

Keynote for the NATSA conference, Santa Cruz, July 4 2006

What can the world learn from Taiwan? From dictatorship to democracy; from miracle to anxiety, from China to the World, from Ilha Formosa to Garbage Island, and maybe back again.

When I was asked to be the keynote speaker for this year's NATSA conference, my first reaction was, "that's a great honor; I would be pleased to do it." But of course I was asked not just to give a keynote speech, but to provide a title, and that meant the speech had to be *about* something, and that meant I had to think what the proper topic would be for a keynote speech, especially one by an elderly Adoga speaking to an audience consisting mostly of young Taiwanese. I briefly considered saying something about one of my own research interests, or about the trajectory of my own career in Taiwan studies, but I rejected those as both parochial and premature: I'm not *that* elderly yet, and not entitled to such flights of egotism; what I do personally is hardly key enough to note as a primary topic for a whole conference. So personal accomplishments are not part of this lecture. But since it *is* a keynote lecture, and ought to add something to the conference beyond what could be gained from just reading the individual papers, it will include a lot of personal opinion. Or I could talk about how Taiwan studies itself has evolved, from a minor branch of China studies to a vibrant field in its own right, and I will say something about that, but the content of such a talk would be redundant here; all we have to do is read the papers and listen to the sessions, and we will know what Taiwan studies is. But because it is a keynote address for *this conference*, I will make use of many of the papers presented here to illustrate my points.

I decided to organize this talk around a broader question of the importance of Taiwan, and the consequent importance of studying it. Addressing an Asian Studies audience, I might phrase the question something like "Why do we care about Taiwan, anyway" (an Adoga can--perhaps must--ask this question in a way a Taiwanese would not have to), or "What possible importance, other than the overblown 'geostrategic' one, could an island with 22 million people--less than California and way less than Vietnam or Thailand or North Korea, let alone Bangladesh or Indonesia--have for the rest of the world?" Or, addressing to a China studies audience, "Is Taiwan Really Different," or, "Why Should Taiwan Get its Own 'Studies,' Anyway." Or, addressing a non-Academic American

audience, I might entitle my talk "No, I didn't say Thailand, and Here's Why It's Important for You to Know That." But for you today, as Taiwanese interested in understanding their own country, and as fellow Adogas with an attachment to the Island, I wanted a more positive spin, so I decided to speak on the topic of "What Can the World Learn from Taiwan?"

I do believe, in fact, that the world can learn a lot from Taiwan, about issues that are paramount on the agendas of thoughtful people everywhere--about dictatorship and democracy, about prosperity and its discontents, about the vagaries of national, ethnic, and class identity, and about the environmental challenges of too many people living on too small a planet. And because I think these lessons are ones that people everywhere, even those who think we hang out in Bangkok, ought to be aware of, I want to challenge all of us, as Taiwan scholars, to get the message out, to tell the world about this Island and the lessons--both positive and negative, both inspiring and cautionary-- it has for the rest of the World. And as examples of those lessons, and the challenges that come from them, I want to speak about the implications of four transitions that have happened in Taiwan in the last quarter century: from dictatorship to democracy; from miracle to anxiety, from China to the World, and from Garbage Island to, if we are lucky, something once again meriting the sobriquet of "Ilha Formosa."

1. From Dictatorship to Democracy

Taiwan's first great transition of the last 20 years has been from an orderly, brutal one-party dictatorship under Martial Law to a messy democracy with guaranteed civil rights as great as those anywhere in the world. What can the rest of the world learn from this first, political transition?

The first thing is that such a transition can happen peacefully, even when the United States gives no help. 1987-91 were key years in the transformation of the world political system; they marked the end of the post-War era or the Cold War Era, and were characterized by massive regime change and reorganization in many countries. This took a series of forms, both in terms of the processes internal to the countries undergoing the transformation, and in terms of the relations between the transitional countries and other world powers. I would argue that Taiwan's model, however, was a unique conjunction of internal-external processes, and for that reason was among the most successful of the transitions. It was peaceful, and it happened without any help (and probably with some resistance) from the United States, which made it unique. We can see this if

we compare Taiwan's transition with those of some other countries.

The worst transitions, of course, were those that happened in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, where unscrupulous nationalistic leaders stirred up very quiescent ethnonationalist sentiments in the wake of the retreat of the ideologically multinational communist regimes, leading to bloody wars that may or may not be just about over. In the Caucasian case, the separatist movements had at least been encouraged, if not outright financed, by the US as an aspect of its previous Cold War policy, and in the South Slavic lands, the US stood by for a long time, making pious statements but taking no actions and only covertly taking sides, before intervening in the late 1990s.

Slightly better, perhaps, was the transition in Russia--violence happened, but it was restricted and restrained, corruption and cronyism reigned for awhile, and now Russia has devolved into a semi-stable neo-authoritarianism that the US, who supported the authoritarians to start with, now wrings its hands about while it cooperates with the authoritarians.

