neo-European style political institutions.

To examine the effect of executive constraints on electoral rules we add an interaction between *Elections* and *Executive Constraints* (including the appropriate turmoil interactions) in Table 5b. In this way, we can examine whether Neo-European style executive constraints influence the effects of Neo-European style electoral rules. Table 5b shows that the results for all dimensions other than *Elections* and *Executive Constraints* are nearly unchanged compared to Table 5a. However, for non-turmoil countries we now find that both *Executive Constraints* and *Elections* have positive and significant effects on growth throughout, except in the very short run

for the latter. These results indicate that the simultaneous adoption of constitutional rules which provide for both Neo-European style elections and executive constraints has indeed a positive impact on development. Figure 6 illustrates this point; when executive constraints are not sufficiently similar to Neo-European standards (the similarity coefficient for *Executive Constraints* is negative), the adoption of Neo-European style electoral rules actually has a negative impact on growth. When *Executive Constraints* are similar to Neo-European constitutions (the similarity coefficient is positive), the effect of adopting Neo-European electoral rules on growth also turns positive.

V. Concluding Remarks

European influence has been identified as a fundamental development determinant. The previous literature has relied on rough proxies of European influence in the very distant past as key predictors of today's institutions and economic performance. However, it remains unresolved how exactly European influence in the distant past has translated into differential development outcomes over the past 200 years. In this paper, we offer a clear and quantifiable mechanism of European influence on economic performance over this time period. Specifically, we suggest that the adoption of European style constitutional rules allowed countries to actively dial European influence up or down over the course of their development. We then quantify the effect of European influence on growth from 1800 to 2005.

The analysis yields five important results. First, we document that the effect of European influence on countries' growth rates is economically and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect varies over time, but it can last for up to 50 years. Greater European influence thus has allowed countries to close the gap to the technology and income frontier through growth accelerations over the entire 200-year time horizon that we consider. Most importantly, dialing up European influence even makes it feasible for countries to overcome unfavorable initial conditions. Second, we find strong growth effects for increases in legislative similarities and for the adoption of European style human rights. At the same time, the effect of elections is moderated by the strength of executive constraints: European style electoral rules are shown to be beneficial to growth only when executive constraints are sufficiently similar to European standards. Third, to our knowledge we are the first to document a clear direct effect of human

rights on economic outcomes. Fourth, our results show that phases of political turmoil negate positive effects of European influence. And fifth, both colonies and non-colonies benefit from European influence, although the influence is slightly smaller for colonies.

Approaching the evolution of European influence on growth over the past 200 years is subject to a number of caveats. Data constraints limit the questions we can ask, especially those related to the endogeneity of political change, and the inclusion of other controls. We take solace in the fact that identical problems have been encountered by all papers in the literature examining similar features of growth over shorter time horizons (usually 40 years at the most). We hope to have opened a new focus in the development literature that tries to identify the *channel* by which European influence can affect growth. The robustness of our results across reference constitutions and empirical methodologies should provide some confidence in our findings.

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**Figure 1: Constitutional Similarity across Countries and Time**

Notes: The figure plots kernel densities of countries' constitutions for the baseline sample of 10,248 countries, differentiated by time periods. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 2: Changes in Constitutional Similarity

Notes: The figure plots changes in constitutional similarities for 523 observations in our benchmark sample. Here the US is the reference constitution.

**Figure 3: Growth Differentials before and after Changes in Constitutional Similarity**

Notes: The figure pools observations and plots the average annual growth differentials 20 years before and after constitutional changes. Here the US is the reference constitution.

**Figure 4: Constitutional Changes and Similarity Reversals**

Notes: The figure plots constitutional changes versus constitutional reversals. Constitutional reversals occur when a specific constitutional change is overturned within 10 years. Here the US is the reference constitution.

Figure 5: Changes in Growth Differentials Due to Increases in Neo-European Influence

Notes: Changes in growth differentials due to a 1 StDev increase in constitution similarity for non-turmoil countries across event horizons ranging from 5 to 50 years (based on coefficients in Table 3a). Here the US is the reference constitution. 90 percent confidence intervals included.

Figure 6: Executive Constraints Moderate the Effect of Free Elections on Growth

Notes: Changes in growth differentials due to a 1 StDev increase in *Elections* similarity for the 30-year event horizon (based on coefficients in Table 5b). Here the US is the reference constitution. 90 percent confidence intervals included.

Table 2: Constitutional Similarity and Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, *T*									
	(1) 5 years	(2) 10 years	(3) 15 years	(4) 20 years	(5) 25 years	(6) 30 years	(7) 35 years	(8) 40 years	(9) 45 years	(10) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.019***	0.013***	0.009***	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.009***	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.013**	-0.021***	-0.024***	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.024***	-0.025***	-0.022***	-0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	10,248	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
R2	0.123	0.235	0.322	0.406	0.484	0.525	0.552	0.544	0.533	0.475
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, *T*									
	(11) 5 years	(12) 10 years	(13) 15 years	(14) 20 years	(15) 25 years	(16) 30 years	(17) 35 years	(18) 40 years	(19) 45 years	(20) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.022***	0.017***	0.012***	0.010***	0.009***	0.009***	0.010***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Turmoil Countries)	0.005	-0.006**	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.005**	-0.002	0.001	0.002	0.005**	0.005**
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Turmoil	-0.003**	0.002	0.003***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.002***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.016***	-0.023***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.012***	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.007***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.012**	-0.021***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.021***	-0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	10,248	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
- of which are in turmoil	1,114	1,048	910	778	660	565	497	421	376	349
R2	0.125	0.239	0.327	0.414	0.490	0.531	0.560	0.552	0.537	0.478
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Accounting for Fixed Effects (Differenced Regressions)

Dep. Variable: Change in average annual growth rate relative to US	Event horizon, T									
	(21) 5 years	(22) 10 years	(23) 15 years	(24) 20 years	(25) 25 years	(26) 30 years	(27) 35 years	(28) 40 years	(29) 45 years	(30) 50 years
Change in Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	-0.006	0.008***	0.015***	0.015***	0.012***	0.007***	0.011***	0.013***	0.018***	0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Change in Constitutional Similarity♠ (Turmoil Countries)	-0.006	-0.005	0.001	-0.020***	-0.015***	-0.012*	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.012**
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Turmoil	0.004*	0.005***	0.002	0.003**	0.002	0.003	0.009***	0.007***	0.003*	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Turmoil x Change in Constitution Similarity	0.000	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.036***	-0.028***	-0.019***	-0.009	-0.014**	-0.018***	-0.008
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Observations	9,298	7,496	6,023	4,752	3,664	2,900	2,431	1,989	1,639	1,375
- of which are in turmoil	1,005	836	654	504	328	221	163	116	97	79
R2	0.001	0.003	0.008	0.017	0.014	0.009	0.042	0.052	0.073	0.088

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 3c: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Bias Corrected Fixed Effects Estimates (Dynamic Panel)

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, T									
	(31) 5 years	(32) 10 years	(33) 15 years	(34) 20 years	(35) 25 years	(36) 30 years	(37) 35 years	(38) 40 years	(39) 45 years	(40) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	0.029**	0.029***	0.032***	0.029***	0.024***	0.033***	0.017*	0.032***	0.011	0.012*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Turmoil Countries)	0.006	0.024	0.023	0.061***	0.034*	0.019	0.013	0.053**	0.018	0.017
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Turmoil	-0.004	-0.001	0.006	-0.004	-0.004	0.003	0.003	-0.006	-0.008	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.023	-0.005	-0.009	0.032	0.011	-0.014	-0.004	0.021	0.007	0.005
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.015)
Initial p.c. GDP difference (logs)	-0.028***	-0.016***	-0.018***	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.009***	-0.016***	-0.008***	-0.015***	-0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	2,017	957	600	436	336	254	210	185	140	117
- of which are in turmoil	222	116	70	52	35	31	24	17	10	12

Notes: Bias corrected LSDV estimates for autoregressive panels (Bruno, 2005a). Event horizons are averaged time periods. Annualized coefficients reported for comparison with Tables 3a and 3b. ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 4a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Neo-European Influence on Colonies

