Grice and Code on IZZing and HAZZing

The distinction

Paul Grice\(^1\) and Alan Code\(^2\) have come up with a useful terminology with which to express a key distinction that Aristotle introduces in the *Categories* and continues to use in later works. The distinction is between *essential* and *accidental* predication.

According to Aristotle, *animal* is predicated essentially of *human*, and both *animal* and *human* are predicated essentially of the individual human, Callias. Similarly, *virtue* is predicated essentially of *bravery*, and both *virtue* and *bravery* are predicated essentially of various individual virtues, such as one that inheres in Callias.

On the other hand, we can predicate *bravery* not just of an instance of virtue that inheres in Callias, but of Callias himself. (We can say not only that one of Callias’s virtues is bravery, but that Callias—since he is brave—is an instance of bravery.) But predicating *bravery* of Callias is what Aristotle would call accidental predication. So Callias is essentially a human being and an animal, but accidentally brave.

The *Categories* terminology

In the *Categories*, Aristotle uses the technical terms *SAID OF* and *IN* to express this distinction. He would say: *animal* is *SAID OF* *human*, and both *animal* and *human* are *SAID OF* Callias. In other words, the *SAID OF* relation holds between a universal and something that falls beneath it in the same category. Similarly, *virtue* is *SAID OF* *bravery*, and both *virtue* and *bravery* are *SAID OF* an instance of virtue that inheres in Callias. On the other hand, neither *virtue* nor *bravery* is *SAID OF* Callias. Rather, *bravery* is *IN* Callias, and *virtue* is *IN* Callias.

In other words *x* is *SAID OF* *y* is the converse of *y* is essentially *x* (*x* is *SAID OF* *y* iff *y* is essentially *x*), and *x* is *IN* *y* is the converse of *y* is accidentally *x* (*x* is *IN* *y* iff *y* is accidentally *x*).

Notice that when we express the fact that *bravery* is *IN* Callias by means of a sentence in ordinary English (or Greek, for that matter) we would say “Callias is brave” rather than “Callias is bravery.” This is the phenomenon Aristotle calls *paronymy* (*Cat.* 1a12-15). The entities involved in this predication are a substance (Callias) and a quality (bravery); but


instead of using the name of the quality ("bravery") we use a *paronym* of it ("brave") in our linguistic predication. The point is that although the two predications "Callias is human" and "Callias is brave" are superficially similar, the underlying ontological relations are different. *Human* is *said of* Callias but not *in* Callias; *bravery* is *in* Callias but not *said of* Callias.

Aristotle also notes *(Cat. 2a29-33)* that sometimes the point about paronymy may be obscured by the linguistic oddity that the *name* of the entity that is *in* a subject and the *adjective* that we use to characterize it are the same. Just as we characterize someone as brave if the virtue bravery is *in* him, so we characterize a body as white if the color white is *in* it. In English ("white"), as in Greek ("*leukon"), the same word is both the name of a quality and an adjective that characterizes something so qualified. This might create the illusion that *white* is *said of* a body (in the way that *bravery* is *said of* a certain virtue or *human* is *said of* a certain animal). But *white* is not *said of* a body, since “the definition of white is never predicated of body” *(Cat. 2a-34)*. This gives us necessary and sufficient conditions (in terms of linguistic predication) for the (ontological) *said of* relation:

\[ x \text{ is said of } y \text{ iff both the name of } x \text{ and the definition of } x \text{ are predicated of } y. \]

**The Grice-Code terminology**

Grice made up the verb “to *IZZ*” for Aristotle’s idea of essential predication. So, Grice would express the fact that *y* is predicated essentially of *x* by saying that *x* *IZZ*es *y*. He uses the verb “to *HAZZ*” for Aristotle’s idea of accidental predication, and would express the fact that *y* is predicated accidentally of *x* by saying that *x* *HAZZ*es *y*. (Note that ‘IZZ’ and ‘HAZZ’ are regular verbs: “*I* *IZZ*, *you* *IZZ*, *she* *IZZes*, …, *I* *HAZZ*, *you* *HAZZ*, *he* *HAZZes*, …” etc.). Code doesn’t use the made-up words *IZZ* and *HAZZ*; he prefers the capitalized words “*Be*” and “*Have*” as technical terms with the same meaning.