Still better were Eastern Europe and European former Soviet Republics, actively encouraged to democratize by the US, with varying results that have now led in most cases to stable regimes based on popular voting, but still carrying the threat of returns to authoritarianism, and sometimes requiring popular revolutionary activity as happened in Ukraine in 2004.

Taiwan really stands out here, because its transition was initiated by the former authoritarian regime itself--though I still don't think anybody knows why Chiang Ching-kuo decided to repent his Leninism on his deathbed; because there was no violence involved; and because the former authoritarian regime, unlike those in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus, was a friend rather than a foe of the US, so the US did nothing to encourage or promote the democratization. Taiwan democratized in spite of the United States, not because of it. The world can learn from this that home-grown democracy can in fact work. The transition was not really complete, I don't think, until 2000, when A-bian's election ended the 70+ year rule of a formerly Leninist party (though admittedly no longer Leninist by that time), the same year, interestingly enough, that the election of Vicente Fox did exactly the same thing in Mexico, ending the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.

The second thing the world can learn from Taiwan's transition to democracy is that, despite all the theories of political economy, class, international relations and whatever, that explain historical events without reference to individuals, is

that Great Persons (alas, it still *is* mostly Great Men) can make a difference in history. I am thinking of Lee Teng-hui here, who I do not think has gotten anywhere near enough credit as one of the most visionary, skilled, and compassionate political figures of the late 20th century. The only other leader I can think of with whom to compare Lee is Nelson Mandela. Each took over a formerly authoritarian government, each came from a majority ethnic group that had been excluded from power, each used a skilled combination of parliamentary legislation and behind-the-scenes dealmaking to ease the former rulers out of their position, retiring them off with no vengeance or even punishment; each set up a commission to investigate and memorialize dark episodes of political repression in his own country; and each retired from office on schedule, preserving democratic process and participation for his successor. If Lee led a corrupt regime and had connections with every major gang faction in Taiwan--and I suppose he did; if, as Perry Anderson said, he betrayed everyone except himself--these are minor compared with the peaceful transition he pulled off. Nelson Mandela, after all, never repented of having been a terrorist.

The third thing the world can learn from Taiwan's transition to democracy is that democracy can be messy and still work. Lots of people--most of them Taiwanese or Chinese--attack Taiwan's democracy for being impure. There is corruption. Vote-buying is rampant. A lot of votes are cast on the basis of patronage rather than ideology or free choice. The Legislative Yuan has been the site of not only cynical, self-serving maneuvering by parties on all sides of the aisle (Taiwan's aisle is more like a mass of interwoven goat trails than a single footpath), but has been the scene of behaviors, such as fist-fights and pig's blood splashing contests, that have been an embarrassment to many Taiwanese intellectuals, including probably some of you here.

But then I, as an American, look at our democracy, beneath the surface of its hoary traditions of Senate-floor courtesy and bean soup, and see the inner workings of a system where voter turnouts are much lower, where vote-buying happens at a much larger scale in the contests for campaign contributions, where the content of campaign messages is reduced to the lowest common denominator of cynical patriotic militarism, where gerrymandering by the party in power practically prevents any real contests in most of the legislative seats, and where the current executive branch is trying as hard as it can to ignore the constitutional separation of powers and become a dictatorship, and I start to cheer for Taiwan's real democracy, where people get out in the streets, where 70 or 80% of them

vote, where seats are contested and really do go back and forth among parties, where coalitions come and go in the strangest ways, and I think, this is probably as good as democracy is going to get in the real world.

A fourth lesson is directed at those who espouse ideas about clashes of civilizations, Asian cultures, or certain versions of Confucian civilization. This is that the democratic transition and the true if far from perfect democracy that has evolved in Taiwan has happened on Asian soil and among a people whose most significant cultural inheritance comes from China. To the Lee Kuan-yews of the world, who claim that "Western Style Democracy" is not suitable for Eastern Cultures, and particularly to the Chinese Communists who have made a variety of excuses ranging from the cultural one much like Lee's to the "immature populace" one much like the Kuomintang used to make, Taiwan's democracy says, in effect, "sorry, but we're doing it." Taiwan is of course not unique in Asia here--Korea has undergone a similar transition in the same time period--but Taiwan's is uniquely significant because it has happened among Chinese-speaking, mostly ethnically Han people, and thus threatens China not only with its autonomy but with its good example. And it rather pulls the rug out from under the idea of "Western-style democracy," anyway. What is "Western-style" about Taiwan's democracy? Taiwan and Korea--along with, of course, earlier examples like Japan and India--help destroy the idea that democracy is somehow uniquely associated with something called the West.