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US		Event horizon, T									
		(41) 5 years	(42) 10 years	(43) 15 years	(44) 20 years	(45) 25 years	(46) 30 years	(47) 35 years	(48) 40 years	(49) 45 years	(50) 50 years
Colonies	**Constitution Similarity♠** (Non-Turmoil)	0.024***	0.017***	0.011***	0.006***	0.005***	0.007***	0.008***	0.011***	0.013***	0.015***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
	Constitution Similarity♠ (Turmoil)	0.007	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.005*	0.005*
		(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Non-Colonies	**Constitution Similarity** (Non-Turmoil)	0.017***	0.018***	0.016***	0.017***	0.015***	0.013***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	Constitution Similarity♠ (Turmoil)	-0.008	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.014**	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.004	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007
		(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Interactions	**Colony x Constitution Similarity**	0.007	-0.000	-0.005	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.003*	0.000	0.003
		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.025**	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.023***	-0.021***	-0.017***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.018***
		(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	Turmoil x Colony x Const. Sim.	0.008	0.012	0.016**	0.015**	0.011**	0.012**	0.010*	0.011*	0.011**	0.009
		(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	Turmoil x Colony	0.008*	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Turmoil	-0.010***	-0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.001	-0.003*	-0.003**
		(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
	Constant	-0.012**	-0.022***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.021***	-0.018***
		(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	Observations	10,248	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
	- of which are in turmoil	1,114	1,048	910	778	660	565	497	421	376	349
	- of which are colonies	7,312	6,492	5,750	5,052	4,439	3,842	3,299	2,806	2,476	2,133
	- of which are colonies in turmoil	915	869	755	636	539	457	397	335	297	273
	R2	0.126	0.240	0.328	0.416	0.492	0.532	0.562	0.554	0.541	0.483
	Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 4b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Neo-European Influence on Colonies by Colonizer

		Dep. Variable: Avg. Annual Growth Differential to Respective Colonizer									
						Event horizon, T					
	Reference Country	(51) 5 years	(52) 10 years	(53) 15 years	(54) 20 years	(55) 25 years	(56) 30 years	(57) 35 years	(58) 40 years	(59) 45 years	(60) 50 years
Colonies / Non-Turmoil♠	USA	0.024***	0.017***	0.011***	0.006***	0.005***	0.007***	0.008***	0.011***	0.013***	0.015***
	DEU	0.050***	0.039***	0.027***	0.019***	0.016***	0.017***	0.017***	0.014***	0.013***	0.015***
	ESP	0.033***	0.031***	0.023***	0.020***	0.021***	0.028***	0.030***	0.031***	0.031***	0.030***
	ITA	0.054***	0.042***	0.032***	0.024***	0.021***	0.019***	0.017***	0.014***	0.012***	0.013***
	UK	0.017***	0.012***	0.010***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.007***
	ALL	0.038***	0.026***	0.018***	0.012***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***
	FRA	0.026***	0.018***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***	0.009***	0.007***	0.004***	0.00155	0.003**
	NED	0.023***	0.016***	0.010***	0.005**	0.004*	0.004**	0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
Colonies / Turmoil♠	USA	0.007	-0.004	-0.006**	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.005*	0.005*
	DEU	0.021***	0.014***	0.010***	0.003	0.003	0.012***	0.013***	0.008*	0.015***	0.022***
	ESP	0.017***	0.016***	0.011***	0.012***	0.016***	0.023***	0.024***	0.023***	0.025***	0.028***
	ITA	0.042***	0.032***	0.023***	0.014***	0.012***	0.013***	0.010***	0.005*	0.006**	0.005*
	UK	0.000	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.010***	-0.011**	-0.020***	-0.026***	-0.027***
	ALL	0.013**	0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.001	0.006	0.012***	0.013***	0.017***	0.025***
	FRA	0.014**	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.011***	0.015***	0.013***	0.008**	0.007*	0.002
	NED	0.007	-0.001	-0.007**	-0.009***	-0.003	0.002	0.004	-0.002	0.001	0.004
Non-Colonies / Non-Turmoil	USA	0.017***	0.018***	0.016***	0.017***	0.015***	0.013***	0.014***	0.014***	0.013***	0.012***
	DEU	0.007	0.006*	0.006***	0.004***	0.000	0.001	0.003**	0.003***	0.002**	0.002**
	ESP	-0.003	0.003	0.000	0.003*	0.005***	0.007***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
	ITA	0.013***	0.008***	0.005***	0.006***	0.005***	0.003***	0.002**	0.002*	0.001	0.000
	UK	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003**	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	ALL	0.006	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	-0.002	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.013***
	FRA	0.005	0.005*	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	NED	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
Non-Colonies / Turmoil♠	USA	-0.008	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.014**	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.004	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007
	DEU	-0.013	-0.003	0.001	0.006	-0.006	-0.005	0.003	0.000	-0.004	-0.004
	ESP	-0.027**	-0.008	-0.001	0.005	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
	ITA	-0.012	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.003	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**
	UK	-0.018**	-0.015**	-0.020***	-0.020**	-0.017***	-0.018***	-0.013**	-0.011**	-0.017***	-0.019***
	ALL	-0.017	-0.015	-0.009	0.000	-0.007	-0.016***	-0.012*	-0.003	-0.005	-0.006
	FRA	-0.038***	-0.029***	-0.022***	-0.027***	-0.034***	-0.037***	-0.031***	-0.022**	-0.015**	-0.014*
	NED	-0.015	-0.005	-0.002	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.005	-0.003

Notes: Coefficient estimates only; detailed results (including standard errors) are available on request. ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 5a: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Disaggregated Constitution Dimensions

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US			Event horizon, T									
			(61) 5 years	(62) 10 years	(63) 15 years	(64) 20 years	(65) 25 years	(66) 30 years	(67) 35 years	(68) 40 years	(69) 45 years	(70) 50 years
Constitution Similarity Dimension	Non-Turmoil Countries	Legislative	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
		Elections	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
		Executive	0.007*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
		Judiciary	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
		Federalism	0.004** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
		Rights	0.003 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
	Composite for Turmoil Countries	Legislative♠	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)
		Elections♠	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)
		Executive♠	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
		Judiciary♠	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
		Federalism♠	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)
		Rights♠	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
		Observations	10,248	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
		- in turmoil	1,114	1,048	910	778	660	565	497	421	376	349
		R2	0.128	0.244	0.334	0.425	0.501	0.543	0.574	0.566	0.556	0.509
		Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Constant, turmoil, and turmoil interaction coefficients are available upon request. ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table 5b: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Disaggregated Constitution Dimensions (with Election-Executive Interaction)

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US			Event horizon, T									
			(71) 5 years	(72) 10 years	(73) 15 years	(74) 20 years	(75) 25 years	(76) 30 years	(77) 35 years	(78) 40 years	(79) 45 years	(80) 50 years
Constitution Similarity Dimension	**Non-Turmoil Countries**	**Legislative**	0.008***	0.007***	0.006***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.006***	0.004***	0.004***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
		Elections♠,+	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002*	0.003**	0.003**	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***
			(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
		Executive♠,++	0.009***	0.008***	0.006***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.006***	0.007***	0.005***
			(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
		Judiciary	0.004*	0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
		Federalism	0.004**	0.006***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	0.001	-0.001*	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
		Rights	0.003	0.004**	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.005***
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	Composite for Turmoil Countries	**Legislative♠**	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.006***	-0.007***
			(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Elections♠,+	-0.012**	-0.013***	-0.007***	-0.004**	-0.002	0.003	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***
			(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Executive♠,++	0.012***	0.005*	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005**	0.002
			(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Judiciary♠	0.003	-0.001	-0.008***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.005**	-0.004**
			(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Federalism♠	-0.002	0.002	0.007***	0.010***	0.008***	0.007***	0.008***	0.010***	0.014***	0.015***
			(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Rights♠	0.005	0.003	0.005*	0.005**	0.007***	0.009***	0.007***	0.004*	0.002	0.004*
			(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
		Observations	10,248	9,269	8,377	7,531	6,773	6,032	5,349	4,721	4,292	3,848
		- in turmoil	1,114	1,048	910	778	660	565	497	421	376	349
		R2	0.129	0.245	0.335	0.428	0.503	0.546	0.577	0.570	0.560	0.511
		Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Regressions include dimension-interactions with turmoil and *Election-Executive* interaction (plus its interaction with turmoil); constant, turmoil, and interaction coefficients are available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels. ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. + *Elections* effects evaluated at *Executive* dimension mean. ++ *Executive* effects evaluated at *Elections* mean.

