

THREE

GLOBAL GEOGRAPHIES

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Globalization is a central focus of research in contemporary human geography. The increasing connections among more and more places on the planet and the accelerated pace at which interactions occur mean that understanding places must entail looking at their situation and representation in relation to global economic, political, and cultural ties. We saw hints of this approach in chapter 2, but in this chapter, Seattle's global geographies are the central focus, providing a way to see Seattle as a global city in relation to three different regimes of global dependency: as a competitive city, a collaborative city, and a curative city.

Seattle is undoubtedly a global city, but of what sort? At the end of the 1980s, local business leaders promoted it as a globally competitive, livable city. Urban development and renewal were to be built on growing Pacific Rim trade, software and biotech innovation, and the remaking of the downtown as a spectacular world-class urban destination. A decade later, this same vision of the city as a "24/7" meeting place for trade partners and advocates, techies, and transnational tourists prompted a successful bid to host the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting. However, arriving along with the trade officials for the much-anticipated event were other global citizens with much more radical ideas about how to make the livable city world class.

Environmentalists, students, unionists, and a wide range of human rights groups organized to remake Seattle into an altogether different sort of global city. Seattle was still envisioned as a gateway for border-crossing transnationals, but in November 1999 the polyglot citizenry swarmed the streets to redefine the meaning of world-class livability in terms of global justice, democracy, and more collaborative approaches to global living. The resulting confrontation made Seattle renowned in the world as a con-

tested global city, but, after the tear gas cleared, the visions of city and citizenship did not stop evolving. Thus today we see yet another global Seattle being built. Neither the promoters of market competition nor the collaborative proponents of global justice have gone away, but in the aftermath of their now-famous standoff, a third and arguably “curative” rethinking of the city is taking shape: a re-visioning of Seattle as a world center of global health philanthropy and other private-sector treatments for the mismatch between global markets and global justice.

From competitive global business city to collaborative global justice city to curative global philanthropy city: each vision of Seattle’s global nature enables and exemplifies different forms of citizenship. These distinct forms of citizenship are important because they suggest how citizens are becoming *denationalized* in global cities.¹ Studying

a city such as Seattle provides a way of examining the so-called cosmopolitanism of citizenship on the ground. Following the argument of David Harvey, geographical research can also in this way reveal whose freedoms and what rights are at stake in metropolitan accounts of cosmopolitanism.² But, beyond academic debates over denationalization, the changing articulations of city and citizenship are also of immediate local importance because of the ways in which each incarnation of a “global Seattle” has been lived and thereby layered onto the city’s landscape.

To understand the different articulations of city and citizenship, it is vital to come to terms with how the competitive, collaborative, and curative visions of Seattle relate and respond to one another. They do not represent a simple

3.1 The skyscrapers of livability. Photo by Matthew Sparke.



historical trajectory, because the competitive global city remains dominant. Yet, while it is vital to address the ways in which the city and citizenship have been transformed by the pro-market boosters of competitive global development, the second and third sections of this chapter show that alternative articulations of the collaborative and curative global city are also embodied in Seattle's landscape for all who care to look for them and remember.

One place from which to see the three incarnations of Seattle's global status is the observation deck of the Space Needle. Had you been there on November 30, 1999, you would have seen the office towers, hotels, and condominiums of the competitive global city (fig. 3.1). But at the same time you would have seen the helicopters and even some of the tear-gas that police used against the Direct Action Network representatives as the union-led protestors massed and marched from an area beneath the Space Needle. It was the direct-action activists who so strengthened the association between Seattle and the global justice movement. They were the ones who chained themselves together at various sites around the Trade and Convention Center downtown, and who thereby ultimately succeeded in their goal of "shutting down the WTO." Yet, had it not been for the collaboration of vast crowds of other protestors in the big march coming south from the Space Needle—vast crowds "fifty thousand deep" in the haunting rap of Seattle's Blue Scholars—the police might never have been overwhelmed and the competitive business vision of a global Seattle would not have been so radically transformed.

In the pre-protest planning, the police and the mayor's office had imagined that most marchers would do a U-turn downtown and turn north, away from the convention center, away from confronting the WTO directly and back toward the Space Needle, where the crowds would disperse.³ Yet while this plan to save the business-friendly city failed spectacularly in 1999, and while the collaboration between marchers and direct-action activists instead ensured Seattle's new reputation as a global city associated with global justice, the rerouting of the calls for justice,

democracy, and collaboration did, in a sense, come back north again to the South Lake Union area in the decade that followed. Thus, if you turn around to look north and east from the Space Needle today, an altogether different landscape becomes visible. Instead of the cosmopolitan crowds of Canadian, American, Mexican, European, and Asian protestors, you can now see signs of a different, more market-friendly cosmopolitanism. In the telling words of a 2009 *Seattle Times* article reporting on the Pacific Health Summit: "The glitterati of global health are gathering in Seattle," making the city the "Davos of global health."⁴

Most notably, near 500 Fifth Avenue North large displays advertising the work of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation picture people from all over the world as beneficiaries of global health philanthropy. Initiated in 1998, but officially founded a year after the Seattle protests in 2000, the foundation is now the largest (which is to say richest) private philanthropic institution in the world. Its new campus in South Lake Union, just a few blocks from the Space Needle, is set to be opened in the spring of 2011 (fig. 3.2) and is imagined by the foundation as a "hub for innovation and gatherings of experts from many fields, perspectives, and countries, who are dedicated to improving lives here and around the world." This work of innovation and gathering expertise is premised on the ethical axiom that, as the foundation's homepage says in capital letters, "ALL LIVES HAVE EQUAL VALUE." It is an ethical premise that clearly implies an inclusive and egalitarian conception of global citizenship, and there can be no doubting the foundation's core commitment to helping people everywhere in overcoming diverse forms of disease and dispossession. Moreover, the global health work that the foundation funds is not simply market fundamentalist, as critics sometimes suggest. Instead, its innovators see themselves as creating cures for "market failure." These cures are aimed at particular places and problems where capitalist market-making has been found wanting: for example, funding drug research for diseases that afflict the poor and that normally provide no profit motive for drug companies to get involved; or, organizing financial services for poor com-



munities shunned by big banks. Yet, as the managers at the Gates Foundation go about their business of funding these global market-curatives, their largesse also has considerable local labor and land market impacts, too.

Today's South Lake Union is being transformed by global philanthropy's vision of Seattle. Here, for example, you can find the imposing head offices of PATH, the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (fig. 3.3), the largest single recipient of Gates funding (having received in the period up to 2007 forty-seven grants worth a total of \$949 million, mostly for medical research).⁵ And here, too, as we shall explore further below, you can find all sorts of other nongovernmental organizations and research centers that are also nonprofit in name but, like PATH, notably entrepreneurial, businesslike and market-oriented in nature. In short, while the landscape of South Lake Union may not have been the site of crowd dispersion that the

3.2 The Gates Foundation campus under construction. Photo by Matthew Sparke.



3.3. The new place of PATH. Photo by Matthew Sparke.

Seattle police had hoped it would be in 1999, it has ultimately become a place where the anti-capitalist calls for global justice articulated in the WTO protests have been rerouted into more market-friendly activities today.

We will reexamine the complexities of the hybrid philanthro-capitalist landscape at the close of the chapter for the lessons it teaches about the degree to which city and citizenship in the age of curative global philanthropy diverge from the competitive and collaborative models of global Seattle that have come before. To begin with, though, we must first explore in more detail what the boosters' vision of the growth-oriented and globally competitive livable city actually involved, before turning to examine its repudiation in the streets in 1999.

The Competitive Global City: Remaking Seattle as a World-Class Destination

*“There is an extra perk that comes with living near the heart of downtown Seattle: global soul. A world-class city that hasn’t lost sight of its down-home roots, Seattle offers urban living that trumps mere status with genuine international flavor.”*⁶

This glowing advertisement for the “global soul” that is supposedly available to condominium buyers in downtown Seattle no doubt sounds a little generic and, well, soulless. Whether you have read something similar in an in-flight magazine or in the travel section or new homes section of your own local newspaper, the familiarity of the sales pitch from one city to another may make you overlook the fact that such property market promotion has a local history. To get a sense of this history in Seattle, it is worth pausing before leaving the Space Needle to consider some other signs in the landscape that tell us something about the longer term development of urban boosterism in the city. Its strategies and styles have changed over time, but it has a relatively long history, going back at least as far as the Alaska–Yukon–Pacific Exposition of 1909: a world’s fair aimed at showcasing Seattle as a city on the Pacific with

ties to colonial opportunities in the Philippines and Hawaii, as well as to the gold of the Klondike.

From the Space Needle you can still see the 1909 fairgrounds, now transformed into the main campus of the University of Washington. By contrast, the Space Needle itself, along with the monorail and the nearby grounds of the Seattle Center, still stands as a monument to another World’s Fair, which in 1962 sought to promote Seattle quite differently as a center of science, industry, and innovation.

Trading on the importance of Boeing and associated industries in the space race, the Century 21 Exposition of 1962 revised the frontier themes of the 1909 World’s Fair with a futuristic focus on Seattle’s leadership in the advancement of American technology and planning.⁷ The Soviet success with Sputnik I in 1957 had enabled the Seattle promoters of the fair to successfully lobby an anxious federal government for support, and thus the decidedly nationalistic and science-centric concerns of the space race meant that Century 21 turned into a classic Cold War concatenation of military-industrial capitalism, all presented as in the fun-loving interest of the liberal American citizen.⁸ Today, the Space Needle, public fountain, and KCTS Public TV studios still remain as reminders of the modernism and public inclusivity of this liberal American citizenship (as does the Elvis Presley movie *It Happened at the World’s Fair*, which conveys the romance and fun of the exhibition along with a sense of trust in its public policing). Yet today, too, one can see more postmodern and privatized neoliberal landmarks (think *Frasier* instead of Elvis). These include: the plush make-over of the opera house; the nearby luxury condos; and, if you are out looking for a property to buy, the occasional sign emblazoned with the brand name—symbolizing the broader market take-over of the 1962 exposition themes—of what is now a real estate company called Century 21. Most conspicuous of all is the multicolored Experience Music Project (EMP) museum of rock and pop (fig. 3.4). There you can experience the affect and architecture of the transition from modern to postmodern urban boosterism in a place whose Web site tellingly boasts of being “a key economic driver among Seattle nonprofit arts

and culture organizations . . . with \$580 million dollars of local economic impact . . . [and] a spectacular, prominently visible structure [that] has the presence of a monumental sculpture.” In all these ways, EMP illustrates how arts and culture are used in the crafting of “spectacular” world-class livability: a process that has gone hand in hand with the wider efforts to rebrand and rebuild Seattle in the era after the Boeing bust of the early 70s, after the Cold War, and after the related rise of post-industrial and post-national ideas about promoting individual cities in a globalized competition for investment and tourism.⁹

Created by the “other” Microsoft billionaire, Paul Allen, and designed by Frank Gehry, the spirit of the 60s arguably lives on at the EMP. But after paying the hefty entrance fee and putting on the headphone guides, visitors see and hear the rock and pop music as an assemblage of individualized and objectified museum experiences cut off from the shared sounds and communal vibes of the concert crowd. The outcome undoubtedly makes American rock more accessible and understandable for uninitiated visitors, but it also repackages the music’s popular energy and occasional notes of radicalism in ways that diminish their social message. What is left instead seems to be just personalized cultural improvement tied to competitive global city promotion. Advertised as a world-class tourist destination, the EMP would therefore seem to co-opt and commodify the liberalism of sixties Seattle, transforming it into the same sort of neoliberal experience in individualized edification available to globe-trotting museum goers everywhere, Gehry’s Guggenheim museum in Bilbao included.¹⁰ And whether Gehry calls himself a “deconstructivist” architect or not, the external architecture of the EMP building would similarly seem to deconstruct the changing meaning of citizenship in the world-class livable city: its fanciful outer skin swallowing up paying passengers who arrive on the mass-transit model turned tourist attraction that is today’s monorail.