The fifth and final thing that I think the world can learn from Taiwan's transition to democracy is that a country--and I use the word advisably to mean a territory, such as Taiwan, the Penghu, and a few offshore islands-- can be ruled by constitutional democracy even when there is no agreement among the political and intellectual elites or among the populace as to whom--what nation--the democratic institutions represent.

This seems peculiar. But as the papers in yesterday morning's panel on ethnicity pointed out, people in Taiwan do not really agree very much on what nation they are part of. Some say they are Taiwanese and Chinese, some say they are Taiwanese but not Chinese, a dwindling but still significant minority say they are Chinese. Some say the ultimate ideal state of things is part of a re-unified China; others say the ultimate ideal is Taiwan as a nation with a national state; many refuse to answer and say they favor "the *status quo*," which everybody knows is not supposed to be permanent, but everybody seems to agree can and perhaps should go on indefinitely. People argue about nationhood, subjectivity,

culture, inheritance, they sometimes vote at least partly because of these issues, coalitions form and dissolve over relations with China, but there has not been a constitutional crisis since the old generals and old legislators were retired in the early and mid-1990s. People play the nationhood game in the context of the political rules of the country. This is really remarkable, and refreshing. It is a lesson for a lot of other young democracies. But it also leads to consideration of the next transition, one not so worthy of celebration, but carrying valuable lessons nonetheless.

2. From Miracle to Anxiety:

At the same time, as so many papers in this conference have pointed out, this political transition and the economic one--commonly known as "the Taiwan miracle"-- that preceded it, have not led to any feeling of satisfaction or security among the Taiwanese people, but rather to what seems like a long-term state of national anxiety and an island-wide inferiority complex. In other words, not only money, but money and democracy can't buy happiness. Why not? Why, to put it plainly, is Taiwan so neurotic? Perhaps examining this question further will lead to more lessons the world can learn from Taiwan. I will look at three manifestations of Taiwan's national neurosis.

The first manifestation is the fear that the economy is falling behind. I think that every time I have visited Taiwan since 1989 (I think eight times), one of the first things I have heard, from the person who picks me up or from the cab driver or from friends at whose house I stay, is something like "Taiwan xianzai buxing," meaning not that there is anything wrong with the Island in general, but rather that the economy is going bust. There was the brain drain, capital flight, the stock market bubble, a currency crisis or two, a labor shortage and the necessity of bringing in foreign workers, the threat of a rising China, the Asian Flu, the deindustrialization of the economy, the inability to move to high-tech fast enough, the loss of competitiveness in now this industry and now that one, the necessity to move manufacturing offshore, the increasing dependence on investment in China... the list goes on. But people live comfortably. The standard home has a car, two or three scooters, a computer with internet access, numerous cell phones, the all-important air conditioner, and a lot of kitchen gadgets totally unfamiliar to us Adogas. People take vacations overseas, eat out frequently and well, send their children to graduate school in America to the point where our graduate admissions committees don't worry about support for the first year when we admit a

Taiwanese student, and yet... they worry.

There are some objective reasons, as there are for economic anxiety in any society. Global, flexible-accumulation capitalism is unpredictable, energy prices are high and Taiwan has little domestic energy production, Taiwan is unusually dependent upon China as a manufacturing platform, a market for domestic products, and even--unofficially at least--a source of cheap labor. There is always competition. But still, in an objective sense, households in Taiwan are prosperous and secure, and there is still a remarkably low spread of incomes from rich to poor. So why the economic anxiety? I have no ready answer here, but again I want to propose a lesson for the world--that rapid development, prosperity, and a huge foreign-accounts surplus are not enough to bring about a feeling of economic security in a country, especially one where political insecurity feels chronic.

The second manifestation is anxiety about not being America. Let me begin with two analyses, both from my graduate students' work, one dealing with Taiwanese psychiatrists and the other with Ukrainian brides--be patient, you will see the connection.

Chou Jen-yu, in his comparison of Taiwanese and Washington State psychiatric hospitals, narrates the tour he was given on his first visit to Western State Hospital, the largest public psychiatric hospital in Washington:

The unit that we were heading to was the “state-of-the-art forensic center,” as the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) likes to call it. Its actual name was Center for Forensic Services (CFS), a high-security building finished in April 2002, only a few months before my visit. At the end of the visit, however, when [my guide] asked me for my comment, I was unable to tell him how I felt about the trip. I might have been praising the design of the building and the beauty of the campus and was in fact sincere when I said that. But there is no way for me at that moment to tell him what “exactly” my feeling was, since it was all too familiar and unfamiliar, too clear and vague, and probably too frightening and comforting, all at the same time. From the first moment I arrived at the hospital, I could not get images of the Taipei City Psychiatric Center (TCPC) out of my head. Something familiar yet concealed was awakened. I told myself: “so, this is what we [Taiwanese] have been heading to.”

