Chinese-Language Islam

Estimates of the number of Muslims living in China today vary widely, but fifteen to twenty million seems to be the minimum. Ten Muslim nationalities are officially recognized by the government, nine of which speak their own languages and live in specific areas of China. The tenth, the so-called Hui, speak only Chinese (albeit with many words and expressions peculiar to themselves) and are scattered all over the country.¹

Islam's history in China extends back to the seventh century, that is, the first century of Islam. The Chinese Muslims provide mythic accounts of how Islam came to China during the lifetime of the Prophet himself, who died in 632. It is known that China signed its first treaty with a Muslim mission in 651, the year of the final conquest of Persia, so the mythic accounts cannot be too far off. A second mission arrived in 655, and another forty are recorded as arriving by the end of the eighth century.² Opinions differ as to when immigrant Muslims may have formed some sort of community, and there is no strong evidence for a Chinese-speaking Muslim community until around the ninth century.³

No one knows to what extent the Islamic presence in China derived from immigrants or from Chinese converts. However this may be, many of the immigrants gradually became indistinguishable from the native Chinese, and a large population of Muslims who considered themselves Chinese became established. Until the seventeenth century, however, it seems that Islamic learning was transmitted in Persian and Arabic (and perhaps Turkic dialects as well), since we have no Chinese texts on Islam written by Chinese Muslims before this time.

Historians agree that Chinese Islam in general is heavily influenced by Persianate Islam. The Japanese historian Tazaka Kōdō, for example, analyzed several book lists provided by Japanese and European researchers in his monumental study of the history of Chinese Islam and came to the conclusion that the books used were mainly by Persian authors.
and mostly in Persian, though Arabic works also played a significant role. After all, Persian was the primary language of Islamic instruction from Persia east, and Arabic is the language of the Koran and of the majority of the Islamic classics.

China was one of the more isolated outposts of Islam, and it was also the site of an enormously rich indigenous civilization. Thus it is not surprising that Muslims eventually had to write in Chinese in order to pass on the Islamic tradition to fellow Muslims. What is surprising is that this movement did not begin until the seventeenth century. The historical factors that precipitated the decision to write in Chinese remain to be investigated. Here I will only suggest certain preliminary conclusions that can be gleaned from the writings themselves.

The Essentials of Islam

By the seventeenth century, Islamic literature in Arabic and Persian was enormously rich. The Islamic sciences had developed in several directions, and diverse writings were available within China itself. When the Chinese ulama decided to write in Chinese, their basic difficulties were how best to cull the essential teachings of Islam from the original sources and then express them in an appropriate idiom. To understand the nature of the problem that they faced, it is necessary to know something about the general situation of Islamic learning at this point in history.

To conceptualize their own religion, Muslims have traditionally divided Islam into complementary fields of knowledge. They considered all these to have roots in the Koran and the Sunnah (the words and acts of the Prophet), while they saw the religion itself as a flourishing tree, with clearly defined branches, each oriented toward the production of fruit. The fruit of Islam’s tree is the perfection of human individuals, however this might be formulated in various schools of thought. Thus Islamic scholarship has always had its own criteria for distinguishing the essential from the accidental, the roots from the branches, and the flowers from the fruit.

In one of the basic ways of thinking about the tradition, Islam is viewed as a “religion” (dīn) with three fundamental dimensions. These are ʾislām or submission to God’s will, imān or faith in God and his teachings, and Ḣaṣb or virtue, sincerity, and beauty of character. One might also call these right action, right understanding, and right intention. As the tree of Islamic learning developed, each of these dimensions grew into a major branch of learning with many boughs and twigs.

The branch of learning that addressed right activity came to be known as “jurisprudence,” or the science of the Shariah (the revealed law). After Koranic Arabic, this has been the most commonly studied science among Muslims. The Shariah delineates in clear detail what the Koran and the Sunnah teach about rites and various communal and societal actions. The so-called “Five Pillars of Islam” are the most basic rites, incumbent on all Muslims. But the Shariah, like Jewish law and Confucian social teachings, also deals with many issues that do not appear “religious” —and certainly not “spiritual”—to most people in the modern West. These include foods, business transactions, marriage, and inheritance. The Orientalist adage, “Islam is not a religion but a way of life,” refers in part to this wide reach of the Shariah.

The second basic branch of Islamic learning addresses right understanding. The Koran commands faith in God, his angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and the Last Day, and it was clear to Muslims that people cannot have faith in things of which they have no knowledge. From earliest times, scholars devoted themselves to explicating these objects of faith. By the third/ninth century, this second branch of the tradition had subdivided into three major offshoots, each of which was well on its way to full flower. “Kalam” or dogmatic theology took a defensive and polemical view of Koranic teachings, depending on rational argument to convince doubters and disbelievers. “Philosophy” was heavily indebted to the Greek heritage and, like Kalam, took a rational approach to understanding, but it avoided Koranic language and often voiced opinions on Ultimate Reality and the prophets that blatantly contradicted the views of the Kalam authorities. “Theoretical Sufism” differed from the first two by stressing suprarational perception over reason. For the Sufi authorities, the key to understanding was not the acquisition of knowledge through study and investigation, but —much in the Taoist fashion —the emptying of the heart so that God might inspire it directly. The most common designation for the knowledge gained by this route is “unveiling” (kāshf). Although these branches of learning tended to be distinct in their formative period, many scholars studied all of them and a number of famous authors wrote books in more than one branch or harmonized them in various ways.

The third basic branch of Islamic learning has to do with right intention, sincerity, purity of character, love for God and the neighbor, ethics, morality, interiority, and the spiritual path. This is the whole enterprise of strengthening one’s personal connection with the divine, purifying the heart and mind, and attempting to live day-by-day in the awareness of God’s presence. The most thorough explications of these issues are found in theoretical Sufism which, as noted, pertains to the domain of right understanding.

In all these branches of Islam, it was —and remains—difficult to speak of anything that might properly be called “orthodoxy,” given that there has been no institution that might decree the correctness or incorrectness of various expressions. This is not to say that no one made claims to
authority, simply that there was no church or hierarchy that could adjudicate the claims. As a result, Islamic norms became established through various sorts of consensus, but debates have always continued. Certainly Muslims agree on the basic principles, which are God’s unity, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the divine origin of the Koran. But all these terms are subject to definition, and diversity of opinion arises as soon as definitions are formulated. Some observers have suggested that “orthopraxy” was the criterion for Islamicity—that is, acknowledgment of the incumency of the Shariah and observance of it. This is perhaps closer to the actual historical situation, but it also is problematic. It is true, however, that acceptance of the incumency of the “Five Pillars” has been considered by most Muslim scholars as the least criterion for Islamic affiliation.

In the second branch of learning, which is the domain of right understanding, there are three foundational issues, often called the “three principles” of Islam—the assertion that God is one (tawhid), prophecy, and the Return to God. Each of the three branches of the tradition that dealt with right understanding discussed these issues in its own ways. Philosophy, for example, had several major schools, and the basic discussions were all rooted in the three principles. In the seventeenth century, most of the positions of the three major approaches to this field of learning were still being discussed. For example, Mullâ Sadrâ of Shiraz (d. 1640) presents in his Asâr an encyclopedic engagement with all the philosophical and theological positions of earlier schools of thought. Theoretical Sufism was especially rich in the diversity of its approaches to divine Unity, though by the seventeenth century the dominant themes were set by the school of Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1240). 5

Sufism had several characteristics that made it adaptable to diverse cultural contexts. These help explain why Sufi teachers were commonly the means whereby Islam has expanded its borders, as can be witnessed in India, Indonesia, Central Asia, Africa, and, as scholars have often remarked, China. These characteristics can be boiled down to the fact that Sufism stresses the essential over the accidental. Always the Sufi teachers focus on “spirituality,” which is to say that they stress the kernel over the shell, the meaning over the letter, the spirit over the body, and the subtle over the dense. If, for example, Rûmî’s 25,000-verse didactic poem, the Mathnawî, has been called for centuries “the Koran in the Persian language,” this is not to suggest that it has any formal similarity with the Koran. Rather, the Mathnawî succeeds in bringing out what Rûmî himself calls “the roots of the roots of the roots of the religion.” It is this special ability to look beyond the form and into the divine intention that marks Sufi writings throughout Islamic history.

Traditional criticisms of the Sufis have come from two groups of scholars who have a vested interest in defending the formal dimensions of the religion. These are the jurists, who specialize in the Shariah, and the Kalam authorities, who defend the primacy of certain exteriorizing interpretations of the Koran. The Sufis have typically replied by agreeing upon the necessity of the formal observances as well as belief in the Koranic dogmas, but by criticizing the critics for not recognizing that all these things, no matter how necessary for Islamic faith and practice, are the body of Islam. Real Islam demands making contact with the heart and spirit of Islam.

