**Orthodoxy, Resistance, and the Family in Chinese Art**

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The night before the start of the conference at which the papers that comprise this book were presented, the conference organizers, Jerome Silbergeld and Dora C.Y. Ching, posed a question to me: why so few family portraits in pre-20th century China?   Why was it that, when organizing a conference on the family model in Chinese arts and literature, dealing with a society about which we have heard for generations that the family is the center of the social and moral universe, a society whose whole social and cultural basis has been called "familism" by some, and one in which human images were one of the main motifs of two- and three-dimensional representational art, it was nevertheless almost impossible to find a *picture of a family* (or a carving or a sculpture of a family) to adorn the cover of the conference program? Why did Chinese artists before the 20th century, in implicit or explicit contrast to European artists, not draw, paint, or carve families?

The answer to this question, it seems to me, is complex but not difficult.  It has to do with the relationships of ideal to reality, of orthodoxy to resistance; and, not

the least, of structure to sentiment in Chinese society.[1]  To understand not just

what Chinese artists so conspicuously left out of their representational works,

but also what they did put in and why, is to understand the role of  a set of

relationships that essentialist scholarship about China,  written by both Chinese

and  outsiders, has  too simplistically lumped together as "the Chinese family."  If

we understand the absence of "families" in Chinese art, it will help us

understand four very important things about China.  First,  human relationships

were until recently, and still are in some cases,  structured by the cruel necessities

of maintaining  a social  system  in which access to productive property was the

means to livelihood for the great majority of people in the society.  Second, these

cruel necessities and the system demanded by their logic required that  the

system be superimposed upon an older, more universal, biologically given,

evolutionarily selected configuration of human sentiments, an alternative that

had to be ruthlessly contained because it could never be eliminated.   Third, the

relative strength of these two models varied with place and time:  in times and

places when the regime of property was strong, so was the orthodox model.

When the regime of property that both sustained and was sustained by that

artificial configuration of sentiments we call the orthodox model broke down, the

model broke down with it, at least part way.   Finally, the whole cultural,

psychic, and historical tension between these models was played out in the realm

of culture and the arts.  Those who maintained this artificial but efficient system

of restructured  human relationships knew what they were doing, and redefined

the unnatural twisting of human sentiments as the natural and proper expression

of such sentiments, using all the cultural resources of law, moral text, and the

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[1] This set of oppositions is inspired by  Gates and Weller  1987.

arts from painting to drama to literature to portray that restructured configuration of sentiments as natural and moral. At the same time, opponents or critics of the system have just as forcefully mobilized art, literature, and other forms of expressive culture to oppose what they considered the tyranny of the orthodox model. This essay will expand on each of these four propositions in turn, in each case using the analyses of the family model in Chinese art analyzed in this book, along with other evidence, to illustrate how, when, and where the Chinese system of relationships worked to maintain itself or lost its support and fell apart.

I. KEEPING THE SYSTEM RUNNING: THE ORTHODOX MODEL

China's greatest anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong, very early saw through the misleading stereotype, perpetrated by Chinese and Sinologists alike, that China was a group- or family- centered society, in contrast to the individual-centered societies of the West. In his most valuable and original work, *Xiangtu Zhongguo*, first published in 1947, he took issue with the whole notion of family as applied to Chinese society. Both the English term family and the Sino-Japanese neologism usually used to translate it, *jiating*, said Fei, were terms for groups, terms that fit well into a group-model of society (*tuanti geju*) derived from the social structure of Western countries . But China, he said, was not organized on a group model, but rather on a model he called *chaxu geju*, or "a mode of organization based on differences and orderings." Here Fei forshadowed by almost a decade the invention of network analysis in Western anthropology of

the family.[2]  We should immediately make it clear to the puzzled reader  that Fei

was not denying the importance of kin relations in Chinese society.  Like just

about every other analyst before and since, he considered kinship to be of central

importance.  But kinship was not about groups; it was about networks of

relationships organized around status differences and status orderings (*chaxu*).

And if there was a name for some kind of unit that embodied these relationships

in Chinese society, it was not  *jiating* but *jiazu*, the patrilineal kinship cluster of

relationships whose strengths fade out from any particular individual who is a

node in the network (Fei 1947; translated in Hamilton and Wang 1992).