In 1997, the Training Committee of the Taiwanese Society of Psychiatry sent out a survey to the chairs of all the psychiatric residency training programs in the country and asked each of them to suggest a must-reading list of books in their training program. The committee then compiled all the information and

came up with a suggested reading list. Among the 244 texts recommended, Taiwanese wrote less than one tenth of them. Moreover, most of these locally written books are solely edited translations from English texts. As to the field of forensic psychiatry, among the 7 suggested books, 6 of them were English textbooks. The only one written in Chinese is a collection of clinical case reports done by the National Taiwan University Psychiatric Department.

Issues [of forensic psychiatry] have not appeared in Taiwan as subjects that need the collaborative attention of psychiatry and the law. When they do emerge – either as a general issue such as court testimony or sexual offenders, or specific cases such as a notorious child abuse that draws national attentions – guidelines in the English textbooks serve as a lighthouse that shows psychiatrists the way to the harbor. There could be postcolonial moments. But it remains a question whether it is postcolonial because of the imposing of American theories on Taiwanese realities, or it is postcolonial because Taiwan's modernization has made American theories indeed relevant to its contemporary conditions."

In other words, even a very green-identified, high-level professional, close to his second doctoral degree, and with extensive experience and considerable criticism of actual American life, is still anxious about whether Taiwan will measure up or not, and thinks of America now as Taiwan's future, whether that is good or bad.

In a second example, our esteemed conference coordinating committee chair, Tseng Hsün-hui, explores the reasons why, despite extreme expense and low likelihood of success, some upwardly mobile Taiwanese men seek to import brides from Ukraine. Unlike those who import brides from Vietnam, for example, who are rather afraid of Taiwan's modern women and looking for wives who will be *guai*, work hard, take good care of their mothers-in-law, and not ask too many questions, the men seeking Ukrainian or other Eastern European brides are looking for glamour, status, respect, and, as Tseng explains, these things are associated with America:

"[T]he business in Ukrainian brides, however, would need to be considered in the dynamics of East-West relationships: how "whiteness" is widely misrecognized in the East as a symbol of "Westernization", "Americanization" and "modernization." A logic of the myth at work that keeps the brokerage business continuing in the market can be briefly summarized as this: all Ukrainians are blond/white, all whites are from the United States of America, America is a perfect example of modernity, modernity is desirable, and therefore Ukrainian

women are desirable. In this sense, what is commodified is not these white women's household labor but their "whiteness."

Clearly, the obsession with America rises to the level of a national neurosis. America is so important that even critics of American life worry about not measuring up, and men will even go to the length of marrying someone from as distant and unknown (and in fact, very un-American) place as Ukraine, just to look like they have earned the right to something, or somebody, American.

There are a lot of other examples, but the lesson for the world, I think, is the degree to which cultural imperialism, intentional or otherwise, is a pervasive force in shaping the psyches of people even in a highly educated, high-income, post-industrial society such as Taiwan. Envy goes beyond the material; in many ways Taiwanese life is the equal or better of American life materially. And unlike so many countries whose citizens long for America because their repressive governments are anti-American, or because America really has material things and civic freedoms that their countries do not have, Taiwan's American dream, or American neurosis, is not a reaction to any kind of local lack. Taiwan forces the world to think about the real sources and mechanisms of American cultural hegemony.

The third and most pervasive symptom, at least among intellectuals, is the anxiety of not quite being a nation. I remember, the morning after the 2000 presidential election receiving an email from Lü Hsin-yi, entitled, "A-Bian, the President of ...?" Would he really be standing there, *bairi lantian manjiang hong* in back of him, portrait of Kuo-fu on the wall, as the band played "San min Zhu Yi, Wu Dang Suo zong...." Well, yes, as a matter of fact he was, and he still does, at least if he can manage to escape recall because of the current corruption scandal. He's an intelligent and prudent man, after all, and he had no choice but to play along with the charade, along with everyone else. But I suspect in his inner being he's not very happy about it. And neither is anyone else. The *institutional* status quo--a functioning democracy on a prosperous island, is fine with everybody right now, but the *ideological* status quo--the names, the symbols, the passports--stinks. Nobody likes it--not the Blues, not the Greens, not the intellectuals, not the ordinary people, not even the Chinese Communists. For everyone, it's better perhaps than any realistic alternative, but that's not saying much, and the result is this full-blown national, or perhaps I should say, not-quite national, neurosis. Like all neuroses, it generates, like not quite anything else in Taiwan, sad, touching, and sometimes funny stories.