Appendix

Table A.1: Countries and Constitution Data Coverage

Country	Constitution Data	Country	Constitution Data	Country	Constitution Data
Afghanistan	1923-2005	Georgia	1995-2005	Nicaragua	1854-2005
Albania	1914-2005	Germany	1871-2005	Niger	1960-2005
Algeria	1963-2005	Ghana	1957-2005	Nigeria	1960-2005
Andorra	1993-2005	Greece	1827-2005	Norway	1814-2005
Angola	1975-2005	Grenada	1974-2005	Oman	1996-2005
Argentina	1819-2005	Guatemala	1845-2005	Pakistan	1956-2005
Armenia	1995-2005	Guinea	1958-2005	Palau	1981-2005
Australia	1901-2005	Guinea-Bissau	1973-2005	Panama	1904-2005
Austria	1920-2005	Guyana	1966-2005	Papua New Guinea	1975-2005
Austria-Hungary	1849-1918	Haiti	1801-2005	Paraguay	1813-2005
Azerbaijan	1991-2005	Honduras	1848-2005	Peru	1826-2005
Bahrain	1973-2005	Hungary	1920-2005	Philippines	1899-2005
Bangladesh	1972-2005	Iceland	1944-2005	Poland	1921-1938, 1946-2005
Barbados	1966-2005	India	1949-2005	Portugal	1822-2005
Belarus	1994-2005	Indonesia	1945-2005	Qatar	2003-2005
Belgium	1831-2005	Iran	1906-2005	Romania	1923-2005
Belize	1981-2005	Iraq	1925-2005	Russia (Soviet Union)	1905-2005
Benin	1960-2005	Ireland	1922-2005	Rwanda	1962-2005
Bhutan	1953-2005	Israel	1958-2005	Samoa	1962-2005
Bolivia	1826-2005	Italy	1848-2005	Sao Tome and Principe	1975-2005
Bosnia-Herzegov.	1995-2005	Jamaica	1962-2005	Saudi Arabia	1992-2005
Botswana	1966-2005	Japan	1889-2005	Senegal	1959-2005
Brazil	1824-2005	Jordan	1946-2005	Seychelles	1979-2005
Bulgaria	1893-2005	Kazakhstan	1993-2005	Sierra Leone	1961-2005
Burkina Faso	1960-2005	Kenya	1963-2005	Singapore	1959-2005
Burundi	1962-2005	Kiribati	1979-2005	Slovakia	1992-2005
Cambodia	1953-2005	Korea, People's Rep.	1948-2005	Slovenia	1991-2005
Cameroon	1960-2005	Korea, Republic of	1948-2005	Solomon Islands	1978-2005
Canada	1867-2005	Kuwait	1962-2005	Somalia	1960-2005
Cape Verde	1980-2005	Kyrgyz Republic	1993-2005	South Africa	1961-2005
Centr. African Rep	1959-2005	Laos	1947-2005	Spain	1808-2005
Chad	1960-2005	Latvia	1922-1940, 1990-2005	Sri Lanka	1931-2005
Chile	1822-2005	Lebanon	1926-2005	St. Lucia	1978-2005
China	1912-2005	Lesotho	1966-2005	Sudan	1973-2005
Colombia	1830-2005	Liberia	1825-2005	Swaziland	1968-2005
Comoros	1975-2005	Libya	1951-2005	Sweden	1809-2005
Congo	1961-2005	Liechtenstein	1818-2005	Switzerland	1848-2005
Congo, Dem. Rep	1964-2005	Lithuania	1922-1940, 1990-2005	Syria	1930-2005
Costa Rica	1841-2005	Luxembourg	1868-2005	Taiwan	1947-2005
Cote d'Ivoire	1960-2005	Macedonia	1991-2005	Tajikistan	1994-2005
Croatia	1991-2005	Madagascar	1959-2005	Tanzania	1961-2005
Cuba	1901-2005	Malawi	1964-2005	Thailand	1932-2005
Cyprus	1960-2005	Malaysia	1957-2005	Togo	1961-2005
Czech Republic	1993-2005	Maldives	1968-2005	Tonga	1875-2005
Czechoslovakia	1920-1938, 1946-1992	Mali	1960-2005	Trinidad and Tobago	1962-2005
Denmark	1849-2005	Malta	1964-2005	Tunisia	1959-2005
Djibouti	1977-2005	Marshall Islands	1979-2005	Turkey (Otto. Empire)	1876-2005
Dominica	1978-2005	Mauritania	1961-2005	Turkmenistan	1992-2005
Dom. Republic	1844-2005	Mauritius	1968-2005	Tuvalu	1978-2005
Ecuador	1830-2005	Mexico	1822-2005	Uganda	1962-2005
Egypt	1923-2005	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	1981-2005	Ukraine	1978-2005
El Salvador	1841-2005	Moldova	1994-2005	United Arab Emirates	1971-2005
Equatorial Guinea	1968-2005	Monaco	1911-2005	United Kingdom	1800-2005
Eritrea	1997-2005	Mongolia	1924-2005	USA	1800-2005
Estonia	1919-1940, 1991-2005	Morocco	1962-2005	Uruguay	1830-2005
Ethiopia	1931-2005	Mozambique	1975-2005	Uzbekistan	1992-2005
Fiji	1970-2005	Myanmar (Burma)	1947-2005	Vanuatu	1980-2005
Finland	1919-2005	Namibia	1990-2005	Venezuela	1830-2005
France	1800-2005	Nepal	1948-2005	Syria	1930-2005
Gabon	1960-2005	Netherlands	1848-2005	Taiwan	1947-2005
Gambia	1970-2005	New Zealand	1852-2005	Tajikistan	1994-2005