The idea of *jiazu* was the basis of the property relationships that held

Chinese society together, at least until the revolutionary changes of 1956.  The

livelihood of probably 90% or more of the Chinese for most of known history

came from property; most of this was  property in land that supported people

directly by their own labor or indirectly through rents; some of it was

commercial or in a few cases artisanal industrial property.  And property was

inherited along the lines of patrilineal descent that formed the basis of the *jiazu*

network organization.  As Arthur Wolf put it, property belonged to a "descent

line," a group of agnatically related males stretching as far back in history as

could be traced and as far forward in the future as could be imagined (Wolf and

Huang 1980: 61-63). From patriline control of property, and thus of the basic

means of livelihood, came patrilineal succession of surnames, patrilineal

inheritance of property ownership, worship of patrilineal ancestors, namely the

whole complex of male-centered, patriarchal institutions that was the basis for

the orthodox organization of kin relations in Chinese society described by Rubie

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[2] The earliest systematic text, and still a classical source is Bott 1957.

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Watson in Chapter **XXX**.[3]

But of course a patriline is an imagined network as much as a real one; most of its members are either long deceased or not yet conceived. In order for patriline property to be worked and managed, and in order for the patriline to reproduce itself, two things are necessary. One, given the universal incest taboo, is women from outside the patriline to marry and reproduce for the line. The other, given the necessity to convert property rights into consumable goods, is a means of organizing the labor of the patriline members, and that of their wives and unmarried daughters, and of sharing out and managing the products derived from the patrline's property. Both of these require a group organization, even if we believe with Fei that the group was never the *basis* of the social organization. There must, in other words, be a household, a group in which labor is organized and the fruits of the labor are shared out, in which children are born and nurtured and the old are cared for, die, and become objects of ancestral worship.

Hence the Chinese family, an ideologically ignored but practically central social *group*, whose workings are ably described in Rubie Watson's chapter for this volume. It was a group that not only served to organize labor and share the fruits among its members, but more importantly for our concerns here, also served to reinforce the patrilineal, patriarchal model of social organization that was the support for property rights. And this meant, as Watson has pointed out, a system of authority in which senior prevailed over junior and male over female

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[3] It is fruitless to speculate on the origins of patriarchy, I think. By the earliest periods in Chinese history that we can reliably reconstruct, patriclans were the basis of the social structure; how they got there we have no reliable way of knowing. See Keightley 2000: 98-101.

(exactly which of these took precedence was a complex question, but on the whole sons obeyed their mothers).[4] It was also a group that women joined at the time of marriage, and of which they were thus only conditional members until they became mothers of adult members of the group. And it was a group that was ritually organized in order to reinforce the system of property based, patriarchal authority, under a series of moral concepts summed up in the basic idea of *xiao*, usually translated into English in what I have always thought of as a rather Orientalistic sounding term, "filial piety."

In this model the family (*jiating*), which is a real unit with legal and economic functions, as Myron Cohen has explained (1976), was organized according to the principles basic to the much more important, but in some ways imaginary network, the patriline or *jiazu.* And because it was organized this way, it embodied a model of relations within the family that emphasized filial bonds and de-emphasized marital bonds, and that emphasized the son's filial tie to his father more strongly than his tie to his mother. We can illustrate this model by the following simple diagram:

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[4] Scholarly discourse on this matter is, I believe, greatly confused by reciting the old proverb of *san cong*, or "three followings," which says that a woman follows her father in childhood, her husband in marriage, and her son in widowhood. An essentialist reading of Chinese patriarchy takes this to mean that a woman was always subordinate to a man, even of the junior generation. Empirical observation subjects this generalization to doubt, as does the observation that a man must display filial piety (which includes absolute obedience) to his mother as well as to his father. Michael Nylan (chapter **XXX,** this volume) makes a case that, in the Han period at least, *cong* meant "follow" in the spatial sense, indicating that a woman joined her father's, her husband's, and her son's households in turn, not that she obeyed their orders equally. This makes a lot more sense to me, given my knowledge of the role of old women in Chinese societies; see also Margery Wolf1972, particularly chapters 10 and 14. More recently I have had this view reinforced in a remark by Professor Matthew Sommer that in the Qing period, old women were "patriarchs."