Hsü Ching-wen wrote a whole chapter of her Ph.D dissertation about the passport problem. You get to the airport, they ask you where you are from, you say Taiwan, and unless they heard "Thailand," they look in their notebook and say "sorry, there is no Taiwan." "Well, my passport is from the Republic of China." "Oh, you're from China, OK." "Well, no, not actually...." Eventually you get through customs, but with a slight headache that isn't due entirely to jet-lag. Luckily, Dr. Hsü found her own passport so she could be here at this meeting but I almost think losing it, however briefly, was a Freudian non-accident that probably happens more to people holding Republic of China passports--issued in Taiwan, of course--than to people holding passports from any other government.

And of course, there are not only no Taiwan passports, but there are no Taiwan embassies (or even ROC embassies anywhere that counts), only "Taipei Economic And Cultural Affairs Offices." There is no Taiwan in the WHO, which usually doesn't matter, but became quite important during SARS in 2003, and the Olympics are graced by a slate of usually-not-very-notable athletes representing the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee." At least the New York Yankees are not an official government organization, so Wang Chien-ming, who is a *very* notable athlete, can be identified as being from Taiwan.

On the surface, the problem here is the one that Chen Chia-ming identifies in his/her paper: Taiwan is caught in a system of nations that does not allow for its free subjectivity. This is one way to phrase it, from the viewpoint of Taiwan itself, but the lesson for the world is really about the nature of nation--it is an artificial construct formulated by a state whose legitimacy is recognized by other states--rather than any kind of naturally occurring social unit deriving from common history and culture. Lots of states are of course effectively multicultural and multi-ethnic, the United States and China among them. And we all recognize from these and other examples that a nation is something that has to be built. But the case of Taiwan, as tragicomic as it may be for passport holders and Olympic athletes--teaches us a critique of the nation on a deeper level. It is not only something constructed, but also three other things. First, its construction can be blocked by factors entirely external to it, even when the state has effective control within its own borders (or, in Taiwan's case, its own shores). Second, this bothers people. In today's world, they want to be a nation, to have not only their flag and their government and their army, but also their passport and their Olympic team, just like people from universally recognized nations do. And third, while this causes a huge national neurosis, of which all the historical and political strategies

descried in Huang Yi-chieh's paper--from anti-colonial resistance to peripheral nationalism to pragmatic identity-- are symptoms, it causes only a few practical problems. The state and the country, unlike the nation, are functioning just fine-- which is to say, muddling through much better than many-- in Taiwan right now.

3. From China to the World

Mark Harrison's paper for this conference reminds us of some things that are easy to forget, given today's journalistic and scholarly standards: that there used to be names for our Island other than just Taiwan or R.O.C--Zhonghua Minguo. Most people know about Formosa, but we forget that it was once Liuqiu, Ziyou Zhongguo, Nationalist China, and a lot of other things. We also forget that "Taiwan" used to refer, at least in some contexts, to something rather other than the Island in question. In the 1960s or 1970s, when someone in the U.S., Japan, or some other country, was described as being pro-Taiwan, this did not mean anything about the person's attitude toward Taiwan. It meant that they favored dealing with the R.O.C. government in Taipei, rather than the P.R.C. government in Beijing, at a time when one could not simultaneously deal with both. In fact, from the standpoint of Formosan independence activists of that time, someone described in this way as "pro-Taiwan" was actually anti-Taiwan, because they favored a policy that would strengthen the KMT's dictatorial rule. The term "Taiwan," in this context, was a synecdoche for "The Republic of China," referring to the small section of the ROC's claimed territory that the ROC government actually controlled. It also meant Chinese cultural conservatism in the face of the Cultural Revolution that was going on in Mainland China.

I mention this name game because it is a nice lead-in to talking about the lessons of Taiwan's third recent transition, from a China-orientation to a world-orientation. When I first lived in Taiwan, in the years Minguo 57 and 58, the world that foreigners saw in Taipei was a strangely displaced little China. Food from many of China's 39--count 'em--provinces, but not from Taiwan, Peiping opera, and all the slogans: Xiaomie Wan'e Maozei, Shixian Sanmin Zhuyi; Fangong Dalu, Jiejiu Tongbao; and the biggest one, over the Taipei train station, Wu Wang zai Ju, though we never figured out exactly where or what Ju was. And the media blackout of real news, especially news that concerned anything to do with China--Zhou Enlai's pictures in the overseas editions of *Time* or *Newsweek*, either torn out altogether, covered in black, or most fun for us, stamped with the

character Fei--Bandit.

And, as I have written elsewhere, this China-orientation was also embraced, in a rather different way, by the anthropologists. While R.O.C. citizen anthropologists were busy continuing both the Japanese colonial tradition and the Chinese tradition of *minzuxue* by recording customs and material culture in Austronesian Villages, foreign anthropologists were only in Taiwan to study China, because we could not go to The Mainland, and because the Communist revolution had transformed "Chinese Culture" irrevocably on the mainland anyway. So while the government was imagining a far away China that had never existed, in the vain hope that they could create it again by an invasion, the foreign anthropologists, while totally contemptuous of the silly government thinking it had any legitimacy to rule China, and ridiculing the notion of Counterattacking the Mainland, were imagining a very real China--real in every aspect except that it wasn't China--right there in Xin Xing or Xi Zhou or Kun Shen. Stephen Murray and Keelong Hong's diatribe against the anthropologists for being stooges of the KMT was probably overblown, since most of them hated the KMT. But Murray and Hong did have a point.