Table A.2: Constitution Variables, Definitions, and Summary Statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Legislative Rules					
AMNDAMAJ	Do const.al amendments require more than a simple legislature majority for approval?	0.555	0.497	0	1
AMNDAPCT_345	What proportion of the vote is needed to approve a const. amendment? 345: 3/5 or 3/4 majority	0.053	0.224	0	1
ASSETS	Does the Const. require that legislators disclose their earnings and/or assets?	0.031	0.173	0	1
CABRESTL	Do members of the cabinet/ministers have to serve in the Legislature?	0.140	0.347	0	1
CHALSTAG	Can bills be reviewed for constitutionality by the legislature at the pre-promulgation stage?	0.177	0.381	0	1
HOUSENUM	How many chambers or houses does the Legislature contain?	0.446	0.497	0	1
IMMUNITY_2	Does the const. provide for ltd immunity for the members of the Legislature under some conditions?	0.794	0.404	0	1
INITIAT	Does the const. provide for ability of individuals to propose legislative initiatives/referenda?	0.105	0.306	0	1
INTLAW	Does the const. contain provisions concerning the relationship between the const. and int'l law?	0.644	0.479	0	1
INTORGS	Does the const. contain provisions concerning international organizations?	0.330	0.470	0	1
LEGAPP_1	Head of State has the power to approve/reject legislation once it has been passed by the legislature (not including reviews for constitutionality)?	0.781	0.413	0	1
LEGAPPDF_4	Which of the following describes the default mode for the approval of legislation? 4: Executive is required to take action: either sign/promulgate or return to the legislature	0.270	0.444	0	1
LEGAPPPT_123	Does the approving/vetoing actor have the power to approve/reject parts of the bill, the bill in its entirety, or both? 1: Can only veto parts of the bill (line-item veto), 2: Can only veto the bill in its entirety, 3: Can veto either specific parts or the bill in its entirety	0.259	0.438	0	1
LEGISL	Does the const. provide for a central representative body (a legislature)?	0.992	0.086	0	1
LEGSUPR	Is a supermajority needed for passing any legislation?	0.183	0.387	0	1
LHLEGIS	Is the first (or only) chamber of the Legislature given the power to legislate?	0.954	0.209	0	1
OVERPCT_12	A majority of the vote is needed to override a veto	0.078	0.269	0	1
OVERPCT_235	More than 2/3 of the vote is needed to override a veto	0.331	0.471	0	1
OVERRIDE	Can vetoes of legislation be overridden?	0.520	0.500	0	1
PUBMEET	Does the const. prescribe whether meetings of the Legislature are (generally) held in public?	0.490	0.500	0	1
PUBMIN	Is a record of the deliberations of the Legislature published?	0.177	0.382	0	1
REMLEG	Are there provisions for removing individual legislators?	0.551	0.497	0	1
REMPRO_2	Is the executive involved in the process for removing individual legislators?	0.044	0.204	0	1
SPECLEG_1	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 1: organic law	0.118	0.323	0	1
SPECLEG_2	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 2: budget bills	0.720	0.449	0	1
SPECLEG_3	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 3: tax bills	0.440	0.496	0	1
SPECLEG_4	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 4: finance bills	0.229	0.420	0	1
SPECLEG_5	Does the const. provide for any of the following special legislative processes? 5: spending bills	0.216	0.411	0	1
UNAMEND	Are any parts of the const. unamendable?	0.271	0.444	0	1
Elections					
ELECTFIN	Are there any provisions for limits on money used for campaigns?	0.022	0.148	0	1
LHELSYS_12	Does the const. specify the electoral system for the first (or only) chamber? 1: Yes, one method, 2: Yes, two methods (a mixed system)	0.250	0.433	0	1
LHSELECT_3	How are members of the first (or only) chamber of the Legislature selected? 3: elected by citizens	0.823	0.382	0	1
OVERSGHT_123	Does the const. provide for an electoral commission or electoral court to oversee the election process? 1: electoral commission, 2: electoral court, 3: both	0.248	0.432	0	1
PARTPRH_23	Does the const. prohibit one or more political parties? Yes, certain types parties	0.137	0.344	0	1
PARTRGHT	Does the const. provide for a right to form political parties?	0.222	0.416	0	1
REFEREN	Does the const. provide for the ability to propose a referendum (or plebiscite)?	0.346	0.476	0	1
UHAGE_UNDER22	Is the mini age limit for eligibility to serve in Second Chamber of the Legislature 22 or under?	0.094	0.291	0	1
UHELSYS_123	Does the const. specify the electoral system for the Second Chamber? 1: Yes, one	0.157	0.364	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
	method, 2: Yes, two methods (a mixed system), 3: Yes, but without providing any specific details				
UHQUOTA	Does the const. stipulate a quota for representation of certain groups in the Second Chamber?	0.049	0.215	0	1
UHSELECT_1	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 1: appointed	0.164	0.370	0	1
UHSELECT_2	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 2: elected by electors	0.180	0.384	0	1
UHSELECT_3	How are members of the Second Chamber selected? 3: elected by citizens	0.195	0.396	0	1
UHTERM_3_5	Is the max term for members of the Second Chamber of the Legislature between 3 and 5 years?	0.171	0.377	0	1
VOTELIM_1	Besides age limits, which additional restrictions does the const. place on voting? 1: must not be incapacitated (mentally or physically)	0.211	0.408	0	1
VOTERES	Does the const. place any restrictions on the right to vote?	0.798	0.401	0	1
VOTEUN	Does the const. make a claim to universal adult suffrage?	0.404	0.491	0	1
Executive Constraints					
AGAP_123	Is Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in approval of the attorney general?	0.090	0.285	0	1
AGNOM_123	Is Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in the nom. of the attorney general?	0.276	0.447	0	1
AGTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for the attorney general over 5 years?	0.045	0.206	0	1
AMNDAPPR_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet approves amendments to the const.?	0.228	0.419	0	1
AMNDPROP_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet propose amendments to the const.?	0.338	0.473	0	1
ATGEN	Does the const. provide for an attorney general or public prosecutor responsible for representing the government in criminal or civil cases?	0.468	0.499	0	1
BANK	Does the const. contain provisions for a central bank?	0.177	0.381	0	1
BANKGOAL_1	What are the policy goals of the central bank? 1: Price stability alone	0.013	0.112	0	1
CABAPPR_12	Who approves the cabinet/ministers? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government	0.224	0.417	0	1
CABAPPT_12	Who nominates/appoints the cabinet/ministers? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government	0.841	0.365	0	1
CABCOLL	Is cabinet/ministers collectively responsible for their actions, or can they be dismissed individually?	0.597	0.491	0	1
COMCHIEF_1	Who is the commander in chief of the armed forces? 1: head of state	0.727	0.445	0	1
DEPAPP_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet approve nomination of the deputy executive?	0.050	0.218	0	1
DEPEXEC	Does const. specify a deputy executive of any kind (e.g., deputy prime minister, vice president)?	0.455	0.498	0	1
DEPNOM_123	Head of state, Head of Gov't and Gov't/Cabinet involved in the nom. of deputy executive?	0.173	0.378	0	1
EMAPPR_1	Who approves a state of emergency? 1: does not need approval	0.117	0.321	0	1
EMCOND_1	Can a state of emergency be called for war/aggression	0.436	0.496	0	1
EMCOND_2	Can a state of emergency be called for internal security	0.373	0.484	0	1
EMCOND_3	Can a state of emergency be called for national disaster	0.123	0.328	0	1
EMCOND_4	Can a state of emergency be called for general danger	0.206	0.404	0	1
EMCOND_5	Can a state of emergency be called for economic emergency	0.045	0.207	0	1
EMDECL_13	Can either Head of state, Head of Gov't, Head of Gov't declare state of emergency?	0.463	0.499	0	1
EMDECL_457	Who can declare a state of emergency? 4: government/cabinet, 5: first (or only) chamber of the legislature, 7: both chambers of the legislature are required	0.120	0.325	0	1
EMRIGHTS	Does the const. provide for suspension or restriction of rights during states of emergency?	0.415	0.493	0	1
EXECINDP	Does the const. contain explicit declaration regarding independent of central executive organ(s)?	0.099	0.298	0	1
EXECNUM_2	One executive is specified in the constitution	0.532	0.499	0	1
HOGADISS_1	Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of Government? 1: Head of State	0.110	0.312	0	1
HOGDEC	Does the Head of Government have decree power?	0.116	0.320	0	1
HOGIMM_2	Is the Head of Government provided with immunity from prosecution? 2: Yes, limited immunity	0.060	0.238	0	1
HOGPDISS_12	Can Head of state call propose dismissal of the Head of Government?	0.201	0.401	0	1
HOGSUCC_12	Should the head of government need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 1: The normal selection process (whether it be election or appointment) is implemented, 2: The legislature appoints a successor	0.164	0.371	0	1
HOSADISS_19	Can Head of gov't/cabinet approve a dismissal of the Head of State?	0.004	0.060	0	1
HOSDCOND_1	Under what grounds can the Head of State be dismissed? 1: general dissatisfaction	0.065	0.247	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
	with the leadership (i.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted)				
HOSDCOND_2	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 2: crimes and other issues of conduct	0.323	0.468	0	1
HOSDCOND_3	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 3: treason	0.206	0.404	0	1
HOSDCOND_4	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 4: violations of the const.	0.192	0.394	0	1
HOSDCOND_5	Under what grounds can the head of state be dismissed? 5: incapacitated	0.135	0.342	0	1
HOSDEC	Does the Head of State have decree power?	0.588	0.492	0	1
HOSDISS	Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of State?	0.580	0.494	0	1
HOSELECT_1	How is the Head of State selected? 1: heredity/royal selection	0.271	0.445	0	1
HOSELECT_2	How is the Head of State selected? 2: elected by citizens	0.342	0.475	0	1
HOSELECT_3	How is the Head of State selected? 3: elected by elite group	0.303	0.459	0	1
HOSELSYS_1	Which of these best categorizes the electoral system for the Head of State? 1: plurality	0.046	0.210	0	1
HOSELSYS_4567	Which of these best categorizes the electoral system for the Head of State? 4: Majority, unspecified, 5: Majority, alternative vote method, 6: Majority, by two round method with popular run-off, 7: Majority, by two round method with assembly run-off	0.211	0.408	0	1
HOSPDISS_19	Can Head of govt/cabinet propose a dismissal of the Head of State?	0.036	0.186	0	1
HOSSUCC_1	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 1: normal selection process (whether it be election or appointment) is implemented	0.329	0.470	0	1
HOSSUCC_2	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 2: the legislature appoints a successor	0.050	0.218	0	1
HOSSUCC_4	Should the head of state need to be replaced before the normally scheduled replacement process, what is the process of replacement? 4: A predetermined line of succession is followed	0.379	0.485	0	1
HOSTERM_UNDER5	Is the maximum term length of the Head of State 5 years or under?	0.426	0.495	0	1
LEGDISS_1	Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature? 1: head of state	0.509	0.500	0	1
LEGINVEXE_NO	Does the legislature not have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?	0.057	0.231	0	1
TERR	Does the const. define the geographic borders/territory of the state?	0.158	0.365	0	1
WAR_13	Who has the power to declare war? 1: head of state, 3: the government/cabinet	0.490	0.500	0	1
WAR_47	Who has the power to declare war? 4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature, 7: Both Chambers, acting jointly	0.215	0.411	0	1
WARAP_123	Who has the power to approve declarations of war? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.036	0.187	0	1
Judiciary Rules					
ADAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges to administrative courts? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.022	0.145	0	1
ADNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to administrative courts? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.059	0.236	0	1
ADTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for administrative courts over 5 years?	0.038	0.191	0	1
CAPPUN	Does the const. universally prohibit the use of capital punishment?	0.135	0.342	0	1
CHFTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court over 5 years?	0.049	0.216	0	1
CHIEFAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.048	0.213	0	1
CHIEFNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.113	0.316	0	1
CONAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.033	0.179	0	1
CONNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.114	0.318	0	1
CONPOW_123456	Does the constitutional court have any additional powers besides reviewing legislation?	0.122	0.327	0	1
CORPPUN	Does the const. universally prohibit the use of corporal punishment?	0.091	0.288	0	1
COUNS	Does the const. provide the right to counsel if one is indicted or arrested?	0.373	0.484	0	1
DEBTORS	Does the const. forbid the detention of debtors	0.132	0.339	0	1
DUEPROC	Does the const. explicitly mention due process?	0.112	0.315	0	1
ECAP_123	Who is involved in the approval of judges nominated to the electoral court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.010	0.099	0	1
ECNOM_123	Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the electoral court? 1: Head of State, 2: Head of Government, 3: Government/Cabinet	0.013	0.115	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
ECTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for the electoral court over 5 years?	0.008	0.089	0	1
EXAMWIT_3	Does the const. provide for the right to examine evidence or confront all witnesses? 3: both	0.036	0.186	0	1
EXPOST	Does the const. prohibit punishment by laws enacted ex post facto?	0.578	0.494	0	1
FAIRTRI	Does the const. provide the right to a fair trial?	0.216	0.411	0	1
FALSEIMP	Does the const. provide for right of some redress for false imprisonment/arrest/judicial error?	0.230	0.421	0	1
HABCORP	Does the const. provide for the right to protection from unjustified restraint (habeas corpus)?	0.659	0.474	0	1
ILLADMIN	Does the const. contain provisions protecting individuals against illegal administrative actions?	0.262	0.440	0	1
JC	Does the const. contain provisions for a Judicial Council/Commission?	0.286	0.452	0	1
JREM	Are there provisions for dismissing judges?	0.661	0.473	0	1
JREMAP_123	Can Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet approve the dismissal of judges?	0.153	0.360	0	1
JREMPRO_123	Can Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet dismissal of judges?	0.089	0.285	0	1
JUDCRTS_1	Does const. contain provisions for administrative courts?	0.194	0.395	0	1
JUDCRTS_2	Does const. contain provisions for constitutional court?	0.180	0.384	0	1
ORDAP_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in approval of nominations to ordinary courts?	0.220	0.414	0	1
ORDNOM_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in nomination of judges to ordinary courts?	0.246	0.431	0	1
ORDTERM_OVER5	Is the maximum term length for judges for ordinary courts over 5 years?	0.148	0.355	0	1
PREREL	Does the const. provide for the right/possibility of pre-trial release?	0.253	0.435	0	1
PRESINOC	Is there a presumption of innocence in trials?	0.305	0.460	0	1
PUBTRI	Does the const. generally require public trials?	0.464	0.499	0	1
RGHTAPP	Do defendants have the right to appeal judicial decisions?	0.180	0.384	0	1
RULELAW	Does the const. contain a gen. statement regarding rule of law/legality/Rechtsstaat?	0.165	0.371	0	1
SPEEDTRI	Does the const. provide for the right to a speedy trial?	0.236	0.425	0	1
SUPAP_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in approval of nom. to highest ordinary court?	0.194	0.396	0	1
SUPNOM_123	Head of State / Head of gov't/cabinet involved in nom. of judges to highest ordinary court?	0.315	0.465	0	1
SUPTERM_OVER5	The maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court is over 5 years.	0.285	0.451	0	1
TRILANG	Does the const. specify the trial has to be in a language the accused understands or the right to an interpreter if the accused cannot understand the language?	0.145	0.352	0	1
WOLAW	Does the const. mention nulla poena sine lege or the principle that no person should be punished without law?	0.652	0.476	0	1
Federalism					
FEDERAL_1	Does the const. recognize Local/Municipal Governments?	0.640	0.480	0	1
FEDERAL_2	Does the const. recognize Subsidiary Units (regions, states, or provinces)?	0.658	0.474	0	1
FEDERAL_3	Does the const. recognize Autonomous Indigenous Groups?	0.051	0.219	0	1
FEDREV	Does the const. contain provisions allowing review of the legislation of the constituent units in federations by federal judicial or other central government organs?	0.188	0.391	0	1
FEDUNIT_3	Is the state described as either federal, confederal, or unitary? 1: federal, 2:confederal	0.188	0.390	0	1
FEDUNIT_12	Is the state described as either federal, confederal, or unitary? 3: unitary	0.121	0.327	0	1
Individual and Human Rights					
ACFREE	Does the const. guarantee academic freedom?	0.274	0.446	0	1
ACHIGHED_1	Does the const. guarantee equal access to higher education? 1: Yes	0.056	0.231	0	1
ACHIGHED_2	Does the const. guarantee equal access to higher education? 2: Yes, but qualified	0.062	0.240	0	1
ASSEM	Does the const. provide for freedom of assembly	0.723	0.447	0	1
ASSOCEXPROP	Combination of ASSOC ('Does the const. provide for freedom of association?'), EXPRESS ('Does the const. provide for freedom of expression or speech?'), and OPINION ('Does the const. provide for freedom of opinion, thought, and/or conscience?')	0.860	0.347	0	1
BINDING	Are rights provisions binding on private parties as well as the state?	0.081	0.272	0	1
BUSINES	Does the const. provide a right to conduct/establish a business?	0.242	0.428	0	1
CC	Does the const. contain provisions for a counter corruption commission?	0.018	0.131	0	1
CENSOR_12	Does the const. prohibit censorship? 1: Yes, 2: Censorship allowed in exceptional cases (i.e. war, state of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, etc.)	0.383	0.486	0	1
CULTRGHT	Does the const. refer to a state duty to protect or promote culture or cultural rights?	0.309	0.462	0	1
ECONPLAN	Does the const. mention the adoption of national economic plans?	0.138	0.345	0	1