Figure 1: The Orthodox model of the Chinese Family

In this chart, the big square represents the *jiating* or family group, as it exists emphemerally to support the continuation of the ideologically more important and more permanent *jiazu* or descent line. The important tie here is the basic patrilineal one, extending from father to son; the other filial tie, from mother to son, is also important. What are less important are the ties between husband and wife in each generation. All the ritual and ideological supports of family relationships emphasize the filial ties, and they are supported by formal and customary law, by morality tales in all forms of high and low literature, and, as we can see in the chapters in this volume, by family representations in various forms of art. The ancestor portraits that we see in chapter **XXX** by Dora Ching provide perhaps the clearest example of art as an ideological prop to the family system. What these portraits show is not the people who are living together now, which is who would appear in family portraits, if there were such, but rather the continuity of the line from generation to generation, demonstrated by portraits of ancestors, alive (still) or dead (really still). But other aspects of this structure are also depicted in various art forms: Ann Wicks (chapter **XXX**), for example, shows many instances of arts that emphasize fertility, male children,

female confinement and subordination, and other features that made this family system work and uphold the property-based patrilineal system.  So we have a tentative answer to Silbergeld and Ching's question: there are no family portraits because the ideological or moral purpose of art is not so much to imitate as to dictate life, and the life that is to be dictated is the life that that reproduces itself through the patrilineal, patriarchal system.

II. RECOGNIZING HUMAN NATURE: THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL

Despite the pervasive presence of this orthodox model in art, literature, law, and folklore, its dominance has never been absolute.  In fact, the degree to which these cultural supports were erected to hold up the orthodox model was perhaps evidence of the fact of that model's ultimate dependence on property and its rickety psychological foundations.  The basic principles of the orthodox model, that ties of patrifiliation had to prevail over ties of maternal attachment  and particularly over ties of conjugal attraction, went directly contrary, I would maintain, to two biologically given and universal facts of human nature.  First, we  have a drive for attachment to caregivers and nurturers, which ties us early and strongly to our mothers much more than to our fathers.[5]  Second, that we

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[5] The nature and evolutionary origins of the ties of attachment are discussed in a sensible and enlightening way in Sarah Blaffer Hrdy's *Mother Nature:* (2000). Hrdy is careful to point out that attachment does not happen automatically, but depends on the behavioral activation of a genetic proclivity that can be explained in general Darwinian terms of its survival value. But given the behavior of Chinese mothers toward their newborns, as well as the distance generally shown by fathers (M. Wolf, 1970, 1972), there seems little doubt that Chinese children and mothers will develop strong bonds of affection.  Of course, the orthodox

have a sex drive--evolved through natural selection because those who had it reproduced more than those who did not--that ties us to our mates. Both of these kinds of attachments, rooted in our mammalian and particularly in our primate nature as K-reproducing creatures, are much deeper, more emotional, more basic to our nature than any kind of invented filial attachment to fathers, let alone to some kind of ideological kinship abstraction such as a *jiazu* or descent line. In a paradoxical way, however, it is also part of our particularly human biological nature to create a artificial structures such as the patrilineal family system, and this is where we depart from even our closest primate relatives. Our nature is to create culture, including those cultural features that are contrary to the more biological features of our own nature. But the cultures we create exist only uneasily alongside that deeper nature that cultures have never succeeded in conquering. So in spite of all the cultural, legal, and moral supports for the patriarchal orthodoxy, the natural ties of attachment and sex have still found expression in Chinese society in two important ways. First, whenever and wherever the supports of property and law were weakened, the system of kin relationships veered away from the orthodox ideal toward the natural reality. Second, even when the orthodox system was functioning smoothly, human nature helped fashion an alternative model in the interstices of the orthodox system. The alternative model, based on how our primate emotional nature reacts to being placed in a particular culturally inherited context, rather than directly on the dictates of that context itself, s, still found its own cultural expression in a series of behavioral patterns that acted contrary to the orthodox

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model specifies that they should. At the same time, however, these bonds should not be so strong that they threaten the primacy of patrifiliation.

model.

If we think of the orthodox model shown in the diagram above as the
family constructed within the more general framework set by the patrilineal
cultural ideology, we can construct a parallel alternative model of the family
constructed (or perhaps evolved) in the more general framework of maternal and
conjugal attachments, and represent the alternative model in the following
diagram.

 Figure 2: The alternative model of the Chinese

Family

In this model, the important ties are between husband and wife, and between
mother and son.  The patrifilial tie, which is central to the orthodox model, is not
only weak here, but fraught with exploding tension;[6] the tie between husband's
mother and son's wife (the famous *poxi guanxi* of Chinese folk sociology), which
does not even exist in the orthodox model, is here also weak but still significant;
like the patrifilial tie it carries a time-bomb of conflict and resentment.

