interesting book, which contains so many shrewd and useful points: Chisholm’s discussion of truth in Chapter 7 seems to me to make not quite a traditional mountain but a semi-traditional molehill out of something that is flat. He says that the question “What is Truth?” is easy to answer if we make a certain metaphysical assumption, otherwise not. The assumption is that states of affairs may be said to exist or not to exist; and that every belief or assertion, with certain exceptions dealt with separately, is a belief or assertion to the effect that a certain state of affairs exists. We can then explain truth by saying that a statement is true provided that the state of affairs, whose existence it asserts, exists.

For some reason Chisholm adds, “It is true that a given state of affairs exists, provided that the state of affairs exists.” Yes, but by the same token it is true that a given soil sample is acid provided that the soil sample is acid; true that all men are mortal provided that all men are mortal; and in general true that \( p \) provided that \( p \). So why not just explain truth in that way in the first place? (This Ramseyean or redundancy account does not get a mention in the chapter.)

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The concept of pleasure has been philosophically problematic, according to the author, since the time of Socrates. But philosophy has failed to give an adequate account of pleasure, he feels, because “the investigation of pleasure has been subordinated to the formulation of moral or motivational theories” (p. 10). This book represents Perry’s attempt to consider the question “What is pleasure?” independent of a formulation of such theories and to arrive at a satisfactory answer in the form of a definition of pleasure. In the end, two definitions are offered, for it turns out that there are two radically different notions of pleasure—that of enjoyment and that of being pleased about. All these have in common, according to Perry, is that they are both “non-conative pro-attitudes” (p. 217), and this common feature is not characteristic of pleasure alone. Thus there can be no single definition of pleasure.

The definitions that Perry offers are not stated first and then tested; rather, they emerge as the result of a lengthy and careful examination of the concept of pleasure. Perry starts out by defending (in a rather
unconvincing way, I’m afraid) the “linguistic” method as a way of answering the question “What is pleasure?” and then spends a chapter discussing the ordinary uses of the word “pleasure,” its cognates and its synonyms. The view that pleasure is a sensation or feeling is briefly exhumed and then reinterred. The objections Perry offers to this view are familiar: sensations, unlike pleasure, have bodily location; pleasure requires “something that gives pleasure,” but “it is logically possible that organic sensations should occur without being caused” (p. 96); a feeling, unlike pleasure, is the sort of thing that can be enjoyed.

The two chapters of greatest interest and importance are those dealing with the cognitive aspects of pleasure and with pleasure as a reason for acting. In these chapters Perry discusses the extent to which belief is involved in pleasure, the notion of a “false pleasure,” the relation between taking pleasure in something and thinking it a good thing, one’s knowledge of one’s own pleasure, and the ways in which pleasure can be given as a reason for acting. In his discussion of these topics he carefully distinguishes between pleasure as enjoyment and pleasure as being pleased about.

It is this distinction that is crucial for almost everything Perry has to say. The major differences he notes between enjoyment and being pleased about are these: what one enjoys is a present happening (or something intimately connected with a present happening), whereas what one is pleased about is a fact, or something believed to be a fact; enjoyment is nonevaluative (one need not think that what one is enjoying is a good thing) whereas being pleased about is positively evaluative (being pleased that \( p \) entails believing that \( p \) is, at least in part, a good thing). Part of what is involved in the first point is this: enjoying \( x \) entails that \( x \) exists, whereas being pleased that \( p \) does not entail that \( p \); it only entails believing that \( p \). I am not sure whether this is the right way of distinguishing between these two forms of pleasure, but a distinction surely needs to be drawn, and it is a virtue of Perry’s discussion of pleasure that the distinction is always kept clearly in mind.

Unfortunately, Perry suffers somewhat from the fairly common philosophical disorder of trying to force troublesome examples into a preconceived mold. For example, he wants to defend the general thesis that the object of enjoyment must be something which actually exists or occurs. He then sees that he will have to accommodate cases in which what is enjoyed is part of a dream, delusion, or hallucination. But the events in a dream are only dream events, not real ones; so what actual object does the man who is having an enjoyable dream enjoy? Perry’s answer is that he enjoys dreaming (p. 115). This answer is unsatisfactory.
for more reasons than I can go into here. It might be thought that Perry can remedy the situation by saying, as he does later (p. 131), that enjoying $x$ also entails believing that $x$ exists or is taking place. But this only invites further difficulties. Thus, consider his example of the character in *Arsenic and Old Lace* who, with obvious enjoyment, "runs up the stairs in the belief that he is charging San Juan Hill" (p. 114). What is he enjoying? According to Perry, it will have to be something that actually is taking place and that the man believes is taking place. So it cannot be charging San Juan Hill that the man enjoys, for he is not actually doing that, nor can it be running up the stairs that the man enjoys, for he does not believe that he is doing that. We will have to find, I suppose, some description which fits both what the man is doing and what he takes himself to be doing, and say that that description describes what the man enjoys. But this is unsatisfactory; in this case we would have to say that what the man enjoys is just *running*, and it is doubtful that this is what he enjoys. And there may well be cases in which there is no common description which fits both what the man is doing and what he takes himself to be doing.