The monorail’s changing symbolic significance notwithstanding, you can still take it back out of the EMP shell. If you do, the journey south toward the downtown



3.4. The Experience Music Project (EMP). Photo by Matthew Sparke.

brings many more landmarks of the globally competitive livable city into view. Through the Bell Town neighborhood, new luxury condominiums are advertised to the left and right, nearly always, it seems, using images of swingers in sexy clothing or fitness gear to lure would-be buyers into the latest “hot” new urban lifestyle (read, real estate) opportunity. Then, after getting off the monorail at Westlake Center, the commercial heart of the livable city beckons and beats on all sides. Here are the brand-name shops: Abercrombie and Fitch, Anthropologie, Banana Republic, Niketown, Nordstrom, and Planet Hollywood. Here close by, too, is Pike Place Market, which, like Boston’s Faneuil Hall and other destination urban markets the world over, is now so full of tourists buying trinkets and T-shirts that it is hard to imagine how the vegetable stalls ever do a profitable business. And here also, not much more than a salmon toss from the Market, are many of Seattle’s famous fine-dining restaurants: Flying Fish, Campagne, Place Pigalle, Maximilien, the Dahlia Lounge, and Wild Ginger. Benaroya Hall, another asset in the livable-city portfolio, welcomes Seattle Symphony audiences into an atrium topped with Dale Chihuly glasswork. And just another block down Union—a street name that does not mesh well with the surrounding spectacle of post-industrial redevelopment—

Seattle Art Museum offers its own good taste to the wrap-around picture of urbane livability.

While the picture may be pretty, the way it was painted was not. Securing “the spectacular city” instead involved the diversion of public funds into heavily subsidized commercial ventures, along with all sorts of authoritarian efforts to rid the downtown of the downtrodden and homeless.¹¹ With the economic challenges facing the city after the busts of the 1970s and ’80s, local leaders, such as mayors Norm Rice and Paul Schell, were pressured by the same worldwide economic forces that were imposing business-friendly norms of competitive urban investment and boosterism right across North America. At the same time, city elites saw the project of attracting the wealthy to downtown as simultaneously necessitating the marginalization of the urban poor. In other words, the project of revitalization also became about making citizenship in the city more exclusive. One reason why, it seems, was a chain of associations that linked the poor with urban legends about the decay and death of cities, associations that at the same time linked the wealthy with visions of vitality, livability, and global success. On the one side, there was the fear of decline—as with Detroit, Buffalo, and other cities in the U.S. rust belt. On the other side, there was the hope of winning in the international competition for investment like other competitive West Coast cities, such as San Francisco and Vancouver, B.C. Thus urban governance was understood to be a bifurcated choice between industrial-era managerialism associated with supporting citizens of all classes (albeit unequally) and global-era entrepreneurialism associated with the gentrification of urban citizenship and the punitive policing and exclusion of the poor.

The shift toward more exclusive and authoritarian ideas about citizenship in Seattle also worked as something of a distraction from the investment of public money in all the new commercial and cultural ventures. These big public subsidies included millions of dollars for two new sports stadiums, and the fact that these stadiums still ended up being named after big private corporations was a good indication of who the real winners were in the entrepreneurial

pursuit of global city competitiveness. However, and this is key to how citizenship in the livable city became increasingly exclusive, instead of being made to feel like losers themselves, the tax-paying public was instead encouraged to concern itself with the threats posed to security by a loser class of poor people. Following a pattern that is found in cities all around the globe,¹² extensive efforts were made to reassure urban and suburban shoppers, visiting tourists, and professional office workers that the beggars would be banished. The livable city of the elites had to become unlivable for others.

Not all Seattle art lovers and concert goers see the poor and homeless as noncitizens without rights to the city. It is true that some notable individuals and editorialists pontificated as if they truly believed this. An aggressive city attorney named Mark Sidran, for example, did his best to look like the Rudy Giuliani of Seattle by pushing a set of anti-vagrancy ordinances through the City Council in 1993, and these and other allied initiatives by city elites were welcomed by the ever-worried *Seattle Times* editorial page. “Seattleites have made huge investments to make the downtown an economically viable, physically inviting place,” the editors explained. “Those achievements are threatened when some streets and parks become unpoliced havens for panhandlers and unruly drunks.”¹³ Likewise, the language later used in 1997 to defeat plans to build a service center for the homeless on Third Avenue near Benaroya Hall was littered with similar depictions of the poor as uncivil and unsavory subcitizens. “It’s like [putting] a meat rendering plant next to a high-income residential area,” argued one opponent of the service center. “It’s a safety thing,” explained another, “I might get accosted, I might get beat up, I might get robbed, I might get raped, or whatever.”¹⁴

Structurally, the actual outcome of all the revitalization efforts, anti-vagrancy laws, and associated policing policies was to make urban citizenship more and more a matter of class privilege. In King County as a whole, growing income inequality shows up only as a small increase in the Gini coefficient from 0.144 in 1970 to 0.187 in 2000.

However, in Seattle's downtown itself, the gentrification of urban citizenship was much more marked in increasing income inequality, increasing per-household income (which, in adjusted 2007 dollars, went from \$28,669 in 1980 to \$42,562 in 1990 to \$63,088 in 2000), and in the imagination and enforcement of who belonged and who did not.¹⁵ The liberal American inclusiveness planned for Century 21 was replaced on the eve of the real twenty-first century by a neoliberal market-sorting that undermined the universality of an urban future for all. As John Fox and John Reese of the Seattle Displacement Coalition predicted in their campaign against Sidran's ordinances: "When the civil rights of the poor and homeless are at stake, the rights of all of us are threatened."¹⁶

In terms of global city developments, one other aspect of the changing class composition of citizenship in Seattle deserves attention: the ways in which the global business classes became interwoven with the efforts to package and sell the Seattle scene internationally. While the poor and homeless were being banished and diminished as rights-bearing citizens, all sorts of efforts were afoot to make Seattle part of a global network of "gateway" cities, in which borderless business-class citizens and allied professional and consumer classes might enjoy new rights of membership and mobility transnationally. The binational, cross-border concept of Cascadia, for example, was promoted all through the 1990s and right up to the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and Whistler in the hope that, by bonding with British Columbia, Washington State (and Seattle) could attract more interest from cosmopolitan capitalists. The idealized Cascadian citizens as conceptualized by these binational boosters were not environmental activists (as in the original bioregional conceptualization of Cascadia), but rather capital-carrying global investors and tourists.¹⁷ This is reflected in the denationalization of citizenship in global cities more generally. Rights to buy property and make contracts, to move freely with work visas, or simply to enjoy fusion cuisine in other cultures can all be understood as developments to denationalize citizenship. The result is that the livability of the American global city

is opened and sold to foreigners with capital, even as poor Americans (including, for example, many Native Americans in Seattle) are effectively excluded from full citizenship.

If we return to our tour of Seattle, the trip from the Space Needle south through the downtown leads us eventually to a site where the cheek-by-jowl juxtapositions of global-city citizenship and its excluded "others" (remember Benaroya Hall and the meat-rendering plant) are especially marked in the landscape. Walk between Pioneer Square, the International District, and the areas south of downtown called SoDo, and you will see signs of this extraordinary intersection on every side (SoDo itself suggests Soho/NewYork/London global city exclusivity). There are foreign tourists and city shoppers in the Pioneer Square coffee shops. Around the corner, to the chagrin of the local shop owners, are the homeless in Occidental Park and the hungry waiting for the Seattle Union Gospel Mission to open. Down the road on game days, sports fans head to their class-assigned positions in the stadiums (which accommodate more luxury corporate boxes than the Kingdome they replaced). If there is no game, there are still the business-day lines of professional staff heading into the headquarters of Starbucks, some returning from overseas trips for the company. Yet right by Starbucks is the SoDo Home Depot, with its all-American indication of the curtailment of citizenship for working-class cosmopolitans: Latino laborers lined up in hopes of being picked for work on local building sites. And right behind Home Depot and the Starbucks offices are a different kind of line: containers packed with the products of Asian laborers, who are themselves managed by far-flung, subcitizenship systems such as the *hokou* registration regime in China. In the summer, there are also cruise ships. Packed with retirees enjoying the last leisure opportunities afforded by diminishing social security, these excursions, again, tell a story of citizenship becoming more exclusive.

Back closer to downtown is the International District. Once a euphemism for Chinatown, the name now signifies the bigger story of Pacific Rim development and gentrification; the upscale Uwajimaya superstore and apartments,

for example, demonstrate the ways in which Seattle's Asian ties now bring wealth and investment to the city, even if the old rooming houses and cheap Chinese restaurants still share space in the district.

In all these ways, the Seattle landscape illustrates how class—something that most Seattle residents tend not to talk about—influences who wins and who loses amidst global city development and denationalization.

Capital, at least in the form of American dollars, introduces another leitmotif in the selling of Seattle as a competitive global city: namely, greenery. “Seattle, the Emerald City, is the jewel of the Northwest, the queen of the Evergreen State, the many-faceted city of space, elegance, magic and beauty,” or so claimed the Seattle–King County Convention and Visitors Bureau back in the 1980s. Taken from *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*, though, the name Emerald City also said something important about the eco-fashioning of the global city. “Just to amuse myself,” explained Oz to Dorothy in the original story, “I ordered them to build this City, and my palace. Then I thought . . . I would call it the Emerald City, and to make the name fit better I put green spectacles on all the people, so that everything they saw was green.” As Matthew Klinge outlines in his eloquent account of Seattle's environmental history, this allusion to the wizardry of Oz is telling because myths of Seattle being closer to nature than other cities rest on similar spectacular illusions.¹⁸ Too much of the green spectacle, it turns out, is like wearing green spectacles: the decline of Seattle's salmon, for instance, is often obscured by the widespread use of salmon signs and symbols in the visual branding of the city.

Notwithstanding other ongoing environmental problems, such as the Duwamish Superfund sites, the worsening of Puget Sound's water quality, and the death of most first-born Orca whales because of toxins that collect in their mothers' milk, Klinge ends his own story hopefully, suggesting that at least a few of their green illusions may now lead Seattleites toward more genuinely sustainable models of development. Whatever we may make of this, there can be no doubting that along with all the sustainable develop-

ment discourse in the city, a great deal of what has actually been sustained is the idea of world-class livability itself. Again, the question of class—specifically, which classes can see the green vision and partake of its rewards—needs answering. In 2009 *Outside Magazine* named Seattle the second-best U.S. city.¹⁹ The fact that Seattle was ranked so high no doubt gave local promoters of the competitive global-city vision another good reason to raise their glasses of Washington State reserve wine. But when one reflects on what was also factored into the ranking by the magazine—including “percentage of college degrees” and “income level,” as well as “quality and proximity to biking, running, paddling, hiking and skiing”—the exclusivity of the vision becomes clear. Seeing green, like buying ski-tickets, clearly costs, making the “outside” Emerald City livability features inaccessible to class outsiders.

In 2006 a global-city newspaper report answered the class question with unusual candor.²⁰ The *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* noted that the Urban Land Institute/Price Waterhouse rankings of that year had rated Seattle the “top global gateway city” in the United States, and it acknowledged that high-ranking cities were “expensive and elitist,” because “people pay a premium to live in them.” Such exclusivity was fine, though, the report reassured readers, because it created a virtuous cycle of the real green stuff of consequence, namely dollars: “companies pay handsomely for brainpower,” it went on, “so employees can afford to live in these places. In turn, an affluent population supports the art community, which drives tourism.” It is this neat ecosystem of profit-making that repeatedly turns sustainable development into sustaining competitive capitalist growth in the global city. It also allows boosters to go on selling the city as a great green place to live. But more than this, it has also allowed businesses to turn Seattle and its image of livability into a tool for selling other things, including everything from outdoor sports equipment and clothing to cars and SUVs advertised on downtown buildings and skyline.