Variable	Definition	Mean	SD	Min	Max
EDCOMPFREE	Does the const. stipulate that education be compulsory until at least some level? Or does the const. stipulate that education be free, at least up to some level?	0.516	0.500	0	1
EQUAL	Does the const. refer to equality before the law, the equal rights of men, or non-discrimination?	0.823	0.382	0	1
EQUALGR	Does the const. protect any particular group from discrimination/provide equality for?	0.627	0.484	0	1
ETHINCL	Does the const. contain provisions concerning national integration of ethnic communities?	0.104	0.305	0	1
EXPCOND_137	Under what conditions or for what purposes can the state expropriate private property? 1: Infrastructure, public works, 3: national defense, 7: general public purpose	0.672	0.470	0	1
EXPCOND_2456	Under what conditions or for what purposes can the state expropriate private property? 2: redistribution to other citizens, 4: land, natural resource preservation, 5: exploitation of natural resources, 6: land reform	0.056	0.230	0	1
EXPRCOMP_1234	What is the specified level of compensation for expropriation of private property? 1: fair/just, 2: full, 3: appropriate, 4: adequate	0.511	0.500	0	1
EXPROP	Can the government expropriate private property under at least some conditions?	0.821	0.383	0	1
FINSUP	Does the const. provide for either general or financial support by the government for any of the following groups: elderly, unemployed, disabled or children/orphans?	0.398	0.489	0	1
FREECOMP	Does the const. provide the right to a free and/or competitive market?	0.095	0.294	0	1
FREEMOVE	Does the const. provide for freedom of movement?	0.561	0.496	0	1
FREEREL	Does the const. provide for freedom of religion?	0.770	0.421	0	1
GOVMED_2	Can state operated print/electronic media outlets	0.042	0.201	0	1
HEALTHF	Does the const. specify that healthcare should be provided by government free of charge?	0.086	0.281	0	1
HEALTHR	Does the const. mention the right to health care?	0.202	0.401	0	1
HR	Does the const. contain provisions for a human rights commission?	0.019	0.138	0	1
INFOACC	Does the const. provide for individual right to view gov't files/documents under some conditions?	0.095	0.293	0	1
INTPROP_1234	Does the const. mention any of the following intellectual property rights? 1: patents, 2: copyrights, 3: trademark, 4: general reference to intellectual property	0.335	0.472	0	1
JOINTRDE	Does the const. provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?	0.385	0.487	0	1
LIBEL	Does the const. provide for the right of protection of one's reputation from libelous actions?	0.158	0.365	0	1
MEDCOM	Does the const. mention a special regulatory body/institution to oversee the media market?	0.051	0.220	0	1
MEDMARK_12345	Does the const. mention any of the following general principles about the operation of the media market? 1: no monopoly or oligopoly, 2: competitive, 3: pluralism, 4: balanced, 5: fair	0.039	0.195	0	1
OFFREL_1	Does the const. contain provisions concerning a national or official religion or a national or official church? 1: Yes, national religion specified	0.309	0.462	0	1
OPGROUP	Does the const. provide for positive obligations to transfer wealth to, or provide opportunity for, particular groups?	0.092	0.289	0	1
PROPRGHT	Does the const. provide for a right to own property?	0.671	0.470	0	1
PROVHLTH	Does the const. mention a state duty to provide health care?	0.216	0.412	0	1
PRTYDUTY	Does the const. refer to a duty to join a political party?	0.002	0.043	0	1
RELTAX	Are religious organizations granted tax free status?	0.046	0.209	0	1
REMUNER	Does the const. provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?	0.247	0.431	0	1
SCIFREE	Does the const. provide for a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress?	0.037	0.189	0	1
SELFDET	Does the const. provide for a people's right of self-determination?	0.061	0.239	0	1
SEPREL	Does the const. contain an explicit decree of separation of church and state?	0.196	0.397	0	1
SHELTER	Does the const. provide for the right to shelter or housing?	0.102	0.303	0	1
STANDLIV	Does the const. provide for a right to an adequate or reasonable standard of living?	0.113	0.316	0	1
STRIKE_12	Does the const. provide for a right to strike? 1: Yes, 2: Yes, but with limitations	0.210	0.408	0	1
TAXES	Does the const. refer to a duty to pay taxes?	0.306	0.461	0	1
TORTURE_12	Does the const. prohibit torture universally or in case of war?	0.419	0.493	0	1
TRADEUN	Does the const. refer to a duty to join trade unions?	0.001	0.032	0	1
WORK	Does the const. refer to a duty to work?	0.199	0.399	0	1

Table A.3: Constitutional Similarity and Growth – Accounting for Human Capital and Democratization

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, T									
	(A1) 5 years	(A2) 10 years	(A3) 15 years	(A4) 20 years	(A5) 25 years	(A6) 30 years	(A7) 35 years	(A8) 40 years	(A9) 45 years	(A10) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Non-Turmoil Countries)	-0.002	0.010	0.008	0.006	0.016***	0.011***	0.013***	0.010***	0.010***	0.008***
	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Turmoil Countries)	0.033	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.007	0.011
	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Turmoil	-0.012	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.002	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	0.035	-0.015	-0.012	-0.011	-0.011	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.003	-0.003	0.004
	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Primary Schooling	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001*	0.002*	0.002**
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Secondary Schooling	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Tertiary Schooling	0.014	-0.006	-0.002	-0.008	-0.002	-0.006	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Democracy Index	0.036***	0.012**	0.002	0.002	-0.001	-0.000	-0.004	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.006	-0.009	-0.009	-0.014**	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.013***	-0.010***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Observations	546	537	479	470	412	403	347	338	285	278
- of which are in turmoil	53	52	44	41	37	37	32	29	22	21
R2	0.098	0.190	0.186	0.343	0.385	0.507	0.490	0.618	0.523	0.619
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Description of the Constitution Data

The original 'Characteristics of National Constitutions' dataset (version 2.0) was downloaded from http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ on July 31, 2015. It included annual panel data on constitutional provisions in 214 countries. To conduct the empirical analysis, a number of variables needed to be recoded or dropped. Below we provide the details of the necessary changes to generate our dataset (also programmed in the provided CONSTITUTION_DATA.do Stata file). The coding pdf file can be obtained from the constitutions project website. The dataset was altered for six major reasons.