The Chinese Language

It is worth remembering that the Chinese ulama were faced with a problem that was not present in any of the other languages used to express Islamic teachings. It would be next to impossible to write scholarly Chinese in the Arabic script, and only slightly less difficult to write Arabic in the Chinese script. When a language does employ the Arabic script, any Arabic word can be made part of it, so languages like Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Sindhi, Gujarati, and Malaysian have numerous Arabic loan-words, and indeed, a language deserves to be called an “Islamic” language largely because of the massive carryover of Arabic terminology. Even the European languages allow for a relatively simple transliteration of Arabic words. But the Chinese script simply does not permit transliteration except in an enormously awkward and even grotesque manner. 6 Thus the name Muhammad, which obviously had to be spelled out in Chinese at least on occasion, ended up being written in a half-dozen different ways, each of them a cumbersome attempt to present the word phonetically.

In short, it should not be surprising that the Chinese Muslim authors avoided using Arabic words. But this made their task unique in the Islamic world. Everywhere else, authors could simply employ the Arabic terms in their own languages, without having to worry too much about getting the exact meaning across. The Chinese ulama had to use pre-existing Chinese words to render Islamic ideas, and every one of these words had precedents and connotations in one or more of the three Chinese traditions—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The paucity of references in the Chinese works to the great personalities of Islamic history, unparalleled in Islamic literature, is tied directly to the difficulty of representing their names in Chinese characters.

There are numerous important terms known in the Islamic languages for which the Chinese authors had to find equivalents. What should be done, for example, with the word Allah? In Persian, the word is part of everyday speech, though people are just as likely to use the Persian equivalent (khudâ). But there is no equivalent in Chinese. According to
Iyazaka, to render the concept of God Muslims used “heaven” in the Tang period (618–907) and both “heaven” and “Buddha” in the Sung dynasty (960–1279). At the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), when they began writing books in Chinese, they used words like “Real Lord” (chén-chú), “Real One” (chén-lái), “Real Ruler” (chén-lái), and “Lord” (chù).

“Real Lord” is especially interesting because Christians employed the expression “Heavenly Lord” (t’ien-chú). The very name of the Christian divinity would have caused difficulties for metaphysically minded Chinese, given that heaven and earth are inseparably linked, while the supreme principle must lie beyond the two. As it happens, the Koran frequently refers to God as “creator of heaven and earth,” and the common Chinese expression “heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things” has its Koranic equivalent in “heaven, earth, and what is between the two,” which occurs in some twenty verses.

The question of Islamic terminology in Chinese has yet to be investigated with any rigor, so a few examples will have to suffice. Muhammad was referred to as the “Sage” (shēng) or the “Utmost Sage” (chǐ-hēng)—”sage” being a term that was reserved for Confucius and the great teachers who had preceded him. Muhammad was also called the “Chief Servant” (shǒu-pú) and the “Ambassador” (chén-chú), terms that reflect a standard version of the second half of the Shahadah (the testimony of faith), recited in the daily prayer—“I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant and His messenger.” The Koran is the “classic” (chín), the “heavenly classic” (t’ien-chú), and the “real classic of the true mandate” (shǐ-míng chén-chú). The Islamic tradition itself is often called “the pure and real teaching” (chǐng-chén chì). Adam is the “human ancestor” (jen-tsù). The prophets (anbīya) and “friends” of God (or the “saints,” awālīya) are the “sages and worthies” (shēng-hsién). The angels are the “heavenly immortals” (t’ien-hsien), a term associated with Taoism. The jinn, who in Islamic terms are spiritual beings ranked below the angels and made of fire rather than light, are “spirits and demons” (shén-kuei). Satan is the “chief spirit” (shou-shen) or the “chief devil” (shou-mo). The vicegerent of God (Arabic khalīfa; English caliph), a term whose spiritual rather than political meaning is important in Chinese, is the “representative” (lái-li). Paradise is called “heaven country” (t’ien-kuo) or “ultimate happiness” (chì-ló). Hell is called “earth prohibited” (li-chín) or “earth prison” (hi-yù). The daily prayer (Arabic salát, Persian namáz) is called “worship” (li-pai). The mosque (masjid) is named “the temple of worship” (li-pai ssu) or “the temple of the pure and real” (chén-chén ssu). In all these cases, the Arabic expressions are basic Koranic terms, but the Chinese words are unrecognizable as Islamic terminology except in the context of the Islamic writings.

The Islamic languages also have numerous theological and philosophical terms that are necessary for serious discussion of the religion, and translating these called for a good knowledge not only of Islamic thought but also of the Chinese intellectual tradition. The first principle of faith, taqwah, is often rendered as “returning to one” (kuer-t) or “practicing one” (hsì-ci). God is frequently discussed in Islamic texts in terms of “essence and attributes” (dhat wa sifat), and for this pairing the Chinese ulama used standard Neo-Confucian pairings such as “root nature” (pen-jiaj) and “movement and quietude” (tsung-ching), or “substance” (ti) and “function” (yang). One of the goals of seeking knowledge is to discover the “reality” (haqiq), things, and this term is often rendered by the extremely important Neo-Confucian term “principle” (li). The two basic worlds of the cosmos, often called the “world of the witnessed” (alām al-shahāda) and the “world of the absent” (alām al-qiyāb), become the “world of color” (yu-se chiai) and the “colorless world” (wu-se chiai)—terms that in the context of Buddhism have usually been translated into English as the “world of forms” and the “formless world.”

Wang Tai-yü

In Islam in Traditional China, Donald Leslie writes that the first Chinese book on Islam known to have been written by a Muslim is The Real Commentary on the True Teaching (Cheng-chiao chen-ch‘uan) by Wang Tai-yü. Other historians agree that the The Real Commentary is one of the most basic works in the history of Chinese Islam, and that its author is one of the two most important leaders of Chinese-language Islam.

Little is known of Wang Tai-yü’s life. The modern editor of his works can come no closer to a date of birth than 1573–1619. Nonetheless, circa 1590 seems likely. At the end of an autobiographical note in The Real Commentary, Wang signs his name as chen-hui liao-jen (an old man of the real Hui). This suggests that at the time of finishing the book he was at least forty. Most likely he was about fifty, which was Confucius’ age when he came to know the heavenly mandate. Liang I-chun, a disciple of Wang Tai-yü, wrote an introduction to The Real Commentary and put its date at 1642. Thus we can assume that Wang was born about 1592, or at most ten years later. The fact that he did not start studying classical Chinese seriously until he was thirty makes the earlier date much more likely than the later.

It is worth noting here that Wang is often referred to in the later literature as “the old man of the real Hui,” and in his conversations and dialogues compiled by his disciples he is also referred to by this title. The disciples, if not Wang himself, certainly had in view the corresponding Arabic and Persian terms for “old man,” that is shaykh and pir, both of which were employed to mean teacher and especially Sufi master. Rumi reminds us that “The shaykh is the ‘old man’ through the intellect, not
through whiteness of beard and head,” so one might think that Wang’s own use of the term “old man” does not refer to age. However, it is unlikely that a young man would call himself by this term in the Chinese context, or even in the traditional Islamic context.

The best guess at the year of Wang’s death seems to be 1657–58. His disciple Ho Han-ching wrote an introduction to what appears to be a second edition of The Real Commentary, dating it 1657, in it he refers to Wang as still alive. In the introduction to another of Wang’s works, Ma Chung-hsin, one of his most famous disciples, refers to his teacher as “the late master Wang,” and this is dated 1658.

In introducing The Real Commentary, Wang tells us that his ancestor was an astronomer who had come to China from “Arabia” (i.e., more likely Persia) to bring a tribute to the emperor Kao three hundred years earlier, during the Ming Hung-wu era (1368–98). He then undertook to correct the details of the emperor’s astronomy and to fix the mistakes of the calendars. “He surveyed high into the nine heavens and deep into the nine seas and stood aloof from previous works, without any mistakes.” The emperor was pleased and thought that it was not possible to reach what he had reached if there was no true transmission of a true learning. Finally he bestowed upon him a Directorate of Astronomy, granted him a house, and exempted him from various obligations. “For three hundred years this mature learning has survived.”

Wang underwent the traditional training of a Muslim scholar in the Islamic languages. He is not specific, but he must have known both Persian and Arabic, if not a Turkic language as well. Sciences that he studied—because any Muslim scholar must study them—include Arabic grammar, Koran commentary, Hadith (sayings of the Prophet), jurisprudence, practical morality, and theology. He certainly also studied theoretical Sufism and perhaps Islamic philosophy.