It is important to make clear here two things about the relationship between
the orthodox model and the alternative model.  First, they are not mutually

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[6] The degree to which father-son bonds are so dangerous as to be hedged about
with what amount to ritual taboos on everyday interaction is graphically
portrayed in another ethnographic classic, Yang 1945, pp. 57-58.

exclusive.  They co-existed and continue to co-exist everywhere and at all times in Chinese history. When I write below about variation in space and time, then, I am talking about variation in the *relative strength* of the two models in the family system in any particular situation.  Secondly, they are not independent of each other in their origins.  The alternative model is not just what happens when human primates form families; it is not a universal model of the human family incompletely overridden by patriarchal orthodoxy.  Instead, it is what happens to universal emotional and biological ties when people in China (and probably a lot of other societies) form patrilocal family groups in the context of patrilineal inheritance and ideology.  That ideology is never  so absolutely hegemonic as to squeeze out all influences of our primate nature, so the primate  nature re-asserts itself in a particular form, which is the alternative or resistance model of the Chinese family. In juxtaposing these two models, then, we are not dealing with Chinese culture vs. human nature, but rather with  what the Chinese patrilocal family group looks like under, respectively, primary influence of the patrilineal, patriarchal ideology and primary influence of primate drives and attachments.

III.  THE DIALECTIC OF THE TWO MODELS

The orthodox model and the alternative model each have their own functions in the social system and their own cultural and environmental supports, which varied in strength over space and time depending on their social, political, and legal contexts, as indicated in the following table:

**Functions**                          **Cultural and Environmental**     **Favorable Contexts**

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**Supports**

*Orthodox Model*

| Descent | Imperial law | Strong lineage |
| Inheritance | Customary law | Strong imperial state |
| Ritual | Property | Weak capital |
| | Lineage organization | Strong property |
| | Art and Literature | |

*Alternative Model*

| Production | Modern law | Weak property |
| Consumption | Modern values | Weak lineage |
| Everyday life | Primate psychology | Weak state |
| Psychodynamics | | Strong capital |
| | | Wage economy |

Conditions for predominance of the orthodox model existed where the state--the ultimate guarantor of patrilineal property rights--was strong, and where capital, and thus opportunities to break away from dependence on inherited property, was weak; and where the lineage, a manifestation of the patriline, existed as a support for the patrilineal social regime. Under these conditions, the arts and literature existed primarily as supports for this model. These conditions are most clearly visible among the property-owning classes during the time that has come to be known as "Late Imperial China," extending from the Song (or perhaps late Tang) to the Qing, when both patrilineal property rights and the

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ideological structures supporting them were most highly developed.

Conversely, at spatial, class and temporal margins, where property and its

supports in lineage and state were weaker, where people could gain a livelihood

from labor or capital rather than land, literature and the arts could be mobilized

to demonstrate the cruelty of the orthodox system, and we find, as in the

twentieth century, artistic and literary expressions of views critical of the

orthodoxy.

*Alternatives around the margins*

**Spatial and class margins.** The easiest and most obvious places to see

expressions of the alternative model of the family are where institutional support

for orthodoxy was at its weakest. An extreme case existed in parts of the Pearl

River Delta in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when silkworm raising and silk

reeling became profitable commercial ventures, requiring so much labor that

male workers could not fulfill all the needs, so that young women commonly

went to work raising worms or reeling silk in their early teens, and could remain

at the job, making a comfortable living, well into middle age. Many women in

this situation, recognizing the suffering entailed in becoming a daughter-in-law

to a patriline, simply refused, and though they might marry and even have

children, postponed for years, or even canceled, the step of moving into their

husbands' families and becoming daughters-in-law. A more radical step was to

resist marriage altogether, living in a communal house with other women, and

perhaps even hiring a poor woman as a substitute daughter-in-law in her place.[7]

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[7] These alternative practices were first analyzed as "marriage resistance" by
Topley 1975 A later, fuller treatment is Stockard 1975, which questions the term