Most notably, the imagery of the Emerald City has become a way of globally selling another brand with green

signage: Starbucks. As James Lyons explains in his study of the Seattle-coffee connection, “retailers [such as Starbucks] sought to cultivate and mobilize associations with Seattle, and make explicit and oblique signifiers of the city crucial to their promotional and branding activities.”²¹ In this way, Seattle effectively reached competitive global city nirvana: its highly ranked livability helped sell a product associated with class distinction and good taste in many other places around the world.

Given the coffee connection to the Emerald City’s global branding, it is notable that since the financial crises of 2008–9, Starbucks has responded locally to falling demand by rebranding and shedding its green signs. The new strategy converts some of its coffee shops back into nonbrand local coffee shops.²² Might this reflect the falling stature of the Emerald City brand, too? After all, the financial crisis hit Seattle hard: emptying downtown offices, shops, and condos; lowering its gateway-city ranking, and spectacularly bankrupting the biggest Seattle-based bank, Washington Mutual. Here again, what is impressive about the promoters is their repeated return to the resources they see in the local landscape, always implying that its sublime physical geography somehow ensures Seattle’s success in the ongoing race to develop a globally competitive economic geography. Thus, in 2010 the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce continued to promote the city with the following sound bites:

Ringed by snow-capped mountain peaks.

Crisscrossed by fresh- and salt-waterways.

Home to urban centers, small cities and vibrant neighborhoods.

Greater Seattle is an incredible place to live as well to do business.

The continuing growth of the Puget Sound region is a clear indication of its desirability as a place to do business and to live.²³

What remains less remarked upon, but nonetheless is very noticeable in all the promotional idealization of the city, is the idea that its citizens should also be considered special and exclusive in terms of class. Education is key here, and the boosters are keen to underline that: “Residents are highly educated; in fact, Seattle consistently ranks at the top in national polls for college degrees per capita.” But important, too, are taste and income. Victories for local wineries are listed alongside all the “best city,” “fast city,” and “gateway city” successes. The high median household income for King County was projected at \$67,338 in February 2010, and the Trade and Development Alliance states that “the Puget Sound region is a relatively affluent area.” Whether this observation is a discreet acknowledgment or a bragging boast, the underlying point about class is surely clear. Seattle is a city where wealthy transnational investors and tourists are warmly welcomed into the livability enjoyed by similarly privileged local citizens. It is gateway city, in other words, that puts class exclusivity into the term “world class,” redefining belonging, ownership, and the mobility rights of citizenship in ways that are commensurate with the competition for global capital. In 1999 it was this same eagerness to embrace the leaders of corporate globalization that led the city to play host to the WTO. However, as we shall now examine in more detail, this invitation to the borderless business class cost the competitive global-city promoters dearly.

The Collaborative Global City: Retaking Seattle through World Class Resistance

“It is time to raise the social and political cost to those who aim to increase the destruction and misery caused by corporate globalization.”²⁴

So began the invitation to “Come to Seattle” by the Direct Action Network as it reached out to diverse groups, welcoming them openly to collaborate in staging the anti-WTO protests. “This will help catalyze desperately needed mass movements,” it went on, “capable of challenging global

capital and making radical change and social revolution.” Clearly, this invitation was very different in tone and goals from those prepared by global-city proponents (a contrast also addressed in chapter 7). Before the protests, for instance, Mayor Paul Schell had depicted the WTO ministerial as a “momentous, exciting affair for Seattle.” Going on to make the classic claims of a booster for world-class status, the mayor argued that hosting the event spoke “to the growing stature of Seattle’s place on the world stage.”²⁵

Instead of joining the competition for global capital, the Direct Action Network’s invitation spoke to how such competition disciplines and diminishes citizenship and democracy. And, instead of class exclusivity, it called for class struggle and other struggles for global justice to be joined in shared nonviolent demonstrations in the streets. Thus, along with issuing the challenge to global capital, the protestors planned for a notably collaborative gathering that would be inclusive and radically democratic in its organization. These plans for the protests—which were extensive and involved all sorts of educational efforts—ensured, in turn, that the collaborations that ensued were multiple and far from just a singular, spontaneous outcry of the multitude.²⁶

The political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are no doubt right to claim that “the real importance of Seattle was to provide a ‘convergence center’ for all the grievances against the global system.”²⁷ But such convergence had to be invited and planned, and this is where real on-the-ground collaboration became so important. At least three collaborations stand out for the ways in which they sutured together the reputation of Seattle as a global city and the idea of global justice. The first was the transnational cooperation of local and global activists sharing common grievances against corporate globalization and WTO rule-making. The second was the “Teamsters and Turtles” collaboration between the unionized working class and various environmental movements that joined the protests. And the third was what might be called the “No Globalization without Representation” collaboration between the direct action activists, who did the bulk of the orga-

nizing and planning, and the less radical, but nevertheless vast and engaged population of ordinary citizens for whom the reworking of the old revolutionary adage about taxation and representation resonated increasingly as the struggle over representational rights unfolded in and over the public space of the city. By examining each of these three collaborations in turn, it is possible to reflect on how they transformed the meaning of world-class citizenship by revising and re-visioning its urban geography.

The first collaboration, between local and global protestors, is important because one of the main mistakes made in media coverage was to ignore the “globalization from below” that the protests represented by simply dubbing them “anti-globalization.” The protestations were instead aimed at a very particular pro-privatization, pro-deregulation, pro-corporate approach to WTO-enforced globalization. A more nuanced and historically savvy description of this critical political position is “anti-neoliberalism.” But such nuance, along with the fact that the protests involved global planning, global participation, and global solidarity, could be negated by the “anti-globalization” label. This negation was easy to do from afar, not least because the involvement of a few right-wing, xenophobic, and anti-trade crusaders (such as Patrick Buchanan) could convince pro-business commentators and economists to conclude that all the protestors were simply old-fashioned “protectionists.” But for those who witnessed or joined the protests on the streets of Seattle, an altogether more global set of arguments and alliances could be seen and heard, advancing a new, postnationalistic protectionism.

The old union chant, “An Injury to One Is an Injury to All,” reverberated loudly down Fifth Avenue in the march led by the AFL-CIO, but it was given new, post-national meaning by the attendant signs calling for a *global* struggle for a better, more humane, environmentally friendly, and democratically accountable approach to globalization (fig. 3.5). “The End of Suffering Comes about Locally through Global Solidarity,” read one. “No Child Labor,” said others. And “Free—to exploit people and nature—Trade” explained one of the spectral street puppets: making visible the

lack of freedoms for people and nature that haunt WTO-enforced free trade. If this was protectionism, therefore, it was based on a new postnational and nonchauvinistic desire to protect people and the environment *everywhere*. And further emphasizing both the promise and practicality of this new kind of protectionism was the profoundly globalized collaboration of local and global protestors in the organization, implementation, and celebration of the protest itself. As Anuradha Mittal has subsequently put it: “The World Turned Out in Seattle.”²⁸

While the Direct Action Network was sending out invitations ahead of the protests, another group, the International Forum on Globalization (IFG) based in San Francisco, organized an extraordinary teach-in on the WTO in Benaroya Hall. This free event generated such interest that it was virtually impossible to get in without reserved passes (a problem with access based on over popularity that was in telling contrast to the problem of access at the WTO meetings in subsequent days). The teach-in featured diverse speakers (including Vandana Shiva and a number of other foreign experts), who delivered powerful if pedagogic speeches explaining the destructive downward harmonization unleashed by WTO rule-making: the prohibition of seed-saving practices by TRIPS; the “race to the bottom” dynamic created by liberalized international competition; and the direct dismantling of environmental, labor, and community protections as a result of WTO nontariff barrier removal laws. These are all now lessons about legal neoliberalism routinely taught in university classes on globalization, but back in 1999 they arrived as insights from activists working around the world on the global impact of WTO law.

Carrying their lessons on corporate globalization into the streets on November 30, 1999, the IFG and associated international trade law activists went on to mingle with other cross-border organizers concerned with migrant rights, indigenous rights, and human rights. Anti-war signs, Canadian maple leaves, and Mexican flags were all abundantly evident, as too were all sorts of foreign-language signs held aloft by small contingents of protestors from Germany, France, Korea, South Africa, and the Carib-

bean. Moreover, many banners and placards held by these groups made it clear that it was precisely the cross-border character of their organizing that made it make sense for them to be there together in Seattle. Maquildora women’s solidarity organizers were there next to “FIX IT OR NIX IT” Canadian organizers; the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, held up a banner saying “BUILDING POWER WITHOUT BORDERS IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR PEOPLE”; and a pro-Cuban group walked next to Chicanos and Chicanas carrying a sign saying “SOMOS UNO PORQUE AMERICA ES UNO”.

Joined together in the streets of Seattle, it was this polyglot crew of world citizens making their local-turned-global cases for another kind of globalization that then went on to merge with the direct-action activists battling with the Seattle police around the Trade and Convention Center. The merging did not go smoothly, and it would be wrong to suggest that the overall collaborative effect had the character of a centrally planned and well-coordinated action. In fact, union plans enforced by marshals wearing orange hats succeeded in steering many protestors *away* from the direction of the barricades and police violence.

Meanwhile, that violence combined with the opportunistic defacement of shop fronts by Black Block vandals, made many marchers nervous about going closer to the action. Odd scenes in which anarchy mixed with fascination and bewilderment were common. Yet, there was solidarity and a sense of shared citizenship amid the confusion.²⁹ And, in the end, so many marching protestors filled the downtown streets that crowd control became impossible for the police. Running out of tear gas, they therefore had to abandon their initial efforts to clear the streets. As a result, WTO delegates found it next to impossible to leave their hotels, and even members of President Clinton’s administration complained to the Secret Service that they could not get to the Trade and Convention Center. The collaborative global city had made competitive global city winners into losers.³⁰

In showing that street protests in a world-class American city could produce meaningful resistance to global cap-





3.5 Global solidarity and resistance during the WTO protests.
Photos by Matthew Sparke.

italism, the protestors also succeeded in making the name of Seattle an emblem of anti-neoliberal organizing across the globe. This, though, was not just about making Seattle a single signifier of global resistance. As significant as this semiotic association with anti-neoliberalism remained afterwards, there were also more material linkages with real-world struggles for global justice as well. As one of the organizers summarized for fellow activists in the days that followed, global collaborations with Seattle were real and happened in real time.

People across the globe took action in solidarity. In India thousands of farmers in Karnataka marched to Bangalore, and over a thousand villagers from Anjar in Narmada Valley held a procession. Thousands took to the streets in the Philippines, Portugal, Pakistan, Turkey, Korea, and across Europe, the United States and Canada. 75,000 people marched in 80 different French cities and 800 miners clashed with police.³¹

After 1999, what many global activists celebrated as “the spirit of Seattle” lived on and grew. The next WTO meeting took place in Doha in 2001, where active civil society engagement was effectively prohibited, but two years later in 2003, when the ministerial was held in Cancun protestors again pressed their critical cases, and the same happened again in Hong Kong in 2005. Over this time, campaigns against other institutions of global corporate governance—ranging from the World Bank and IMF to the G8 and G20—also continued to attract widespread “Seattle-style” opposition. In terms of citizenship, these subsequent developments meant that the collaborative global connections exemplified by Seattle went on to inspire a form of democratic denationalization involving civil society groups in other newly collaborative global cities across the planet. Prague, Gothenburg, Montreal, Mumbai, Genoa, Cape Town, Nice, New York, and even Washington, D.C., have all come to join this list. It is true that the policing of this new, global-city resistance has also become routinely draconian and preemptive in its

zoning and targeting of protestors. In becoming more authoritarian, however, the policing reveals that the market-makers of global capital continue to be haunted by the specter of Seattle. In this sense, the ongoing repression of the global justice movement in other collaborative global cities further vindicates Seattle critics, who argued that the police reprisals made manifest the repressive unfreedom at the heart of global free-market rule-making. While academics and jurists may well go on debating what sort of spaces democratic states should provide for protest within particular national jurisdictions, the larger lessons spiraling out of Seattle relate to demands for a wider, denationalized, collaborative freedom across the planetary space of global citizenship itself. This then is no doubt why political philosophers conclude that “Seattle was the first global protest: the first major protest against the global system as a whole, the first real convergence of the innumerable grievances against the injustices and inequalities of the global system.”³²

The second collaboration that further ensured Seattle’s global salience and transnational ties was the coming together of the “Teamsters and Turtles.” The sense of joy in this collaboration was evident on the streets. Environmentalists marched happily alongside rank-and-file union members, the two groups clearly moving beyond divisive stereotypes of one another. In terms of citizenship, the Teamsters and Turtles alliance also represented a re-imagining of the space of democracy: the global scope of environmental concerns helping at least at a symbolic level to denationalize union concerns about outsourcing and reawaken the old internationalist spirit made so famous by the International Workers of the World in Seattle in the early twentieth century. Speech makers from both the environmental movement and the unions articulated a shared global perspective on improving both environmental and labor standards globally. To be sure, some union placards still railed against the offshore siting of jobs. And some environmentalists still spoke of the need for environmental protections, without addressing the plight of workers. But on November 30, 1999, these ongoing tensions were

replaced by a shared global concern articulated loudly with linked arms in Seattle streets.