Although Wang had immersed himself in Islamic learning, as a young man he did not have the ability to write proper Chinese—this despite the fact that he belonged to a Muslim family that had been established in China for three hundred years. He presumably had relatives who had become thoroughly Sinicized. This alone would have sensitized him to the difficulties of making Islamic teachings available to Muslims who were learned in Chinese but had no proper training in the Islamic languages. Moreover, his own social position did not allow him to be proud that he did not know Chinese—which might have been the case if his family had lived in some isolated part of China. He writes that he did not study Confucian learning in his childhood, and at the age of twenty his knowledge of Chinese was sufficient only for correspondence. At the age of thirty, he says, “I was so ashamed of my stupidity and smallness that I started to read [Chinese] books on metaphysics and history.”

Given his role as a scholar serving the Muslim community, it is doubtful that he was ashamed before the non-Muslim Chinese. Most likely he means that he was not able to communicate properly with well-educated Muslims—that is, those who had gone through the standard Chinese educational system. One of his accomplishments seems precisely to be that he eventually mastered the intellectual arts of his time and was able to engage in discussions and debates with other Chinese scholars on their own level. When his student Liang writes in his introduction to The Real Commentary, “My teacher Wang Tai-yü had mastered the four teachings and had studied all the doctrines of the various schools,” this does not seem to be too much of an exaggeration.

Chin Chi-tang, the first modern scholar to take a critical look at the Chinese sources on Islam, wrote a short biography of Wang that is reprinted in the 1987 edition of Wang’s collected works. He tells us that Wang originally lived and taught in Nanjing. When the soldiers of the newly established Ch’ing dynasty invaded the city in the year 1645, he went to Beijing. There he met a wealthy Muslim merchant named Ma Ssu-yüan, who offered him hospitality as a guest teacher. Ma was in the habit of holding sessions in which scholars of various traditions would gather and debate, and Wang soon became known as one of the most outstanding of these scholars. According to one anecdote, in 1650 the abbot of the Iron Mountain Buddhist monastery heard of Wang’s prowess in debate and undertook to challenge him. He spent days debating Wang, but eventually had to admit the inferiority of his own understanding, and then he became Wang’s disciple. When Wang died, he was buried in the graveyard of his benefactor’s family. In the year 1935, Wang’s tomb was renewed and a new stele was erected.

Three of Wang’s works record his debates and conversations, which were gathered together by his disciples after his death. The longest of these works is called The True Answers of the Very Real (Hsi-chên cheng-ta). Published in 1658 by his disciple Wu Lien-ch’eng, it is a collection of some two hundred exchanges in the form of questions and answers. Some take the form of short or longer dialogues, and some are simply a single question along with Wang’s answer. The questioners were Muslims, both scholars and commoners, as well as Taoists, Buddhists, and Confucians.

The other two collections of dialogues are presented as the Appendix (fu-lu) and the Addendum (sheng-yü) to The True Answers. The first of these, about three thousand characters long, adds thirty-six conversations in the same style as the main text, dealing mainly with Confucianism and Islam. The Addendum is a series of short questions from Buddhist monks with equally short answers in about four thousand characters. The latter text represents Wang as a skillful practitioner of Zen-style repartee, but it also presents him as sharply critical of Buddhist positions. Tazaka questions its authenticity, suggesting that it may have been written later.
and appended to the book as a way of making Wang appear more hostile to Buddhism than he actually was.

The Real Commentary is by far Wang's longest work. In it he summarizes Islamic teachings in two volumes, each of which is divided into twenty chapters. The relatively scant attention that the work pays to Islamic practices suggests that Wang Tai-yü was not worried about the transmission of the Shariah. Presumably Muslims were being taught how to pray, fast, and prepare food in the proper way within the family. Instead, Wang is attempting to explain the logic of Islamic theological, cosmological, and psychological teachings, many of which might not have made sense to the Chinese mind, especially if offered without attention to the subtleties of Chinese thought. In cases where Wang does discuss practice, the issues are usually those that would go against Chinese customs, such as the prohibition of pork, wine, and gambling. Indeed, for the Chinese, the most striking characteristic of the followers of this foreign religion was precisely the fact that they refused to eat pork, that greatest of delicacies.

Wang depicts Islam in a way that makes it appear largely in agreement with Confucian ideas. He often quotes from the Chinese classics and sometimes employs Buddhist terminology to make his points. He is not uncritical of the three Chinese traditions, but it is probably fair to say that his criticisms do not transgress the degree of mutual criticism found among the three traditions themselves. The non-Muslim Chinese reader would not feel that Islam has too much to say that is very different from what was already available in Chinese learning. He would feel, however, that the Muslims are much more in agreement with the Confucians than with the Taoists and Buddhists.

This is not to suggest that all Muslim readers would have been happy with the way in which Wang was presenting Islam. In his introduction he remarks that certain scholars had read his manuscript and blamed him for quoting too much from the Chinese classics and going too deeply into Taoism and Buddhism. He agrees with his critics that everything can be found in the classical books of Islam, but he points out that Chinese speakers have no access to those books. Hence he has presented Islam in a way that those unfamiliar with its teachings can understand it. Elsewhere he maintains that he cites Confucian sources only in those places where Islamic teachings are not different from those of Confucianism, such as in the cultivation of the personal life, regulating the family, and governing the country. Always, however, the foundation of the argument and the standard of judgment is the Koran.

In his introduction to The Real Commentary, Wang's disciple Liang explains his own view of Confucianism, and this coincides more or less with what one can glean from the writings of Wang himself. It also coincides nicely with Erik Zürcher's points about the Chinese "cultural imperative, noted here in the introduction. Liang writes that if someone asks if the Tao of Confucianism is wrong, he will answer that it is not. On the level of everything under heaven, the Confucian way explicates the Five Relationships—ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, older brother and younger brother, and two friends. It also explains sincerity of will, correctness of heart, cultivation of the personal life, regulating the family; governing the country, and bringing peace to everything under heaven. It clarifies the principles of these relationships, and it exhausts the ways, such that nothing escapes from it. It is the totally correct middle way, and it avoids all extremes. Without these teachings, the way of heaven would not be perfect and the law of governing would not be complete, and because of them, the way of the Confucian teachers never changes. However, the teachers never speak of the origin of the world and the relationship between life and death. They talk about the middle, but not about the beginning and the end.

In short, Liang tells us that the Confucian teachings fail to address the issue of creation on the one hand and eschatology on the other. Given that ma'ād or the "return" to God is the third of the three principles of Islamic faith, this cannot but appear as a major lack in Muslim eyes. Moreover, discussion of the Return is invariably associated with discussion of the Origin (ma'ād). The Koran links the notion of returning to God with that of coming from him in numerous verses, and this sets the pattern for all subsequent discussions of Islam's third principle. Thus it seems that Chinese Muslims like Wang and Liang granted the correctness of traditional Confucian teachings on social relationships and cultivation of the personal life and the self, but they considered them lacking on the level of faith, where all three principles of the religion need to be addressed—ta evacuation, prophecy, and the return to God.

Practically nothing is known about Wang's training, but it is obvious from his writings that he was well grounded in theoretical Sufism. The research of Joseph Fletcher and others has shown that certain Sufi orders, especially the Naqshbandiyya, were active in China during this period, and there is no reason to suppose that the sophisticated theoretical doctrines of Sufism had not been brought along with the more practically oriented teachings. The most obvious candidate for intellectual influence on Wang was the school of Ibn al-'Arabi, which was flourishing throughout the Islamic world at this time and had several major representatives among the Naqshbandi masters. However, Wang almost never cites Arabic words or mentions names of Muslim scholars in his writings. At the present state of knowledge, it would be difficult to make anything more than circumstantial arguments for such influence.

Besides The Real Commentary, Wang wrote two longish treatises and several minor works. I referred to one of these treatises, The Great Learning of the Pure and Real (Ch'ing-ch'en ta-hsüeh), in the introduction. This work,
whose title might also be translated as “The Principles of Islam,” shows clearly the traces of Sufi theoretical teachings. As noted, the phrase “Great Learning” looks back to the Confucian classic by the same name. The expression “the Pure and Real” is a standard term by which Chinese Muslims refer to Islam—an expression that may have been coined by Wang himself. The topic of the book is the first principle of Islam—tawhid or the assertion of God’s unity—and the discussion is carried out in terms that are reminiscent of the school of Ibn al-'Arabi, though Neo-Confucian thinking is far more obviously represented. We can conclude from this treatise that Wang found Neo-Confucian metaphysics sufficient to provide the basis for explicating the idea of tawhid along with the demands that it makes for cultivation of self and individual transformation. However, he does not deal with the second and third principles of faith, those of prophecy and the Return. For his teachings on these issues, one needs to refer to The Real Commentary.