Less extreme cases of the weakening of the orthodox model can be seen in that variety of locations where, as Hill Gates demonstrates in her wonderfully provocative *China's Motor*, what she refers to as the "Petty Capitalist Mode of Production" held sway over the more orthodox "Bureaucratic-Tributary Mode." In the petty capitalist mode, everything was commoditized, to the point where women might be made the objects of buying and selling, on the one hand, but on the other might be able to engage in all kinds of commercial transactions on behalf of themselves or their families, and thus gain a measure of personal and economic autonomy (Gates 1996). The result was greater control over fertility, more uxorilocal marriage and other non-standard family forms, and a much greater instance of women as household heads. I experienced life in a much weakened form of Chinese patriarchy in a former coal-mining village in Taiwan in the 1970s, where property had little hold on families because people had until recently been so poor and virtually landless. There kinship networks were more bilateral, women had much more contact with their own mothers, a large portion of households were effectively headed by women, and the cult of patrilineal ancestors was much attenuated (Harrell 1982: 176-80).

The important thing to realize about all these and many other marginal cases of weakened orthodoxy, however, is that the orthodoxy did not disappear in any of them. Women in the Pearl River Delta still had to go through a show of being married or hiring a substitute, even though they avoided the worst

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"resistance," showing that these alternative forms were ways in which women asserted their power within a system of marriage, not outside it. Ironically, Stockard's characterization fits the definition of resistance employed by such authors as James Scott, in his *Weapons of the Weak* (1985). For our purposes here, the argument is immaterial, whether these women were resisting marriage or using "resistance" within marriage, they were certainly acting in response to an ability to use the alternative model of the Chinese family.

consequences of living as a daughter-in-law in a Chinese family. Young women

living in areas where the petty capitalist mode was dominant or where property

was weak altogether were still often subjected to humiliation and domestic

violence, and although they might have more recourse against the perpetrators,

they were unable to avoid the system altogether. Sons might have easier and less

hierarchical interactions with their fathers in peripheral areas, but they were

never equals, and at least ritually sons had to defer to their fathers everywhere.

Real change came only with revolution and later capitalist modernization during

the 20th century, but even today that change is only partial.


**Temporal margins**

The orthodox model both supported and depended on the ways in which the

patrilineal property regime regulated access to material goods. It should thus

follow that wherever and whenever access to goods deviated from control by

that property regime, family systems would less rigidly patriarchal than in the

orthodox model. Not only around the spatial peripheries but also before and

after the Late Imperial era, we find family regimes where the orthodox model

was less dominant.

It is difficult for us to judge what family relationships might have been

like in the pre-imperial era; we simply do not have the kind of legal, fictional, or

historiographical resources to say anything reliable. But thanks to scholars such

as Michael Nylan (chapter **XXX**, this volume) we can demonstrate that during the

early imperial period of the Qin and Han dynasties, families were not as rigidly

orthodox as they were in late imperial times. Nylan shows us several ways in

which the Han dynasty model had not yet solidified into the rigid patriarchal

orthodoxy of the Late Imperial period.  These include definitions of families as based around husbands and wives, flexible rules of inheritance, married sons' residence away from parents, relatively common non-agnatic adoption and uxorilocal marriage,  widespread approval of widow remarriage, and the absence of a legal requirement to worship one's ancestors. At the same time, Nylan makes clear that patriarchal ideology, if not absolutely hegemonic, was still an important factor in  elite families of the Han period.  She sums up her argument aptly: "The impulse to strict notions of the patriline -- while evident in the Han texts -- did not dominate the discussions."  Patriarchy as an ideology was well established by the Han period, planting the seeds of the orthodox model, but it was not able to suppress recognition that the conjugal tie was the real basis of reproduction, and thus the most important bond in the family.

At the other end of the time scale of Chinese history, we find first the critiques of the oppressive, feudal family system that marked early 20th-century cultural iconoclasm, and then the real changes brought about by revolution, industrialization, and the demise of a property-based system of livelihood. Rubie Watson's chapter XXX in this volume recaps the anthropological consensus about the Chinese family and the changes it has undergone in the period of nearly a century since the May Fourth modernizers first raised the cry to "Trash the Kong [Confucius] Family Store."  As Watson points out, the socialist revolutionary changes that began in the 1950s resulted in removal of the legally-supported custodianship of elders over patriline property, and thus occasioned a whole series of changes that moved the reality of the Chinese family further and further from the orthodox model.  These included some that echoed the Han period model described above, such as  emphasis on conjugal over filial ties and

married sons' residence away from their parents, and others that constituted more fundamental deviations from the orthodoxy, such as the decline in arranged marriages, the rise of romance and sexuality as legitimate concerns rather than dangers to patriarchy, and most importantly, a general de-emphasis on the patriline, encompassing both the bilateralization of kinship and a shift in the balance of power between elder and younger generations.