Capturing the collaborative qualities of the protests in their own philosophical style, Hardt and Negri also emphasize that “the unexpected collaboration of trade unionists and environmentalists was just the tip of the iceberg.” The protests “brought together innumerable other groups expressing their grievances against the global system—those against the practices of huge agribusiness corporations, those against the prison system, those against the crushing debt of African countries, those against IMF controls of national economic policies . . . and so on, ad infinitum.”³³ The Teamsters and Turtles alliteration stood for a much longer chain of allied social movement solidarities. It was for the same reason, though, that less sympathetic commentators poured scorn on the collaborations as sixties-style incoherence. Corporate globalization guru Thomas Friedman dismissed the protests in this way as “Senseless in Seattle”: “Is there anything more ridiculous in the news today than the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle? These anti-W.T.O. protesters—who are a Noah’s ark of flat-earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960’s fix—are protesting against the wrong target with the wrong tools.”³⁴ Given that Friedman subsequently went on to write a book that used the flat-earth metaphor to represent the world-changing implications of globalization, this was an especially egregious, and self-incriminating, effort at ridicule.³⁵ The protesters were not out-of-touch flat-earthers at all, nor did they demand or represent a return to the American-centric anti-war radicalism of the 1960s. Instead, their transnational and trans-grievance collaboration in united criticism of the WTO effectively anticipated and argued against precisely the flattened vision of the world that Friedman himself went on to peddle in his best-selling book. In doing so, it also involved a third collaboration: a collaboration that used the tools of American democracy to argue for more global democracy in institutions of global governance such as the WTO.

NO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION was probably one the most popular and powerful slogans

of the whole protest. It was used by Sierra Club environmentalists and union protestors alike, and it clearly resonated with the wide variety of ordinary Seattleites who, at Benaroya Hall and elsewhere, clamored against the unelected, unaccountable, and generally undemocratic nature of WTO administration. As the Sierra Club sign made obvious, the slogan deliberately recalled the spirit of democratic uprising associated with the Revolutionary War. And out in the harbor, a protest stunt by the steelmakers union dumped fake steel bars from Asia in the water, in a reference to the Boston Tea Party. But the slogan itself—No Globalization without Representation—also departed from the original nationalism of “No Taxation without Representation” (not to mention the xenophobia of today’s teapartiers). By substituting “globalization” for the American concern with “taxation,” it pointed postnationally toward a vision of global citizenship, to the idea that economic globalization had to come with the globalization of democracy. The primary target here was the WTO for not allowing any stakeholders except trade lawyers and trade ministers into meetings over trade complaints. But the larger argument, and one made powerfully and poetically in other signs recalling and revising U.S. constitutionalism, was that ordinary people need new ways to make global institutions more democratically accountable.

As the police confrontations became more violent and more people were arrested and imprisoned, a civil emergency was declared. City streets were cordoned off and the National Guard was brought in. In this context, the importance of demanding democratic rights became increasingly resonant locally as well as globally. Ordinary members of the Seattle public who joined the protests, and even just passersby, were arrested along with the direct-action activists. Residents of the Capitol Hill neighborhood where officers chased demonstrators and fired tear gas also experienced police violence and arrests. And those who were arrested went on to face further abuse and detention without access to legal counsel. As Jill Friedberg’s brilliant movie *This is What Democracy Looks Like* documents in detail, all of these developments only increased solidar-

ity among citizens, marchers, and activists. Outside King County jail, a huge vigil took place, and a chant that had already been heard all day reverberated into the night: “Whose Streets? Our Streets!” These and other similar moments illustrated that the demands for global democracy, such as those made by the Sierra Club and union protest signs, were suddenly, and for many people surprisingly, salient for Seattle citizens, too. Global justice had also come to be about local justice in the collaborative global city.

The Curative Global City: Remaking Seattle as a World-Class Philanthropy Center

“Every year, millions of people in developing countries die from diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis that have been all but forgotten in rich countries. For these diseases, the economics of the marketplace are not sufficient to commercially justify the large-scale investment needed to develop and deliver vaccines and drugs. Through global advocacy, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is working to address this market failure by promoting innovative health financing mechanisms that provide better incentives to the private sector to create global public goods.”³⁶

Providing here a frank acknowledgment of global health inequalities, explicitly referring to markets not serving the poor, and making references to “market failure” and the “failures of the marketplace,” Joe Cerell’s explanation of how the Gates Foundation approaches its work sounds a little like some of arguments made against the WTO in Seattle in 1999. Yet published on the Web site of the International Monetary Fund and emphasizing public-private partnerships as the correct cure for market failure, there are very big differences, too. The concern with global injustice and the desire to honor the idea that all lives are of equal value still obviously animate this vision of global health philanthropy. In this sense, the basic concept of global citizenship shares something with the inclusive impulses

of Seattle in 1999. But, at the same time, democratic collaboration, support for governments resisting structural adjustment policies, and demands for popular protest and public accountability are not seen as ways to win global justice. Instead, the Gates Foundation focuses on strategies deliberately designed to cure market failure using private-sector incentive schemes and market-mediated innovations in global health, development, and education. Market fundamentalism, business-knows-best ideology, and an absolute faith in the power of markets are thus not radically challenged as they were in 1999. Instead, they have been revised and replaced by what is better termed “market foster-care” through diverse plans for micro-management and development.

Huge debates rage online between ardent critics (represented, for instance, by gateskeepers.civiblog.org) and sympathetic observers (represented by Matthew Bishop and Michael Green’s philanthro-capitalism.net) of the impact Seattle philanthropy is having on global health, development, and education. Here the much more specific aim is to ask how the philanthro-capitalist cures are related to Seattle as a global city and the denationalization of citizenship. The strong ethical insistence on the equal value of all human life in the statements of the Gates Foundation translates into a wider commitment by much of the rest of the Seattle-based global philanthropy community into seeing life across all national borders as worth saving. The concept of citizenship underpinning their efforts is in this sense global and denationalized. At the same time, a closer look at the details of the programs envisioned and implemented by Seattle’s philanthro-capitalists indicates that this same global inclusivity is also radically individualizing. The goals are about empowering individuals—not nation-states—to overcome disease and diminished circumstances where markets have failed. Thus, just as activists’ critiques of market failure are replaced by an emphasis on micro-market management, so, too, it seems, are the protestors’ ideas of collaborative global citizenship and collective responsibility replaced by an emphasis on individual empowerment and personal responsibility.

Along with the individualizing imperatives comes a notably entrepreneurial reimagining of the geography of intervention. Target areas for global philanthropic involvement are imagined and mapped as investment sites where the philanthro-capitalists seek to create the greatest possible return on their money. To be sure, the return is measured in terms of improved health outcomes, environmental enhancements, and human capital development rather than on purely monetary measures of capital. Yet, the broad investment vision and vocabulary, the talk of more health for money, and all the associated investments in innovations ranging from vaccines to transgenic seeds to water contamination measurement tools would seem to suggest that Seattle's philanthro-capitalists bring some of the same business outlook to their approach to global empowerment as the city's competitive boosters employ to advocate for local investment. What changes is that the investment logic is inverted: going outward from Seattle to the rest of the world and enfolding it in a reconceptualization of planetary space as the staging ground for Seattle's global ambition. This approach is no doubt much healthier than the spread of Starbucks, but there remains nonetheless a certain sort of promotional logic at work that is very much of a piece with the ranking boasts that preoccupy Seattle's more traditional urban boosters. The result, not surprisingly, represents a notable hybridization of the meaning of world class.

One example of the hybrid reconceptualization of world-class Seattle, produced by leaders of the curative global city, has been cartographic. Created by the Washington Global Health Alliance, it takes the form of world maps that represent all the other parts of the planet to which the global curative efforts of Washington State, and Seattle-based institutions in particular, are linked by the integrative ties and investments of global health development (fig. 3.6).³⁷ The Washington Global Health Alliance's global vision clearly represents something different and distinctly denationalized. Scaling up John Snow's inaugural cartography of public health citizenship in Victorian London, it might even be argued to represent a new "ghost map" of


global public health citizenship.³⁸ But investment-oriented and promotional as it is—a form of mapping that would register cholera deaths as a new opportunity for targeted curative capacity-building rather than as an indication of an infected water source—this denationalized remapping of health citizenship clearly has a local agenda. In short, it represents an attempt to leverage local economic development opportunities out of the global developments being planned by Seattle's philanthro-capitalists. As a result, Washington Global Health Alliance meetings have featured Washington State's senators and governors celebrating what they see as the local job and growth opportunities tied to global health, and reports from these gatherings help highlight the ways in which the curative global-city vision emerges from the ongoing tension between competitive and collaborative ideas about Seattle's ties to global health.

"Global health is now part of our region's economy," explained Senator Patty Murray at one joint Health Alliance and Chamber of Commerce meeting in 2008.³⁹ Her colleague, Senator Maria Cantwell, added that the economic impact included an extra \$4 billion in business activities in the state. The reporter commenting on the resulting big business interest in this emergent "industry" further captured the way in which enduring concerns with the competitive global city rankings race were overshadowing the proceedings. "The field of global health, once perhaps regarded as a noble humanitarian endeavor aimed at healing and helping the world's poorest people," he began, "is now becoming something of an 'emerging industry' that the Seattle business community sees as a highly competitive enterprise that is ours to lose." However, the same reporter also went on in his article to highlight more collaborative concepts of the region's role in global health still being articulated at the conference. "It sort of implies that the bottom line here is jobs and income for us as opposed to being focused on assisting poor people in the developing world," argued Dr. Steve Gloyd, the head of Health Alliance International (HAI) and director for global health curriculum at UW. Joining him in resisting all the corporate pressures, Wendy Johnson, another UW and HAI doctor, said:

WASHINGTON'S GLOBAL HEALTH SECTOR HAS WORLDWIDE REACH AND IMPACT

THE STATE'S GLOBAL HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE GROWING – BRINGING THE BENEFITS OF INNOVATIVE RESEARCH, EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND PROGRAM DELIVERY TO PEOPLE ACROSS THE WORLD

WGHA organizations have a global presence. The map below shows the international locations of WGHA organizations' offices and facilities. WGHA organizations operate offices and lab facilities in 29 countries and 58 cities worldwide. This does not include the hundreds of project sites and the use of partner facilities.



3.6 Curative global capacity building.

Source: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

“I think it’s a slippery slope. Once you define this as an industry, you tend to start investing in the kinds of projects that support jobs and programs rather than in what’s really needed to solve health inequities in poor countries.”