I) Irrelevant Variables
A number of variables are irrelevant to our analysis, for example COWCODE (Correlates of War country code) or SOURCE ('What is the source for the text of the Constitution?'). All excluded variables due to irrelevance are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

II) Variables Required Recoding
Some variables were originally coded categorically. Enumerated type were recoded into dichotomous (binary) variables. Details on the coding are provided in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file. When none of the individual answers had meaningful interpretations, they were dropped. All variables dropped because the lack of meaningful interpretations are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

III) Imprecise Variable Definitions
Some variables were imprecisely defined, for example when the definitions included the terms "refer" or "mention" without further definition. For example, the variable MARKET ('Does the constitution refer to the 'free market,' 'capitalism,' or an analogous term?') is ambiguous whether the reference is positive or negative. All excluded variables are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do file.

IV) Ambiguous Variable Coding
Some variables are coded ambiguously in the sense that the definitions imply unclear alternative hypotheses.
AMEND ('Does the constitution provide for at least one procedure for amending the constitution?') is deleted since it contradicts in part UNAMEND ('Are any parts of the constitution unamendable?').
CRUELTY ('Does the constitution prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?') is deleted for lack of an interpretation for a zero, since no country in our dataset explicitly allows cruel treatment in the constitution.
CUSTLAW2_123 ('What is the status of customary international law in the constitution?') is dropped since the answer is conditional on a positive response to CUSTLAW ('Does the Constitution refer to 'customary' international law or the 'law of nations'?'), which we exclude based on its imprecise definition, see point III).
FREEELEC ('Does the constitution prescribe that electoral ballots be secret?') is dropped since it is unclear whether a zero necessarily implies that elections are not free. Australia and the United States are prominent examples for countries that do not specify secret ballots in their constitution.
HOSIMM_12 ('Is the Head of State provided with absolute or limited immunity from prosecution?') is eliminated because no country in our dataset explicitly denies immunity to the head of state.
HOSTERML_5 ('Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms the Head of State may serve?'), LHTRMLIM_5 ('Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms members of the first (or only) chamber may serve?') and UHTRMLIM_5 ('Are there no restrictions in place regarding the number of terms members of the second chamber may serve?') are deleted since most countries do not specify term limits in their constitution, leaving us with an unclear alternative hypothesis.
INTEXEC_123 ('Does the legislature have the power to interpellate members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the executive responsible for reporting its activities to the legislature on a regular basis?') had to be dropped because the meaning of interpellate differs widely across constitutions (ranging in meaning from "has the right to submit questions" to "has the ability to schedule a vote of confidence").
INVEXE ('Does the legislature have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?') is replaced with LEGINVEXE_NO, which only takes the value one if the constitution explicitly prohibits the legislature to investigate the activities of the executive, and zero otherwise.
JUDPREC ('Does the constitution stipulate that courts have to take into account decisions of higher courts?') is dropped since definition does not indicate how higher court decisions have to be "taken into account".
JUDIND ('Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central judicial organ(s)?') is dropped because the variable does not indicate what the declaration exactly refers to, e.g., which central judicial organs are included and whether their independence is ensured or ruled out.

OCCUPATE ('Does the constitution provide for the right to choose ones occupation?') is dropped from the dataset, since specific rights are frequently subsumed under more general statements in constitutions. For example, the US constitution contains no statement regarding "free occupational choice" (hence OCCUPATE=0), but the 9th amendment states "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." PRIVACY ('Does the constitution provide for a right of privacy?'), DEVLPERS ('Does the constitution provide for an individual's right to self-determination or the right to free development of personality?') and SAFEWORK ('Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?') are dropped for the same reason. For example, while the US constitution makes no explicit statement regarding PRIVACY (hence PRIVACY =0), there are a number of provisions that refer to the right of privacy, such as the protection of home and property (4th amendment) or the privacy of beliefs (1st amendment).

OFFREL_3 ('Does the constitution contain provisions that specifically prohibit a national religion?') is deleted because its simultaneous inclusion with OFFREL_1 ('Does the constitution contain provisions that specify a national religion?') would imply an unclear alternative hypothesis for both variables.

PRESS ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of the press?') is deleted due to some unclear codings in the data. For instance, the current French constitution does not contain an explicit statement on the freedom of the press, implying PRESS=0. However, it declares in the preamble that the country's standard for citizens' guaranteed rights is the "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789", which in article 11 states that "The free expression of thought and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: thus every citizen may freely speak, write, and print, subject to accountability for abuse of this freedom in the cases determined by law."

SLAVE ('Does the constitution universally prohibit slavery, servitude, or forced labor?') is dropped because no country in our dataset explicitly allows slavery in its constitution.

V) Correlation

Some constitutional rules feature high correlations and capture similar concepts. These variables are dropped to minimize multicollinearity issues:

OVERWHO_13456 ('Can the legislature override vetoes of legislation?') is dropped due to its near perfect correlation with OVERRIDE ('Can vetoes of legislation be overridden?').

UHLEGISL ('Is the Second Chamber of the Legislature given the power to legislate?') and HOUSENUM ('Does the legislature contain one chamber or house?') have a correlation coefficient of .94; we thus eliminate UHLEGISL. In addition, HOGELECT_4 ('Is the Head of Government appointed?') and HOGDISS ('Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of Government?') are highly correlated with EXECNUM_2 ('One executive is specified in the constitution.'), with correlation coefficients of -.83 and .99, respectively. We only keep EXECNUM_2.

EDCOMP ('Does the constitution stipulate that education be compulsory until at least some level?') and EDFREE ('Does the constitution stipulate that education be free, at least up to some level?') are combined into EDCOMPFREE given that they capture similar dimensions. EDCOMPFFREE takes the value one if we observe a positive response for one of the variables, and zero otherwise.

ASSOC ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of association?'), EXPRESS ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of expression or speech?'), and OPINION ('Does the constitution provide for freedom of opinion, thought, and/or conscience?') are combined for the same reasons into ASSOCEXPRESSOPINION, which takes the value one if either of the three variables features a positive response.

EXPLIM ('What limits/conditions are placed on the ability of the government to expropriate private property?') has an interpretation that is nearly identical to EXPROP ('Can the government expropriate private property under at least some conditions?'). We therefore only keep the latter variable.

VI) Variables with Conditional Coding

The coding of several variables is conditioned on other constitutional rules, which complicates their interpretation. For instance, HOGDECIM ('Which arrangement describes the implementation procedure for Head of Government decrees?') is only answered when HOGDEC ('Does the Head of Government have decree power?') takes the value one. In this case, we only keep the latter variable. Other variables excluded on this basis are given in the CONSTITUTION_DATA.do Stata file.