But the end is not yet. Rural Chinese livelihoods are still partially property-based, and for this reason the former spatial relationship between the orthodox core and the alternative periphery has been turned inside-out. While contemporary urban Chinese marry for personal reasons, live mostly in nuclear families, depend on state pensions to support the elderly, and form networks in which daughters are just as important as sons, their rural cousins' marriages are still at least partly arranged, they give large dowries and brideprices,[8] and they still engage in tactics from not registering births to sex-selective abortion and infanticide to ensure a male heir among their allotted one or two children.

*Alternatives in the center*

In demonstrating the differential distribution of the varying strengths of the orthodox and alternative models, however, we should not forget the basic dialectical fact that the two models have always coexisted in the same times and places, in fact in the same families. In fact, the psychodynamics of the Chinese family, as illustrated in literary genres from opera to fiction to ethnography, have

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[8] For a provocative account of how family relationships are changing in the Chinese countryside, see Yan 2003.

been based on this very dialectic between the two models, each a thesis producing its own antithesis. The more repressive the orthodox model, especially to women and the younger generation, but more generally to the emotional well-being of all, the more its biologically-based antithesis springs forth. We can see examples of ways in which both the conjugal and the maternal tie--the two thickest lines in our diagram of the alternative model--erupt even at the core of the most orthodox families. Watson sums up this tension in her chapter:

...strains and contradictions of being good daughters, daughters-in-law, and wives as expressed in women's laments. Songs and popular stories about star crossed lovers, operas about evil mothers-in-law, and an exacting ritual cycle that externalized filial piety attest to the demands of a code of conduct that exacted a high degree of individual commitment to elders. There was indeed resistance to this code. Daughters chafed -- and sometimes rebelled -- under arranged marriages that forced them to live among strangers. Daughters-in-law killed themselves because of menacing mothers-in-law, and sons sometimes followed personal goals rather than meet parental demands. The code itself, however, remained a cherished ideal.

Perhaps the most systematic model of alternative family structures within the core was put forth by Margery Wolf, who formulated the idea of the "uterine family," in which mothers consciously maneuvered to bind their sons to them, to exploit the psychological ties of maternal attachment, in order to form a solidary group of mother and children that would be a refuge and a bulwark against the

unreasonable demands of the patriarchal orthodoxy (Wolf 1972: ch. 3).

For our argument here, it is important to see  strategies of resistance to patriarchal dominance such as tragic romance, women's laments, or the formation of uterine families, not as replacements for the orthodox model, such as we might see in peripheral times or places less dominated by the property regime, but as alternative structures that spring up precisely because the orthodox patriarchal model is so strong.  Not being able to overthrow the model, and not being willing to succumb entirely to the sacrifices the model demanded, people--women more strongly than  men, but both sexes at some level--develop mechanisms for coping with the strains of orthodoxy as best they can.  These manifestations of the alternative model within the orthodox model were "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1986) that made life in patriarchy bearable.  But only sometimes, as indicated by the high rate of suicides among daughters-in-law in both pre- and post-revolutionary times (Wolf 19  ; Philllips, Li, and Zhang 2002).


III. RESPONSES TO REALITY: VIOLENCE, SEGREGATION, AND THE ARTS
Given that the alternative was always visible and threatening to those who enforced the orthodoxy, including the state, moralists, patriarchs, and mothers-in-law, it is not surprising that they  all took direct measures to reinforce the orthodoxy and suppress the alternative.  Violence necessarily lay behind all these efforts, whether it be in the form of imperial law that prescribed decapitation as the penalty for a son striking a father, with no penalty at all for a father striking a son unless the son died (Bodde and Morris 1967: 37), in the form of present-day

kidnapping and trafficking in brides from the far periphery to meet the needs of remaining patriarchal structures in the wealthier parts of the countryside, or many other forms. But as in so many societies, the mix of direct violence (spousal and child beatings, corporal punishments, and the like) and ideological sanctions backed up with violence only as a distant threat (moralist tracts, family instructions, dramatic depictions of the fate of illicit lovers), varied according to social class. As a rough approximation, we might say that the lowest classes, those who did not hold property rights of any sort, were free of the more extreme strictures of patriarchy, but not of the violence used to enforce the subordination of women.[9] Those who held property or rights to property, but in small amounts, and who lived a life at the subsistence level or above, depended on a mix of direct violence and ideological persuasion to enforce patriarchy, while the elites, those with access to wealth, education, and the high arts, depended only very indirectly on violence, and much more immediately on a combination of sexual segregation and cultural reinforcement, to maintain the family orthodoxy.[10] Since this volume deals with the family model in the arts, I concentrate here primarily on the ideological rather than the violent means, but it should be kept in mind that violence was always the ultimate enforcer of