What makes these tensions over the meaning of global health in Seattle especially significant is that they help explain how the curative philanthro-capitalist vision sees things in relation to the tension. The same reporter concluded his article by quoting Cheryl Scott, the conference co-chairwoman and a senior adviser at the Gates Foundation. She told him that “she understood the concern about treating global health as if it were just another commercial

enterprise.” However, she explained, this was largely a semantic tool aimed at arriving at a “framework” for building a unique kind of public-private partnership. “None of this is to imply that we (the Gates Foundation) think global health can work solely as a private model,” she said. Contrary to the criticism that the Seattle philanthropy favors privatizing global health, Scott said that many of their projects are being done “in close collaboration with Third World governments.” With ongoing pressure from global public health advocates who emphasize strengthening health systems, and with own their rigorous commitment to objective results assessment, it is no doubt true that the Gates Foundation and other allied institutions in the city will continue to build global collaborations. Indeed, with new critical studies published in medical journals posing questions

about “the geographical location of primary recipients [of funding],” the pressure to share the wealth outside of Seattle looks set to rise.⁴⁰ As they go global, though, Seattle’s philanthro-capitalists also continue to build new buildings in South Lake Union, and here the pull on curative global city ideas seems very much more in the direction of the competitive global city with which we began.

One sign of the times that indicates which way global Seattle is headed is that the Seattle Displacement Coalition, which fought for the rejected downtown service center and against Sidran’s ordinances, now finds itself fighting publicly subsidized gentrification in South Lake Union.⁴¹ In 2008 John Fox of the coalition complained thus that in the seven preceding years over \$100 million in public city funds had gone into the redevelopment of South Lake Union, much of it supporting the property development plans of the real estate company Vulcan owned by Paul Allen. This amount almost equaled what Allen had hoped to win originally from the public when a referendum was held on his vision for an Upper East Side plus central park plan of a “Seattle Commons” in South Lake Union. But having rejected that plan in a referendum in 1995, the public is still providing the money and, as it were, getting the upper east side but not much park space. Going forward, Fox further fears that many more municipal dollars will be used to support Vulcan’s high-rise plans for the area, with global health humanitarianism and Emerald City sustainability both playing their part in “green washing” the corporate demands for higher height limits on South Lake Union’s skyscrapers.

While the old commons continue to become increasingly about public-private partnerships in South Lake Union, the boosters of the competitive global city have added the area’s soaring global philanthropy reputation to their own playbook of promotional props. A local “Prosperity” blog put it like this in late 2009:

There’s been a lot of buzz about the region’s growing global health industry over the last two years, and for good reason: with the largest philanthropic investor in this

industry in the world (Gates Foundation) here in our backyard, combined with leading research institutions in global health (University of Washington’s School of Global Health, Seattle Biomedical Research Institute), and internationally recognized service delivery organizations (PATH), we’re pretty well situated to become THE epicenter for this industry in the world. But a lot of people are still confused as to how a cluster that’s focused on helping the world’s poorest people survive the world’s most widespread diseases translates into economic prosperity for our region.⁴²

Confused as they might be at the start, their confusion seems unlikely to last long after they turn to the Web sites of the Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce or the Trade and Development Alliance, where all sorts of high-ranking success stories of Seattle’s global health business class are recorded, alongside the enduring hype about the region’s natural future as a victor in other global city championships. In this sense, the curative global city assets merely help complement an earlier reliance on Boeing, Microsoft, Amazon, and Starbucks as growth generators. Now in addition, we are told, we can rely further on Zymogenetics, Heartstream, Alcide, Immunex, Physio-Control, and the Siemens Medical Systems’ Ultrasound Group, and all these private corporations can in turn rely for expert support and labor market synergies on the public-private, philanthro-capitalist complex of South Lake Union.

In February 2010 a new Global Health Nexus venture was launched, “aimed at bringing together the expertise of local life-science companies, global-health researchers, businesses and nonprofit groups.”⁴³ The venture further highlighted the ongoing effort to harness curative philanthropy to the larger project of selling Seattle and competing globally for foreign markets and cosmopolitan investment dollars. Summing up this promotional vision, Bob Aylward, the executive vice president for business operations for the Seattle Mariners, described the rationale for the Global Health Nexus to the *Seattle Times*: “We’re sitting on the edge of a magnificent opportunity for this region to take this differentiated product, global health,

and brand it as a sector that can go out and attract worldwide attention.” Meanwhile Chris Rivera, president of the Washington Biotechnology and Biomedical Association, explained to the same *Seattle Times* reporter that industry really did see denationalized global opportunity in the curative global city’s global reach. “For a for-profit private biotech company, the fastest emerging markets are the developing nations,” he said. “We have to figure out how to partner with the organizations that already understand these markets.”

From curing the world to competing in world markets, the denationalized but clearly also commodified and corporatized vision of the Global Health Nexus seems to take us back to the age-old competitive concern about promoting Seattle as a global market leader.

The co-optation of global health for selling the city in the old game of global boosterism will seem for many a bitter pill to swallow. But if the historical geography of Seattle’s ongoing remaking as a global city tells us anything, it is that the definition of civic citizenship is always in flux, always being contested, and always, therefore, up for grabs. The Chamber of Commerce and the downtown elites may now be championing denationalized global citizenship in ways that trump global health with global competition, but the advocates of a collaborative global Seattle have not given up on the city. In 1999 the citizenry made Seattle stand for something different, and the memory of “No Globalization without Representation” continues to serve as a reminder of other more critical and collaborative conceptualizations of the global city that won’t go away. Global soul is not always for sale, and, this city reminds us that there is going to be an ongoing Battle of Seattle over the meaning of “world class.”

NOTES

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Dick Walker for their ideas for improving this chapter. All arguments and errors remain my own.

- 1 For her classic account of global cities as command and control hubs in global hierarchies of finance, services, and new consumption practices, see **Saskia Sassen**, *The Global City* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For her more recent theorization of denationalization, see Sassen, “Incompleteness and the Possibility of Making: Towards Denationalized Citizenship?” *Political Power and Social Theory* 20 (2009): 229–58. And for further geographical commentary on this theory, see Tim Cresswell, “The Prosthetic Citizen: New Geographies of Citizenship,” *Political Power and Social Theory* 20 (2009): 259–73; and Matthew Sparke, “On Denationalization as Neoliberalization: Biopolitics, Class Interest, and the Incompleteness of Citizenship,” *Political Power and Social Theory* 20 (2009): 287–300. While focused on a so-called First World city, this present chapter is part of a broader project to decenter such cities as normative models in competitive global rankings. This can most obviously be done by refocusing attention on city regions outside of North America and Northern Europe (e.g., Matthew Sparke et al., “Triangulating the Borderless World: Geographies of Power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, n.s. 29 (2004): 485–98; and Ananya Roy, “The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory,” *Regional Studies* 43 (2009): 819–30). But, as Ananya Roy suggests, we also need to revisit how cities “everywhere”—including in the West—are “worlded” by social ties and political tensions that variously transect and transcend traditional global city competitiveness hierarchies. By engaging with questions of denationalized citizenship in the worlding of collaborative Seattle and curative Seattle, this chapter seeks to contribute in this cross-cutting way.
- 2 David Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

- 3 For details, see Paul De Armond, "Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tactics" in **John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt**, *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999). In what may well be read as another co-optation of the radicalism of 1999, this Rand corporation publication is actually a reprinted and slightly revised edition of a movement-oriented essay by De Armond, titled *Black Flag over Seattle*, still available at <http://www.albion-monitor.com/seattlewto/index.html>.
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- 5 David McCoy, Gayatri Kumbhani, Jinesh Patel, and Akish Luintel, "The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's Grant-Making Programme for Global Health," *The Lancet* 373 (May 9, 2009): 1645–53.
- 6 Suzanne Monson, "Cosmopolitan Flavor: A World Class City Offers Global Experiences for its Downtown Residents," *Seattle Times*, New Homes Saturday Section, February 6, 2010, D4.
- 7 **John Findlay**, *Magic lands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
- 8 John M. Findlay, "The Off-Center Seattle Center," *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 80 (1989): 2–11.
- 9 See David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism," *Geografiska Annaler B*, 71 (1989): 3–10.
- 10 On this, see Frank Moulaert, Arantxa Rodriguez, and Erik Swyngedouw, *The Globalized City* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 11 Timothy Gibson, *Securing the Spectacular City* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).
- 12 Rowan Ellis, "Civil Society, Savage City," Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 2010; Don Mitchell, *The Right To The City* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003); and Neil Smith, *The New Urban Frontier* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
- 13 Gibson, *Securing the Spectacular City*, 175.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 232, 233.
- 15 Many thanks to Matt Townley for his work in calculating these data.
- 16 Gibson, *Securing the Spectacular City*, 178.
- 17 Matthew Sparke, "Not a State, but a State of Mind," in *Globalisation, Regionalisation and Cross-border Regions*, ed. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-Ling Sum (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002), 212–40; and Matthew Sparke, "A Neoliberal Nexus," *Political Geography* 25 (2006): 151–80.
- 18 Matthew Klinge, *Emerald City* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
- 19 Trade and Development Alliance of Greater Seattle, <http://www.seattletradealliance.com/aboutSea/about-greater-seattle.php>.
- 20 Andrea James, "Seattle Named a Top 'Global Gateway' City," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, November 9, 2006, http://www.seattlepi.com/business/291668_officespace09.html.
- 21 James Lyons, "'THINK SEATTLE, ACT GLOBALLY': Speciality Coffee, Commodity Biographies and the Promotion of Place," *Cultural Studies* 19 (2005): 14–34.
- 22 Claire Cain Miller, "Now at Starbucks: A Rebound," *New York Times*, January 20, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/business/21sbux.html>.
- 23 See <http://www.seattlechamber.com>.
- 24 David Solnit and Rebecca Solnit, *The Battle of the Story of The Battle of Seattle* (Oakland: AK Press, 2009).
- 25 Fred Moody, *Seattle and the Demons of Ambition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 4.
- 26 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
- 27 *Ibid.*, 287.
- 28 Solnit and Solnit, *The Story of . . .*, 2.
- 29 See, e.g., Matthew Stadler, "Love & War," *The Stranger*, December 9–15, 1999, <http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/Content?oid=2733>.
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- net/2009/11/24/the-wto-effect/.
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- 32 Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 286.
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- 34 Thomas Friedman, "Senseless in Seattle," *New York Times*, December 1, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/01/opinion/foreign-affairs-senseless-in-seattle.html?pagewanted=1>.
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- 37 For the full report and other maps of Washington-linked global-health research and intervention projects, see <http://www.wghalliance.org/about/where-we-work>.
- 38 Compare with **Steven Johnson**, *The Ghost Map* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006).
- 39 Tom Paulson, "Global health seen as big business for Seattle," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, October 23, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/384753_healthbiz24.html.
- 40 McCoy et al., "The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's Grant-Making Programme," 1649.
- 41 See Seattle Displacement Coalition Web archive at http://zipcon.net/~jvf4119/outside_city_hall.htm.
- 42 Eric Schinfeld, "Global Health: Our Window to the World," November 20, 2009, <http://prosperityblog.wordpress.com/2009/11/20/global-health-window-to-the-world>.
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FOUR

RURAL GEOGRAPHIES

David Barker, Anne Bonds, Jennifer Devine,
Lucy Jarosz, Victoria Lawson, Lise Nelson,
and Pete Nelson

At first glance, it may seem strange to have a chapter on rural geographies in a book about Seattle. Yet one cannot understand this urban place without appreciating its broader regional context. The rural Pacific Northwest is intimately linked with city life in Seattle through economic, demographic, and political processes. Hay, wheat, and lumber, exported through the port of Seattle, contribute to the regional and urban economies. City residents who vacation, reside, and retire in rural places across the region redefine land use, rural aesthetics, and the politics of conservation. Migrants who come to the region for work on farms and in factories reshape the cultural vibrancy of the city and beyond. Without these economic and cultural connections, the city would be different.