Estimation Results for other Neo-European Reference Countries

Reference Country: Germany

Table A.4: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to DEU	Event horizon, T									
	(A11) 5 years	**(A12)** 10 years	**(A13)** 15 years	**(A14)** 20 years	**(A15)** 25 years	**(A16)** 30 years	**(A17)** 35 years	**(A18)** 40 years	**(A19)** 45 years	**(A20)** 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.030***	0.023***	0.016***	0.011***	0.007***	0.008***	0.009***	0.007***	0.006***	0.007***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.019***	-0.024***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.024***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	9,713	8,724	7,822	6,966	6,200	5,447	4,754	4,116	3,536	3,011
R2	0.133	0.255	0.350	0.438	0.533	0.597	0.616	0.607	0.583	0.546
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.5: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to DEU	Event horizon, T									
	(A21) 5 years	**(A22)** 10 years	**(A23)** 15 years	**(A24)** 20 years	**(A25)** 25 years	**(A26)** 30 years	**(A27)** 35 years	**(A28)** 40 years	**(A29)** 45 years	**(A30)** 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.034***	0.026***	0.018***	0.012***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.006***	0.007***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.004***	-0.002	0.001	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.027***	-0.021***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.005*	-0.003	-0.006**	-0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.018***	-0.024***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.024***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.007	0.006*	0.005*	0.001	-0.002	0.004	0.006**	0.002	0.004	0.008**
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	9,713	8,724	7,822	6,966	6,200	5,447	4,754	4,116	3,536	3,011
- of which are in turmoil	1,156	1,076	942	802	666	556	475	395	327	264
R2	0.136	0.258	0.352	0.442	0.535	0.598	0.616	0.609	0.587	0.551
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.6: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to ESP	Event horizon, T									
	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)	(A35)	(A36)	(A37)	(A38)	(A39)	(A40)
	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.018***	0.018***	0.013***	0.012***	0.014***	0.018***	0.019***	0.018***	0.018***	0.017***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.029***	-0.037***	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.038***	-0.034***	-0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	9,782	8,808	7,916	7,233	6,471	5,723	5,170	4,537	4,080	3,546
R2	0.160	0.296	0.367	0.438	0.501	0.545	0.575	0.586	0.580	0.537
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.7: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to ESP	Event horizon, T									
	(A41)	(A42)	(A43)	(A44)	(A45)	(A46)	(A47)	(A48)	(A49)	(A50)
	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.020***	0.021***	0.014***	0.013***	0.014***	0.018***	0.019***	0.019***	0.018***	0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.002	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.002***	0.001	-0.001	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.017***	-0.013***	-0.009***	-0.006**	-0.005	-0.006*	-0.007**	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.005**
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.029***	-0.038***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.037***	-0.034***	-0.031***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.003	0.007**	0.005	0.007**	0.009***	0.013***	0.013***	0.010***	0.010***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	9,782	8,808	7,916	7,233	6,471	5,723	5,170	4,537	4,080	3,546
- of which are in turmoil	1,171	1,088	909	781	654	554	510	452	403	346
R2	0.162	0.299	0.370	0.441	0.503	0.547	0.576	0.588	0.583	0.539
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.8: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to FRA	Event horizon, T									
	(A51) 5 years	(A52) 10 years	(A53) 15 years	(A54) 20 years	(A55) 25 years	(A56) 30 years	(A57) 35 years	(A58) 40 years	(A59) 45 years	(A60) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.017***	0.011***	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.004***	0.002**	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.021***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.026***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	9,413	8,652	7,934	7,383	6,625	5,882	5,200	4,573	4,005	3,581
R2	0.131	0.257	0.344	0.428	0.510	0.551	0.565	0.549	0.511	0.466
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.9: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to FRA	Event horizon, T									
	(A61) 5 years	(A62) 10 years	(A63) 15 years	(A64) 20 years	(A65) 25 years	(A66) 30 years	(A67) 35 years	(A68) 40 years	(A69) 45 years	(A70) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.019***	0.014***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	0.002***	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.003*	0.001	0.002**	0.002***	0.002**	0.002*	0.001	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.011***	-0.009***	-0.006**	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.020***	-0.027***	-0.029***	-0.030***	-0.028***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.026***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	9,413	8,652	7,934	7,383	6,625	5,882	5,200	4,573	4,005	3,581
- of which are in turmoil	845	802	720	649	558	486	433	370	311	264
R2	0.132	0.259	0.346	0.429	0.511	0.551	0.565	0.549	0.511	0.468
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.10: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to ITA	Event horizon, T									
	(A71) 5 years	(A72) 10 years	(A73) 15 years	(A74) 20 years	(A75) 25 years	(A76) 30 years	(A77) 35 years	(A78) 40 years	(A79) 45 years	(A80) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.038***	0.029***	0.021***	0.016***	0.013***	0.011***	0.010***	0.008***	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.021***	-0.029***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.029***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	10,309	9,319	8,417	7,561	6,793	6,040	5,347	4,709	4,130	3,591
R2	0.188	0.298	0.354	0.418	0.486	0.530	0.541	0.529	0.506	0.470
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.11: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to ITA	Event horizon, T									
	(A81) 5 years	(A82) 10 years	(A83) 15 years	(A84) 20 years	(A85) 25 years	(A86) 30 years	(A87) 35 years	(A88) 40 years	(A89) 45 years	(A90) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.040***	0.030***	0.022***	0.017***	0.014***	0.012***	0.011***	0.009***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.001	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.002***	0.001	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.015***	-0.009***	-0.007**	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.021***	-0.030***	-0.033***	-0.035***	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.031***	-0.029***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.025***	0.022***	0.015***	0.008***	0.005*	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	10,309	9,319	8,417	7,561	6,793	6,040	5,347	4,709	4,130	3,591
- of which are in turmoil	1,360	1,281	1,113	937	783	668	579	494	421	354
R2	0.190	0.300	0.357	0.422	0.489	0.532	0.543	0.532	0.510	0.477
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

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Table A.12: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to NLD					Event horizon, T					
	(A91) 5 years	(A92) 10 years	(A93) 15 years	(A94) 20 years	(A95) 25 years	(A96) 30 years	(A97) 35 years	(A98) 40 years	(A99) 45 years	(A100) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.013***	0.008***	0.003**	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.020***	-0.025***	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.027***	-0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	10,180	9,367	8,465	7,609	6,841	6,088	5,395	4,757	4,178	3,639
R2	0.134	0.260	0.345	0.436	0.519	0.577	0.606	0.602	0.571	0.507
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.13: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to NLD					Event horizon, T					
	(A101) 5 years	(A102) 10 years	(A103) 15 years	(A104) 20 years	(A105) 25 years	(A106) 30 years	(A107) 35 years	(A108) 40 years	(A109) 45 years	(A110) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.015***	0.010***	0.005***	0.003**	0.003**	0.002*	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.003**	0.001	0.002**	0.004***	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.011**	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.004*	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.018***	-0.025***	-0.028***	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.026***	-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.027***	-0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.004	-0.001	-0.005*	-0.005**	-0.001	0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	10,180	9,367	8,465	7,609	6,841	6,088	5,395	4,757	4,178	3,639
- of which are in turmoil	1,118	1,089	979	854	732	633	564	497	429	370
R2	0.135	0.261	0.347	0.440	0.522	0.578	0.607	0.603	0.572	0.508
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.14: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to UK	Event horizon, T									
	(A111) 5 years	(A112) 10 years	(A113) 15 years	(A114) 20 years	(A115) 25 years	(A116) 30 years	(A117) 35 years	(A118) 40 years	(A119) 45 years	(A120) 50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.010***	0.005***	0.003**	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.015***	-0.022***	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.023***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	10,204	9,225	8,333	7,487	6,731	5,990	5,309	4,680	4,107	3,576
R2	0.148	0.280	0.371	0.457	0.534	0.584	0.610	0.607	0.575	0.497
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.15: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to UK	Event horizon, T									
	(A121) 5 years	(A122) 10 years	(A123) 15 years	(A124) 20 years	(A125) 25 years	(A126) 30 years	(A127) 35 years	(A128) 40 years	(A129) 45 years	(A130) 50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.012***	0.008***	0.006***	0.005***	0.003**	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002***	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.017***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.013**	-0.022***	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.024***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.023***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	-0.005	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.017***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Observations	10,204	9,225	8,333	7,487	6,731	5,990	5,309	4,680	4,107	3,576
- of which are in turmoil	821	776	682	590	492	409	351	290	239	200
R2	0.150	0.284	0.375	0.461	0.538	0.587	0.613	0.611	0.579	0.502
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.16: Effect of Constitutional Similarity on Growth

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, T									
	(A131)	(A132)	(A133)	(A134)	(A135)	(A136)	(A137)	(A138)	(A139)	(A140)
	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
Constitution Similarity	0.025***	0.015***	0.009***	0.007***	0.003**	0.003*	0.003**	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.008	-0.017***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	8,440	7,681	6,959	6,402	5,641	4,895	4,344	3,713	3,257	2,837
R2	0.126	0.243	0.341	0.428	0.508	0.551	0.591	0.580	0.550	0.486
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.17: Effect of Constitutional Change on Growth – Accounting for Political Turmoil

Dep. Variable: Average Annual Growth Differential to US	Event horizon, T									
	(A141)	(A142)	(A143)	(A144)	(A145)	(A146)	(A147)	(A148)	(A149)	(A150)
	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
Constitution Similarity (Effect for non-Turmoil Countries)	0.029***	0.019***	0.012***	0.009***	0.005**	0.003**	0.003**	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil	-0.010***	-0.006***	-0.003**	-0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Turmoil x Constitution Similarity	-0.027***	-0.023***	-0.018***	-0.015***	-0.009**	-0.004	0.000	0.006	0.009**	0.015***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.007	-0.016***	-0.022***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.022***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constitutional Similarity♠ (Effect for Turmoil Countries)	0.002	-0.004	-0.007*	-0.006*	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	0.006	0.008**	0.014***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	8,440	7,681	6,959	6,402	5,641	4,895	4,344	3,713	3,257	2,837
- of which are in turmoil	1,033	976	866	774	627	509	446	378	329	283
R2	0.128	0.246	0.344	0.432	0.510	0.554	0.594	0.581	0.552	0.491
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: ♠ Composite effect calculated with the Delta method. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table A.18: Constitutional Similarity and Growth –Dimension Results by Reference Country (Non-turmoil Countries)

