

eastern and southern Manchuria, and that is the region where Kim Il Sung proved himself. Kim is one of the better-known Korean guerrilla leaders, but there were others equally, if not more, famous among the Koreans, and in fact many were Kim's superiors and close comrades at one time or another. There were Yi Hong-gwang, An Pong-hak, Chu Chin, Kim Ch'aek, Yi Hak-man, Ch'oe Yong-gön, Ch'oe Hyön, and Chön Kwang, to mention only a few. Some of them fought in different regions, and Kim may not have had personal contacts, but he knew of their guerrilla activities.

Many members of the various units were killed by the Japanese, and a number of them surrendered. Those who survived the war and returned north to tell the story of their struggle number approximately 120 men and women.<sup>21</sup> Almost all survivors were asked to reminisce, and their tales are published in many books and reprinted time and again in magazines and newspapers.<sup>22</sup> They remembered no other leader but Kim and refused to remember those who surrendered to the Japanese. Only the most important ones, such as Kim Il and Ch'oe Yong-gön, withstood the pressure and abstained from recounting their partisan activities. Other partisans who are not encouraged to remember are those who fought in northern Manchuria where Kim had no operational ties. Yim Hae, Kim Ch'ang-dök, and Kim Kwang-hyöp, for example, have not revealed how they fought the Japanese in northern Manchuria without Kim.

It is conceivable that Kim began his guerrilla activities as early as 1932 when he was barely twenty years old. In some of the earlier accounts, Kim was said to have worked under a partisan named Yang Söng-yong. Yang was reported by the Japanese police to be a common bandit near the Wangqing area, but Yang later did fight under the Chinese guerrilla army and died in September 1935.<sup>23</sup> The reason for these and other contradictory claims is not difficult to understand, but they certainly do not do justice to Kim's true record, which, as we shall see, is considerable.

Suh, Dae-Sook. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Ch. 2-3.

## 2

# Kim and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

The army that ultimately unified the scattered Chinese and Korean guerrillas in Manchuria was the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (*Dongbei kangri lianjun*), led by a Chinese commander, Yang Jingyu.<sup>1</sup> It is under this army that Kim Il Sung and his guerrillas fought against the Japanese in Manchuria from approximately 1932 to 1941. This army was unmistakably Communist but it was not Korean. Thus Kim Il Sung did fight against the Japanese in Manchuria, but he did so under Chinese, not Korean, command. It is not my purpose here to examine fully the operation of this army, but since Kim traces his revolutionary tradition to the guerrilla activity against the Japanese in Manchuria, it is important to scrutinize the United Army and the Korean participation in it.

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抗日  
連軍

### *The United Army*

The origin of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army began in 1932 when a guerrilla group in Panshi prefecture in southern Manchuria was reorganized as the 32nd Red Army. It is said that the 32nd Red Army of Panshi prefecture was so named to follow the

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(吉林)

31st Red Army of the Chinese Communists in Sichuan province.<sup>2</sup> In January 1932, the headquarters of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was moved from Shenyang to Harbin, and various Communist guerrilla groups were organized under its command. On the second anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, September 18, 1933, Yang Jingyu reorganized the 32nd Red Army to found the first independent division of the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (*Dongbei renmin gemingjun*) with approximately three hundred partisans. The following year, in November 1934, Yang expanded by adding the second independent division, and both divisions operated primarily in southern Manchuria. Yang became commander of the army and appointed Yi Hong-gwang,<sup>3</sup> a Korean, commander of the First Division, and Cao Guoan, a Chinese, commander of the Second Division.

In eastern Manchuria, the Second Army was established under the command of a Korean guerrilla fighter named Chu Chin in March 1934 in Santouwai. This army was expanded into two independent divisions in May 1934 in commemoration of the Jiandao May 30 Communist Incident.<sup>4</sup> Chu Chin commanded the first independent division with Wang Detai as his political commissar, and he appointed a Chinese, Fang Zhensheng, commander of the second independent division. This army united a number of scattered Chinese and Korean guerrillas amounting to nearly a thousand strong, including Chinese fighters led by Dong Changying. The majority of this army consisted of Korean recruits from Jiandao. In northern Manchuria, the Third Army was established under the command of Zhao Shangzhi, putting together the Communist guerrillas in the Zhuhe region in the autumn of 1933. During the following year, Zhao and his comrade Li Zhaolin fought the Japanese with approximately four hundred guerrillas. However, the formation of the Third Army was not announced until January 28, 1935.

In northeastern Manchuria, the guerrilla fighters of Wang Delin were united under Li Yenlu to form the Fourth Army. Li had united the fighters of Shi Zhongheng and other guerrilla leaders, putting together a sizable group headquartered in the Mishan area. There were a number of Koreans participating in the Fourth Army including Kim Chin-guk and Yi Chin-bok.<sup>5</sup> In the area near

Mudanjiang, Ningan guerrilla groups were formed shortly after the Japanese took over Manchuria; this group began with approximately two hundred guerrillas, but it expanded under the leadership of Zhou Baozhong and guerrilla groups led by Ping Nanyang. Zhou at times worked with the guerrillas of the Second Army, but in September 1934 he formed the Fifth Army and appointed such able commanders as Chai Shiyang and Liu Hanxing of Jidong guerrilla groups. Farther to the north near Jiamusi on the lower reaches of the Sungari River, Tangyuan guerrilla groups were reorganized into the Sixth Army under the leadership of Xie Wendong. Tangyuan guerrilla groups were reorganized a number of times, moving from region to region on both banks of the Sungari River, and they were later commanded by Xia Yungjie.

Soldiers of these six armies consisted of members of the Chinese and Korean Communist parties, youth volunteers, and other anti-Japanese Nationalist armed groups. Even the Japanese estimated that the total number might have reached as many as 15,000.<sup>6</sup> There were many casualties as well as defections from these groups, but by the mid-1930s these six armies were under the direction of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, receiving directives from Kang Sheng in Moscow. Han Shoukui, who was sent to Manchuria from the Comintern to direct the activities of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1936, was arrested soon after his arrival on April 16, 1936, and he revealed much about Chinese Communist activities in Manchuria.

The Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 called for a united front of all anti-imperialist forces, and the Chinese Communist Party issued the August First Declaration in 1935. In response to the declaration, the leaders of these six armies issued a declaration of their own addressed to the leaders of the entire Chinese anti-Japanese movement, including both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, on October 12, 1935, pledging a united front of these groups and other anti-Japanese forces in Manchuria. Shortly thereafter, on January 28, 1936, some of the leaders of these armies held a meeting in Tangyuan prefecture in Sanjiang province to announce the formation of a united army named the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (*Dongbei kangri lianjun*) on February 20, 1936.<sup>7</sup>

There was much fighting by these groups, and casualties were high. But when the Japanese intensified their drive into Manchuria

in 1931 and continued into the China mainland in 1937, the resistance in Manchuria against Japanese rule also intensified. The major force of resistance was in southern, southeastern, northern, and northeastern Manchuria, and during the mid-1930s more guerrilla armies were formed and joined the United Army. In Raohe, near the Soviet border, south of Khabarovsk, the Seventh Army was organized by a Korean guerrilla leader named Yi Hak-man, known to the Chinese as Li Baoman. In this manner the United Army was expanded to include eleven armies. The Eighth Army was expanded from the Sixth Army and was headed by Xie Wendong in the Yilan and Fangzheng areas; the Ninth Army was expanded from the Third Army and was headed by Li Huatang in Tonghua, Sanjiang province. In November 1936, Wang Yachen announced the formation of the Eleventh Army in Fuyuan near Khabarovsk on the banks of the Amur River.

With the proliferation of various armies operating in different regions, coordination from one army to another became difficult, and since all were engaged in guerrilla activities in the countryside and forests away from towns and villages, strict control of eleven armies was virtually impossible. Each army, more or less, operated on its own, and hence there were no large-scale challenges to the Japanese army or the Manchukuo police force. In an effort to coordinate their activities, these eleven armies were reorganized according to their operational regions into three route armies at various times from 1936 to 1938. The First Route Army was announced on May 11, 1938, by combining the First and Second Armies to operate primarily in southern Manchuria under the command of Yang Jingyu. The Second Route Army was organized with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Armies in January 1937 and operated in eastern Manchuria under the command of Zhou Baozhong. The Third Route Army was organized with the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh armies in 1936 and operated in northern Manchuria under the command of Zhao Shangzhi.

The leadership of the United Army during the latter half of the 1930s changed rapidly. The roster of officers presented in table 2.1 was put together by combining information from a number of Chinese and Japanese sources.<sup>8</sup> For a better understanding of their guerrilla activities, see map.