These links are sustained in part by the dominant images of towering mountains, salmon streams, and wilderness trails characterizing the Pacific Northwest. But these cultural icons obscure other parts of the rural landscape. The rural regions of the Northwest, encompassing Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana, are also places of impoverishment, low wages, hardship, and economic transformation. The contemporary landscapes of the American Northwest are being reworked in a range of ways, shifting from largely farm work and the extraction of resources to tourism and service work. These shifts are driven by the exhaustion of finite resources, changing environmental attitudes and pressures, changing farm subsidies, a reduced availability of public lands for grazing, and reduced access to public lands for logging. These changes bring the Old West of miners, cowboys, timber workers, farmers, and ranchers into contact (and sometimes tension) with the New West of tourists, vacation homes, ski resorts, and upscale recreational amenities, retailers, and theme

towns. Here we highlight these often-hidden rural geographies by portraying them in three types of landscapes: playgrounds, dumping grounds, and unseen grounds.


Recent Demographic and Economic Trends in the Rural Northwest

Stretching from the Pacific Coast of Oregon and Washington through the glacier-clad Cascade Mountains and on into the basin and range landscapes of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, this five-state region possesses perhaps the most diverse physical geography in the entire United States. Like much of the rural western United States, the nonmetropolitan portions of these five northwestern states have experienced significant demographic and economic changes over the past two decades, which can be summarized as follows:

1. The rural Northwest saw robust population growth between 1990 and 2000. This growth is most pronounced in high-amenity destinations in close proximity to public lands. The growth subsided considerably between 2000 and 2008, but continued in high-amenity areas.
2. Hispanics are becoming an increasing presence in the region and are beginning to spread into areas beyond the more agriculturally dependent communities.
3. A few pockets of extreme wealth are emerging in the region's resort destinations, suggesting that class polarization is spreading out across space.

Population Change in the Rural Northwest

Overall, the last two decades brought robust population growth to the rural Northwest. Mirroring national patterns of a rural rebound in the 1990s, the region's population expanded 14.1 percent during that decade, and this growth carried over into the early part of the twenty-first century at a 6.8 percent rate. These regional growth rates greatly outpaced the national growth experiences over the same



4.1 Percent change in total population for the nonmetropolitan Northwest. All counties shown in green had positive population growth; the darker the shade of green, the more rapid the population growth.

NOTE: The data cut-off between the first and second quartiles was modified to allow differentiation between population loss (shown in yellow) and population gain.

time. Nearly 60 percent of the nonmetropolitan counties in the Northwest had growth rates exceeding the national nonmetropolitan growth rate of 7.5 percent during the 1990s, and only 17 percent actually lost population. Though still surpassing the national growth trends, since 2000 nonmetropolitan growth in the Northwest has subsided considerably. In this more recent period, only 43 percent of the region's counties had growth rates exceeding the national nonmetropolitan rate of 2.5 percent and roughly the same number of counties—42 percent—in the region lost population.

TABLE 4.1 POPULATION CHANGE FOR THE FASTEST AND SLOWEST GROWING COUNTIES
IN THE NONMETROPOLITAN NORTHWEST, 1990-2000 VS. 2000-2008

1990-2000				2000-2008			
County	State	% Change	Domestic Migration Rate (%)	County	State	% Change	Domestic Migration Rate (%)
Top 10				Top 10			
Teton	ID	73.48	42.60	Teton	ID	47.24	26.45
Teton	WY	61.99	18.51	Sublette	WY	42.84	37.85
Morrow	OR	44.42	24.47	Madison	ID	36.37	7.64
Ravalli	MT	43.81	40.92	Gallatin	MT	32.42	23.88
San Juan	WA	38.65	24.64	Campbell	WY	23.07	12.76
Blaine	ID	37.97	14.08	Crook	OR	20.01	17.54
Bonner	ID	37.66	31.13	Johnson	WY	19.63	19.75
Jefferson	OR	37.59	8.11	Flathead	MT	18.80	14.87
Elmore	ID	37.23	-1.70	Mason	WA	17.09	15.69
Grant	WA	35.74	12.50	Kittatas	WA	16.75	12.65
Bottom 10				Bottom 10			
Richland	MT	-9.21	-7.31	Garfield	WA	-14.06	-10.22
Daniels	MT	-10.12	-6.42	Wheeler	OR	-14.74	-8.27
Wibaux	MT	-10.25	-3.19	Phillips	MT	-15.75	-12.91
Power River	MT	-10.41	-14.56	McCone	MT	-15.23	-14.16
Rosebud	MT	-10.53	-14.74	Sherman	OR	-15.31	-15.62
Phillips	MT	-10.68	-10.81	Daniels	MT	-18.54	-13.24
McCone	MT	-12.37	-14.89	Wibaux	MT	-18.91	-11.14
Prairie	MT	-12.48	2.92	Sheridan	MT	-20.02	-12.81
Sheridan	MT	-12.51	-8.14	Liberty	MT	-20.06	-17.42
Garfield	MT	-19.41	-12.22	Treasure	MT	-26.02	-22.88

Population change shows distinct geographic variation across the rural Northwest (see fig. 4.1 and table 4.1). The highest growth rates are found along the spine of the northern Rockies in Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana, as well as along the Pacific Coast. In contrast, the declining counties are heavily concentrated in the far eastern stretches of the region.

A combination of factors can explain the geographic variation in growth experiences across the rural Northwest. First, proximity and access to urban centers greatly influences the patterns of population growth and decline. Eight of the ten fastest growing counties in the nonmetropolitan Northwest in the period 2000 to 2008 contain “micropolitan” centers—small cities that act as a regional urban hub.

In contrast, five of the ten counties with the highest population loss over the same period were classified as the least urban by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.


These counties have no population center greater than 2,500 people and are not adjacent to a metropolitan or micropolitan area. Second, population growth driven by domestic migration also appears to be drawn toward high amenity areas. In the Northwest, natural amenities often include large tracts of public lands, national parks and monuments, wilderness areas, scenic vistas, and other features. This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated in the greater Yellowstone region straddling the borders between Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. Teton County, Wyoming; Teton County, Idaho; and Gallatin County, Montana, have experienced extremely high domestic migration as households seek out these high-amenity landscapes. Third, many of these areas with reasonable access to medium or larger urban centers have become premium retirement destinations. With nearly 80 million baby boomers aging into retirement in the second decade of the twenty-first century, these areas are primed for significant growth, and it is not surprising that four of the fastest growing counties in the region since 2000 are classified as retirement dependent. Each of these four is either micropolitan or adjacent to a micropolitan area demonstrating the confluence of these forces driving population change in the region.

Increasing Ethnic Diversity in the Rural Northwest

The patterns of growth across the rural Northwest have been layered on top of increasing ethnic diversity, driven in large part by a growing Latino population in many communities. For several decades, Latinos have found work in the region's agriculture and food-processing industries, and this is evidenced in panel A of figure 4.2. and table 4.2. Many of the counties with the highest concentrations of Latinos are classified as farm-dependent counties.¹ Virtually all of the top 10 counties in figure 4.2 are found in the fertile lands of Oregon and Washington, along the Columbia River, or along Southern Idaho's Snake River. These

regions produce large quantities of such labor-intensive crops as grapes, apples, peaches, cherries, potatoes, onions, and a variety of berries, all of which need to be picked by hand.

While the highest concentrations of Latinos are found in the more agriculturally dependent regions, it appears that Latinos are spreading out into other areas of the rural Northwest. Panel 2 of table 4.2 and panel B of figure 4.2 identify the areas with the most rapid growth of Latinos between 2000 and 2008. Panel B shows the Latino population growing most rapidly in many of the high-amenity areas. In these new destinations, Latinos are presumably



4.2 Latino population concentrations and relative change in the nonmetropolitan Northwest. The darker the shading, the higher the concentration of Latinos (panel A) or the more rapid the growth of the Latino population (panel B).

TABLE 4.2. CONCENTRATION AND CHANGE IN THE LATINO POPULATION, 1990-2008

2000			2008		
PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION					
County	State	Percent	County	State	Percent
Top 10					
Adams*	WA	47.08	Adams*	WA	55.12
Clark*	ID	34.25	Clark*	ID	40.44
Grant*	WA	30.09	Grant*	WA	35.69
Malheur	OR	25.62	Minidoka*	ID	30.25
Minidoka*	ID	25.46	Morrow*	OR	29.77
Hood River	OR	25.02	Malheur	OR	27.76
Morrow*	OR	24.43	Jerome*	ID	27.31
Cassia*	ID	18.74	Hood River	OR	26.72
Jefferson	OR	17.74	Gooding*	ID	24.27
Jerome*	ID	17.17	Cassia*	ID	23.39
PERCENT CHANGE, LATINOS					
Camas*†	ID	1275.00	Sublette†	WY	239.29
Sweet Grass*†	ID	671.43	Glacier†	MT	198.11
Wheeler*	OR	558.33	Valley†	ID	145.33
Teton†	WY	547.54	Judith Basin*	MT	130.77
Clark*†	ID	514.04	Flathead†	MT	122.53
Blaine†	ID	410.05	Gallatin†	MT	120.82
Granite*†	MT	300.00	Teton†	WY	114.35
Lincoln*	OR	255.54	Adams†	ID	111.11
Sherman†	OR	235.71	Lincoln	WY	102.54
Tillamook†	OR	229.10	Roosevelt	MT	100.76

* Denotes farm-dependent counties

† Denotes recreation-dependent counties

responding to increasing employment opportunities in the service industries and construction trades stimulated by the growth of the overall population. Of the top ten counties ranked in terms of Latino population change, only one is classified as farm dependent and seven are classified as recreation dependent counties. Most of these recreation counties are found in the mountains and along the coasts,

a long way from the region's agricultural centers. Teton County, Wyoming, provides a striking illustration of the rapid pace of Latino population change. In 1990 the decennial Census recorded just 183 Latinos in Teton County out of a population of 11,267 (1.6 percent). By 2000, the Census showed 1,185 Latinos living in the county, and the most recent estimates available for 2008 indicate a Latino popu-

lation of 2,540 out of 20,376 total residents, or 12.5 percent. Clearly, the expanding Latino presence is beginning to impact new destinations.

Emerging Islands of Affluence

In the Northwest, new activities are emerging as important contributors to rural economic bases. Since the 1960s, employment in manufacturing and service industries has grown considerably in rural areas across the country, while traditional resource-based sectors have declined in relative and absolute importance. In addition, nonemployment income in the form of dividends, interests, and rents has become an increasingly important component of nonmetropolitan income streams, and migration is drawing more nonemployment income into rural areas. As affluent individuals seek out attractive places to live, they often bring with them accumulated wealth, producing highly visible pockets of affluence in specific rural locales. Some of the most pronounced “islands of affluence” are found in the rural Northwest and are presented in figure 4.3 and table 4.3.

In the year 2007, roughly 17.5 percent of personal income in the United States was derived from dividends, interests, and rent. In places like Sun Valley, Idaho (Blaine County), or Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Teton County), 50 percent or more of annual personal income is derived from accumulated wealth. Assuming the \$1.7 billion in dividends, interest, and rent arriving in Teton County is distributed equally among its residents, the per capita level of dividends, interest, and rent in the county exceeds \$85,000 per year. Many of the areas with high dependence on nonemployment income coincide with the amenity-rich, recreation-dependent destinations that have accelerated population growth and growing Latino populations. In fact, eight of the top 10 counties listed in table 3 for the year 2007 are recreation dependent, and all counties in the top 10 have more than twice the national share of income from dividends, interest, and rent. Given that the origin of dividends, interest, and rent income is likely to be nonlocal, these income sources represent new money flowing into the county economies, or new sources of economic base. Furthermore, given the likelihood that this income is *not* evenly distributed across the population in places



4.3 Percent of total personal income derived from dividends, interest, and rent, 2007. The darker the shading, the greater the share of total personal income derived from dividends, interest, and rent.