Liu Chih

If anyone surpasses Wang Tai-yü in his influence on Chinese-language Islam, this would be Liu Chih, who was born about 1670, some dozen years after Wang’s death. He wrote the culminating work of his career in 1724; it is not known when he died. He tells us that his father was a scholar who deeply felt the lack of Islamic materials in Chinese. After a preliminary Islamic education, Liu began to study the Chinese classics at the age of fifteen, then devoted six years to Arabic and Islamic literature, three to Buddhism, and one to Taoism. He completed his education by studying 137 books from the “West.” Most scholars have assumed that he means European books, and this is likely, given the fact that the famous Jesuit Matteo Ricci had arrived in China a century earlier, in 1601. He and his successors wrote many Chinese tracts on Christianity and Western knowledge in general. One Japanese scholar, however, thinks that this might mean Persian and Arabic books along with European books.

Liu Chih turned his efforts toward making Islamic learning available in Chinese from the age of thirty-three, that is, around the year 1700. He says that he wrote several hundred manuscripts, of which he published only ten percent. Modern scholars have remarked that he is more sympathetic toward Confucianism than any other Chinese Muslim author. Like Wang, he saw no fundamental discrepancy between Islamic teachings on God and the world and the grand philosophical themes of Neo-Confucianism. Using the Neo-Confucian term li, he writes that the guiding “principle” of the Koran is similar to what motivated Confucius and Mencius. This li, he says, “is the same li which exists everywhere under Heaven.” He seems to be expressing in Chinese terms the Koranic view that God has sent prophets to teach tawhid to all peoples.

Liu completed his first major work in 1704, calling it T’ien-fang hsing-li, a title that has usually been translated as The Philosophy of Arabia. T’ien-fang means literally “the direction of heaven,” and is used both for Mecca, the direction of Muslim prayer, and for Arabia. Hsing-li means literally “nature and principle,” but it refers specifically to Neo-Confucianism, which is typically called “the school of nature and principle” (hsing-li hsüeh). Thus, it would not be going too far to translate T’ien-fang hsing-li as “Islamic Neo-Confucianism.” Like the title of Wang’s Great Learning of the Pure and the Real, it points already to a synthesis of Islamic and Confucian teachings.

The Philosophy of Arabia is divided into six short books. The first book, which Liu Chih calls pen-ching, “the root classic,” sets down the main ideas of the text in five chapters, for a total of about 2,000 characters. The five chapters are followed by ten diagrams that illustrate the metaphysical and cosmological relationships described in the chapters. Each of the five remaining books explains one of the five chapters in detail, and each employs twelve more diagrams to do so. The resulting seventy diagrams are reminiscent of those found in Arabic and Persian works of the school of Ibn al-'Arabi from about the eighth/fourteenth century onward, but they also appear to be traditional Chinese depictions of the relationships among the three basic realities—heaven, earth, and the human being. This may be why a non-Muslim mandarin and Vice-Minister of the Board of Propriety could remark in a preface to the Philosophy that the Buddhists and Taoists had undermined the ancient Confucian doctrines. “Now, however, in this book of Liu Chih we can see once more the Way of the ancient sages. . . . Thus, although his book explains Islam, in truth it illuminates our Confucianism.”

If we do keep the translation Philosophy of Arabia for Liu Chih’s T’ien-fang hsing-li, it needs to be kept in mind that the study of “Nature and the Principle” that he undertakes does not coincide with falsafa in the technical Islamic sense. His Neo-Confucian approach to things is much more congenial with the world view of later Sufism than with that of the Muslim philosophers. The fact that he had an eye on Sufi texts becomes completely clear in the first book, the “root classic,” where he repeatedly mentions a number of Persian and Arabic works by name. These include Naşr al-Dîn Râzî’s Mîrsâd al-îbâd (twenty-nine times), ‘Abd al-Rahmân Jâmi’s Ashî’at al-lama’ât (fifteen times), ‘Azîz al-Dîn Nasîf’s Maqâṣid-i aqsâ (twelve times), and Jâmi’s Lauâ’î (eleven times). These are four classic Sufi texts, the first three of which had been translated into Chinese some thirty or forty years earlier, and the last of which
was later translated by Liu Chih himself. I will have more to say about them shortly.

Liu Chih completed his second major work, *A Selection of the Important Rules and Properties of Arabia* (T'ien-fang tien-li [i.e., yao-chien]), in 1710; it deals in twenty sections with a variety of theoretical and practical teachings. He finished his third and last major work, a biography of Muhammad, in Nanjing in 1137/1724. This is the only long Chinese work on Islam to have been studied by modern scholars; it was partly translated into English in 1921, and also into Russian, French, and Japanese. The article on Liu Chih in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* calls it "undoubtedly Liu Chih's greatest work," but this seems a premature judgment, since greatness is not necessarily gauged by widespread appeal. The work is a relatively straightforward recounting of the historic-mythic origins of Islam in terms that agree with traditional Arabic and Persian texts and fit the rhetorical and religious needs of Chinese Muslims. Certainly a study of Liu Chih's methods in this book would tell us a great deal about how Islam was being taught to Chinese Muslims. But Liu Chih's two other major books, especially the *Philosophy*, are sophisticated attempts to harmonize Islamic metaphysical, cosmological, and spiritual teachings with the Chinese traditions. They are certainly more interesting for Chinese intellectual history, and either or both may have made a more important contribution to the permanent establishment of Islam in China.

In both *Philosophy* and *Rules and Properties*, Liu Chih provides lists of the titles that he employed as his sources. There are altogether sixty-eight different titles, eighteen of which are used in both books. At least fifteen titles represent various Sufi schools of thought. Although the exact identity of many of the titles has not yet been established, there do not seem to be any significant works pertaining to the fields of Kalam and Islamic philosophy. In other words, most of the works that provide theoretical explanations of the nature of things—God, the cosmos, the soul—belong to the Sufi tradition. It is clearly the Sufi works along with Neo-Confucianism that form the basis for Liu Chih's explanation of Islamic teachings.

Even more indicative of the Sufi context of Liu Chih's *Philosophy* is the actual text, which is a synthesis of the metaphysical and cosmological teachings of the just-mentioned Persian works presented in the language of Neo-Confucianism. The book seems to have been widely read well into the twentieth century, because it was republished twenty-five times between 1760 and 1939. A brief summary of the contents of its first book can help provide a sense of the theoretical issues that occupied the minds of Muslim intellectuals.

Chapter one: The beginning of creation and transformation. The beginninglessness beginning is the origin of the ten thousand things. This is the Real Substance, which is the root nature of creation and transformation. It is the Real Being, the Uniquely One, and the Real Principle. Its knowledge and power pervade its root nature, and these two become manifest as the inward and outward of the subtle function. As the subtle function starts to move, yin and yang become separate, bringing about the manifestation of water and fire. Fire appears outwardly along with air, and then heaven and the stars become manifest. Water piles up inwardly along with earth, and then the earth and the oceans come into existence. Next the four elements bring forth the ten thousand things.

Chapter two: The separate endeavors of the ten thousand beings. The One Real overflows and transforms, and this results in the appearance of principle along with images. The principle is possessed by the Real's knowledge, and the images are seen because of its power. Knowledge pertains to the domain of before-heaven (the spiritual realm), and power spreads out in after-heaven (the earthly realm). The domain of before-heaven reveals itself through images, and the domain of after-heaven gives form to the principle. Knowledge and power become manifest in a great variety of human types, including four degrees of sageliness and various lesser degrees such as those of worthies, men of knowledge, modest servants, and good people. So also they appear in the various levels of creatures, including the three "children" (Chinese tzu, Arabic miwallidat), which are the animals, plants, and inanimate things, and in the nine heavens, the four elements, and the four seasons.

Chapter three: How human nature and the human body come to be manifest. The essence of the seven elements (the four elements and the three children) turns outwardly and gives birth to the human ancestor. All the qualities and characteristics of the created things appear in human beings gradually, beginning month by month in the womb and extending to the stages of their gradual growth and development until they reach perfection.

Chapter four: The virtues preserved in the human body, heart, nature, and mandate. All virtues are gathered together in the heart. Seven virtues make the heart spiritual and clear. These are obedience, faithfulness, kindness, clear discernment, sincere reality, issuing concealment, and real appearance. The last of these is the first heart, or the real human heart that gave birth to all the levels of the descending arc of manifestation. The human task is to traverse the ascending arc. Thereby one can return to the real heart, complete the circle, and achieve the perfect form of human fullness, the state of the human ultimate.