Now, of course, all that seems as quaint and antiquated as it was at the time, and Taiwan, aside from the problem of not being a nation, is as connected to the world, or more so, than most other countries. There is no need to litanize the way Taiwan is connected; we are all here, after all. But the ways in which Taiwan has made these connections can tell us a lot about globalization.

The first lesson from this transition is an old one, an economic one from the miracle days. It is about the impossibility of a small country staying within its own economic borders. As is well known, state-directed, export-oriented consumer-goods producing industrialization is the mechanism through which Taiwan enriched and transformed itself economically. Depending on how we view this process, it could serve as ammunition for either pro- or anti- Free Trade ideology. On the one hand, it is widely recognized that the lowering of the trade barriers of the earlier import substitution policy, and the shift to export promotion in the mid-1960s was what brought about the so-called takeoff of rapid economic growth. Without trade, Taiwan's economy would never have expanded in its miraculous fashion. But at the same time, the growth of trade was managed by a series of adjustments in fiscal and tariff policy that regulated the market in ways that true free-marketers would consider distortions. Either way, trade--free or fair--market or managed, depending on your preconceived ideas of economic

justice--was not only necessary for economic growth, but also for the other kinds of connections that formed Taiwan's transition from a China- to a World-orientation. The kind of autarky that was implied in the China-orientation simply would not have worked; the Taiwan economy could not have stayed within its own borders and grown.

The second lesson is about the inability to stay within cultural borders. This was possible, of course, during the period of martial law, censorship, and bombardment with Free China propaganda. But as soon as the censors were called off, as soon as a free press and free speech and the import of books and magazines were allowed, the cultural borders of the small country disappeared. I saw a wonderful example of this when I visited my student Lü Hsin-yi--along with cultural activist Chen Chi-nan, in Ilan in 1997, and I was treated to the official version of Ilan's cultural history as shown in architecture, which later became a chapter in her book. The county government offices imitated a 19th-century Hoklo farm house, representing the predominant local population; the library was in the style of a Suzhou garden, representing the Republic of China influence, or imperial Chinese gentry culture more generally; the museum of Ilan history was in a refurbished Japanese officers' club, representing the Japanese colonial influence; a new highway bridge was designed in a modernist architect's imagined representation of Atayal men's bows and arrows and women's gathering baskets, representing the mountain Aborigine heritage, and of the two government sponsored Gi-lan chu, or Yilan houses I was taken to, one, called Ge-ma-lan chu, was an imagined takeoff on what the local plains Kevalan people's houses might have looked like if anyone knew, representing the original inhabitants of the Yilan plain, and the other was in a kind of Scandinavian forest modern style, representing, I guess, the rest of the world and Yilan's broad cosmopolitanism.

This, and in fact other schemes hatched by cultural thinkers like Yu Hsi-kun and Chen Chi-nan, may seem a little schematic and more than a little forced, but I see them as symptoms or manifestations of something that we can justly celebrate--the attempt by progressive thinkers on Taiwan to avoid cultural nationalism and chauvinistic cultural exclusionism. Insofar as anyone makes any kind of case for Taiwan nationalism, it cannot be in terms of a distinctive language and culture. There are distinctive slants and aspects to Taiwan's language, food, religion, festivals, and many other things, but these are not of the order that makes for a distinctive "national culture." The language allows me to get around just fine in Fujian; the gods I can trace back (as do the Mazu temple

committees in Taiwan) to the whole southeastern Chinese maritime region; the festival calendar is more or less what it is in Changzhou and Quanzhou. In fact, a few years ago I asked a friend from Chengdu, who had visited Taiwan, what he thought of the place. He said "wo feichang xihuan taiwan. Taiwan bi zhongguo hai zhongguo." The only things that really are distinctive come from the native Austronesian cultures, who have had regrettably little influence on the Island's cultural "mainstream," from Japanese colonialism, and perhaps recently from America, but they have those American things, increasingly, in China, too.

The lesson to be learned here is not that Taiwan is part of China--I personally lean quite strongly the other way--or that two nations can have a common culture--even though that is a proposition I can easily accept. The lesson is that Taiwan was forced, by circumstances, not to be exclusionary in its cultural borders, that if Taiwan was going to build any national consciousness, it pretty much had to be a consciousness based on the particular mixture of historically situated influences, not on any kind of ancient and unchanging tradition. The perhaps unintended but nevertheless felicitous result was that Taiwan's national intellectuals had to build an inclusive nationalism, one based on no hostility at all. And the lesson is, if the purpose of nationalism is to build citizen loyalty, this works at least as well as the dangerous and explosive appeals to primordial sentiments used by so many nationalist governments, including China's.