TABLE 4.3 COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST DEPENDENCE ON NONEMPLOYMENT INCOME

2000			2007		
Share of Personal Income (%)			Share of Personal Income (%)		
Top 10			Top 10		
Teton	WY	51.09	Teton	WY	64.30
San Juan	WA	48.51	San Juan	WA	54.67
Sweet Grass	MT	40.45	Blaine	ID	45.47
Gilliam	OR	40.03	Sweet Grass	MT	38.77
Wheeler	OR	39.38	Sheridan	WY	38.61
Golden Valley	MT	37.03	Golden Valley	MT	37.49
Carter	MT	36.95	Park	WY	36.66
Johnson	WY	36.84	Jefferson	WA	36.05
Garfield	MT	36.64	Johnson	WY	35.56
Judith Basin	MT	36.05	Wheatland	MT	35.53

like Teton County, such communities clearly include some extremely wealthy people, further contributing to the class polarization in the region.

It is also noteworthy that table 4.3 shows a few counties in the eastern portion of the region with high dependence on dividends, interest, and rent. These places should not be confused with the likes of Jackson Hole or Sun Valley. For the counties in the eastern portion of the region, the high dependence on dividends, interest, and rents indicate broader forces of economic restructuring in the resource-based industries. The rental income generated in places like Golden Valley and Wheatland County, Montana, is likely derived from the rental of farmland to increasingly large farm operators. Between 2002 and 2007, the number of farmland owners in Golden Valley, Montana, receiving rental income from their land more than doubled, as smaller operators ceased farming their own property and leased it to larger operations. Such processes are symptomatic of agricultural restructuring and lie behind some of the other demographic trends described above.

Layering the Old and the New

Some have described all these demographic and economic changes as a shift from “Old West” to “New West.” The Old West is often characterized by resource extraction activities, as well as by heavy federal government expenditures on dams and other facilities, while the New West is seen as dependent on a service-based economy, attracting large numbers of footloose and affluent individuals to the high-amenity landscapes in the region. These two labels suggest that the West is a place of stark contrasts and oppositions.

Such a clear distinction between old and new neglects the considerable practical fuzziness in the region. Counties like Teton, Wyoming, and Blaine, Idaho, have become places of exceptional wealth, and the shift from resource extraction to natural amenities is almost complete. It would be premature, however, to pen the obituary for the “Old” West. Traveling through the Teton counties, or from Bend, Oregon, up to the Cascade crest, the landscape remains dominated by heavily resource intensive activities. While these activities may not be driving the growth in the region, they are still visibly dominant forces shaping the

landscape. Furthermore, transformations in these resource-dependent activities are a powerful catalyst behind specific demographic changes, including the increasing ethnic diversity in certain areas and the population decline in eastern portions of the region. Therefore, a new West does not replace an old West. Rather, new economic and demographic forces work with the more traditional forces that originally developed the region. These processes of change require careful analysis and defy simple binary classifications of “old” and “new.”

Beyond the Dominant Image: Theorizing Rural Difference

There are at least three distinctive landscapes in the rural places of the Northwest that are connected to economic restructuring, rural poverty, and contemporary economic development: playgrounds, dumping grounds, and unseen grounds. This typology of the rural American West is not exhaustive; rather, it is indicative of the diversity of realities and experiences in rural places. The rural Pacific Northwest is a destination point and home to a diversity of people of varying economic positions, races, and ethnicities in places that are alluring and beautiful and places that are invisible and unseen. We explore the Northwest landscape through the prism of these types of places, in order to show how the popular images and the iconic landscapes obscure as much as they reveal. If the common image is the playground landscape, opening our eyes to both unseen grounds and dumping grounds reveals categories of race and poverty that are integrally linked to middle class, predominately white lifestyles of consumption. In what follows, we provide some examples of the broader processes that are making geographies of poverty in the region.

Playgrounds

Playgrounds are places such as Gallatin and Flathead Counties, Montana; the Methow Valley; San Juan Islands and Suncadia in Washington; Bend, Oregon; Driggs and Coeur

D’Alene, Idaho. They are aesthetically appealing areas of costly leisure activities and multimillion-dollar homes and ranches. Playgrounds are located near mountains, lakes, coastal shores, forests, national parks, and ski resorts. They are easily recognizable for their beauty and wildness. Playgrounds are dominant in the public imaginaries of the Northwest. People want to live in these places because of their leisure-time activities and aesthetics. These areas are experiencing substantial gentrification, as they become the sites of second, third, and even fourth homes of the wealthy and famous (for example, see fig. 4.4).²

Tourism is an important aspect of any economy, and property values are significantly higher in playgrounds than in other rural areas. Playgrounds may also be locations for businesses primarily serving wealthy or middle-class consumers, such as art galleries, boutique clothing and sporting goods stores, gourmet restaurants, and artisanal bakeries. Environmental awareness, liberal political values, middle-class lifestyles emphasizing outdoor activities, and the support of local business and small-scale, local and sustainable food production define these areas.

Kittitas County in Washington State, for example, has gone from being largely ranch land to being a playground in three decades. This county is located on the eastern slopes of the majestic Cascade Mountain range. Its diverse topography spans vast timberlands covering half of the county’s 2,315 miles and prime pastures of bunchgrass ideal for grazing livestock and growing hay. Surpassing earlier boom periods in logging and mining, cattle ranching and hay and grain production drove the county’s economy until the 1970s. Since then, Kittitas’s natural amenities, proximity to Puget Sound, and celebrated ranching history have enabled developers to transform the ranchland into a spot sought after by tourists, bedroom commuters, hunters, second-homers, and retirees. This economic transformation is intimately connected with economic restructuring in the U.S. economy away from resource extraction, manufacturing, and farming to diverse service-based sectors. As Seattle became a global hub of computer software development and biotechnology research and the headquarters for Star-

bucks and REI, Kittitas County's location as a recreation hotspot on the map of America's "New West" has turned on the successful marketing and creative revitalization of the county's "Old West" ranching history and cowboy culture.

Dumping Grounds

Dumping grounds are the places constituting the working landscapes of the West. Places like Stevens and Benton Counties, Washington; Cassia County, Idaho; and Big Horn County, Montana. These places are former farming areas, ranchlands and/or resource-extraction areas that offer labor, land, and water resources in order to attract prisons, farming factories, and food processing plants and thus

bring economic development to rural areas of high unemployment and poverty. Economies of dumping grounds are moving increasingly toward retail and service-sector activities dominated by discount stores such as Wal-Mart and fast food chains such as McDonald's and Burger King. The areas may be near beautiful mountains or rivers, but they lack the spectacular scenery of playgrounds and proximity to large urban areas or well-known national parks. Rural economic restructuring in these areas is signaled by the closure of mines and a downturn in logging activities, leaving rural places starved for jobs and a secure tax base. City and county leaders compete with other rural areas around the country to attract national and transnational agribusiness and manufacturing firms, state and federal prisons, and other forms of business through the lure of cheap land, water, and labor, as well as by offering tax breaks or infra-

4.4 View from Mount Rainier. Photo by Jehane Ramola.





4.5. Prison in Hardin, Montana. Photo by Anne Bonds.

structural development (such as roads). These places often welcome businesses that those living in urban areas and in playgrounds see as polluting and undesirable: large-scale hog farms, food processing plants, and solid-waste sites—hence the epithet: dumping ground. See the following case study for links between prison investments and ongoing rural poverty (see fig. 4.5).

Over the past three decades, prison populations in the United States have soared to unprecedented levels. In fact, between 1970 and 2003, the U.S. prison population grew sevenfold, making it the largest in the world.³ Driven by “tough on crime” laws that sent more people to prison and kept them there longer, local, state, and federal governments have scrambled to keep pace with expanding levels of incarceration and increasingly overcrowded prisons, thereby facilitating a prison construction boom. Though this boom peaked in the 1990s, the monumental expansion of prisons continues to reshape landscapes across the United States and now affects extended families and encompasses entire neighborhoods and communities. It also raises a series of pressing questions about where to

locate prisons, how to fund prison building, and what the human costs of this growth are.

Prison construction has boomed particularly in rural communities. An average of 25 new rural prisons opened *each year* in the 1990s, leading to the siting of 350 new rural prisons.⁴ During the 1990s, a new prison opened within rural America every fifteen days.⁵ Why are so many prisons located in rural America? Many rural communities are negotiating the economic changes outlined above, as they also confront severely limited budgets, declining tax revenue, a less diversified economy, and restricted employment opportunities.

As certain rural economies languish and prison construction continues to expand, prisons have emerged as a “recession-proof” opportunity for communities seeking industrial investment and job creation and have become an increasingly common component of economic growth initiatives. In fact, some rural communities actively recruit prisons, utilizing tax breaks, land, infrastructural guarantees, and series of other incentives to secure public and private prison bids.

These trends are playing out in important ways in Washington, Oregon, and Montana as each state has expe-

rienced substantial prison development in rural communities. For example, in Ridge County, Montana, town leaders in Carson worked hard to recruit a prison as the solution to a depressed local economy, high unemployment, and deep poverty. Ultimately, rather than creating local economic growth, their efforts have greatly damaged the sense of community and created more questions about the area's economic future.

In Montana, the already volatile nature of agriculture and ranching has been compounded by increased flows of wheat and beef from Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that have driven down prices for local ranchers.⁶ Additionally, there was a 24 percent decrease in the state's mining firms between 1992 and 2002 (U.S. Bureau of the Census). Ridge County, in the eastern part of the state, is experiencing these restructurings acutely.

Ridge County's history is shaped by the colonization of its indigenous peoples, struggles over land and resources, racial inequality, and persistent poverty. Nearly two-thirds of the county is designated as tribal land. Despite its small population of just over 3,000, inequality is conspicuous. Like other reservation counties, the area has some of the most historically entrenched levels of poverty in the state and, indeed, in the nation. The county's 2005 poverty rate stood at 29 percent, more than double the national poverty rate of 12.4 percent, or the state rate of 14 percent.⁷

These economic forces—a depressed local economy and deeply entrenched poverty—set the stage for a proposed prison in the town of Carson. Faced with declines in primary industries and few amenities to compete with more scenic, gentrifying areas in the state, town leaders in Carson try to recruit any kind of investment they can. Rural communities like Carson have become dumping grounds as a consequence. Community leaders work to loosen environmental, zoning, and labor restrictions in order to attract any industrial development at all, thus bringing in prisons, corporate dairies and hog farms, toxic waste storage, and food processing and animal slaughtering plants. This results in a race to the bottom, wherein leaders pursue

competitive, pro-growth economic development projects at any cost, resulting in dramatic economic shifts, undesirable employment opportunities, and fewer living wage jobs. Ironically, leaders build support for these projects by emphasizing job creation and employment growth.

Ridge County has been the potential site for two private corrections facilities in the past decade. Just a decade earlier, the community was nearly selected as the location for a new state prison to be managed by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). However, county commissioners, representing their largely tribal constituency, prohibited the prison from moving forward on county land just outside of Carson. More recently, local officials were approached by yet another private corrections corporation with a feasibility study highlighting the appropriateness of Carson for a correctional facility. Ultimately, town leaders did further efforts to build a 464-bed detention center, despite having no secured inmate contracts with the state of Montana. The proposed institution was to bring 110 new jobs to the area, and research participants repeatedly said that the prison was “strictly an economic development project.”⁸

With construction complete and employees in place, the facility was scheduled to open in August of 2007. However, the detention center continues to sit empty as Carson struggles to obtain inmate contracts, with a \$27 million bond that went into default shortly after the facility was to be opened in 2007. Although the community and the private firm had tentative assurance that the Department of Corrections would need the space, this agreement collapsed after the election of a new governor in 2005. In efforts to address the lack of inmates, the private correctional company has been seeking out-of-state contracts. However, later in 2007, the Montana State attorney general ruled that the facility cannot legally house out-of-state inmates. Since then, town officials have made offers to host ever more politically marginalized populations, such as high-level sex offenders and including the 240-detainees from the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center.