Chapter five: How everything described in the first four chapters returns to the One. One is the root nature of all numbers, and the numbers are the subtle functions of the One. When substance (t'i) and function (yung) are undivided, this is the "Real One." When function manifests substance, this is the "Numerical One." When the function returns to
the substance, this is the “Embodied One.” Although there are three Ones, in fact each is the same One with a different description. The Real One gives rise to transformation, the Numerical One perfects transformation, and the Embodied One transforms the transformations. Each of the three Ones has in turn three levels, each of which has a variety of manifestations on the level of cosmic transformation, though all manifest the same Principle. The tiniest thing manifests the complete substance of the root nature, and each moment is everlasting and infinite. Heaven and the human being are undivided transformations, and all things and the “I” go back to the Real. The first act is the principle of reality, the present act is the guise of reality, and the seeing of the guise is the being of the reality. At this point the seed and the fruit are completed.

It should be noted here that Liu Chih’s discussion of the “three Ones” in the fifth chapter has in view Wang Tai-yu’s discussion of the same three Ones in the Great Learning, though the subdivisions of each One do not follow Wang’s scheme.

The Arabic Translation of
Liu Chih’s Philosophy

Liu Chih’s Philosophy of Arabia was highly esteemed by the Chinese ulama, so much so that one of them translated it into Arabic. This was Ma Lian-yuan, who was born around 1840 and died in 1903. He was a member of a famous scholarly family from Yunnan and played an active role in encouraging Islamic education in that province. He is said to have written about twenty books, mostly in Arabic and Persian. He published his translation of Liu’s Philosophy in two stages. In 1898, he published the Chinese text of the root classic, along with an interlinear Arabic translation. This appeared in Yunnan with the Chinese title Hsing-li wei-yen (“The concealed words of the Philosophy”) and the Arabic title Lata’if (“Subtleties”).

Given that the text of Lata’if is extremely dense, Ma no doubt had planned to provide a commentary on it from the beginning. However, it seems that he left China around the time that the book appeared, going first to Burma and ending up in Cawnpore in India. There he published his commentary (a book of 165 pages) during the last year of his life. He called it Sharh-i lata’if (“The explanation of the ‘subtleties’”). It seems to have had quite a readership, because it was republished in Cawnpore some twenty years later, and then published for a third time in Shanghai. In the text, Ma calls himself by his Arabic name Muhammad Nūr al-Haqqīn al-Sayyid Luqmān. He makes a good deal of use of Liu Chih’s five books of commentary on the five chapters, but his explanation of the text is far too free to be called anything but a paraphrase of Liu Chih’s own commentary.

Ma’s Lata’if and Sharh-i lata’if present Liu Chih’s teachings in Arabic terms that would be familiar to anyone versed in theoretical Sufism. At first glance, they seem to be more or less standard Sufi explanations of the nature of God’s relationship with the cosmos and the soul. There is no overt trace of the Neo-Confucian world view that is so obvious in Liu Chih’s original. However, careful study shows that the text depicts the Islamic universe in a way that is clearly reminiscent of Chinese thought. A unifying theme of the book is the balance that is established between two complementary divine attributes—knowledge and power—whose mutual activity brings the universe into existence. The original Chinese text demonstrates explicitly that Liu Chih had in mind the yin-yang complementarity that guides Chinese depictions of the nature of the universe.

In Ma’s Lata’if, the first chapter is called “Explaining the descents of the macrocosm.” In it he describes twelve descending levels of reality. The second chapter details all the kinds of existent things in the macrocosm, explaining how their diverse characteristics depend on the divine attributes that they manifest. Chapter three explains that the human being was created in twelve levels that coincide with the twelve levels of the macrocosm. Chapter four deals with the specific characteristics of human beings, especially the virtues and character traits that distinguish them from other creatures, and it also describes the various human types. The fifth and final chapter explains how human beings bring together all the characteristics and qualities of the universe and then, by means of their own all-comprehensive nature, return to the One from which the universe arose.

The manner in which Ma’s Arabic text is infused with yin-yang thinking can be seen by any careful reader. Here it will suffice to analyze the argument of the first chapter, in which the pattern is set for the rest of the book. The chapter begins by dividing reality into three basic stages, which are God, heaven, and earth; or True Existence, the spiritual realm, and the corporeal realm. Each of these stages can be further subdivided. The first stage can be divided into three levels, which are God’s Essence, his attributes, and his acts—though Ma also mentions many other well-known names for these levels. The second stage, also in three levels, pertains to the spiritual world. It includes the supreme Spirit (the First Intellect), the universal soul, and the universal intellect. As for the third stage, it covers the six levels of the corporeal world, beginning with the Dust (universal substance), moving down through the four elements, heaven and earth, and the three progeny (the three kingdoms); and ending with human beings.
The Chinese influence on this scheme begins to appear right at the beginning when the text explains how the divine attributes give rise to the divine acts. What is unusual is the focus on two divine attributes to the exclusion of others; these two being knowledge and power, or omniscience and omnipotence. The two join together to issue the creative “command” (amr), which is “Be” (kun), and this in turn gives rise to the first “being” (kaum), which is none other than the Spirit (the First Intellect).

The Spirit is a single created reality that displays the traces of knowledge and power. The dual aspect of its divine source appears in the two remaining levels of the spiritual world. The trace of knowledge gives rise to the universal soul, which is the spiritual reality of all possessors of spirits, meaning animals, humans, jinn, and angels. The trace of power gives rise to the universal intellect, which is the spiritual reality governing inanimate things, meaning celestial spheres, elements, minerals, and plants. In short, the cooperation of knowledge and power brings about two sorts of spiritual reality, one centered on awareness and the other on activity. Thus, the universal soul and the universal intellect are the yin and yang of the spiritual realm. A slight Taoist influence might be discerned here in the fact that yin, represented by knowledge and soul, stands higher on the scale of reality than yang, represented by power and intellect, though the standard Sufi schemes also place knowledge higher than power.

The text calls the first level of the corporeal world, which is the Dust (jâbâr) or universal substance, the “dregs” of soul and intellect. Since soul and intellect arise from the traces of knowledge and power, the dregs manifest these same two divine attributes. Within the Dust, the traces of these two attributes are differentiated into two forces, which the Chinese text calls yin and yang. In place of these two words, Ma introduces two rather strange Arabic words, qarrânt and harrânt, which may be his own coinage. The meanings of the two terms are clear both from their derivation and from Ma’s explanation of the text. They can be translated respectively as “frigid” and “fervid.”

Ma explains that the divine power, which becomes manifest in the spiritual domain as intellect, demands the movement of creative activity, and this movement produces heat. In contrast, the divine knowledge, which becomes manifest in the spiritual domain as soul, demands stillness, or the fixity of the objects of knowledge within the knowing subject, and this stillness gives rise to cold. Thus, within the original, undifferentiated and chaotic Dust, some of the dust is fervid or yang and some frigid or yin; some is moving and some still. The fervid dust moves toward the outside, and the frigid dust settles down on the inside.

Having explained the movement of the frigid and fervid forces, Ma draws a diagram to illustrate his point. It consists of three concentric circles. The central circle, which represents movement toward the center, is labeled “frigid,” and the outermost circle, which represents movement toward the periphery, is labeled “fervid.” Ma then refers explicitly, for one of the few times in the text, to Chinese teachings. He provides the famous diagram of tai-chi, which represents yang on the right side and yin on the left, and he says that the circle of fervid and frigid provides a more adequate representation of the nature of things.

The differentiation of the Dust into fervid and frigid gives rise to a second level of bodily creation, which is fire and water, and these in turn produce the third level, that of the four elements. The elements, still under the influence of fervid and frigid, give rise to heaven (manifesting the fervid) and earth (the frigid), then to the three progeny, and finally to human beings. In each succeeding level, the interplay of forces becomes more complex, but Ma frequently refers back to the original divine duality of knowledge and power. So also, in the remaining four chapters he sometimes mentions the complementarity of the two divine attributes or that of frigid and fervid, to explain how creation and transformation bring about the differentiation of the universe in its entirety. In the last chapter, he illustrates how the same two forces are harnessed in the reverse movement, which reintegrates all things in the Real One through the activities of human beings.

Translations into Chinese

Few Islamic works are known for certain to have been translated into Chinese, and the Koran itself was not translated in its entirety until 1927. The primary or secondary literature sometimes mentions that a given book is a translation, but these statements need to be treated with caution. Traditional Chinese authors spoke of translations rather loosely, and the authors of most of the secondary literature have been conversant with Chinese but unfamiliar with the Islamic languages. If a book is to be called a “translation,” it should certainly have two characteristics. First, the original text should be available for comparison. Second, the work should follow the original text rather closely, not simply be inspired by it. Drawing the line here may not be easy, but some attempt should be made, and this cannot be done without having both texts available.

