

University of Washington
Department of Political Science
Property Rights and Institutional Analysis, POL S 582, Spring 2017
Wednesdays 1:30-4:20pm, Savery 167
Professor Susan Whiting
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Course Description

This 5-credit course approaches institutional analysis through the lens of property rights theory. It examines the nature and origin of property rights and the consequences of the property rights structure for economic growth and governance. The course explores these issues in theory and in a range of historical and contemporary cases.

Course Requirements

1) Short papers (40%). Students will write four short response papers over the course of the quarter. Response papers should develop an argument or explore a theme based on the readings for that week on the syllabus and should be about 1-2 pages in length. Students should e-mail their papers to the class list (pols582a_sp17@u.washington.edu) by 5pm on Tuesday evening before class. Students are required to read all response papers before class and be prepared to discuss them in the context of the readings.

2) Final paper (40%). Students will write a longer paper of approximately 15 pages double spaced. The paper is due to Canvas no later than Wednesday, June 7th at 12:00noon. The final paper may take one of three possible forms.

a) a *World-Politics*-style review essay. This type of essay takes a selection of important works on a single theme and uses them as a springboard to lay out a fresh agenda for further research. For an example of this style, see: Ziblatt, "How Did Europe Democratize?" *World Politics* 58:2 (2006).

b) a research design that treats the literature as a springboard. The research design should contain a literature review that motivates the proposed research, a research design, a plan for relevant data, and a clear indication of how you will know whether your hypotheses find support in the data.

c) a theoretically informed research paper. The paper should build on relevant theoretical and empirical literature and include a qualitative or quantitative empirical component. This option is appropriate if you already have access to relevant empirical material.

3) Reading and participation (20%). Completion of assigned readings and active participation are the foundations of the seminar. In addition, all students should read all response papers before class on Wednesday and be prepared to discuss them along with the assigned readings. Paper writers should be prepared to lead discussion of their response papers in class.

Office Hours

Office hours are Tuesday and Thursday 10-11am and by appointment in 147 Gowen Hall.

Additional Course Information

The Department of Political Science recognizes and affirms the University of Washington's mission to "value and honor diverse experiences and perspectives, strive to create welcoming and respectful learning environments, and promote access, opportunity and justice for all." We expect every member of this community to contribute toward cultivating an inclusive and respectful culture throughout our classrooms, work environments, and campus events.

If you would like to request academic accommodations due to a disability, please contact Disability Resources for Students, 011 Mary Gates Hall (<http://depts.washington.edu/uwdrs>). If you have a letter from DRS indicating you have a disability that requires academic accommodations, please present the letter to me so that we can discuss the accommodations you may need for class.

Course Materials

The following books are available for purchase at the University Book Store and on reserve at the East Asia Library:

Douglass North, *Structure and Change in Economic History*

Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*

Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*

E.P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act*

Michael Albertus, *Autocracy and Redistribution*

Catherine Boone, *Property and Political Order in Africa*

Gary Libecap, *Contracting for Property Rights*

Stephen Haber, et al., *The Politics of Property Rights*

Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*

Amy Poteete et al, *Working Together* (on order)

Additional materials are available full-text online via the UW Library E-Journals and E-Books collection as well as via Canvas (as noted below).

Course Schedule

WEEK ONE

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

Introduction

WEEK TWO

Wednesday, April 5, 2017

Foundations: Property Rights and Transaction Costs

Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost." *Journal of Law and Economics* Vol. 3, (October 1960), pp. 1-44.

Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," *American Economic Review* Vol. 57, No. 2 (May 1967), pp. 347-359.

Douglass North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

For a law-and-society critique of the law-and-economics perspective, see

Robert C. Ellickson, "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County," *Stanford Law Review* Vol. 38, pp. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/466

For a multi-disciplinary perspective on the elements of rights, see

Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," *Land Economics*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 249-262

For reference:

Alchian, Armen, and Harold Demsetz, "The Property Rights Paradigm," *Journal of Economic History* 33 (March 1973), pp. 16-27.