*Area of Operation by the northeast Anti-Japanese United Army*

Table 2.1. *Leadership of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army from 1936 to 1941*

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	First Route Army (Commander-in-Chief: Yang Jingyu)
First Army	(Commander: Yang Jingyu; Political Commissar: Yi Hong-guang*)
	First Division (Commander: Cheng Pin)
	Second Division (Commander: Cao Guoan)
	Third Division (Commander: Chen Hanzhang)
Second Army	(Commander: [Chu Chin*], Wang Detai; Political Commissar: Wei Zhengmin)
	Fourth Division (Commander: An Pong-hak*; Ch'oe Hyōn*)
	Fifth Division (Commander: Fang Zhensheng)
	Sixth Division (Commander: Kim Il Sung*)
	Second Route Army (Commander-in-Chief: Zhou Baozhong)
Fourth Army	(Commander: [Wang Delin], Li Yenlu; Political Commissar: Huang Yuqing)
	First Division (Commander: Li Yanping)
	Second Division (Commander: Zou Youyan)
	Third Division (Commander: Guo Fude)
Fifth Army	(Commander: Zhou Baozhong; Political Commissar: Song Yifu)
	First Division (Commander: Ping Nanyang)
	Second Division (Commander: Fu Xianming)
	Third Division (Commander: Guo Fude)
Seventh Army	(Commander: Yi Hak-man*; Political Commissar: Ch'oe Yong-gōn*)
Eighth Army	(Commander: Xie Wendong; Political Commissar: Liu Shuhua)
Tenth Army	(Commander: Wang Yachen)
	Third Route Army (Commander-in-Chief: Zhao Shangzhi)
Third Army	(Commander: Zhao Shangzhi; Political Commissar: Feng Zhongyun, Kim Ch'aek*)
	First Division (Commander: Zhao Shangzhi)
	Second Division (Commander: Li Xishan)
	Third Division (Commander: Li Fulin)
	Fourth Division (Commander: Shi Guilin)
	Fifth Division (Commander: Li Zhaolin)
Sixth Army	(Commander: Xia Yunjie; Political Commissar: Chang Shoujian)
	First Division (Commander: Xia Yunjie)
	Second Division (Commander: Feng Zhingang)
	Third Division (Commander: Chang Chuanfu)
Ninth Army	(Commander: Li Huatang)
Eleventh Army	(Commander: Qi Zhizhong)

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Note: Among these leaders of the United Army, only a few survived World War II. Zhou Baozhong of the Second Route Army survived the war and later became an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in its Eighth National Congress. Zhou died in February 1964. When a North Korean military delegation visited Beijing shortly before his death, Zhou was hailed as their former leader in Manchuria. Li Yenlu was elected to the Standing Committee of the Third National People's Congress in January 1965. Feng Zhongyun was twice elected to the National People's Congress from Jilin. See their activities in Donald W. Klein and Ann B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1945*; Howard L. Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 1:415-416; and *Who's Who in Communist China*, pp. 367-368. See also a similar chart in the Chinese People's Revolutionary Museum that was reproduced in Nishimura Shigeo, *Chūkoku kindai tōhoku chiekishi kenkyū*, pp. 290-304.

\*Korean officer

It is this United Army that most of the Korean partisans joined to fight the Japanese from 1932 to 1941. The top leadership of this army was held primarily by the Chinese Communists. Koreans were scattered in all of these armies, but they were heavily concentrated in the Second Army because it operated in eastern Manchuria, where Koreans had emigrated and settled for a long time, outnumbering the Chinese in the region. There were many gallant Korean partisans in all armies, including Yi Hak-man who later became commander of the Seventh Army.<sup>9</sup> It was the Second Army in which Kim Il Sung began his armed guerrilla activities.

### *Kim and the Second Army*

When the Second Army was first organized in March 1934 the commander was a Korean named Chu Chin, and his political commissar was Wang Detai, a Chinese who later succeeded him as commander. Chu Chin was a good fighter, well known for his exploits against the Japanese. He was eventually arrested in February 1935 by the Yilan branch of the Japanese police, whose members were rewarded with money and trophies.<sup>10</sup> Kim Il Sung began in this Second Army as a fighter in the third detachment of the First Company of the Second Independent Division and rose through the ranks, eventually reaching the rank of Sixth Division commander. His activities along with such other Korean guerrillas as Kim Il, Ch'oe Hyōn, and An Kil were notable, and Kim consolidated his position within the army.<sup>11</sup>

When the Second and Fifth Armies were regrouped for a joint operation against the Japanese in 1936, the rise of Kim's prominence within the guerrilla group was obvious. Kim was assigned to the Chinese commander Chai Shiyong and deputy commander Fu Xianming as political commissar of the Central Command. He also commanded his own division, named the Kim Il Sung Division, of approximately one hundred men in the Emu area halfway between Jilin and Mudanjiang.<sup>12</sup> However, for a Korean to rise in the Chinese army was a difficult matter, even for a man with Kim's background of attendance at Chinese schools and fluent in the Chinese language. The commander of the Second Army, Wang Detai, was killed in a battle against the Japanese Seventh Cavalry Division in the Fusong area on November 7, 1936. He was succeeded by another Chinese, Zhou Shudong, but he too was killed, on April 24, 1937, in the battle of Antu.<sup>13</sup> The command of the Second Army was taken over by still another Chinese, Wei Zhengmin, Kim's mentor. There were a number of important casualties among Korean guerrillas too; Kim Myōng-p'al, for example, who was four years senior to Kim and had an illustrious record of guerrilla activity against the Japanese, was killed in October 1937. On the Japanese side, Major General Ishikawa Shigeyoshi was killed by a company of guerrillas led by An Pong-hak, a Korean partisan, in the battle near Tunhua prefecture on October 10, 1936.

In an effort to control the Communist guerrillas, the Japanese in Manchuria launched a number of expeditionary forces. The Japanese army, particularly the *Kantōgun* (Guandong Army), was interested in securing their bases in Manchuria to support their advance into the China mainland. The Japanese wanted to develop and secure coal mines, timber industries, and other natural resources in Manchuria without interference from organized Communist resistance groups. This effort, together with the measures taken by the police of the Manchukuo government, eventually brought an end to the operation of the United Army.

The final push to stamp out the Chinese Communist guerrilla forces in Manchuria came when the *Kantōgun* appointed Major General Nozoe Shōtoku commander of the Second Independent Security Division in Jilin. In October 1939, leaders of the Japanese military and the Manchurian government met, and Nozoe's expe-



*Zhou Baozhong, commander of the Second Army*



*Li Yenlu, commander of the Fourth Army*



*Feng Zhongyun, political commissar of the Third Route Army*




*Kim Il Sung and his soldiers, autumn 1940*

ditionary force was given thirty million yen to wipe out the Communist guerrillas by March 31, 1941.<sup>14</sup> Major General Nozoe was assisted by an able man and veteran "bandit hunter," Lt. Col. Fukube Kunio, who proposed a two-prong policy of defeating the guerrillas in combat and persuading them to surrender. The latter was called a submission operation that promised the guerrillas money and immunity from punishment if they would abandon communism and surrender. Fukube's policy was successful. Those who surrendered not only abandoned communism but assisted the Japanese in capturing the leaders of the guerrilla forces.

In anticipation of the intensified Japanese expedition, the First Route Army in southern Manchuria reorganized themselves. The First and Second Armies of the First Route Army were organized into three directional armies (*Fangmianjun*). In this final reorganization of the First Route Army, Kim Il Sung was appointed com-

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*Commanders of the Japanese and Manchukuo Expeditionary Force:  
Major General Nozoe Shōtoku, Yu Chenzhi, and Lieutenant Colonel Fukube  
Kunio*



*Body of Yang Jingyu, commander-in-chief of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, February 23, 1940*

mander of the Second Directional Army operating in Jiandao province where the majority of residents were Korean. The leadership of the First route Army in November 1938 was as follows:<sup>15</sup>



*Japanese Expeditionary Force that killed Yang Jingyu*

Commander-in-Chief: Yang Jingyu

Deputy commander: Wei Zhengmin

Chief of staff: Fang Zhensheng

Political commissar: Chōn Kwang (Korean)

First Directional Army commander in Tonghua province: Cao Yafan

Second Directional Army commander in Jiandao province: Kim Il Sung (Korean)

Third Directional Army commander in Jilin province: Chen Hanzhang

When the Japanese expeditionary campaign under General Nozoe intensified, all of these leaders except Kim Il Sung were either killed or surrendered. In the most famous campaign to capture the commander-in-chief of the First Route Army, Yang Jingyu, the Japanese forces were guided by one of Yang's most trusted comrades, the former First Division commander Cheng Pin who submitted to the Japanese. Yang was killed on February 23, 1940, in the battle of Mengjiang in Tonghua province. He was tracked down for about a week by Cheng Pin, and it was claimed that the detachment which eventually killed Yang was commanded

by Nishitani Kiyojin of the Mengjiang Prefectural Police Expeditionary Force, which belonged to the Tonghua Provincial Police headed by Kishitani Ryūichirō.<sup>16</sup>

Yang's chief of staff Fang Zhensheng was arrested and executed by the Japanese on February 15, 1940, and the commander of the First Directional Army, Cao Yafan, was killed by his own men in an internal squabble on April 8, 1940.<sup>17</sup> The commander of the Third Directional Army, Chen Hanzhang, was killed by the Japanese on December 8, 1940, after a long chase from southern to northern Manchuria. After Yang died, the deputy commander Wei Zhengmin assumed leadership of what was left of the First Route Army. Shortly after the death of Yang, Wei called a small meeting, March 13-15, 1940, at the camp of the political commissar, Chōn Kwang, in Huaxun. This meeting was attended by eleven leaders of various groups left in the First Route Army including Han In-hwa, Kim Kwang-hak, Ch'oe Hyōn, Kim Chae-bōm, Kim Il Sung, and Chōn Kwang. In view of the mounting casualties, Wei cautioned that all units, whenever possible, should avoid direct confrontation with the Japanese and change tactics to work more closely with the people. Even this new tactic did not work, however, as two members of this group, Kim Kwang-hak and Kim Chae-bōm, were arrested when they went into villages to work with the people.<sup>18</sup>