In trying to track down books with both of these characteristics, I have been able to discover only three works—three of the four Persian Sufi texts mentioned as having been translated into Chinese. Although I am reasonably certain that the fourth, Maqâsid-i aqâsâ, was also translated, I have not seen the Chinese text and can judge only on the basis of a description made by Palladius in the nineteenth century. The originals
of these four works are all well enough known to be among the small number of Sufi books to have been translated at least partially into English. The first, Mīrād al-ibād min al-nabūdar ilā l-maʿād ("The path of God’s servants from the origin to the return"), was written by Najm al-Dīn Rāzi (d. 654/1256), an important master of the Kubrawī Sufi order. It was translated as Kuei-chén yao-tao in the year 1670 by Wu Tzu-hsien, who is believed by some scholars to have been a student of Wang Tai-yü. This is by far the longest of the four works, and the Persian text is deservedly the most famous and widely read. It can be considered, as its English translator puts it, "the summation of the historical elaboration of Sufism" down to the thirteenth century, when there was an extraordinary flowering of Sufi literature. It is a thorough exposition of right understanding, the second dimension of Islam, with the aim of inspiring Muslims to engage themselves in the third dimension, that of spiritual aspiration. It deals in a relatively systematic manner with the nature of human beings as the linchpin of cosmic existence and universal equilibrium. It describes the prophets as the guides to ultimate happiness and presents a detailed enumeration of the ascending levels of human perfection. It discusses the various modes of unveiling and spiritual vision that the travelers may witness in their journeys to God, and describes their final attainment to the Divine Presence. It explains that human beings have been given charge of fashioning their own souls during their sojourn in this world and that, in the next world, they will find themselves divided into four basic types, depending on the nature of the soul that they have achieved. A final section devotes eight chapters to explaining how various sorts of people should follow the path to God—kings, ministers, scholars, the wealthy, farmers, merchants, and craftsmen.

Among the qualities that have made Mīrād al-ibād a classic are the clarity, fluency, and beauty of its prose. Although it deals with issues that remain abstruse in the hands of theologians and philosophers, it avoids technical discussions and uses the imagery and analogies of everyday language. The result has been an extraordinarily popular book, read throughout the eastern lands of Islam as a guide to all dimensions of the path to God. Although understanding the book does not demand training in the technical Islamic sciences, it does require a degree of knowledge of the tradition that would have made its translation into Chinese no easy task. On the whole, Wu Tzu-hsien is as faithful to the original as one could hope, and he is helped in his efforts by the nature of the text, rooted more in imagery than in technical discourse. Nonetheless, when the discussion enters areas that would be difficult for Chinese readers to understand without detailed commentary, he is not averse to dropping the passage.

The second of the four texts is Maqṣad-i aqṣā by the well-known Sufi ʿAzīz al-Dīn Nasafi (d. ca 700/1300), also a master of the Kubrawī order.

According to the description of the work given by Palladius, it was translated by She Yun-shan in 1679, less than ten years after Mīrād al-ibād, as Yen-chhen ching. According to other sources, it was translated under the name Kuei-chén pi-yao by P'o Na-ch'ih. It seems, however, that P'o Na-ch'ih is the pen-name of She Yun-shan, who was a disciple of Ch'ang Chih-mei (d. 1683), the author of a popular Persian grammar. The Persian text presents us with a much shorter, more systematic, and drier explanation of the Sufi path and its relation with the Shariah and Ultimate Reality. It provides a straightforward exposition of many basic philosophical, cosmological, and psychological teachings, focusing mainly on the relation between God, the cosmos, and the perfect human being (insān-i kāmil). It is much more philosophical than Mīrād, though written in relatively simple language. Chinese Muslims would have liked the clarity with which the text explains the basic elements of spiritual cultivation, but, lacking a copy of the Chinese, I cannot judge how the translator dealt with the text.

The third was Ashīʿat al-lamaʿat ("The rays of The flashes") by Jāmi, a famous scholar who was a member of the Naṣrbandi order. It is a commentary on Lamaʿat, a Persian classic by Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī, a thirteenth-century Sufi of the school of Ibn al-ʿArabī. It was translated by P'o Na-chih, the same person who translated Maqṣad-i aqṣā, though it is not known to have been published before 1927. The book's cover gives the title as the Chinese transliteration of the word Ashīʿat, that is, Eschen-erhting. Inside the text, the name of the book is given as Chao-yian pi-chuieh ("The mysterious secret of the original display"). Since the commentary moves forward phrase by phrase and sometimes word by word, it includes the whole text of ʿIrāqī's work, which is an exquisite disquisition on the metaphysics of love in mixed prose and poetry, and, in She's arrangement, Lamaʿat is more clearly differentiated from the commentary than in Jāmi's original. The commentary itself unfolds the meaning of the text in a relatively dry and systematic manner, and She is rather free in making use of those parts of the commentary that would be relevant to Chinese readers and ignoring other parts. He is not as faithful to the original as Wu Tzu-hsien is to the text of Mīrād al-ibād, but he seems to have made a serious attempt to stick to the literal meaning.

The fourth is the text translated here in part 6, Lāwāʾīh ("Gleams"), also by Jāmi. It was translated into Chinese by Liu Chih as Chen-ching chao-wei ("Displaying the concealment of the real realm"). It is not clear when it was first published, but the 1925 edition has a preface dated 1751. Liu Chih is not as faithful as She to Jāmi's original text, and unlike him, he drops the poetry, which plays a significant role in the original.

We can now turn to a few examples of works that are called translations in the secondary literature without sufficient evidence. The earliest example is Ssu-p'ien yao-tao by Chang Shih-chung, which has a preface
by Sha Chen-ch’un g dated 1653. Wang Chan-ch’ao, who wrote a second preface in 1872, says that the work is a translation, but he does not mention the original title or author. Other sources give it the Persian title Chahār fasl (“Four chapters”). The four chapters deal with faith, the Real Lord and Islam, worship and its rules, and purification. The book was recorded by three students who attended lectures given by Chang, in which he commented on the original text. It quotes from Mīrād al-ībād several times as well as a book called ‘Aqād. The book seems to be a paraphrase and commentary rather than a translation.41

A second example of a work that is claimed to be a translation is Liu Chih’s most famous book, to which he gave both a Persian/Arabic and a Chinese title, Tarjama-yi Muṣṭafā: T’ien-fang chih-sheng shih-lu (“The translation of Muṣṭafā: The biography of the utmost sage of Arabia”). Leslie thinks that the main body of the text is in fact a translation of a fourteenth-century Persian work, Tarjama-yi mawlid-i Muṣṭafā, by ‘Abī ibn Muhammad Kāzirūnī, which in turn is a translation from the Arabic original by ‘Abī’s father. A comparison of the Chinese text with one version of the original, however, shows that while Liu Chih retells many of the stories in ‘Abī’s work and follows the same general order, he also condenses the text drastically and adds material from other sources. In addition, he freely adapts the stories to fit the needs of Chinese narrative; among other things, his version places a far greater stress on the supernatural elements than does the original.42

In the nineteenth century, Lan Hsü Tzu-hsi wrote a book called T’ien-fang cheng-hsiieh. In a preface dated 1861, Wang Shou-ch’ien says that the book is translated from the language of T’ien-fang, but there is little evidence that it should in fact be called a translation. It consists of seven chapters dealing with cosmology, the Arabic alphabet, Koran and Hadith, human nature, the Real One, important Islamic teachings, and descriptions of “real persons.” The last chapter is especially interesting. Beginning with Adam, it mentions a few of the prophets, describes Muhammad and some of his family and companions, praises two unnamed persons from the central Islamic lands, and concludes with accounts of two Chinese scholars, Wang Tai-yü and Ma Ming-lung, the latter being the author of Jen-chi hsing-yü, written in 1656. As the last “real person,” the author describes his own mother.43

Ma Fu-chu, a nineteenth-century scholar who was executed for his alleged involvement in a rebellion in Yunnan, wrote about his extensive travels in the central Islamic lands and composed some twenty of his thirty-seven surviving works in Arabic. One of his Chinese works is Han-i tao-hsing chiu-ch’ing, the original of which he himself had written in Persian.44 He is also said to be the author of a short rhymed treatise on the Kaabah, which is available in an English translation and provides a fine example of the synthesis of Islamic and Chinese thinking.45

Among Ma’s works said to be translations is one of the most significant works waiting to be studied in the context of Sufi writings. This is Ta-hua tsung-kuei (“The great transformation of all returning”), which is described as having been dictated and edited by Ma and written down by Ma Kai-k’o in 1865, when Ma Fu-chu was seventy-two years old.46 It is offered as a translation of the “Fuṣūs,” that is, the Fuṣūs al-hikam by Ibn al-ʿArabi, whose school of thought was already represented in Chinese by the two works of Jāmi. The Fuṣūs is the most famous text in Sufism and the work most often commented on. In the introduction to the Chinese work, Ma Kai-k’o states that the significance of the book is that, in contrast to the works of Wang Tai-yü and Liu Chih, it explains the nature of death and the resurrection. However, the Arabic Fuṣūs has little to say about these topics.