R. H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica* (1937)

WEEK THREE

Wednesday, April 12, 2017

Secure Property Rights and Economic Growth

Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventh-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* (1989)

Barry Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* (1995)

Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," *Economics and Politics* Vol. 7, No. 3 (November 1995), pp. .

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 91, No. 5 (December 2001), pp. 1369-1401.

Dan Bogart and Gary Richardson, "Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain," *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May 2011), pp. 241-274.

For reference:

Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Steven C. A. Pincus and James A. Robinson, "What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?" pp. Canvas.

David Stasavage, "Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited," *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2002).

Mogens K. Justesen, "Better Safe than Sorry: How Property Rights and Veto Players Jointly Affect Economic Growth," *Comparative Politics* (January 2014).

Clair Yang, Long-Run Persistence and Interrupted Development: Evidence from Imperial Civil Examination in Historical China, Job talk paper, University of Washington, 2016.

WEEK FOUR

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

Sociological Perspectives: Fictitious Commodities and Class Power

Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944).

Michael Levien, "The Politics of Dispossession: Theorizing India's 'Land Wars,'" *Politics & Society* Vol. 41 (2103), pp. 351-

E.P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (Allen Lane 1975), Introduction, pp. 1-3, and Part 3, pp. 131-210.

Frank K. Upham, "From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory," *International Law and Politics* Vol. 41 (2009), pp. 551-. UW Library full-text online.

WEEK FIVE

Wednesday, April 26, 2017

Property Rights, Democracy, and Redistribution

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 3.

Ben Ansell and David Samuels, "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach." *Comparative Political Studies* (2010)

Daniel Ziblatt, "Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 103, No. 1 (February 2009), pp. 1-31.

Michael Albertus, *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

WEEK SIX

Wednesday, May 3, 2017

Property Rights, Citizenship, and Governance

Catherine Boone, *Property and Political Order in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Aziz Rana, "Colonialism and Constitutional Memory," *UC Irvine Law Review* Vol. 5

Naomi R. Lamoreaux, "The Mystery of Property Rights: A U.S. Perspective," *Journal of Economic History* Vol. 71 No. 2 (June 2011).

WEEK SEVEN

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Property Rights, Citizenship, and Governance, II

Gary D. Libecap, *Contracting for Property Rights* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Gary D. Libecap, "Chinatown, Owens Valley and Western Water Re-Allocation: Getting the Record Straight and What It Means for Water Markets," *University of Texas Law Review* Vol. 83, No. 7 (2004-5), pp. (legal perspective) OR Gary D. Libecap, "Chinatown: Transaction Costs in Water Rights Exchanges: The Owens Valley Transfer to Los Angeles," Karl Eller Center Working Paper, University of Arizona, 2005. (economic perspective). Canvas.

Watch: "Chinatown," Roman Polanski, director, 1974.

WEEK EIGHT

Wednesday, May 17, 2017

Collective Action and Cooperation

Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "The Politics of Property Rights," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 867-881.

Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), Chp.

Elinor Ostrom, "Collective Action Theory," in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (2009).

Amy R. Poteete, Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom, *Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

<http://www.ifriresearch.net/resources/methods/>

<http://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=1223>

WEEK NINE

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

Property Rights a Private Good

Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929* (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 567-576.

WEEK TEN

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

Specifying and Enforcing Property Rights: State and Society

Ryan Bubb, "The Evolution of Property Rights: State Law or Informal Norms?" *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (August 2013), pp. 555-594.

Stanislav Markus, "Secure Property as a Bottom-up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States," *World Politics*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 242-277.

Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry, "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," *Journal of Political Economy* Vol. 116, No. 6 (2008), pp.981–1022.

Complementary Institutions and Policy Implications

Timothy Besley, et al., "Long-run impacts of land regulation: Evidence from tenancy reform in India," *Journal of Development Economics* Vol.118 (2016) 72–87.

Hernando De Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), excerpt. Canvas.

Jan Michiel Otto, "Rule of Law Promotion, Land Tenure and Poverty Alleviation: Questioning the Assumptions of Hernando de Soto," *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* Vol. 1 (2009), pp. 173-195.