The end of the First Route Army came when the political commissar, Chōn Kwang, surrendered to the Japanese submission operation on January 30, 1941, and turned against his comrades-in-arms. Chōn led the Japanese expeditionary troops to the hideouts of his fellow guerrillas. Soon thereafter, Wei Zhengmin was killed on March 8, 1941, in Huaxun. Others either surrendered or were arrested and later submitted to the Japanese, including Pak Tūk-bōm, who gave the Japanese much information on the remaining guerrillas and their activities, making it almost impossible to continue fighting. Among the leaders of the First Route Army, Kim Il Sung was the only one who neither surrendered nor was captured and killed. Kim continued to fight to the end, but when it became obvious that the United Army was defeated, and the Second and Third Route Armies were also defeated in the north and northeast, Kim fled to the Soviet Union. It is reported that Kim told Wei

Zhengmin he wanted to follow Zhou Baozhong, commander of the Second Route Army, into the Soviet Union, but Wei was said to have withheld permission. Kim fled shortly after the death of Wei in March 1941 by way of Hunchun prefecture, using a wooded area called Meili across from Vladivostok.<sup>19</sup> General Nozoe's expeditionary forces had succeeded in their campaign to wipe out the United Army, and General Nozoe ordered dissolution of his own force on March 12, 1941. The Japanese and Manchukuo joint victory celebration was said to have been held on March 19, 1941, about two weeks ahead of schedule.<sup>20</sup>

There are various reports on numbers of Communist guerrillas in Manchuria, but both Chinese and Japanese accounts are either exaggerated or discounted. The Japanese estimated that approximately 15,000 guerrillas were operating from 1932 to 1940, and the Chinese claim there were more than 30,000 guerrillas in the eleven armies of the United Army.<sup>21</sup> Irrespective of their claims, Communist revolutionary struggle in Manchuria was an ordeal to be remembered by both Chinese and Japanese forces.<sup>22</sup>



## 3

## Guerrilla Accomplishments

This account of the United Army is not intended to deny or belittle the many successful exploits of Kim Il Sung and his partisans. The fact that he outlasted his Chinese superiors and Korean comrades in the First Route Army to the end is commendable. Kim survived as a true Communist guerrilla without surrendering, despite numerous Japanese campaigns to defeat him and without submitting to the many invitations to defect. The reward posted by the Japanese for information leading to his arrest in 1936 was only 20,000 yen compared to 200,000 yen for Yang Jingyu, but by 1939 Kim commanded the same amount as Yang.<sup>1</sup> At one point, one of the Japanese expeditionary forces thought they had killed him, and the money was paid and a citation was issued to the commander of that force, but Kim turned up in another region.<sup>2</sup>

Kim's accomplishments are impressive, as we shall see, but what is most damaging to his record is his exaggerated claims. Kim has built an image of a benevolent and righteous leader who took from the rich and gave to the poor and still fought for the Korean Communist revolution. His fame as a successful guerrilla fighter comes not from his benevolence but from the ruthlessness with which he

dealt with Japanese and Korean collaborators. It is a good record for a young man to have taken up arms against the Japanese while many of his compatriots were collaborating with the enemy. Kim claims many campaigns in southern and eastern Manchuria prior to 1935, but these seem to have been small-scale operations. His most illustrious campaigns do not start until about 1936 and they end in 1940.

### *Koreans in the United Army*

Kim does not mention his former affiliation with the United Army; he claims that he organized a Korean anti-Japanese partisan group on April 25, 1932. He says that he fought the Japanese in Wangqing prefecture in March 1933, in Xiaowangqing in April, in Dongning prefecture in September. He also claims that he reorganized his partisan groups into a Korean People's Revolutionary Army in March 1934, twice going to northern Manchuria to Ninggan prefecture near the city of Mudanjiang from 1934 to 1936. Kim's effort here is to establish a Korean identity and to build a Korean tradition out of his association with the Chinese Communist guerrilla group.

Kim began his guerrilla activities early in a Korean Nationalist group, led by Yang Se-bong, but soon changed to fight for the Chinese group headed by Wu Yicheng who was not a Communist guerrilla leader. Kim said that his first encounter with the Chinese commander Wu was in June 1933 when he visited him in Luozigou to resolve the problem of Chinese killing some thirty Korean partisans led by Yi Kwang in April 1933. Kim is supposed to have had a conference in which he was able to persuade Wu to work with and not against Koreans. As a result of this meeting Kim is said to have brought Wu's forces, including Shi Zhongheng and Li Sanxia, under his command.<sup>3</sup> These claims are absurd to say the least.

Wu was a well-known Chinese commander who inherited most of the soldiers of Ma Zhansan and Li Du, both of whom fled to the Soviet Union after the Japanese took over Manchuria in 1931. The Japanese at one time reported that Wu's command had several thousand Chinese soldiers. It should be remembered that Kim had

organized his own partisan forces in April 1932, only a year earlier, with eighteen men. Friction between Chinese and Koreans was not uncommon, and at times the Chinese discrimination against Korean partisans was intolerable. Many Koreans who were uncertain about their role in the Chinese guerrilla force left to join a partisan group headed by a Korean commander. This was the Second Army of the United Army, headed by a Korean commander named Chu Chin, that operated in the Jiandao region where Korean residents outnumbered the Chinese. In the Jiandao region of eastern Manchuria, 78 percent of the population were Koreans compared to 22 percent Chinese, and in southern Manchuria the percentage was reversed, about 80 percent Chinese and 20 percent Koreans. Most of the Koreans were engaged in farming, working about half of the arable land in this region.<sup>4</sup>

The racial conflict in the United Army came out in the open in January 1935 through the Minsaengdan Incident. The Minsaengdan was a Japanese police front organization of Korean residents in Manchuria established to curb the constant looting by bandits. Members would disguise themselves as bandits, penetrate the camps of the guerrillas, and return with information of their whereabouts, numerical strength, condition of arms, and the like. This organization was in existence for only a short period, from February to July 1932, but its name became a catchword among the partisans and any Korean agent was called a *minsaengdan*.

A similar organization named Hyöpchohoe was organized to perform more or less the same function on September 6, 1934, by a Japanese gendarme, Lt. Col. Katō Hakujirō of Yanji prefecture. The president of the organization was a Korean collaborator named Kim Tong-han, and it had a membership of 8,195 men in the Jiandao region. This group openly advocated assassination of guerrilla leaders, induced the surrender of partisans, and rewarded informers. It was in operation until December 27, 1936, when it merged with still another organization known as Kyōwakai or Hyōphwahoe.<sup>5</sup>

The incident that touched off the open hostility between Korean and Chinese guerrillas was the penetration by an agent of Hyöpchohoe into the armed camp of the Second Army. The agent knew that a certain guerrilla named Han Yong-ho had gone to fetch food

in nearby Baicaogou. Acting as Han's friend, he had entered the campground and escaped with vital information about the guerrilla base. When he returned to the base, Han insisted on his innocence but was executed after interrogation. Han named others before his death, and a wave of interrogation and execution spread throughout the Second Army, eventually reaching as far as the commander, Chu Chin, and his political commissar, Yi Sang-muk. Chu was able to escape, but he was later captured and executed by the Japanese; Yi Sang-muk surrendered to the Japanese and revealed much information about the impact of the *minsaengdan* on the Sino-Korean relationship in the United Army.<sup>6</sup>

After this incident, Wang Detai, a Chinese, was appointed to succeed Chu Chin as commander of the Second Army, and its leadership was taken over by the Chinese. Worse than the change in leadership was the suspicion hanging over every Korean partisan. Many innocent Koreans were suspected and tortured. Hō Yōng-ho, for example, was immediately dismissed from his position as Second Company commander, and Ch'oe Hak-ch'ōl and some sixty men in Hunchun prefecture were expelled from the army. According to one report, the enraged Korean partisans even conspired to assassinate the new Chinese commander, Wang, in retaliation.<sup>7</sup>

A conference to solve the problem of *minsaengdan* was held from February 24 to March 3, 1935, in Daihuanggou in Wangqing prefecture under the new political commissar of the Second Army, Wei Zhengmin. Some of the excessive punishments were recognized and rectified by the Chinese. While there was no change in the composition of leadership circles, the Chinese persuaded the Koreans to stay and fight with them in the United Army. Kim Chae-su, who later defected, reported that in some areas the Chinese and Koreans organized separate detachments. In others, however, the prejudice against the Koreans continued, and many Koreans left the United Army. In Tangyuan, for example, the commander, Xia Yunjie, was a heavy opium smoker who ordered his Korean subordinate Yi In-gün to cut off the ear of a kidnapped Korean hostage; when Yi refused, Xia called him a *minsaengdan* and shot him to death on the spot. Five Korean partisans in that army escaped and reported the incident to the commander of the Third Army, Zhao Shangzhi. Zhao rectified the situation by relieving Xia from his

post.<sup>8</sup> However, the United Army was no longer the same place for Koreans and many left.

North Korean historians claim that Kim played a leading role in mediating the differences between Chinese and Koreans in the incident. The records of the conferences held under the auspices of Wei Zhengmin in February and March 1935 are available, and Kim was not present at those meetings, let alone playing any role in them. The earlier version of Kim's biography condemned the leaders of the Korean delegation to these meetings, Song Il and Kim Söng-do, as factionalists, but the latest version omits their names. Kim Söng-do was not even present. Song Il headed the delegation, but he was later falsely accused of being a *minsaengdan* himself and was executed.<sup>9</sup>

The more important consequence for Kim Il Sung was his future role in the United Army. Most of the fainthearted Koreans defected, and cooperation between the Chinese and Koreans was difficult at best. Kim was one of the few Koreans the Chinese had trusted because of his facility in the Chinese language and his Chinese educational background. For those who remained, the Chinese leaders paid extra attention and treated them well, particularly after the August First Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party that called for a united front of all ethnic groups in Manchuria.