	Reference Country	Dep. Variable: Avg. Annual Growth Differential to Respective Reference Country									
		Event horizon, T									
		5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
Legislative	USA	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.007***	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***
	DEU	0.014***	0.009***	0.006***	0.007***	0.008***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	0.003***	0.005***
	ESP	0.004*	0.004***	0.006***	0.008***	0.010***	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***	0.012***
	ITA	0.012***	0.007***	0.003**	0.003**	0.005***	0.006***	0.005***	0.002*	0.002	0.003**
	UK	0.006***	0.005***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	ALL	0.003	0.006***	0.004*	0.004**	0.006***	0.006***	0.002*	-0.000	0.001	0.001
	FRA	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002**	0.001*	0.001	0.001*
	NED	0.002	0.004*	0.005***	0.007***	0.008***	0.007***	0.004***	0.001	0.001	0.002**
Elections	USA	0.002	-0.000	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.001*	-0.001	0.000	0.001**	0.002***	0.001**
	DEU	-0.002	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***
	ESP	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.006***
	ITA	-0.003*	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.004***
	UK	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001
	ALL	-0.004	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.000
	FRA	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001***	-0.002***
	NED	0.001	-0.003**	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
Executive	USA	0.007***	0.005***	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.002**	0.003***	0.004***
	DEU	0.022***	0.017***	0.013***	0.010***	0.007***	0.005***	0.005***	0.003***	0.001	-0.001
	ESP	0.008***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***	0.011***	0.009***
	ITA	0.008***	0.009***	0.010***	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.007***	0.005***
	UK	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
	ALL	-0.003	-0.002	0.003	0.005**	0.004**	0.006***	0.006***	0.003**	-0.000	-0.002*
	FRA	0.011***	0.011***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.004***	0.002***	0.001
	NED	0.010***	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Judiciary	USA	0.004*	0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	DEU	0.003	0.004***	0.001	0.001	0.002***	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***
	ESP	0.005***	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.010***	0.012***	0.012***	0.010***	0.009***	0.008***
	ITA	0.010***	0.007***	0.004***	0.002**	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	UK	0.004*	0.003*	0.001	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001
	ALL	0.017***	0.013***	0.004*	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000
	FRA	0.012***	0.006***	0.003***	0.002**	0.002***	0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.001*
	NED	0.001	0.004**	0.004**	0.003**	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.000
Federalism	USA	0.004**	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.004***	0.000	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.001	-0.001
	DEU	0.006***	0.006***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***
	ESP	0.011***	0.007***	0.004***	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.002*
	ITA	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002**	0.001	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	UK	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.002**	0.001*	0.002**	0.002***	0.001
	ALL	0.012***	0.010***	0.006***	0.004***	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***	0.003***	0.002**	0.001
	FRA	-0.000	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001***
	NED	0.002	0.002*	0.003***	0.004***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002**	0.001**	0.003***	0.002**
Rights	USA	0.003	0.004**	0.004***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	DEU	0.001	0.004***	0.006***	0.003***	0.001	0.004***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	ESP	0.006***	0.004***	-0.002	-0.006***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.009***	-0.008***	-0.007***
	ITA	0.012***	0.010***	0.007***	0.002**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	UK	0.002	0.002*	0.002**	0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	ALL	0.008**	0.006**	0.006***	0.005***	-0.001	-0.003**	-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.002	-0.001
	FRA	-0.005***	-0.002*	-0.001*	-0.001*	0.000	0.001*	0.001*	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***
	NED	0.003	0.001	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.001*

Notes: Coefficient estimates shown for non-turmoil countries only. Robust standard errors in parentheses ***, **, * are 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.

Table A.19: Constitutional Similarity and Growth –Dimension Results by Reference Country (Turmoil Countries)

	Reference Country	5 years	10 years	15 years	20 years	25 years	30 years	35 years	40 years	45 years	50 years
		Dep. Variable: Avg. Annual Growth Differential to Respective Reference Country — Event horizon, T									
Legislative	USA	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.006***	-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***
	DEU	0.020***	0.012***	0.005*	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.000	-0.002	-0.005***
	ESP	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	-0.002	-0.004*	-0.003	0.001	0.003	0.001
	ITA	0.014***	0.010***	0.008***	0.002	-0.001	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.006***	-0.008***
	UK	-0.005	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.009***	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.019***
	ALL	0.012**	0.006*	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.008***	-0.006**	-0.004	-0.005*	-0.005*
	FRA	0.009*	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.006**
	NED	0.007	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.005**	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.011***
Elections	USA	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.004**	-0.000	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.005***
	DEU	-0.018***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.004**	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.003*	0.001
	ESP	-0.022***	-0.026***	-0.016***	-0.011***	-0.006***	-0.004*	-0.003	0.000	0.001	0.004
	ITA	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.004**	0.000	-0.001	-0.004*	0.000
	UK	-0.010**	-0.007**	-0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.004	-0.006	-0.002
	ALL	-0.023***	-0.021***	-0.014***	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.005**	-0.004*
	FRA	-0.017***	-0.005**	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.004*	0.005***	0.006***
	NED	-0.019***	-0.008**	-0.005*	-0.005**	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.007**
Executive	USA	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001	-0.004**
	DEU	0.001	0.004	0.012***	0.007**	0.003	0.005	0.006*	0.004	0.003	0.005*
	ESP	0.008	0.013***	0.016***	0.018***	0.019***	0.020***	0.022***	0.024***	0.021***	0.018***
	ITA	0.000	0.008**	0.010***	0.008**	0.010***	0.011***	0.015***	0.010***	0.010***	0.009***
	UK	0.009*	0.008**	0.005**	0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001
	ALL	0.017*	0.025***	0.026***	0.20***	0.014***	0.012**	0.015***	0.013**	0.008	0.008
	FRA	0.003	0.008**	0.009***	0.007**	0.006*	0.006*	0.010***	0.007**	0.004	0.000
	NED	-0.003	0.000	-0.003	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	0.006**	0.008***	0.006**	0.007**
Judiciary	USA	-0.001	-0.005	-0.010***	-0.014***	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.005**	-0.005**
	DEU	0.012**	-0.008**	-0.006*	-0.005**	-0.003	-0.010***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.010***	-0.015***
	ESP	-0.007	-0.007**	-0.008***	-0.004	0.002	0.005**	0.005**	0.003	0.001	0.005***
	ITA	0.010**	-0.002	-0.006**	-0.005*	-0.005**	-0.002	0.000	-0.003	-0.003	0.002
	UK	0.002	-0.007**	-0.009***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.006***	-0.004*	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	ALL	0.016**	-0.007*	-0.017***	-0.018***	-0.015***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.009***
	FRA	0.016***	0.003	-0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.006*	0.004
	NED	0.016***	0.007**	0.004	-0.002	-0.006**	-0.007***	-0.005**	-0.002	0.001	0.002
Federalism	USA	-0.005	-0.003	0.000	0.004**	0.004**	0.006***	0.010***	0.012***	0.015***	0.016***
	DEU	-0.004	-0.002	0.002	0.008***	0.007***	0.004**	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.008***
	ESP	0.013***	0.011***	0.008***	0.004**	0.005**	0.006***	0.008***	0.009***	0.011***	0.011***
	ITA	0.000	-0.003	-0.001	0.004**	0.004**	0.005***	0.005***	0.004**	0.003	0.004*
	UK	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.005**	0.006***	0.004*	0.003	0.001
	ALL	0.017***	0.011***	0.007***	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**	0.005*	0.003	0.003	0.003
	FRA	-0.004	-0.008***	-0.004**	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.004**	-0.003	-0.005***	-0.008***	-0.006***
	NED	0.006	0.001	0.003	0.003**	0.004***	0.006***	0.007***	0.005***	0.006***	0.007***
Rights	USA	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.002	0.005**	0.006***	0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001
	DEU	0.001	0.009***	0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.006***	0.007***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***
	ESP	0.008	0.010***	0.003	-0.003	-0.007***	-0.009***	-0.012***	-0.018***	-0.016***	-0.016***
	ITA	0.005	0.012***	0.009***	0.003	0.001	-0.003	-0.009***	-0.007***	-0.003	-0.006***
	UK	0.010***	0.010***	0.005**	0.004*	0.007***	0.004**	0.004**	0.005**	0.005***	0.005*
	ALL	-0.019***	-0.007*	-0.001	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.007**	0.012***	0.013***
	FRA	-0.005	-0.002	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	NED	-0.008*	-0.001	-0.004	0.001	0.005**	0.006***	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002

Notes: Coefficient estimates shown for turmoil countries only. Robust standard errors in parentheses ***, **, * are 1, 5, 10 percent significance levels.