Mme. de Vogel takes to be "The Doctrines"—that is to say, the "unwritten doctrines"—that are Plato's and that constitute Platonism: the metaphysical principles of the One (or First or Good) and the Dyad (or Being), the third hypostasis, nous, the account of human nature that follows from this, and its implications for the human moral situation. The volume concludes with an "Analytical Contents" which gives some guidance to the arguments of the individual essays, but there is neither the Index nor the Bibliography of works cited that would make this volume more useful to those who are not immersed in these discussions already.

One might complain about the (perhaps) excessive positivity of some of Mme. de Vogel's judgments; especially on the crucial issue of whether, as against Cherniss and certain others, there were any unwritten doctrines. She notes his contrary opinion, but virtually ignores the arguments in support of it. And that is the general tenor of the various essays; her 'rethinking' leads her to revise or retract none of her previous judgments. Yet her positions, even when one wants to disagree with them, are based on a deep and thorough knowledge of the texts and bespeak an intelligence that is at once clear, exact, genteel, and sympathetic. Our discussions of these issues will be the poorer for her absence.

Gerald A. Press

Hunter College, City University of New York


Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is a translator's nightmare. The crabbed and compressed Greek text defies accurate rendering into graceful English. A smooth and unambiguous translation will surely fail to be neutral on points of interpretation. In pursuit of neutrality one must be relentlessly literal, and that is the option Furth has chosen in this new translation of four of the central books of the *Metaphysics*. The result, as Furth notes, is not pretty. Indeed, an ancestor of the present volume, in underground circulation a decade ago, came to be called *The Eek Papers*, since it was written in "a vernacular neither English nor Greek" (vi).

One hopes that philosophically serious but Greekless readers will not be frightened off, for this translation will bring them closer to Aristotle's original than any yet produced. It will not replace the great Ross translation (of course it is not intended to), but can justly take its place alongside it; the reader of one will surely want to consult the other.

In addition to the translation, Furth has provided a glossary of key terms (both Greek-to-Eek and Eek-to-Greek), an analytical table of contents, and a rather sparse (38 pages) set of notes. Flags are set in the text to signal the first occurrence of terms included in the glossary and to mark passages discussed in the notes.

A literal translation aims to present just what the author said without prejudicing the issue of what he meant, where that is subject to varying interpretations. In the case of a philosophical text, where disputes over interpretation are common even when translation is not an issue, literalness is crucial. But it is important to realize that literalness is an
ideal that can at best be approximated. There is often no way to preserve an original's
vagueness or ambiguity no matter how literal one tries to be, and one must regularly
choose among variant manuscript readings. In such cases the translator is forced to
decide what the author meant before beginning to record what he said.

A good example of this can be found in Furth’s translation of Z6 1031b27–28.
Aristotle is explaining why the pale in one sense is, and in another is not, the same as its
essence. The text, in all but one manuscript, reads: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ οὖ ταῦτα, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταῦτα. One manuscript has τὸ (nominative) in place of
the second τῶ (dative), and Alexander reads τὸ for the first τῶ also. Furth, although he
does not note a deviation, apparently (and wrongly, I think) follows Alexander. He takes
the dative nouns (e.g., τὸ ἀνθρώπω) to be elliptical for Aristotle’s canonical way of
referring to essences (e.g., τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἴναι), and so translates: “For the essence of man
and the essence of pale men [sic] are not the same, but it [pale] is the same as the essence
of the affliction [pale].” This leaves Aristotle’s argument obscure at best, for there is no
obvious connection between the essence of man and the issue at hand. But if we follow the
manuscript tradition, we must take the implied subject to be the τὸ τί ἐν εἴναι of the
previous clause and the datives to be governed by ταῦτα; the καί, I would suggest, is
epexegetic. The line then reads: “For it [sc. the essence of pale] is not the same as the
man, i.e., the pale man, but it is the same as the attribute [pallor].” So construed,
Aristotle’s argument is lucid: to leukon, he has told us (1031b23) is ambiguous as between
pallor and the pale [thing]. Pallor is an attribute and the pale [thing] is, in this case, a (pale)
man; the first; but not the second, is the same as the essence of leukon. Hence, whether or
not to leukon is the same as its essence depends on which way we mean to leukon.

The book is nicely produced (as we have come to expect from its publisher),
although it would have benefited from a brisk final editing. Most of the errors I
detected involve omissions that are likely to bewilder the graduate and undergraduate
students who constitute the primary intended audience. Some examples: (1) a sub-
scripted “d” is attached to key occurrences of the dative case (as in “being pale,” when it
means “essence of pale”), and this is explained in the notes. Soon, however, other
subscripts begin to appear, but no explanation is offered, and no consistent one comes
readily to mind. (2) In a few cases, an English term flagged for glossary entry can be
found (by looking in the Greek glossary) only by one who already knows what Greek
term it translates. (3) Joseph Owens’s classic The Doctrine of Being in Aristotle’s Metaphys-
ics, second edition, is cited simply as “Owens DOB.” (4) The notes are uneven in both
quality and quantity. There are gems of exegesis (e.g., ad 1032a11) but also occasional
lapses into self-indulgence (e.g., ad 1056b31). Students will be disappointed that so
many passages receive no comment. (5) Rendering pathos as “affliction” is perversely
literalistic. In Aristotle the term is a semi-technical piece of jargon, usually (and preferably)
translated “attribute,” as the passage quoted above illustrates.

But these complaints are minor when compared with the value of Furth’s achieve-
ment. Every serious student of Aristotle’s Metaphysics should be grateful for the avail-
ability of this useful volume.

S. Marc Cohen

University of Washington