So *said of* and *IZZ* are converses: *x* is said of *y* iff *y* *IZZes* *x*. Likewise, *in* and *HAZZ* are converses: *x* is in *y* iff *y* *HAZZes* *x*.

Here is the way Aristotle’s claims, above, would be expressed in the language of *IZZ*ing and *HAZZ*ing:

**Aristotle’s claim**

- Human is *said of* Callias.
- Animal is *said of* Callias.
- Animal is *said of* human.
- Virtue is *said of* bravery.
- Bravery is *in* Callias
- Virtue is *in* Callias.

**In *IZZ*- *HAZZ* terminology**

- Callias *IZZes* human.
- Callias *IZZes* animal.
- Human *IZZes* animal.
- Bravery *IZZes* virtue.
- Callias *HAZZes* bravery.
- Callias *HAZZes* virtue.

Notice that nothing ever *IZZes* what it *HAZZes* or *HAZZes* what it *IZZes*. Callias *IZZes* human, but he does not *HAZZ* human; Callias *HAZZes* bravery, but he does not *IZZ* bravery. Note too
that IZZing is not identity: Human IZZes animal, but human ≠ animal. Identity might be defined, however, as reciprocal IZZing:

\[ x = y \text{ iff } x \text{ IZZes } y \text{ & } y \text{ IZZes } x \]

**Some further ramifications**

Notice that the logical properties of IZZing and HAZZing are different. IZZing is transitive—if \( x \) IZZes \( y \) and \( y \) IZZes \( z \), then \( x \) IZZes \( z \). (If Callias is human and a human is an animal, then Callias is an animal; if something belongs to a species, it belongs to every genus under which that species falls.) But HAZZing is not transitive: Callias HAZZes bravery, but he does not HAZZ all of bravery’s accidental attributes—e.g., the attribute of having been exemplified at the battle of Thermopylae. Likewise, IZZing is reflexive (for every \( x \), \( x \) IZZes \( x \)) but HAZZing is not—Callias does not HAZZ Callias, nor does bravery HAZZ bravery.\(^3\)

(If these claims, or any of the following, seem dubious to you, try to think them through and figure out why they are true.)

The reason why Callias IZZes animal is that he IZZes human, and human IZZes animal. So we may generalize and say that when \( x \) IZZes \( y \), it follows that \( x \) IZZes something that IZZes \( y \). In other words, if \( x \) IZZes \( y \), then \( \exists z (x \text{ IZZes } z \& z \text{ IZZes } y) \).

Likewise, the reason why Callias HAZZes virtue is that he HAZZes bravery, and bravery IZZes virtue. Again, we may generalize and say that when \( x \) HAZZes \( y \), it follows that \( x \) HAZZes something that IZZes \( y \). In other words, if \( x \) HAZZes \( y \), then \( \exists z (x \text{ HAZZes } z \& z \text{ IZZes } y) \).

Notice an important upshot of this: every predication, even accidental predication, implicitly involves some kind of essential predication (i.e., classification). In “Callias IZZes human” it is there explicitly. But in “Callias HAZZes bravery” it is there implicitly: Callias HAZZes something that IZZes bravery. That is, Callias is (accidentally) brave because something that happens to inhere in him is (essentially) an instance of bravery. To put the point another way: when we predicate human of Callias, we are classifying him by means of an essential predicate of his. And when we predicate bravery of Callias, we are classifying one of his qualities by means of an essential predicate of that quality.

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\(^3\) The idea that “bravery HAZZes bravery” is often attributed to Plato (and called the “literal self-predication” of Platonic Forms).