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[9] It should be clear by now that I am using the term "patriarchy" to refer to a particular constellation by which young women are dominated and abused in the interests of the patriline. It is not the same as male dominance, since patriarchy requires the active participation of older women as dominators. In this sense, abused women of the lowest classes were victims of male dominance by violence, not of patriarchal dominance by a combination of violence and ideology.

[10] An interesting, if somewhat inside-out parallel is provided in Li Zhang's essay on gender relations among three social classes among Zhejiang immigrants in 1990s Beijing. Women in upper-class households were segregated and marginalized, while those in middle-class households were active participants in the family business, albeit restricted in their sphere of movement. Those among the lowest classes were heavily exploited as laborers. Zhang 2000.

orthodoxy, as well as a potential weapon for the rebels against the system.

The question of ideological or cultural reinforcement of patriarchal orthodoxy brings us back to Silbergeld and Ching's original question about the lack of family portraits, and to Ching's chapter **XXX** about ancestor pictures in this volume. There she shows elegantly how pictures of ancestors reinforce the orthodox ideal, reminding the reader that the basis of the orthodoxy is the infinite and indefinite patriline, not the temporally and spatially circumscribed household. An ancestor serves metonymically as a representation of a patriline, whether in the form of a portrait or of an ancestral tablet. The same is true of a pair of ancestors, whether represented pictorially in one or two portraits. A male and female ancestral couple in the typical portrait sits parallel to each other, facing the descendant paying ritual homage; they do not interact with one another as a couple, but instead represent two focal points for the junior member's orientation to his patriline. Even the rare portrait that includes a family, such as the one attributed to Gu Kaizhi that includes male and female members of several generations, does not reproduce a household, but rather a series of ancestors who have bequeathed their patrilineal descent and inheritance to the living. The pictures of sons interacting with their parents, which illustrate the *Classic of Filial Piety*, do the same thing: the son interacts with each of his parents, as in the orthodox family model illustrated in Figure 2 above; they do not interact with each other in any conjugal way. Finally, the portrait of the emperor and empress sacrificing together does the same thing from the other direction: it depicts not conjugal interaction, but the parallel cooperation of a married couple in their common obeisance to the founders of the patriline. Each one of these types of pictures emphasizes the importance of the patriline and of

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the vertical ties that hold together the orthodox constellation of interpersonal relations that contributes to the patriline's reproduction and continuation.

A logical consequence of the patriarchal orthodox model is gender segregation, at least in those situations where segregation is economically feasible. If conjugal ties represent a threat to the solidarity and continuity of the patriline (even when they are necessary to its continuation), then women marrying in from outside are seen as subversive time-bombs. But the women, of course, are necessary; they not only bear the children but also rear them. It would be ideal, then, to confine women's roles to reproductive ones, to keep them out of other patriline activities as much as possible. For the non-elite classes, where women participate in production as well as reproduction, and men and women perforce share the same living quarters and cooperate in a domestic division of labor, this is impossible, and despite the ideal of men on the outside and women on the inside, a lot of interaction goes on. Still, even for those families where interaction rather than segregation is inevitable, reality, the arts provide at least an approximation of how the orthodox model might be approached under the less-than ideal conditions of non-elite reality. . The *nianhua* or New Year Pictures that I describe in chapter XXX are a good example of this: each type of picture illustrates an aspect of this ideal family structure, from the aggressively masculine military door gods posted on the outer gate, to the dancing (male) gold-and-money children who represent fertility and are posted at the entrances to the (ideally female) living quarters.