There are still dangers, of course, and this is the final lesson in Taiwan's transition to a world-orientation. One is that the inclusivist national ideology is somehow too weak to counter the primordial, exclusivist claims of Chinese nationalism. Almost everyone I talk to in China assumes that Taiwan is part of China--it's not even open for discussion--that Lee Teng-hui and A-bian are puppets of the Japanese and the Americans whose great ambitions in life are to see China fall apart so they can continue their colonial oppression where it left off in the 1940s, and that they would gladly give their lives to prevent Taiwan from doing in name what it has done in fact for the last 57 years--namely act as an independent country. This danger is compounded by the cliché-ridden accounts to be found in the world English language press, which can't print a story about Taiwan without saying that "Beijing considers the Island to be a renegade province."

Another danger is that there are ethnic tensions lurking not very far beneath the surface. The recent call by Hou Hsiao-hsien and others to resist "min-nanization" of the island's culture, certainly a temptation for the Greens when they

have been widely blamed for mismanaging both the economy and foreign relations, are probably more than just paranoia, and I have heard warnings by Aborigine legislators of all three parties about the danger of Hoklo hegemony. When Taiwan had a China-orientation, this was no kind of danger; Chinese nationalism precludes exploitation of any differences within the Han, and the Aborigines are, sadly, too small a portion of the population to make any difference. The lesson for the world is that an inclusive political consensus has to stay that way, or else democracy becomes fragile.

4. From Garbage Island to Ilha Formosa?

In the summer of 1991, right at the height of the Taiwan's plastic era, I made a brief visit to my old "second home" near Sansia in Taipei county. In a journal written a few days later in China, I wrote,

"Taiwan is garbage island. We usually think of environmental problems mainly in terms of water and air pollution, or perhaps destruction of habitat for various kinds of development. Taiwan has all of these...but garbage is the main thing. It lines the streets, it lines the streams. It drips from every porch and every tree.

Now I don't think that the Taiwanese are any less messy than Chinese people [for example]. And there's a consciousness of ecological//environmental problems which includes garbage, to the point that Ploughshare even had some demonstrations, and the folks who answered my questionnaire in the Valley in 1989 often mentioned garbage as a drawback of the place. So what's going on?

I think the main problem is simply one of volume and density. An ice-cold soda in Chengdu is 3 RMB, and that's a real treat, to the point that most people probably don't have one more often than once a week, if ever. But in Taiwan, 20NT is nothing, so when the weather is hot and you have to go somewhere, of course you get yourself a soda. So there are a lot more cans per square meter. And all the consumer goods of that goods-rich society come packaged, often in plastic or some other equally noxious substance. So the stuff multiplies...

The great paradox in all this is that everybody *complains* about the garbage. The people of Ploughshare, for example, actually instituted collective action against any more dumping into that big pile up [above the village]. They blocked trucks and marched several times earlier this year, and eventually the garbage company stopped dumping there. But in true NIMBY-land East fashion, they

couldn't find any other place to dump stuff, so a few weeks ago, they started up again, and there haven't been any more demonstrations this time around...."

As we all know, Taiwan's transition from Garbage Island back to Ilha Formosa still has a ways to go. On one of my recent visits to my host village near Sanhsia, the family with whom I was staying got out an old copy of my *Ploughshare Village* book to look at the old pictures from the early 1970s and reminisce a bit while showing them to an American colleague and his wife who were visiting Taiwan with me. We leafed through to a picture of some hillside rice terraces on a bend in a river, trees and red brick houses above and the river below. "li kua: hit gu kat sui....a jima pi: kat bai!" This seems to be everybody's feeling, about rural spaces at least--no more red brick compounds among green fields, in fact fewer fields all the time, more unplanned communities with jarringly incompatible buildings, no more bucolic scenes of water buffaloes coming home at dusk, no more little dirt trails across lush green forests between towns on two sides of a mountain range. And in urban terms, the air pollution in the big cities is still pretty bad--though, in my Taiwan chauvinist way, I always point out that the pollution in Taipei is nothing compared to Wuhan or Chengdu. They have taken down the noise-pollution meter that replaced the Wu Wang Zai Ju sign in front of the old Taipei Station, too, and the noise level does seem to be going down. But there are a lot of people in a small area, a lot of cars and scooters, so no city in Taiwan is any kind of model for pollution control.

Still, the grossest abuses really are gone, and how the transition happened brings us to our final series of things the world can learn from Taiwan.