### *The Poch'önbo Raid and the Korean Association*

The largest and most successful campaign Kim waged during his guerrilla days was the raid on Poch'önbo, a Korean town just over the Manchurian border. Kim's Sixth Division of the Second Army of the First Route Army, consisting of nearly two hundred guerrillas, attacked the town on June 4, 1937, destroying local government offices and setting fire to the Japanese police box, the local elementary school, and post office. He took four thousand yen from the local people and inflicted damage estimated at sixteen thousand yen. He took the town and occupied it for that day, but early the next morning he retreated to Manchuria. The stunned Japanese police pursued Kim's unit to the Yalu River on June 5, but Kim Il Sung turned around and defeated the Japanese police force, killing seven Japanese police officers including Police Chief Ökawa.<sup>10</sup> In

a related campaign, Kim was joined by the Fourth Division commander, Ch'oe Hyön, who was returning from a similar raid on Musan on June 9, 1937, in Ershidaogou in Changbai prefecture in Manchuria. The combined forces raided the outpost of Yokoyama timber camp and attacked the Japanese forces, killing more than ten and taking nine hostages as well as guns and ammunitions. This was the raid that made Kim famous and known to the Japanese.

The raid was important for its military impact alone, but more important to the Japanese was the fact that the raid on Poch'önbo was coordinated by the anti-Japanese united front organization known as *Hanin choguk kwangbokhoe*, the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association. Members of the association were in touch with Kim Il Sung's Sixth Division for nearly half a year planning for the raid. Kim claims that he was president of the association, but the facts on the association are well documented and its operation is known.

The association was created to form a united front of the anti-Japanese Koreans in Manchuria following the August First Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935. The association was founded on June 10, 1936. Its declaration, platform, and bylaws of eight chapters and fourteen articles are documented.<sup>11</sup> The person who played the most important role in organizing the association was Chön Kwang, Kim's superior in the United Army. Chön Kwang was directed in turn by Wei Zhengmin who came from the Comintern. Branches of this association were created in various border towns within Korea; for example, Kwön Yöng-byök organized the Changbai Operation Committee (*Changbaek kongjak-wiwönhoe*), the Kapsan Operation Committee was organized by Pak Tal and Pak Küm-ch'öl, and the Kangguri Operation Committee by Ch'oe Kyöng-hwa. Kim Il Sung did have a role because he used the members of the Kapsan group to attack Poch'önbo in June 1937, but his connection did not go beyond his military campaign. The organizational work of establishing various branches seems to have been the work of Chön Kwang.

Chön Kwang is a celebrated revolutionary known to the Korean revolutionary movement as Ö Söng-yun. The declaration of the association was signed by an initiatory committee consisting of three men: Ö Söng-yun, Öm Su-myöng, and Yi Sang-jun. Of the

韓人  
國光  
會

長白工  
委員  
會

three, O Sōng-yun is most famous. Together with an accomplice named Kim Ik-sang, O tried to assassinate a Japanese general, Baron Tanaka Giichi, in Shanghai on March 28, 1922. He missed Tanaka, however, and killed an innocent woman who was getting off the boat behind Tanaka. O was immediately arrested and interned in the Japanese consulate jail in Shanghai. He escaped on May 2, 1922, and eventually made his way to Manchuria through Europe and the Soviet Union and joined the United Army.<sup>12</sup> O was known in the United Army as Chōn Kwang and worked closely with Yang Jingyu and Wei Zhengmin. In fact, O was Kim's superior in the United Army, serving as political commissar under Wei, while Kim was one of its division commanders. Wei Zhengmin held one of his last meetings of the First Route Army at O's operational headquarters. Kim Il Sung did participate in this meeting, and Kim knew O Sōng-yun, known to him as Chōn Kwang, very well, but he does not mention Chōn Kwang or O Sōng-yun at all.

Even without his claim to membership in the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association, his military exploits are impressive. The raid on Poch'ōnbo was particularly important because he crossed the border and came into Korea from Manchuria, using an underground group that was organized by the United Army. Kim's earlier guerrilla activities in Manchuria were reported in Korea as early as October 1936. An article in *Chosōn ilbo* described Kim with about forty men descending on a Korean farmer named Pak Hūng-yong in a small village named Shiliudaogou and taking his cow and grain on October 4, 1936.<sup>13</sup> There are many more articles about Kim's activities of this kind, but they deal with Kim's banditry and general condemnation of his plundering, sympathizing with the suffering of the Korean immigrants in Manchuria. It was difficult for Korean-language newspapers of the 1930s under strict Japanese censorship to report any patriotic and Communist activities.<sup>14</sup> However, the Japanese made a big issue of Kim's raid into Poch'ōnbo, because Kim's activities did not stop with Korean farmers or Korean collaborators but extended to killing Japanese police officers in Korea. Kim's guerrilla activities in both Manchuria and Korea commanded the immediate attention of the Japanese because he was an able guerrilla leader efficient in killing Japanese soldiers and police.

### Guerrilla Activities: 1937-1940

Many Japanese accounts of Kim's guerrilla activities report on this period, and there are even more claimed by Kim in North Korea. There is no need to describe them all in detail, but it is important to know how Kim fought, recruited guerrillas, procured supplies and arms, and conducted himself.

Even before his raid into Korea, Kim's force of nearly 150 guerrillas, joined by an equal number of partisans headed by Cao Guoan, met the Japanese expeditionary force in February 1937 and engaged them in a number of battles in Changbai prefecture near Paektusan. Especially noteworthy is the battle of Limingshui on February 26, 1937. A small detachment of approximately 50 guerrillas challenged the Japanese forces, but when the Japanese expeditionary force gave chase to the retreating guerrilla detachment, Kim Il Sung's main group of 250 guerrillas attacked from the snow-covered highland where they were hiding, covering their heads with white cloth. It is reported that nearly five feet of snow fell the night before. Kim and Cao's guerrillas defeated the Japanese, killing thirteen officers under Lieutenant Kawada, wounding fourteen Japanese soldiers, and taking seventeen prisoners including Lt. Murayama Masashige.<sup>15</sup>


Kim Il Sung fought all during 1938 and 1939, mostly in southern and southeastern Manchuria. There are numerous accounts of his activities, such as the Liudaogou raid of April 26, 1938, and his raid into Korea once again in May 1939. Another noteworthy engagement was Kim's battle with the Japanese Special Police headed by Maeda Takeshi that tracked Kim's group for months in early 1940. When Maeda's forces finally caught up with Kim in March 13, 1940, at Daimalugou in Helong prefecture, they were attacked by Kim's guerrillas. After the attack, Kim is said to have released his captives because he had to move on quickly. Maeda's police pursued him for nearly two weeks, catching up with him in Hongqihe, Antu prefecture, on March 25, 1940. In this battle, Kim deployed 250 guerrillas against 150 of Maeda's force and defeated him completely. Kim killed the commander Maeda Takeshi, 58 Japanese police officers, and 17 workers attached to the police force and wounded many police officers and workers. He took 13 prisoners and much ammunition and weapons from Maeda's force. To the

Korean captives, Kim is said to have preached Communist revolution in Korea, and he asked them to join his guerrilla forces voluntarily. He promised them he would someday invade Korea.<sup>16</sup> Kim's force expanded to approximately 340 guerrillas in July 1940, and such trusted comrades as Ch'oe Hyōn, Ch'oe Ch'un-guk, Kim Tong-gyu, and An Kil worked closely with him. However, his force became one of the main targets of Major General Nozoe Shōtoku's expeditionary forces, and Kim himself admits that he went into a small-unit operation from August 1940.

Kim's largest command was approximately 300 men, both Chinese and Koreans, at the height of his operation from 1937 to 1940, but at times he operated with fewer than 50 men. This is not to belittle his efforts. The nature of his operation was such that the forces were divided into many small companies and detachments, constantly moving from one location to another in deep mountain forests and difficult-to-reach areas. It was an arduous undertaking with the Japanese expeditionary forces constantly following their trail. To avoid heavy casualties, his campaigns in most cases were hit-and-run operations. There were many casualties, particularly in the winter months. Kim said that the winter of 1936-1937 was so harsh that he spent most of the time in the snow-covered impassable mountains with only a few soldiers.

Kim recruited Chinese coolies and Korean farmers, and in many of his raids into towns and villages he kidnapped young men and trained them to fill the ranks. In his raid on Poch'ōnbo, for example, Kim recruited nearly ninety Koreans into his company. For the recruitment of officers, the Second Army advertised a training school and printed handbills to announce the recruitment of officers. Among several qualifications listed, such as age and loyalty to the cause of China and Chinese communism, was a provision that the prospective candidate should not smoke opium. These handbills were printed in Chinese and were directed to the Chinese and Korean residents in Manchuria. Kim's principal method, however, was to take hostages.<sup>17</sup>

The guerrillas acquired their provisions in several ways. The most commonly used methods were demands made on rich Koreans, enforced by taking hostages. At times they attacked small villages and trains to replenish their supplies. At other times, they



*In commemoration of the capture of Chu Chin by the Yilan Branch of the Japanese police, February 1935*

offered opium and ginseng farmers their protection and exacted their crops. Kim often used threats against farmers to collect supplies and money. One of the phrases he often used against the farmers and Japanese collaborators was to give "guns if you have guns, people if you have people, money if you have money, and goods if you have goods." Kim used to threaten people that if they did not comply, he would cut off the ears of the hostages, and if they still did not comply he would cut off their heads.<sup>18</sup>

Numerous reports in Korean newspapers cite Korean immigrants who suffered at the hands of the guerrillas. Kim's partisans took 5,000 yen from a rich Korean miner named Kim Chae-hūng; from those who did not have cash on hands, they took promissory notes to be collected later.<sup>19</sup> Kim spoke often of the dire need for food and described grievous circumstances with little clothing in the dead of winter. Kim and his men had to go for more than two or three days without food, and at times they maintained a diet of salt and water. The methods they used to acquire provisions were not unusual for an underground guerrilla force.<sup>20</sup>