This would lead one to suspect that Perry is in something of a muddle over the notion of an *object of enjoyment*, and I think this is actually the case. He introduces this important notion in an attempt to distinguish between enjoyment and sensations (a use to which it can well be put) and quickly shows that he does not know what to do with it. Thus, he writes (p. 96): "Pleasure is logically dependent upon there being something that gives pleasure; it is logically possible that organic sensations should occur without being caused." This seems to me to be true but irrelevant. It is logically possible, too, for there to be *pleasure* which is not caused. Admittedly, the differences between the *cause* and *object* of pleasure may be difficult to make out, but the distinction is completely overlooked by Perry.

The generally solid and careful work in the book is occasionally marred by odd claims and careless analyses. For example, in elaborating on his view that being pleased that $p$ entails believing that $p$, Perry notes that since "‘believes’ generates non-extensional contexts, if we truly say a person believes that some specific thing exists or occurred, it must be the case that the person believes that the thing has the nature and/or identity indicated by our way of referring to it" (p. 141). This may be correct, but Perry goes on to gloss it by saying that "Smith believes that an inheritance exists" entails "Smith believes with regard to the thing he believes exists that it is an inheritance." This clearly will not do. The analysis apparently comes to this:
there is something such that Smith believes it exists and Smith believes it is an inheritance. We are then in the embarrassing position of having to ask what thing it is about which Smith holds these two beliefs, when there may not be any such thing, although Smith may indeed believe that an inheritance exists. Perhaps a more charitable way of understanding Perry’s analysis is this: Smith believes that something exists which he believes to be an inheritance. But now, with the quantifier safely imbedded in the “belief” context, the “double-belief” analysis is otiose, coming to no more than: Smith believes that there is an inheritance. There is still another difficulty with Perry’s analysis, for he presumably intends it to apply to all “belief” contexts, and it will surely fail in case the context is, at least partly, extensional. Thus, consider: “Smith believes that what Jones painted is a genuine Picasso.” Presumably, this sentence would be used to mean: Smith believes, with regard to what Jones painted, that it is a genuine Picasso. But à la Perry we get: Smith believes, with regard to the thing he believes Jones to have painted, that it is a genuine Picasso. It is unlikely that this is what Smith believes.

On page 190 we learn, with some surprise, that “one logically cannot be pleased about one’s own deliberate actions.” This is untenable. I surely can be pleased that I attended a certain concert (whether or not I enjoyed it), and it is surely a deliberate action on my part about which I am pleased. It is not enough to qualify the view, as Perry does, by allowing that one can be pleased about the success of one’s action, for I need not be pleased that I succeeded in attending the concert—it may have taken no effort at all for me to attend. The reason given in support of this odd claim is that what one is pleased about must be news to one, and one’s own acts cannot be such news (p. 177). But this is not adequate support, even on Perry’s grounds. For his claim that what one is pleased about must be news to one is based on the view that what one is pleased about must be a fact with which one is fairly recently acquainted (p. 146), not on the view that what one is pleased about must be something about which one has found out or been informed.

Perry spends a good deal of time discussing and criticizing the views of other philosophers who have written on pleasure (Ryle, Thalberg, Bedford, Williams, et al.) and he seems to me to be at his best in this critical role. But his own positive contributions, for the most part, do not rise to this level. One notable exception is his brief discussion of knowledge of one’s own pleasure, in which he argues convincingly that one can be mistaken about whether one is pleased or is enjoying. This is first-rate. But while there are moments of enlightenment, the
work as a whole is something of a disappointment. The problematic concept of pleasure remains to be satisfactorily elucidated.

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The aim of Mr. Soltis’ book is to “provide a linguistic framework free from ambiguity and conceptual confusion useful to further theoretical discussions of the phenomena of visual perception.” His stated method is twofold: “first to examine ordinary usage in our ‘perception language’” and “second to analyse ordinary perceptual situations and to provide new terminology or significant distinctions.” A hoped-for result of his work is to show its relevance to “educational practices and purposes.”

The study is divided into three parts: a general examination of the notion of seeing; an inquiry into the relations between knowing and seeing in cases where seeing has been “successful” (that is, “one has formed a true belief with respect to what one sees”); and an inquiry into the ideas involved in seeing and believing when “seeing has failed to bring about a true belief with respect to what is seen.”

After a three-chapter critical exposition of the views of Ryle, Hanson (allegedly based partly on Wittgenstein), and Price, the first part ends with Soltis’ own analysis. According to this there are “four basic ways in which the general term ‘seeing’ is literally used in ordinary discourse”—namely: (i) “simple seeing” (that is, “to mean that the visual discrimination of some physical object has occurred,” without any implication that a person realizes what he has seen); (ii) “successful seeing” (that is, “to mean that A is right” in what he believes that he has seen); (iii) “failure in seeing” (that is, “to mean that A is wrong” in what he believes that he has seen); and (iv) “failure to see” (that is, “we use ‘seeing’ in the negative sense to indicate that he has not visually discriminated a physical object”). Soltis adds further subdivisions to encompass what, following Ryle, he calls “seeing”—for example, “seeing” spots, “seeing” pink rats, and so forth.

Part II of the book (Chs. 5 and 6), devoted to “successful seeing,” investigates the relation between knowing and seeing. This includes