Ma also wrote a book called Ssu-tien yao-hui, which was published along with his study of the Fuṣūs. Two contemporary Chinese scholars claim that it is a translation,47 but this seems unlikely. In the introduction, Ma An-li says that Ma Fu-chu studied many Arabic and Persian books on Islam, and then spent eight years writing the essence of these books in Chinese. The book itself consists of four chapters, dealing with these topics: (1) six warnings about the fountainhead of faith; (2) the essential meanings of the rituals and the endeavors; (3) an interpretation of the meaning of the hidden and the clear; and (4) a descriptive examination of the true and the false.

The Neo-Confucian Background

Those familiar with the Chinese intellectual tradition in general and Neo-Confucian teachings in particular will quickly recognize that many of the important discussions of Chinese-language Islam are old friends. However, those unfamiliar with this background may find useful a brief outline of some of the more important terms and concepts that have been assimilated by the Chinese ulama. Before looking at these, however, it is well to remember that Neo-Confucianism was a tradition of learning that was hardly static or monolithic. The “Neo” in Neo-Confucianism refers to the fact that beginning in about the tenth century, there was a major revival of Confucian teachings, after centuries of relative neglect and strong rivalry from Buddhism and Taoism. Confucianism had itself been largely responsible for the shape Chinese civilization had taken, and Taoist and Buddhist teachings were formulated with it in view. Neo-Confucianism in turn assimilated a good many of the Taoist and Buddhist terms and concepts in its own formulations. The exact relationship among the three traditions is much debated by experts in Chinese intellectual history, but few would
disagree with Wing-tsit Chan's statement that Neo-Confucianism represents "the full flowering of Chinese thought." He goes on to explain that "Its major topics of debate, especially in the Sung (961-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) periods, are the nature and principle (li) of man and things. (For this reason it is called the School of Nature and Principle, or Hsing-li hsueh.)"

The great thinkers of the Neo-Confucian tradition represent high points in the history of Chinese thought, much like the great figures of the Islamic tradition, such as Avicenna, Averroes, Ghazâlî, Suhrawardî, Ibn al-'Arabi, and Rûmî. Major authors included Ch'ang Ts'ai (d. 1077), Ch'êng Hao (d. 1085) and his brother Ch'êng I (d. 1107), Lu Hsiang-shan (d. 1193), Chu Hsi (d. 1200), and Wang Yang-ming (d. 1529), but there were dozens of other significant figures during the same period, not to mention Buddhist and Taoist teachers. There was a great deal of dialogue, debate, and disagreement among the Neo-Confucians themselves and between them and the Taoists and Buddhists. Indeed, one of the common criticisms that Neo-Confucians leveled at each other was that they had distorted the teachings of Confucius and Mencius by importing ideas from the other two traditions. In short, the Chinese tradition, much like the Islamic tradition that was flourishing at the same time, was highly diverse and dynamic.

Despite the diversity of perspectives represented by the Neo-Confucian masters, certain concepts and themes are constantly discussed and debated, and it is these that form the backbone for the work of the Chinese ulama. Wing-tsit Chan, for example, declares that Neo-Confucian thought has three cardinal concepts—principle (li), nature (hsing), and destiny or mandate (ming). He adds that by the time of Chu Hsi, the greatest of the Neo-Confucians, six concepts had become central to the discussion. In addition to principle and nature were the Great Ultimate (t'âi-chî), vital-energy (or material force, chi), the investigation of things (k'o-wu), and humanity (jen). All these terms play significant roles in Chinese Islam.

The term Tao itself means, of course, "way," and the word is employed constantly in both Confucianism and Taoism with a variety of meanings depending on the context. As Ch'en Ch'un (d. 1223) remarks in his chapter on the word in his Neo-Confucian Terms Explained, "The general principle of Tao is the principle people should follow in their daily affairs and human relations." Like other Neo-Confucians, Ch'en identifies the Tao with principle (li), though he does not neglect to point out the differences in nuance, as in his remark "The Way is that which can be followed forever, and principle is that which is forever unchanging."

The term t'âi-chî or the Great Ultimate is typically paired with wu-chî, which can be translated as "the Ultimate of Nonbeing" or "the Non-Ultimate." This pairing becomes important to Neo-Confucian thinking at least from the time of An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate, a brief but highly influential treatise by Chou Tun-i (d. 1073). In the Taoist perspective, the Non-Ultimate represents a reality that is situated beyond all being, differentiation, and conceptualization. It is the Tao that cannot be named. In contrast, the Great Ultimate is the Tao that can be named. It is pure and undifferentiated being, carrying within itself the roots of all manifest reality. According to Chu Hsi's influential interpretation of these two terms, they designate a single reality, the Principle, but from two different points of view. As Wing-tsit Chan explains, "The Non-Ultimate is the state of reality before the appearance of forms whereas the Great Ultimate is the state after the appearance of forms."

For Chu Hsi, the concept of the Great Ultimate is inextricably bound up with principle, an ancient term that had been the center of Neo-Confucian thinking by the Ch'êng brothers. According to them, principle is "self-evident and self-sufficient, extending everywhere and governing all things . . . It is many but essentially one, for all specific principles are but one principle. It is possessed by all people and all things . . . It is universal truth, universal order, universal law . . . It is a universal process of creation and production."

The Great Ultimate gives rise to the universe through movement (tung) and quietude (ching), which are designations for the two basic cosmic forces, yang and yin. As Chu Hsi writes,

There is no other event in the universe except yin and yang succeeding each other in an unceasing cycle. This is called Change. However, for this movement and quietude, there must be the Principle that makes them possible. This is the Great Ultimate.

Principle is often paired with vital-energy (or material force, ch'i). Vital-energy designates the subtle force that is differentiated first into yin and yang, then into the Five Agents (or elements). These are water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. Ch'en Ch'un writes, "Originally there was only one vital-energy. It is divided into yin and yang and further divided into the Five Agents. The two and five separate and combine in their own way as they operate, producing and reproducing throughout time without cease."

For Chu Hsi, principle and vital-energy are two sides of the same reality. Principle is hidden, while vital-energy is manifest. Vital-energy determines the movement and quietude of everything that appears to human beings. In effect, the whole universe is vitally dynamic and ever-changing because of the principle that animates it. Ch'i manifests li. To use another pair of terms well known both to Neo-Confucians and Buddhists, principle is the "substance" (t'i)—or, as some prefer to translate it, the "essence"—that underlies and infuses all things, while
vital-energy is the "function" (yang) that becomes manifest in all things. Substance is one, functions are many. The myriad manifestations that appear in the world—the "ten thousand things"—well up from a single substance that undergirds them.

In human terms, a key synonym for both substance and principle is hsìn or "heart," one of the most important expressions in all of Chinese thought. Many Sinologists, such as Chan, have translated this term as "mind," and others as "mind-and-heart." But to translate hsìn as "mind" in the present context would lose sight of the fact that in Islamic thought, the "heart" (Arabic qalb, Persian dîl) plays nearly the same role as hsìn in Chinese thought. In the Koran and the Islamic tradition in general, the heart is the center of the human being and the root of awareness. The Koran associates all good with a healthy heart, and notably it makes the heart the locus of consciousness and intelligence (sâql). The Sufi tradition constantly discusses the necessity of purifying the heart so as to reach the special intimacy with God that only human beings can achieve.

In Islamic discourse, the whole enterprise of becoming truly human has to do with making the heart "wholesome" (sâlih). Remember here that the Koran calls the prophets and worthies the "wholesome" (sâlihin) and it repeatedly commands the doing of "wholesome deeds" (sâlihat). The Prophet said, "There is in the body a lump of flesh. When it is wholesome, the whole body is wholesome, and when it is corrupt, the whole body is corrupt. Indeed, it is the heart." According to a hadith often cited in Sufi sources, God says, "My heaven embraces Me not, nor My earth, but the heart of My faithful, gentle, and meek servant does embrace Me." For both Islam and the Chinese tradition, then, the "heart" is the spiritual organ that is specific to the highest possibilities of human nature, especially the understanding of things as they truly are.