*Li Zhaolin of the Third Route Army.*



*Li's Korean wife and children*



*Leaders of the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association arrested after the Poch'ŏnbo raid, December 1937*

*From left to right, seated front row:  
Sŏ In-hong, Yi Che-sun, Chi T'ae-hwan, and Kwŏn Yŏng-byŏk (all executed);  
standing back row:  
Pak Nok-kŭm (free), Hwang Kŭm-ok (six months), Chang Chung-yŏl (eight months), and Pak Kŭm-ch'ŏl (life imprisonment)*



*Ch'oe Hyŏn and his men in Dunhua prefecture, winter 1938*



*Members of the First Route Army, summer 1939*

In an effort to find out more about the internal operation of Kim's guerrilla force, the Japanese police sent in a woman named Chi Sun-ok whose husband had earlier joined the force. She joined ostensibly to look for the husband she had not seen for three years, but in truth she was sent in by the Japanese police equipped with a poison pill to swallow if she was unmasked and unable to withstand the torture. She joined the Seventh Detachment commanded by O Chung-hüp of Kim's guerrillas in August 1939 and worked nearly a year as a cook and seamstress. She was released from the guerrillas by Han Ik-su because she was weak and unable to move fast when the guerrillas had to retreat into mountain forests. Chi Sun-ok reported that when she first joined the guerrillas, she was interrogated by Kim Il Sung in person for nearly four days, and she was allowed to join the women's detachment consisting of about thirty-two women.



*A guillotine in Manchuria.*



*Public display of the beheaded.*


Shortly after she joined, Kim's group raided a wealthy Chinese landlord named Liu and took him hostage to get food and clothing. She and other women made clothes from the fabric for the



*Chông Kwang (second from left), Kim Il Sung's superior in the First Route Army, surrendered January 30, 1941*



*Pak Tũk-bõm surrendered September 28, 1940.*



*Kim Il Sung in the Soviet Union, 1943  
Left to right: Kim Il Sung, unknown, Ch'oe Hyõn, and An Kil*



*Kim Il Sung, his wife, Kim Chông-suk, and son Kim Jong Il*



guerrillas. After repeated requests, she was allowed to see her husband once, but her husband was transferred to another unit. In November 1939, the Seventh Detachment commander O Chung-hūp was killed in a raid and O Paek-yong succeeded him as commander. She reported that Kim Il Sung was an able leader, constantly preaching to his men about international communism and Korean nationalism when they were not fighting or retreating. She also said that on October 11, 1939, eight Russians came with two interpreters and stayed nearly ten days discussing something with Kim in the forest near Sandaogou, Helong prefecture. She suspected that the Russians supplied ammunition and arms from the Soviet Union at least once in three months. She confessed that the most difficult part of her guerrilla life was the hunger and cold.<sup>21</sup>

As for the procurement of arms, Kim said that he fought with weapons he took from the Japanese. This was one method the partisans used to acquire arms, but in most cases the Korean partisans received weapons from their Chinese counterparts, and sometimes they bought ammunition locally. There are many Japanese arrest reports dealing with the illicit sale and purchase of firearms, particularly those attempts by Ch'oe Hyōn, who was the supply officer for the Second Army. At times the Manchurian police, after faking an encounter with the guerrillas, sold their weapons and ammunition for profit. It was reported that Fang Zhensheng, one of the Chinese commanders, regularly obtained arms and ammunition in this way.<sup>22</sup>

Still another method was to *make* arms. Pak Yōng-sun made a crude form of grenade, for example, which the Koreans called *yōn'gil p'okt'an* (Yanji bomb).<sup>23</sup> Simple repairs of guns and pistols were all done by the partisans themselves. Perhaps most noteworthy was the fact that the guerrillas often crossed the border into the Russian Maritime Province and bought arms from the Soviet Union. This practice was common in the northern region across from Khabarovsk where the Second Route Army, and more specifically the Seventh Army, operated. The commander of the Seventh Army, Yi Hak-man, used to cross the border into the Soviet Union and bring back large numbers of arms and ammunition.<sup>24</sup>

Kim's accomplishments as a guerrilla are therefore many. He fought the Japanese expeditionary forces at great odds. He was ulti-

mately defeated, but he never feared the Japanese. What he feared more was the hunger, the cold, and the defection in his ranks. Many of his men, including Kim Pong-jun, Yim U-sōng, Pak Tūk-bōm, Han In-hwa, and Kim Chae-bōm, did defect. Even his superior officer in the First Route Army, Chōn Kwang, surrendered to the Japanese and then helped the Japanese expeditionary force hunt Kim down, but Kim escaped and survived. There was strife in his own ranks also, such as the quarrel between Ch'oe Hyōn and Pak Tūk-bōm. When Pak defected, he joined the Japanese in the search for Ch'oe Hyōn. Among those captives and hostages Kim took in his numerous raids into timber camps and coal mines, few believed in his Communist revolution and virtually all looked for an opportunity to defect.

#### *In the Soviet Union: 1941-1945*

While Kim is silent about his retreat into the Soviet Union, there are many reports of his trek there. He is said to have entered the Soviet Union to evade the pursuing Japanese forces soon after the death of Wei Zhengmin on March 8, 1941. Wei was Kim's superior and mentor, and his death convinced Kim that his guerrilla activities in southern Manchuria had come to an end. In the biographical sketch of Wei, there is a story of camaraderie between Wei and Kim, signifying the joint effort by Chinese and Koreans against the Japanese. Kim always cared for Wei, who was in ill health, securing rare herb medicine for him and giving him food when it was scarce. Wei, in turn, is said to have prepared Korean buckwheat noodle soup (*naengmyōn*) when Kim visited him in his camp. Wei said that Kim's love for *naengmyōn* was well known, and he prepared it properly, even when it was difficult to get foodstuffs.<sup>25</sup>

Kim is said to have left from Hunchun prefecture, using the wooded area called Meili, along the banks of the Tumen River into the area west of Vladivostok. It is said that Kim had only six men with him when he crossed the border and that he was temporarily interned until his identity was verified by Zhou Baozhong, the commander of the Second Route Army who had earlier retreated to the Soviet Union in 1940.<sup>26</sup> Kim eventually joined the Chinese guerrilla group led by Zhou Baozhong in three training camps.

One defector from North to South Korea related that when he was a reporter for the North Korean newspaper *Minju Chosŏn*, he was told by Kim Il Sung himself that he had fled to the Russian Maritime Province in 1941. He said his article to that effect appeared in the paper on August 15, 1947.<sup>27</sup>

Chinese and Korean partisan retreats, either tactical or by necessity, were not uncommon. One of the more famous Chinese leaders, Li Du, fled to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. In addition to Zhou Baozhong, Kung Xienying and Chai Shiyong also fled to the Soviet Union, and Yi Hak-man, the Korean commander of the Seventh Army, crossed the border into the Soviet Union. In a Russian study about the liberation of Korea, Major General B.G. Sapozhnikov relates that there were many partisan crossings as early as 1936 and 1937. He recounts one incident that he investigated while stationed in the Russian Maritime Province. He was asked on February 22, 1936, to investigate a crossing of armed guerrillas into Soviet territory. Accompanied by one Korean interpreter named Kim Soy (Kim So-i, or Lieutenant Kim), he found that some sixty partisans, of whom two-thirds were Koreans and one-third Chinese, under the command of a Korean partisan named Pak In-ch'öl, had come into the Russian Maritime Province. He said that many were wounded and hungry, and the commander, Pak, was wounded in his left arm. Sapozhnikov related that after he had helped them he sent them back to Manchuria in April 1936. He also expressed the general concern of the Russians at the time that it was difficult for them to distinguish between genuine anti-Japanese partisans and Japanese agents disguised as partisans.<sup>28</sup>

The Soviet Union seems to have welcomed the Chinese and Korean guerrillas from Manchuria in the 1940s after they had forcibly relocated Korean residents from the Russian Maritime Province to the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the latter half of the 1930s. Survivors of all units of the United Army eventually retreated at various times from 1940 to 1941 into the Soviet Union. They were camped and trained in three locations: Okeanskaya Field School near Vladivostok, Voroshilov Camp in Nikolsk, and a training camp in a wooded area south of Khabarovsk.<sup>29</sup> Korean partisans were scattered in all three Soviet training camps, and Kim Il Sung was trained at Okeanskaya Field School.

Kim eventually met all Koreans from the Second and Third Route Armies including those under Zhou Baozhong, among them Ch'oe Yong-gŏn, Kim Ch'aek, and Kim Kwang-hyŏp, but survivors of Kim's own group from the First Route Army, including Sŏ Ch'öl, An Kil, and Ch'oe Ch'un-guk, stayed with Kim in the southern camps near Nikolsk and Vladivostok.

The purpose of the Soviet Union in training these men seems to have been to use them against the Japanese if ever the Soviet Union had to fight the Japanese in Manchuria. These guerrillas, though defeated in Manchuria, had both the experience and the will to fight the Japanese. There are scattered reports that Kim Il Sung led a small detachment and reentered Manchuria near Dongning prefecture and fought the Japanese. One report says that Kim Il Sung, Ch'oe Hyŏn, and Chai Shiyong and their partisans of 150 men were reorganized into three detachments with fifty guerrillas each in the Voroshilov Camp commanded by a Soviet officer of the 57th Guard Unit in Iman. The same report says that Kim Il Sung headed the second detachment and taught anti-Japanese songs and trained his men. Kim is said to have returned to Manchuria and fought the Japanese police unit headed by Koga on April 26, 1941.<sup>30</sup> There are other reports of his men fighting in Manchuria after the retreat to the Soviet Union, among them were An Kil, Kang Kŏn, Kim Il, and Yi Pong-su.