But among the truly wealthy and powerful, women could be segregated in their own sphere of life and still perform their reproductive functions. There thus developed a culture of what Patricia Ebery called "the Inner Quarters,"

where women live a purer life, sheltered from and kept out of the political, economic, and ethical negotiations and compromises necessarily made by the males of the patriline (Ebrey 1993).  Ann Wicks's chapter  **XXX** in this volume, on pictures of mothers and children, demonstrates how this idealized and segregated world of women and children is portrayed in the visual arts. Whether the scene of children playing is on the street or in a secluded garden, mothers are visible but  fathers are not, and the mothers in these pictures are playing the roles prescribed for them by orthodoxy: producing and raising children for the patriline, but in a place and in a way safely insulated from its affairs.

At the same time, the most insightful thinkers within the elite cultural system realized that the ideal of sexual segregation, of a pure realm of women and children shielded from the outside world, was always a tenuous, and sometimes an untenable construction.  In Louise Edwards's analysis (chapter XXX) of the role of visual arts in the great Qing Novel *Honglou Meng*, she shows that this inner realm, itself partly constructed through the arts of garden design and painting, can never be really segregated from the core structures of orthodox patriarchy; it is violated not only by the inevitable intrusion of sex but by the intrusion of Granny Liu, who comes from the lower classes where  segregation and other niceties could never be maintained.

Of course, *Honglou Meng* is at the same time a very detailed and socially grounded novel and a portrayal of an ideal, and in reality even those classes that practiced social segregation did not do it to an extreme; within the family there seems to have been considerable actual interaction, circumscribed but not prevented by the patriarchal  orthodox model.  This fact is brought out notably

by Craig Clunas's chapter XXX on the Wen family painters of the Ming period, whose lines of transmission of artistic skill and ideas were almost as likely to go through wives, mothers, and aunts as through fathers and uncles.  Whether this participation of women in the arts as the creative equals of men transgressed the expectations of the orthodox model or simply indicated the security of that model among these privileged, proptertied classes,  is difficult to know, but it warns us against accepting an ideal such as the patriarchal orthodoxy as anything but an ideal.

Coming back to the changes and critiques of the 20th century, I want to expand on some of the points made by Jerome Silbergeld in his chapter on families in modern films.  Both *Judou* and *The Day the Sun Turned Cold* are not-too-subtle criticisms of the  orthodox ideal, both dealing with those classes where the violence is more important than ideology as means of maintaining some version of the patriarchal ideal.  And in many ways their critique is a less subtle version of the one presented in *Honglou Meng*: the patriline goes on, even though it is based on a fiction that everyone knows is a fiction.  But the "extended soap opera" family depicted in *Yi Yi* is something else again.  In the Taipei of the 1990s, the family revolution has already happened.  High-schoolers date, people pick their own spouses, mother is free to run off to the mountains with her guru, father does not take up with his old girlfriend at least partly because of his feelings for his wife and children. But is patriarchy gone?  Not quite.  At the beginning of the 21$^{st}$  century, when Shanghai parents are just as likely to live near their daughters as near their sons, when even villagers in Heilongjiang think of the marital relationship as the most important, the ravages of the system are still a topic for contemporary arts.  Mother's reason for taking up serious pop-

Buddhism is not entirely a product of her own individual psychology.

At the same time, things really have changed, as illustrated by the two most popular forms of photography in the contemporary Chinese-speaking world. One of these began in the early part of this century, but gained its greatest popularity since the revolution. It is the *chuan jia fu*, or "Whole Family Happiness," and it looks remarkably like a family portrait from any other Western or Eastern country. Parents, children, sometimes grandparents and others pose together, all looking at the camera but close enough to be seen as interacting . Its focus is the household or the bilateral network of close relatives, not the patriline. Its existence has been made possible, I think, by the decline of patriline property as the basis for livelihood, and the  space thus created for the alternative model to assert itself even in so ideological a sphere as pictorial representation.

Even more significant, I think, is the rise of bridal and wedding photography, as documented in detail in Bonnie Adrian's recent ethnography about Taiwan, *Framing the Bride* (Adrian 2003). The elaborate, expensive, day-long photography sessions and the sumptuous, huge-format albums that are now required for weddings are objects of at least as elaborate attention as the ancestral portraiture of the past, and the  focus is primarily on the bride and secondarily on the bridal couple. **XXX** says in chapter **YYY** that "ancestral portraits are  not art," and perhaps Taiwan's (and, increasingly, China's) bridal albums are not art either. But they are representations of life in a visual format. They, too, depict an ideal, but the ideal has changed. We are seeing, in the form of visual representations, the beginning of the end of the Chinese orthodox family model.

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