In Neo-Confucian terms, the process of refining human nature and aligning oneself with the Tao is associated with the idea of "cultivation" (hsiu), a word that can also be translated as repairing, regulating, refining, reforming, and pruning. The first stage of cultivation of the self is "cultivation of the personal life," which is mentioned in the Confucian Great Learning between "regulating the family" and "making the heart true." The literal meaning of the term personal life here is "body" (siên), which is a general designation for "the four limbs and the one hundred bones." As we saw in the introduction, the Great Learning tells us, "Those who wished to govern their countries would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their bodies. Those who wished to cultivate their bodies would first make their hearts true." The body here is the foundation for human consciousness and the basis for all human relationships. It must be trained to act correctly in all circumstances and to observe the propriety (li, Arabic adab) in every situation.

In short, "cultivation of the body" designates roughly the same domain as that denoted by the Arabic expression, tahdíh al-akhlāq, or "refinement of character traits." Tahdíh means to prune, clean, purify, polish, and refine. Akhlāq, the plural of khalq, means "character traits" and is used technically to designate the science of ethics. Hence, "cultivation of the body" can be understood to mean refinement of moral and ethical character. In Islamic terms, it is to eliminate base character traits (saṣf al-akhlāq) and to acquire noble character traits (makārim al-akhlāq).

In Confucianism, the most important of the virtuous traits that need to be acquired are summed up as the Five Constants (wu-ch'ang), which are often listed as humanity (jen), righteousness (li), propriety (li), wisdom (chih), and faithfulness (hsìn). One Neo-Confucian version says that they are "righteousness on the part of the father, love on the part of the mother, brotherliness on the part of the elder brother, respect on the part of the younger brother, and filial piety on the part of the son." These are closely associated with the Three Bonds (san-kang)—the moral and ethical ties between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife.

In Chu Hsi's way of looking at things, the heart can be said to have two sides. In terms of its substance or original nature, it is identical with principle. In terms of its function, it is principle mixed with vital-energy. In its substance, the heart is purely good, but in its function, it becomes involved with both good and evil. If people must undertake "the investigation of things," this is so that they may cultivate the body, train themselves in good character, and return to the original nature of the heart, which is identical with the substance of all things. Ultimately they will reach the principles of all things, and the principles of the things are in reality one principle, which is none other than the Great Ultimate. According to Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi's central idea is encapsulated in his maxim, "The Great Ultimate is nothing other than principle." The first and most important of the Five Constants is jen. This term is impossible to translate, and among the many attempts that have been made are benevolence, perfect virtue, human-heartedness, love, benevolent love, goodness, altruism, co-humanity, and true manhood. I use "humanity," following Wing-tsit Chan. In Confucianism it is the highest human good, and for Chu Hsi it is identical with the substance of the heart. To recover one's heart is to become truly human and truly humane. Humanity in this sense is the substance of all good and the wellspring of every virtue and beautiful human quality. Chu Hsi writes,

In discussing the excellence of man's heart, [Mencius] said, "jen is man's heart" [6A:11]. Both the substance and the function of the four moral qualities [jen, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom] are thus fully presented without mentioning them. For jen as constituting
the Tao consists of the fact that the heart of Heaven and Earth, which produces things, is present in everything. . . . In the teachings (of Confucius, it is said), "Conquer oneself and return to propriety" [Analects 12:1]. This means that if we can overcome and eliminate selfishness and return to the Principle of Heaven, then the substance of this heart will be present everywhere and its function will always be operative.61

The differentiation that is referred to by the pairings "principle and vital-energy," or "substance and function," parallels the two domains that are mentioned in another ancient pair of terms—ming (destiny or mandate) and hsing (nature).62 The first of these is typically associated with heaven and what comes down from heaven, and the second with what becomes established in the earth as a result of heavenly activity. Thus, for example, when Confucius tells us about the stages of his lifetime, he says that he came to know the "mandate of heaven" at the age of fifty (Analects 2:4). The exact meaning of this mandate was much debated in Chinese thought. Those inclined toward a more theistic view of things tended to look upon it as God's decree and commandment, while those who looked at things in more impersonal terms associated it with the natural order. Thus Chan tells us that "in religion it generally means fate or personal order of God, but in philosophy it is practically always understood as moral destiny, natural endowment, or moral order."63

In the Chinese Islamic texts, it seems best to translate the term ming as "mandate" rather than "destiny" or "fate." The same range of meanings is found in the Koranic term amr, usually translated as "command." The Islamic intellectual tradition divides God's command into two sorts. One sort of divine command, called the "engendering command" (amr takwini), pertains to the natural order. It is the command that brings about the existence of things. "His only command, when He desires a thing, is to say to it 'Be!', and it comes to be" (Koran 36:82). The other sort, called the "prescriptive command" (amr taklifi), pertains to the human order and designates the moral and social commandments that God sends down through the prophets. Thus, in Islamic thinking both natural laws and moral laws are God's "command," which is to say that they both have the same source and manifest the same principle. Reading the Chinese texts in Islamic terms, one might say that ming, like amr, refers to the divine command as embracing both the engendering and the prescriptive commands. However, scholars understand it to mean "mandate" when it refers to the moral order, and "destiny" or "fate" when it refers to the natural order.

The correlation between mandate and nature goes back at least to the 1 Ching, where it is used in the commentary on the first hexagram: "The way of the Creative works through change and transformation, so that each thing receives its true nature and destiny [mandate] and comes into permanent accord with the Great Harmony."64 Chu Hsi provides a well-known Neo-Confucian formula when he tells us, "What is imparted by Heaven to all things is called mandate. What is received by them from Heaven is called nature."65 Or again,

Nature refers to what is stabilized, whereas mandate refers to what is operating. Mandate, for example, refers to water flowing, while nature refers to water contained in a bowl. A big bowl contains more water, while a small one contains less. The water in a clean bowl will be clear, whereas that in a dirty bowl will be turbid.66

One of the most vexing questions that arises here is why some bowls are large and some small, some clean and some dirty. In other words, what is it that causes the differentiation of the ten thousand things? And what is it that makes human beings uniquely able to achieve sagehood, and uniquely blameworthy if they fail to achieve it? All things, after all, follow heaven's mandate and their own natures, and as such they are what they must be. If this is so, why should human beings be criticized for being what they are? What is wrong if they simply live according to their own nature, which manifests the heavenly mandate? A basic Islamic answer to this question is simply to differentiate between the two commands, or the two "mandates." The engendering and creative command establishes nature, but the prescriptive command addresses human free will, which itself is given by nature. People will be held responsible for following the prescriptive command inasmuch as they are free. Of course, the question remains as to how free they are, and this was constantly debated. Chu Hsi and others frequently address these issues. In the following, Chu Hsi does so while answering the question, "Physical nature differs in the degree of purity. Does the nature bestowed by Heaven differ in degree of its completeness?"

No, there is no difference in the degree of its completeness. It is like the light of the sun and the moon. In a clear, open field, it is seen in its entirety. Under a mat-shed, however, some of it is hidden and obstructed so that part of it is visible and part of it is not. What is impure is due to the impurity of vital-energy. The obstruction is due to the self, like the mat-shed obstructing itself. However, man possesses the principle that can penetrate this obstruction, whereas in birds and animals, though they also possess this nature, it is nevertheless restricted by their physical structure, which creates such a degree of obstruction as to be impenetrable.67

The basic Neo-Confucian perspective on things can be summarized as follows: One principle, which is the Tao or the Great Ultimate, gives
rise to the infinite diversity that is called heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things. All things are constituted by the interplay of the vitality-energies, yin and yang, which manifest the one Principle. The function of each thing is distinct, but, in the last analysis, the substance of all is the Great Ultimate. Things naturally flow according to the mandate of heaven, but the natures of things are such that some display heaven’s characteristics more fully than others. In the case of human beings, nature has become obscured and needs to be purified and clarified. This is achieved by learning, which aims to recover the true heart, within which all the virtues are fully present. As Wang Yang-ming puts it,

When the heart is free from the obscuration of selfish desires, it is the embodiment of the Principle of Heaven, which requires not an iota added from the outside. When this heart, which has become completely identical with the Principle of Heaven, is applied and arises to serve parents, there is filial piety; when it arises to serve the ruler, there is loyalty; when it rises to deal with friends or to govern the people, there are faithfulness and humanity. The main thing is for the heart to make an effort to get rid of selfish human desires and preserve the Principle of Heaven."