The most important revelation is a report made in February 1943 when a Soviet-trained Korean guerrilla named Pak Kil-song was arrested. Pak was one of the Korean detachment leaders arrested on January 4, 1943, after entering Manchuria from the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup> Pak revealed there were approximately 700 men in Khabarovsk Camp taking orders from a Soviet officer named Vassiliev, but such Chinese leaders as Zhou Baozhong and Chang Shoujian appealed unsuccessfully to the Soviet authorities to let them be autonomous and take orders only from the Chinese Communist Party. Pak also revealed that, when he returned to Manchuria, he discovered that the Korean underground leader in Manchuria, Hŏ Hyŏng-sik, was killed on August 3, 1942, and the operation in Manchuria had had to undergo reorganization. In this reorganization Kim Ch'aek was elected leader of the underground organization in September 1942, but he was ordered to return to the Soviet Union.

Among others who returned and were arrested were Han Hŭng-sŏn and Kim Ch'un-sŏp, who told of their training in the Soviet Union in anticipation of the Soviet war against Japan. Details of the Soviet training of partisans are not known, but some sort of sophisticated training seems to have taken place, including parachute exercises. Major General Sapozhnikov has related that when the Soviet army entered Manchuria at the close of World War II, they dropped paratroopers near Harbin and were able to link up with them after crossing the border in August 1945. In a jovial mood shortly after his return to Korea, Kim Il Sung said that he and his men were planning a dramatic entrance into Pyongyang by parachute, but the confounded Japanese had surrendered before their plans could be realized.<sup>32</sup>

Pak Kil-song also revealed that the Soviet Union was in the process of creating an international military unit under their Far Eastern Command by recruiting and training the anti-Japanese guerrillas from Manchuria, an army 10,000 strong, to prepare for their campaign against the Japanese. In an effort to train the retreating guerrillas from Manchuria, the Soviet Far Eastern Command appointed a few officers of the international unit. Pak said that in the camp near Khabarovsk, Zhou Baozhong, commander of the Second Route Army, and Chang Shoujian were appointed colonel; Kim Ch'aek and Feng Zhongyun were appointed lieutenant colonel; and Wang Minggui, Bian Fengxiang, Chang Guangdi, and Pak himself were appointed to the rank of major.<sup>33</sup> Similar organization must have taken place in Voroshilov Camp and Okeanskaya Field School, and Kim Il Sung is said to have been appointed major in the 88th Division of this international unit of the Far Eastern Command of the Soviet army. When Kim first appeared in Pyongyang, he was reported to have returned to Korea in a Soviet army uniform wearing the rank of captain or major.

It was during his five-year stay in the Soviet Union that Kim was married to Kim Chŏng-suk, a member of his partisans who fought with him in Manchuria. The record of Kim Chŏng-suk appears in Japanese police files, and the North Koreans recognize her as a partisan who was a close comrade of Kim Il Sung, but not his wife. Kim Chŏng-suk was born on December 24, 1919, the elder of

two daughters of a poor farmer in Hoeryŏng, Hamgyŏng pukto. She was seven years younger than Kim and had a background similar to Kim's own. She followed her mother to look for her father in Yanji, Manchuria, but found that he had already died there. Soon thereafter she lost her mother and became an orphan. She is said to have joined Kim's guerrilla force in 1935 at the age of sixteen as a kitchen helper. She worked at many odd jobs for the guerrillas and was arrested by the Japanese in the summer of 1937 while working as an undercover agent to procure food and supplies.

When she was released, she rejoined the guerrillas. She is said to have cooked, sewed, and washed for the guerrillas and even saved Kim's life once in 1939.<sup>34</sup> Japanese Major General Nozoe Shōtoku, whose expeditionary force hunted Kim and his partisans during his last days in Manchuria, related that his able military police sergeant Nagashima Tamajirō had captured a woman partisan named Kim Hye-sun who claimed that she was the wife of Kim Il Sung. She was arrested on April 6, 1940, and has related that she and another woman along with three male partisans were left behind because she was wounded. The Japanese tried to use her to lure Kim to surrender, but they were not successful. There is no record of such a woman partisan in any of the Chinese or Korean sources.<sup>35</sup>

Kim Chŏng-suk followed Kim Il Sung into the Soviet Union, apparently married him there, and bore him a son on February 16, 1942. This son was given the Russian name Yura and the Korean name Chŏng-il (Kim Jong Il). While in the Soviet Union, she bore him another son. Kim's second son, named Shura (Kim P'yŏng-il), was born in 1944, but he drowned in a swimming accident in July 1947 in Pyongyang. She also bore him a daughter (Kim Kyŏng-hŭi) in Pyongyang, but the whereabouts of this daughter are not known. Kim Chŏng-suk died on September 22, 1949, in Pyongyang while delivering a stillborn baby.<sup>36</sup> She was affectionately called Vera by the generals of the Soviet occupation forces in Pyongyang, and for one year after the establishment of the republic in North Korea until her death in September 1949, Kim Chŏng-suk was the first lady of North Korea. Major General N.G. Lebedev, executive officer of the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea, remem-

bered her as a vivacious and generous lady who always cooked enormous amounts of food for the hungry Soviet generals when they visited Kim's home.<sup>37</sup> A statue was erected and a museum was built in her home town in Hoeryŏng after her son Kim Jong Il became prominent in North Korea in the late 1970s, but this tribute to her is in commemoration of the contribution to the Korean revolution as a partisan and not as wife of Kim Il Sung or mother of Kim Jong Il.

Given his personal background and the circumstances in Korea and Manchuria during the latter part of the Japanese occupation, Kim's record of anti-Japanese guerrilla activities is commendable. For a young man who had no family life to speak of and deprived of basic support from his family and friends, Kim did well to join a subversive, Communist group to fight for his country. Even if the United Army was a Chinese guerrilla force, he fought against the Japanese for the cause of communism in China and Korea. He suffered many defeats, but he also scored some impressive victories and made a name for himself — indeed, he became the most wanted guerrilla leader in Manchuria. He persisted in the hopeless fight without much support, but he endured and did not surrender or submit to the Japanese. He also preached to his men the cause of Korean independence and the need for communism and fostered anti-Japanese spirit in the darkest days of the Korean independence movement. He did not win many converts, and he had to resort to taking hostages to prolong his guerrilla activities, but he did fight to the end. When the Japanese expeditionary force crushed the guerrillas in Manchuria, he fled to the Soviet Union, where he was trained by the local Soviet authorities. He returned to North Korea when his country was liberated.

In an effort to denigrate his past records, South Korean sources consider him a fake, denying him his past revolutionary activities. But Kim is not a fake. To be sure, there were countless patriots who attained majority at the time of the fall of the Korean kingdom in 1910 and fought the Japanese throughout their adult lives, returning to Korea at the end of thirty-five years of Japanese occupation. There were many who perished, fighting for freedom in

Korea during the period. Compared to these men, Kim's period of struggle is indeed brief, and his contribution may not be considered significant as that of others, but his record is a solid one and deserving of recognition even if it was under the United Army of the Chinese Communists.

A more serious difficulty comes from his attempt to build a towering Korean image of himself by denying any of his Chinese and Soviet connections. North Koreans have manufactured evidence to prove that Kim was a Korean revolutionary who fought solely for Korean liberation, claiming nonexistent records and denying the contribution of others to the cause of Korean independence. Evidence of his close relationship with the Chinese guerrillas is overwhelming, however, and his persistent denial of such records does not improve his image as a Korean revolutionary. Many Koreans fought against the Japanese alongside whoever supported their cause. Even the Korean Nationalists who despised communism asked for assistance from the Soviet Union in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East and the Comintern in the 1920s.

Kim's image-building campaign is indeed extreme in many respects. His show of filial piety, for example, does not seem to be simple reverence of his parents, who in fact did little for Kim in his boyhood. His purpose, rather, seems to be more self-serving: an effort to build his own image as a pious Korean son from a revolutionary Korean family. As an uneducated Korean youth who spent most of his young life fighting what he considered to be his enemy, the Japanese, Kim's record is commendable, and his less-than-adequate knowledge of the tenets of communism is nothing to be ashamed of. His insistence that he taught fourth graders dialectical materialism when in fact he was expelled from school in the eighth grade does not make him a good Marxist.

To refute Kim's claims is not difficult. But more important than the false claims is his effort to build the tradition of Korean communism and Korean revolutionary spirit upon such fallacious foundations. His Chinese and Soviet connections were fortunate for his future in the northern half of liberated Korea, but the suppression of such records to show that he accomplished all for Korea in the name of Korea does not bring about the intended result. His parti-

san activities with the Chinese were not ever-victorious; in fact, they ended in defeat. It is his persistence and obstinate will, characteristics of many successful revolutionaries elsewhere, that deserve recognition. It was also his political good fortune to have had Chinese and Soviet connections that distinguished him from other Korean revolutionaries.

## II

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# CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

The Koreans greeted their liberators in 1945 with uncommon enthusiasm — not so much because they approved or disapproved the disparate political ideologies of the Soviets and the Americans but primarily because their military occupations brought an end to the harsh Japanese rule under which they had suffered so long. But they soon learned the consequences of the liberation their own revolutionaries did not bring home. The United States instituted direct military rule in the South and the Soviet Union virtually dictated its wishes in the North. The so-called temporary division of the country was to last longer than the entire period of the Japanese occupation. Numerous efforts at peaceful reunification of the country have failed, and the North Korean military attempt to reunify the country brought even more unwanted non-Korean military forces into Korea and killed more Koreans, yet left the country still divided. The flames of the Korean revolutionary spirit have died without truly attaining the ultimate objective: an independent and unified Korea.