As Carson's local officials struggle with the disastrous

outcome of their prison development efforts, the barbed wire–surrounded facility sits empty, literally in the middle of town. Meanwhile, Ridge County’s poverty rate continues to soar, unemployment rates climb, and service providers struggle to offer much needed provisions to the community’s growing numbers of people in need. Carson, now burdened with a debt that it cannot pay, continues to seek inmates through a series of increasingly desperate efforts. Sadly, those suffering most from the prison development efforts are the poorest community members.

MIGRANT WORKERS IN DUMPING GROUNDS

One of the most paradigmatic examples of rural inequality is the dependence of modern agriculture, food processing, and tree-planting industries on low-wage, immigrant (usually Latino) labor. Dependence on Latino farmworkers in the Pacific Northwest reaches back to the 1942 Bracero Program, which brought 47,000 Mexican workers to the region to harvest crops that threatened to spoil because of World War II labor shortages. Historically, most of these workers migrated seasonally and were largely invisible to

4.6 Map of northwestern Oregon showing northern Willamette Valley, Woodburn, and Portland. The top-five farmworker-receiving counties in the state are highlighted.



4.7 Downtown Woodburn, 2004. Photo by Vicky Lawson.

predominantly white, rural communities. This invisibility stemmed not only from the temporary nature of their presence but from the spatial containment of farmworkers in isolated labor camps. Starting in the early 1980s, however, a growing number of these workers began to settle permanently in the region. By the 1990s and beyond, the figure of the male and migrant (seasonal) farmworker was largely (although not completely) replaced by farmworker *families* who were settling in small and medium-sized rural towns and communities throughout the Northwest. These resident farmworkers—a broad term used to refer to workers on farms, in food processing facilities, and in tree-planting operations—transformed the cultural, social, and political landscapes of the rural Northwest in ways often predicated on their continued socioeconomic marginalization and exclusion from dominant understandings of place and belonging (see fig. 4.6).

The influx of Latinos and struggles over housing and services in Woodburn, Oregon, a small city located at the heart of the agriculturally rich northern Willamette Valley (fig. 4.7), provides another example of a dumping ground landscape, one which illustrates tensions around race, poverty, and belonging. Around Woodburn, the demand for farmworkers expanded dramatically in the 1970s and into the 1980s as new labor-intensive industries emerged (e.g.,

4.8 Migrant farmworker housing, ca. 1965-68. The Valley Migrant League photograph collection. Reproduced with permission from the Oregon Historical Society.



greenhouse and nursery crops) or old industries expanded (canning, food processing, tree planting). A growing range of rural employers began actively to recruit Mexican workers because immigrant workers—particularly undocumented ones—were less expensive and less able to contest working conditions.

The movement of farmworkers into Woodburn and other nearby towns overwhelmed the existing housing stock. Landlords took advantage of the situation and often charged rent on a per-room basis, crowding several families into single-family housing. Farmworker families were paying several hundred dollars to live in a garage, for example. The local newspaper, the *Woodburn Independent*, ran numerous stories in the late 1980s on the overcrowded and often dangerous housing conditions in many neighborhoods. In 1990 the city government organized a “Livability Forum,” which according to the newspaper was inundated by a crowd of “angry citizens.”

In response to this crisis, the Farmworker Housing Development Corporation (FHDC) was founded in 1991 by activists who were involved in a range of farmworker advo-

cacy organizations. These activists realized that a crucial issue in their broader goal to protect the rights and health of farmworkers was access to decent, safe, and affordable housing located—they were very explicit on this point—*within city limits*. They were determined to claim a space of belonging for farmworkers in the community and to undermine the labor camp as the assumed place “out there” for farmworkers (see fig. 4.8). Eventually they set their sights on a city-owned piece of property within walking distance of downtown Woodburn, on which to build the Nuevo Amanecer (New Dawn) complex.

However, the city council, the mayor, and a group of vocal citizens fought for over a year to prevent FHDC from buying the property. The city relented only after the state of Oregon threatened to revoke its eligibility for additional community development block grants. Although race and the migration status of farmworkers were never explicitly mentioned during these hearings, analysis of transcripts and interviews with key actors suggested that race, “illegality,” and class haunted these debates that were framed as being about “taxpayer rights.” Such issues emerged more explicitly a year later when anonymous hate mail was sent to an FHDC

neighbor describing Nuevo Amanecer in this way:

The Mexicans are going to have a housing project in Woodburn, right across the street from the high school where their gangs can freely mingle with our kids. . . . The Mexicans will work the summer season and then spend the winters in living quarters built for them with our money.⁹

State-sanctioned and subsidized farmworker housing within Woodburn's city limits legitimized the presence of farmworkers in town, something that was an affront to some of the town's white residents even if the city's budget would benefit from the transaction and it would alleviate a very visible housing crisis.

Two years later, FHDC purchased a vacant lot across from the Woodburn City Hall, in the heart of downtown, in order to build a new complex, Esperanza (Hope) Court. During the intervening years, Nuevo Amanecer was an exemplary housing complex, including national recognition for its design and participatory governance structure. Laudatory articles in the *Woodburn Independent* seemed to suggest that the fears expressed by some had been unfounded: Nuevo Amanecer was a big success for the residents and larger community alike. Yet once again, FHDC experienced significant opposition to their new project on the part of the planning commission, city council, and some residents.

The struggle over Esperanza Court came to a head during a city council hearing in October 1996. Supporters, including farmworkers, activists, advocates, and health-care workers, highlighted the difficulty workers had finding decent housing. While opponents acknowledged the need for housing, they argued that *this* was not the appropriate location for farmworker housing. Although the speakers did not articulate *where* they thought farmworker families and housing belonged, perhaps they were harkening back to a time when the social spaces of farmworker were more fully contained within labor camps—beyond city boundaries and out of sight. The impassioned speeches by opponents about the future of Woodburn and its property values were made in vain, as the city attorney advised that any action other

than approval would be overturned in court. The council voted to approve the plan.

The struggles over Nuevo Amanecer and Esperanza Court brought out competing visions of place, race, and belonging in Woodburn during a period of rapid demographic change. The effort to build safe and affordable housing for farmworkers in Woodburn sheds light on ongoing and future struggles over race and belonging in the region.

Unseen Grounds

Unseen grounds are the forgotten, invisible, rural places of the Northwest. Examples are Musselshell and Golden Valley counties in Montana; areas in northeastern Washington State; and parts of southern Idaho. They are marked by shuttered shops, dying small towns, and out-migration in the wake of the decline in natural resource extraction through logging and mining. These places may face environmental problems of declining water quality or soil fertility as a result of historic forms of resource extraction. They are the marginalized environments of struggling small ranches and low-paid service sector employment, offering little economic opportunity for young families for a sustained quality of life.

4.9 Main Street in “unseen grounds,” eastern Montana. Photo by Vicky Lawson.



Unseen grounds also possess unconventional forms of beauty, but these are effectively invisible because of economic and social marginalization. These spaces can be the arid landscapes of sagebrush and antelope, of rolling hills unfolding beneath brilliant blue skies that stretch endlessly overhead. But unseen grounds are not destination points for tourists; they are the bypassed and invisible spaces in the New West. Unseen grounds have negative population growth: they are disappearing communities (see table 4.1). In the Pacific Northwest we find many “unseen” counties concentrated in rural eastern Montana, where fragile ecologies and disappearing investments are expressed by stores lining Main Streets that are closed and shuttered (fig. 4.9). Simulated pearl necklaces and birthday cards still on display in the window of one general store are covered with dust, cobwebs, and grit.

We call these places “unseen grounds” because they are off the grid. They are far away from and inaccessible to, major transport routes and established recreation resorts and they are sparsely populated and politically marginalized. In addition, these places remain reliant on politically unpopular mining and logging activities. These are vulnerable environments, with harsh seasons, that have been historically damaged by efforts at economic development that led to pollution of groundwater and intensive agriculture that eroded unirrigated and fragile lands. These areas, where local economies remain heavily dependent upon ranching and small farms, have the highest rates of poverty (fig. 4.10).

Residents frequent the local bars and cafes but travel to larger towns and Wal-Mart centers for groceries, medicines, and jobs. Individual efforts to revive community businesses have failed, and small grocery stores and small cafes off the major highways display For Sale signs. Individual businessmen and artisans employ the Internet to advertise and sell their products around the country. There may not be adequate, potable water available despite large amounts of cheap land and willing, cheap labor. Highways encourage residents to drive elsewhere to shop and pursue recreational activities. Leaders are dispirited, unengaged, or lacking in vision. Community activists work toward



4.10 Dryland farming in southern Idaho. Photo by Vicky Lawson.

visions of a different future but are cynical about resident apathy and disengagement.

Residents acknowledge that most people in their communities are poor. Employment opportunities are extremely constrained here. Most residents commute to work in larger, nearby towns. The best that community leaders hope for is that economic development and growth occur nearby and that their communities will develop into bedroom communities serving larger areas with cheap labor and cheaper housing. A social service provider remarks that “the poor are us.” This solidarity with the very poor stood out in our research, because in other areas with high Latino poverty, whites whom we interviewed focused on differences rather than alliances.

Rethinking the Rural Northwest

Wealth and poverty, work and leisure, and the beauty of the valleys, mountains, lakes, and coastlines of the American West are woven through three distinctive landscapes that contain economic development trajectories fueled by neoliberal economic policy and that racialize rural poverty in different ways. The New West is indeed booming, as witnessed by rapid urbanization and growth in rural areas and playgrounds, but it also contains spaces of deep

vulnerability and want in areas we call unseen grounds and dumping grounds. Our typology of rural places in the Pacific Northwest suggests that rural impoverishment is the recent result of economic restructuring and the movement away from historical forms of rural employment and development to new forms exemplified by playgrounds and wealthy and middle-class landscape consumption emanating from Seattle. Dumping grounds hew the neoliberal line of development and attempt to woo any investments in manufacturing or agriculture to their regions, but this time it is the forms of business that no one else wants in their backyards. Unseen grounds are areas that are transforming and disappearing from both iconic and economic development images.

Poverty unfolds unevenly in all of these places, and is most visible in places that travelers to the New West will never see. But even though poverty may be denied and invisible in rural spaces, it is indeed substantially present in the rural New West. Dumping grounds and unseen grounds exist on the peripheries of our collective visions of the West. They reveal that rural poverty is not just present in the Mississippi Delta, Appalachia, or Native American reservations of the Southwest, but that it also occurs in regions that are celebrated as economic development success stories. Certainly the greater metropolitan region of Seattle is seen as this kind of success story, as are its regional and rural playgrounds and sites of agro-tourism, such as the nationally known ski resorts of Idaho and Montana and the vineyards of Washington. It is important to acknowledge that sociospatial trajectories of urbanization, rural restructuring, and the movements of money, agricultural productions, and farm and food workers between the city and the countryside bind Seattle and rural landscapes together so that poverty and wealth and the city and the country remain always linked, both seen and unseen.

income is derived from farm activities, or at least 15 percent of employment is in agriculture.

- 2 See <http://www.destination360.com/north-america/us/washington/methow-valley-wa> (accessed 9/28/09).
- 3 Bruce Western, *Punishment and Inequality in America* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 2006).
- 4 C. Beale, "Cellular Rural Development: New Prisons in Rural and Small Town Areas in the 1990s." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Rural Sociology Society, Albuquerque, NM, August 18, 2001.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 S. Gallaher, "Farmers Warned to Be Aware of Stress and Economic Turmoil." *The Associated Press state and local wire*, Helena, Montana. December 18, 1998. LexisNexisAcademic.
- 7 U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Economic Census, 1992, 1997, 2002*. <http://www.census.gov/econ/census02>.
- 8 Personal communication, 2006.
- 9 G. Rede, "Woodburn Police Investigate Anti-Hispanic Letter," *The Oregonian*, March 19, 1993, 5.

NOTES

- 1 Farm-dependent counties are identified by the Department of Agriculture as those in which 15 percent of