The first lesson in this series is the one promoted articulately by Professor Rob Weller in his two recent books, that environmental consciousness and political democracy are partners in progress. It's not just the familiar refrain that democratic institutions really do put a brake on the environmental depredations of autocratic or repressive governments and their industrial branches or cronies, though the recent history of China has certainly shown this by negative example. It is also, as Weller points out, that environmental activism can be the impetus for political organization at the grass-roots level, and thus for democratization and political participation of the whole society. The first round of protests at Houjin in Kaohsiung, documented by Lü Hsin-yi in her paper for this conference, shows very clearly how environmental protest and the development of political opposition can go hand in hand.

The second lesson is that environmental protest and environmental activism is are not necessarily elite activities, even though environmentalism may be an elite ideology. As Richard White pointed out in his now-classic essay about Washington, "Are you an Environmentalist, or do you Work for a Living," people who live in an environment care about preserving that environment so they can continue to live there, and this principle applies whether the local residents are loggers in the Pacific Northwest forest, Reikai Hunters in the Southern Taiwan Mountains, or blue-collar workers in Kaohsiung's grungy industrial suburbs. The industrial workers protesting the 5th naphtha cracker in the south, the villagers stopping the garbage trucks in the north, or the coalition of Aborigines assembled to stop the Ai-liao River reservoir, all are local people who care about the places where they live. All were taking risks in the late 1980s and early 1990s (though not as risky as their actions would have been ten years earlier), and all were doing it in the name of home.

The third lesson is that environmental activism and government may sometimes be opposed, or may sometimes be allied. At the time government and industry were the engines of development, Houjin protestors and many others were in opposition to authority, but with Taiwan's current mania for growing the economy by getting local communities to manufacture or display something that people from other communities want to eat or photograph or put on nicknack shelves or give friends as presents showing they have been to that place, the places have to look nice. I am astonished now when I go back to Yingge, which has no smokestacks anymore because it has almost no kilns, but has a really spiffy museum of--what else--pottery, and an "old street" that is in no way old, but that is free of cars, nicely paved in fake cobblestones, and full of fun things to buy, such as the pottery bird-call whistle my friend Ma Tengyue bought for me when he took me there. The local culture movement, which is so central to the formation of the inclusive identity I talked about a few minutes ago, becomes an ally of the environmentalists. If only you didn't have to drive to get there, wherever "there" is.

Which brings us back to A-bian. If his greatest accomplishment was just getting elected president (the first time), certainly his second greatest accomplishment--and, I suspect, the real reason why he could get elected, was his policy of *lese bu luo di*. Tip O'Neill might have been exaggerating to make a point when he famously said that "all politics is local," but in the environmental case, as Taiwan has shown, it's almost always true.

Conclusion:

So the world has a lot to learn from Taiwan--much of it positive, some of it cautionary, none of it horrible. What can we, as practitioners of Taiwan studies, do to help the rest of the world learn about this Island, not only so they won't think we're from Bangkok, but also so they can learn the lessons that Taiwan has to teach?

First, we should try not to just talk to ourselves. It's fun to get together in a kind of tribal rite like NATSA, but most people in the room already know a good portion of what everyone else is going to say. Is there a way that we could move effectively from Taiwan studies to studies of Taiwan that would have a broader impact with larger scholarly and popular audiences?

One thing would be to write books that are not just about Taiwan, but that speak to broader issues in a way that appeals not just to academic specialists. It's interesting that I can think of only three books in this category--and two of them, *The House of Lim* and *A thrice-told Tale*, are by Margery Wolf. The third, I am happy to say, is *Framing the Bride* by Bonnie Adrian, who is one of our conference participants. Why they are all concerned with the general area family, marriage, and gender, I'm not sure. But more of this.

But if we can't necessarily write books with broad student or popular appeal, we can at least write books with appeal to broad *scholarly* questions, that will be read outside the confines of those who actually care about Taiwan--the natives and the adopted adogas. Arthur Wolf's various works on family, marriage, and the incest taboo come in this category--they even put Taiwan on the anthropological map for awhile. I think Emma Teng's book on colonial geography and Melissa Brown's book, which is about some of the identity issues I talked about earlier, come in this category as well, and probably also, earlier on, Tom Gold's book on State and Society.

Also, I would mention to the younger scholars here, write primarily about Taiwan and how Taiwan as a case study can help contribute to our understanding of more general issues like democracy, identity, and environmental consciousness. Don't write so much to show other people that you understand Foucault or Harvey or Habermas. We all understand Foucault and Harvey and Habermas; what we need to know more about is Taiwan.

And be able to be positive about the Island. Don't succumb to the academic temptation to be nothing but critical. It's easy to join in the chorus of "taiwan xianzai buxing," but think of how far the island has come in the last 30 years. Keep a balance between criticism and credit, and the world will continue to have a lot to learn from Taiwan.