There were many organized Korean independence groups outside of Korea, but none of their military units entered the country

*hangil hyōngmyōng 20nyōn.*

23. *Saikin ni okeru Chōsen chian jōkyō* (1936), pp. 250-251; *Yōksa sajōn*, pp. 615-616. For his death, see Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, reel SP86, frame 10704.

## 2. Kim and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army

1. There are a number of accounts of Yang's guerrilla activities in Manchuria: Ji Yunlong, *Yang Jingyu huo kanglien diyilujun*; Lei Ding, *Dongbei yiyongjun yundong shihua*; and his life stories in *Hongqi biao biao*, 5:119-123 and 124-131; 8:57-58.

2. *Manshūkoku chianbu keimushi, Manshūkoku keisatsushi*, pp. 533-542.

3. Yi Hong-gwang was a close comrade in arms of Yang Jingyu. He was born in 1910 in Tandong, Yongin-gun, Kyōnggido, Korea, and went to Manchuria in 1926 with his parents. He fought gallantly, killing many Korean collaborators, such as Ko Sōk-kap. During his fighting days, he was also known as Yi Hong-hac or Yi Ūi-san, and his disguise was so effective at times that the Japanese mistook him for a woman. Yi died in May 1935 at the age of twenty-five. He is one of the very few guerrillas whom North Koreans recognize as a Korean fighter in Manchuria. During the Chinese civil war after the end of World War II, the Korean volunteer group that helped the Chinese Communists in Northeast China was known as the Yi Hong-gwang Company. For an account of Yi's life see, among others, *Dongbei lieshi jinianguan*, ed., *Dongbei kangri lieshichuan*, 1:69-82; *Xinghuo liaoyuan*, 4:378-388.

4. The Jiandao May 30 Communist Incident was a joint uprising by Chinese and Korean Communists on May 30, 1930. It was one of the rare uprisings that was successful. The insurrection was to commemorate the dissolution of Korean Communist organizations in Manchuria and encourage the Korean Communists to join the Chinese Communists. See the details in my earlier study, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*.

5. For the Fourth Army, there is an excellent account written in 1936 and published in Paris: Sun Jie, *Dongbei kangri lianjun disijun*. This book was later translated into Russian; see Sun Tsze, *Partizanskaya bor'ba Man'chzhurii* [Partisan struggles in Manchuria] (Moscow, 1939).

6. *Manshūkoku chianbu keimushi, Manshūkoku keisatsushi*, pp. 536-537. Chinese Communist accounts today claim much larger numbers, but there is no way to verify their claims. For the Chinese account, see *Wei Manzhouguoshi*, p. 497.

7. For the text of the declaration and draft bylaws of the formation of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, see Gunseibu gomonbu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:775-786.

8. There is much conflicting information from different sources. Recent Chinese Communist sources include *Wei Manzhouguoshi*, pp. 498-500; *Dongbei lieshi jinianguan*, ed.; *Dongbei kangri lieshichuan*. Earlier Chinese sources include Ji Yunlong, *Yang Jingyu huo kanglien diyilujun*, for the First Route Army and Sun Jie, *Dongbei kangri lianjun disijun* for the Fourth Army. Recent Japanese sources include Katō Toyotaka, *Manshūkoku keisatsu shoshi*; *Gendaishi shiryō*; *Ranseikai, Manshū kokugun*, pp. 287-292. For earlier Japanese sources, see Shihōshō, keiji-

kyoku, dai goka, *Manshū ni okeru kyōsan shugi undō*, Shisō kenkyū shiryō tokushū, dai 41-go, Shisō jōsei shisatsu hōkokusho, May 4 1938, p. 205; Gunseibu gomonbu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:162-762.

9. There were others too numerous to mention here. In the First Route Army, there were Pak Tūk-bōm, Han In-hwa, An Kwang-hun, Kim In-guk Kim Chae-bōm, and others. In the Second Route Army, there were Kim Ch'ol-u, Kang Tong-su, Kang Sin-il, and Kang Sin-t'ae. In the Third Route Army, there were Kim Kang, Ch'oe Myōng-gu, and Yi In-gūn, and others, to mention only a few. Consult the partisan lists in appendixes 1 to 3.

10. Chu Chin, born in 1878, was also known as Chu Chin-su. He fled to Manchuria shortly after the Japanese annexation of Korea and participated in Korean Communist activities in both Russia and Manchuria. Today the North Koreans do not mention any of his anti-Japanese activities. Chu was executed by the Japanese shortly after his arrest. See the record of his arrest in the Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police: Jiandao and Hunchun areas, May 1910-March 1938, pt. 8, "Kantō chihō heihi no bōdō to waga keisatsukan no katsudō oyobi kōgun no shutsudō," reel SP105, frame 9303. See the photographs in reel SP76, frame 3608.

11. Others mentioned include Yi Pong-su, who was vice-minister of the Ministry of defense until his death in the North in 1967; Ch'oe Hyōn, who was the vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission; Nam Ch'ang-il, who died fighting the Japanese in Manchuria; and An Pong-hak, who surrendered to the Japanese on September 30, 1986. See *ibid.*, reel SP105, frames 9390, 9396, 9402, 9408, 9412-13, 9418, 9420, and other frames in the series. *Ranseikai, Manshū kokugun*, p. 354. Here again the North Korean historians mention nothing of An's guerrilla activities.

12. The joint operation of the Second and Fifth Armies had four commands: Western, Central, Eastern, and Auxiliary. The entire force was under the command of Zhou Baozhong, and Kim was in the Central Command under Chai Shiyang. For the entire roster see *ibid.*, p. 289. It is also available in Gunseibu gomonbu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:176-177.

13. *Ranseikai, Manshū kokugun*, pp. 370-371.

14. For Nozoe's command, there are a number of sources that give division-by-division information. For the conference on October 1, 1939, attended by the commander of the *Kantōgun*, General Iimura, Minister Hoshino, and others, see *Manshūkokushi*, pp. 321-322; *Gendaishi shiryō*, pp. 456-471.

15. Ji Yunlong, *Yang Jingyu huo kanglien diyilujun*, pp. 62-89. There are some errors in dates and places in this book, but it is one of the most reliable records in Chinese. The author related that he had interviewed many participants in the United Army, including Kim Il Sung. There are many records of this final reorganization in Japanese sources. See, for example, *Ranseikai, Manshū kokugun*, pp. 401-402; *Manshūkokushi*, pp. 310-311.

16. Yang was invited to surrender, but he fought to the end; when he was killed, the police honored him with a samurai-style burial. Today there is a museum built in his honor and even a town named after him in Northeast China.

For the account of Yang's final battle, see Katō Toyotaka, *Manshūkoku keisatsu shoshi*, 3:31-41; Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, pp. 415-417. For the Chinese source, see Dongbei lieshi jinianguan, ed., *Dongbei kangri lieshichuan*, 1:41-68.

17. See the record of Cao Yafan's death in *Gendaishi shiryō*, p. 432. See the Chinese version in *Dongbei lieshi jinianguan*, ed., *Dongbei kangri lieshichuan*, 2:59-65.

18. *Shisō ihō* (December 1940), no. 25, pp. 62-75; *Shisō geppō* (November 1940), no. 77, pp. 129-176.

19. For the record of Kim's retreat into the Soviet Union in March 1941, see, among others, *Manshūkoku shi*, p. 325; Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, p. 411; Katō Toyotaka, *Manshūkoku keisatsu shoshi*, 3:48-49. Here Katō believes that Kim entered the Soviet Union as early as July 1940, but there is ample evidence of Kim's activities into early 1941 in Manchuria.

20. Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, pp. 413-417.

21. There are monthly statistics of "bandit appearances" from November 1934 to March 1940 in Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, pp. 422-489. For the Chinese account, see *Wei Manzhongguoshi*, p. 497.

22. For a study of the Chinese Communist revolutionary struggle in Manchuria, see Chong-sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945*. For Chinese sources see, among others, Zhou Baozhong, *Zhandou zai baishan heisui*, and the memoirs of Li Yen-lu. See also Suzuki Shōji, "Manshū kyōsan shugi undō kenkyū no gendankai."

### 3. Guerrilla Accomplishments

1. For others in this category, including Cao Yafan, Chen Hanzhang, and Ch'oe Hyōn, see Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, p. 402.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 350, 371-373.

3. Paek Pong, *Minjok ūi t'aeyang Kim Il Sung changgun*, 1:112-119.

4. For many informative statistics about the Koreans in Manchuria, see Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:139-146, 484-609.

5. There were other organizations that performed similar functions. The most commonly cited is a Nationalist group, *Yōnbyōn chach'i ch'okchinhoe*, headed by Chōn Sōng-ho. For details of Hyōpchohoe, see Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 2:149-200; also in Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, pp. 491-501.

6. Yi Sang-muk wrote an open letter decrying the unfair treatment of Korean partisans by the Chinese. A somewhat moderating Chinese attitude was expressed in a statement by the Chinese. See both documents in my earlier study, *Documents of Korean Communism*, pp. 452-454.

7. This information was the result of the internment and torture of a group of Korean partisans under Kim Hyōn. See the report in Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:120-121.

8. The five Koreans from Tangyuan who reported Xia's inhumane activities to Zhao were Yi Man-sul, Kim Sōng-gyo, Pae Kyo-jik, Sin Che-sōp, and Hō Chōng-bin. There are many stories of this nature. See the details in Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:755-756.

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9. Paek Pong, *Minjok ūi t'aeyang Kim Il Sung changgun*, pp. 160-162. For the earlier version, see *Chosōn kũndae hyōngmyōng undongsa*, pp. 229-330. For a complete list of those who participated in the meeting see Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:115.

10. Kin Seimei, *Chōsen dokuritsu undō, kyōsan shugi undō hen*, 5:441-468. This raid is also known as the Hyesanjin Incident. See *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:257-323.

11. North Korean historians claim that the association was founded on May 5, 1936, and that the association had more than one hundred branches and more than 200,000 members. The ten-article platform of the association was widely circulated, but a heavily edited declaration of this association appeared for the first time only in June 1978 (*Nodong sinmun*, June 2, 1978). The original platform, declaration, and bylaws are available in *Shisō ihō* (March 1938), no. 14, pp. 60-64. The original documents were translated and appeared in my earlier study *Documents of Korean Communism*, pp. 455-467.

12. For O's activities, see *Tong-a ilbo*, March 30, March 31, April 1, and May 6, 1922. They are also recorded in *Kuksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe, Ilche ch'imyak hañi han'guk samsimyungyōnsa*, 6:744 and 782. See also a study of O's activities in Yi Myōng-yōng, "Tongman ūi p'ung-un-a O Sōng-yun." Yi has also written an interesting article on the Fatherland Restoration Association in *Sōnggun'gwan taehakkyo nonmunjip* [Collection of essays of Sōnggyun'gwan University], no. 17.

13. *Chosōn ilbo*, October 7, 1936.

14. For other reports on Kim's banditry in Manchuria, see *Chōson ilbo*, November 11, 20, 22, 24, 27, December 5, 22, 1936. There are many North Korean claims to various reporting of Kim's activities in *Tong-a ilbo* (August 17, 1936) and *Chōson ilbo* (September 12, 1936), describing Kim's guerrilla forces of 5,000 strong, but no such article can be found. See the South Korean rebuttal of North Korean claims in *Kim Il Sung kwa Kim Sōng-ju*, pp. 45-66.

15. Kim Il Sung claims that he killed 110 Japanese and took more than 60 prisoners. See Paek Pong, *Minjok ūi t'aeyang Kim Il Sung changgun*, 1:252-254. For the Japanese account, see Ranseikai, *Manshū kokugun*, pp. 354-361. There are several Japanese maps of troop deployment against Kim's guerrillas. Another Japanese account is in *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:344-346.

16. Kiuchi Tadao, "Kantō shōnai hizoku tōbatsu jōkyō ni kansuru ken" [Concerning suppression of bandits in Jiandao province], report of Japanese consul in Hunchun, April 19, 1940. For other activities, nearly a day to day account of the last days of the United Army, see *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:222-728.

17. *Tong-a ilbo*, July 11 and 16, 1937; Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:196; *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:409-413, 435.

18. There are three examples of threatening notes written by members of the Second Army in my earlier study, *Documents of Korean Communism*, pp. 449-451. For the originals and more examples, see Gunseibu gomombu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:213-217, and 2:272-276.

19. *Saikin ni okeru Chōsen chian jōkyō* (1939), p. 415. See also Kin Seimei, *Chōsen dokuritsu undō*, 5:446-453. For Korean newspaper reports, see *Chosōn ilbo*,

October 7, 23, 29, November 7, 22, and December 4, 5, 1936. There are others too numerous to cite here.

20. See Paek Pong, *Minjok ūi t'aeyang Kim Il Sung changgun*, 1:240-242. There are many unbelievable stories in various accounts of those who participated in the guerrilla activities, so inflated that it is quite easy to distinguish fact from fiction. See among others the many stories in 12 volumes of *Hangil ppalchisan ch'amgajadūl ūi hoasanggi*.

21. Kiuchi Tadao, "Kin Nichisei hidan no naibu jōkyō ni kansuru ken" [Concerning the internal conditions of the Kim Il Sung Communist Bandit Group], by the consul of Hunchun, top secret no. 186, July 26, 1940.

22. This was revealed during the interrogation of a surrendered Korean partisan named Ch'oe Kwang-suk on December 14, 1935. For the acquisition of arms by Ch'oe Hyōn, see Gunseibo gomonbu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:189-222.

23. There are many articles on this small bomb Pak invented. The model I saw in the revolutionary museum looked more like a grenade. Pak has written a book about this device, *Yōn'gil p'okt'an* [Yanji bomb]; Yanji is the prefecture in eastern Manchuria where he was from.

24. There are many accounts of Yi Hak-man's purchase of arms from the Russian Maritime Province. See Gunseibu gomonbu, *Manshū kyōsan hi no kenkyū*, 1:808-809.

25. *Wei Manzhongguoshi*, pp. 555-557.

26. For Kim's retreat, see *Tokumu ihō* (May 1943), no. 4, pp. 5-60. For Zhou Baozhong, see Donald W. Klein and Ann B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, 1:225-228; Mu Qing, "Dongbei kangri lienjun douzheng shilo" [Brief history of struggle of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army], in *Wei dongbei di heping minzhu er douzheng*, 1:62-79; *Manshūkokushi*, p. 325.

27. See the reference in Han Chae-dōk, *Han'guk kongsan chu'ui wa pukhan ūi yōksa*, pp. 130-133. There is no way to verify this fact because that particular issue of *Minju Chosōn* is not available.

28. B. G. Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzvy," in *Osvobozhdenie Korei*, pp. 164-183.

29. *Manshūkokoku*, chianbu, keimushi, tokumuka, *Tokumu ihō* (May 1943), no. 4, pp. 23-32. "Habarosuku yaei gakkō no jōkyō," *Gaiji geppō*.

30. *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:694 and 733-767. See also excerpts from Zhou Baozhong's diary, "Zhou Baozhong 'Kanglien riji' zhaichao," *Shehui kexue zhanxian* (1984), no. 2, pp. 213-226.

31. *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:708-720. The Soviet Union sent Korean agents into Manchuria to help Korean partisans there. See Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Police: Jiandao and Hunchun areas, pt. 7, "Manshū jihen oyobi sono igo," reel SP105, frames 9082-9087. See also an informative study of Kim's activities by Wada Haruki, "Kin Nichisei to Manshū no kōnichi busō tōsō."

32. One defector who met Kim several times in Pyongyang before he fled the North related in his memoir that Kim had told him a brief story of his partisan activities. The accounts of the defectors, including this one, are in most respects

unreliable. See O Yōng-jin, *Hana ūi chūngōn*, p. 176; "Soren busō Chōsen jin chōsha no sennai sennyū jiken," in *Tokkō gaiji geppō*; "Kin Nichisei no katsudō jōkyō," *Tokkō gaiji geppō*; B.G. Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzvy," pp. 164-183.

33. For the interrogation report on Pak Kil-song, see top secret reports by Japanese consul Hiraoka Nin in Heihe consulate on January 12 (no. 7), January 18 (no. 13), February 17 (no. 53), March 20 (no. 76), March 26 (no. 82), and others of 1943. Reproductions of these reports are also available in *Gendaishi shiryō*, 30:694-731.

34. See the North Korean version of Kim Chōng-suk in *Yōksa sajōn*, 1:251-254. For her guerrilla activities, see several articles mentioning her in *Hangil ppalchisan ch'amgajadūl ūi hoasanggi*, 2:140; 7:108; and 10:55; see also "Kin Nichisei hidan no naibu jōkyō ni kansuru ken," Report of Kimura Tadao, July 26, 1940.

35. There is a newspaper article of the capture of Kim's wife in *Chosōn ilbo*, July 5, 1940. See also Yi Myōng-yōng, *Kim Il Sung yōlchōn*, pp. 318-320. In this book, Yi Myōng-yōng is trying to prove that Kim Il Sung is a fake, and the man had died in Manchuria.

36. *Akahata*, September 28, 1949.

37. Interview with Major General N. G. Lebedev in Moscow on July 21, 1978.

## PART II. CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER

### 4. The Soviet Occupation of North Korea

1. I. M. Chistiakov, "Voevoi puti 25-i armii," pp. 11-60.

2. See the account of Generals Chistiakov and Romanenko in The Stalingrad campaign in A. I. Evemenko, *Stalingrad*, pp. 387-426; also in A. M. Samsonov, *Stalingradskaya bitva*, pp. 379-381 and 526-527.

3. There are many accounts of his denial. In answer to one direct question about whether he had fought on the German front, Kim is reported to have said that he himself had not, but some of his men were sent; O Yōng-jin, *Hana ūi chūngōn*, pp. 176-177.

4. My interview with General Nikolai G. Lebedev in Moscow on July 21, 1978. Many South Korean accounts relate that Kim was wearing the uniform of a Soviet army major, but there are other reports that he was wearing the insignia of a captain.

5. B. G. Sapozhnikov, "Iz istorii sovetsko-koreiskoi druzvy," pp. 168-169.

6. I have not been able to identify the guerrilla leader known as Pak In-ch'ōl. There are records of Paek Yōng-ch'ōl and Pak Ch'ōl; both died about 1937.

7. Kim Il Sung is said to have returned with Ch'oe Yong-gōn, Kang Kōn, Ch'oe Hyōn, Ch'oe Yong-jin, Yi Yōng-ho, Ch'oe Kwang, Kim Kwang-hyōp, Kim Kyōng-sōk, Cho Chōng-ch'ōl, Kim Ch'un-yōk, Ch'oe Ch'un-guk, Yi Pong-su, and Yu Kyōng-su. All these men came back on a boat with their wives. Kim did