THE NORTH WIND

In the first year after liberation, the northern half of Korea accomplished what most Koreans and many Western observers thought would be the inevitable result of the end of Japanese rule—a thoroughgoing revolution. Within nine months of the liberation, landlordism had disappeared, the land had been redistributed, major industries had been nationalized, radical reforms had eliminated the worst abuses of the colonial factory system and had established formal equality for women. Within a year of the liberation, a powerful mass party, enrolling hundreds of thousands of Koreans, and a rudimentary army provided the organization and coherence that Korean politics had so long lacked. By the end of 1946, north Korea, like the south, had delineated the contours of the separate state that formally emerged there in September 1948. Furthermore, most of the unique features that have come to be associated with North Korean communism had emerged during this period: a heavy dose of nationalism, stress on the critical role of the leader, an inclusive united front policy, and the ideological mix of socialism and self-reliance that has become the peculiar vehicle for communism in Korean national form. All this was done quickly, efficiently, not to say ruthlessly, but comparatively speaking, with a minimum of bloodshed. In other words, north Korea went through the "normal" process that we might expect from the residual effects of Japanese colonial rule.

Colonial development had transformed the relationship between northern and southern Korea. Historically, the south had been the region of landed wealth and aristocratic dominance; agricultural production covered the peninsula, and the richest, most productive lands were in the south. The north, except for certain areas in Hwanghae and South P'yŏng'ān provinces, had large regions of dry-rather than paddy-field production and upland penury that led in many places to slash-and-burn cultivation. Wild regions in the upper peninsula were never fully integrated into the traditional Korean state. Regional prejudices, in typical fashion, came to overlay these material distinctions—but these were by no means so strong as to invite a rationale for national division.

By 1945, however, north and south faced each other in the context of a recent, rapid reversal of the traditional relationship. The north had moved out of backwardness into modern industrial relations, giving a dynamic basis to the society in a new mode of production; even the wild border regions yielded something—something Japanese guerrilla leadership. The north became the repository, therefore, of what was young, dynamic, and progressive. The south retained an exalted status and a traditional legitimacy as the home of Korea's rulers, but Japanese rule had deeply eroded that structure of status and authority and had bequeathed to the north the essential basis for a reversal of the old relationship.

The recent emergence of industry in the north also required and stimulated the emergence of a modern Korean state on a new basis. For any leadership, northern industrialization and its growth under public rather than private auspices would have suggested the need for a strong center. Managerial and planning needs, the integrated grid of transportation and communications associated with industry, the requirements for steady supply of labor and materials, all spell extended functions for the state. For a radical anticolonial leadership, however, a strong state could also prove useful in reorienting a skewed infrastructure toward national rather than colonial needs and in insulating Korea from the dislocations of open involvement in the world market. Polanyi wrote:

If the organized states of Europe could protect themselves against the backwash of international free trade, the politically unorganized colonial peoples could not. The revolt against imperialism was mainly an attempt on the part of exotic peoples to achieve the political status necessary to shelter themselves from the social dislocations caused by European trade policies. The protection that the white man could easily secure for himself, through the sovereign status of his communities was out of reach of the colored man as long as he lacked the prerequisite, political government.3

The radical tonic for Korea's plight, therefore, would be social revolution at home and a withdrawal and insulation from a world economy dominated by advanced industrial states. The sundering of the colonial sphere left a tightly organized, highly nationalistic polity in the north that quickly began to restructure and reform colonial distortions in
agriculture, industry, and society. By the end of 1946, one of the first examples of revolutionary nationalism in a postcolonial “Third World” setting was in place.

To say that even today few Western observers would agree with all, or any, of the above is only to begin to appreciate the gulf in understanding that separates the existing Western historiography from the reality of postwar North Korea. The reasons for these differences of opinion are many, among them: (1) because the Soviet Red Army occupied north Korea, so that this Korean revolution went on under the protective umbrella of Joseph Stalin, many Stalinist abuses of socialism have been assumed to characterize north Korea during this period as well; (2) the existing historiography in the West has been and remains subject to the distortions of the Cold War and the special pleading of South Korea, so that the literature tends to be classically biased; (3) North Korea itself has failed to deal honestly and thoroughly with its own history during the period so that most of its histories are of marginal use; (4) the Korean revolution occurred in the earliest days of the Cold War, presenting a hard image of Third World revolution to Westerners, especially Americans, who hoped to fashion a liberal-democratic path to postcolonial development; and (5) none of the Korean revolutionaries had experience in or ties with the West, as had those in the Vietnamese or Chinese revolutions. For all these reasons it is necessary to begin again at the beginning and to attempt to abandon received wisdom to get at the reality.

The Soviet Occupation

We have outlined in earlier chapters the general contours of Soviet presurrender policies for the Korean peninsula. At his meetings with Roosevelt at Teheran and Yalta, and in discussions with Harry Hopkins in May 1945, Stalin left the Americans with the impression that he had agreed to a four-power trusteeship over Korea. He carefully avoided committing such agreements to paper, however, and the actual written record shows for the most part a Soviet emphasis on Korean independence. At Potsdam in July, Molotov asked specifically for a thorough discussion of a Korean trusteeship, calling it an unprecedented and unusual arrangement; no substantive discussions occurred, however, and the matter had to be put off to the Moscow Foreign Minister’s meeting at the end of 1945.

Military discussions at Potsdam touched on likely Soviet operations in Korea and, in effect, left the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea, and the losses likely to be incurred in defeating them, to the massive Soviet land armies. The American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the quick successes of the Soviet army in Manchurian battles forced an abrupt Japanese surrender and left a vacuum on the Korean peninsula that the Soviets were best poised to fill. George Lensen describes the Soviet move into Korea:

Soviet planning and preparations for the campaign [in Korea and Manchuria] were elaborate and the offensive . . . was mounted on a large scale, with over 1½ million men, 5½ thousand tanks and self-propelled guns.3

On August 10 units of the Soviet 25th army attacked the north Korean cities of Üngii and Najin, meeting only light Japanese resistance. After the August 15 Japanese surrender, the Russians entered the major port city of Wonsan on August 21. Three days later they marched into Hamhŭng and P’yŏngyang.3 Although various Korean groups aided the Soviet entry with attacks against the Japanese, and although Koreans were in the 25th army detachments, there is no mention of participation by Kim Il Sung and his guerrilla followers in either Soviet or North Korean accounts.4

Through their quick and extensive engagement of Japanese forces, the Soviets won military and political advantage: militarily, they were in a position to march down the peninsula to Pusan; politically, they won favor among the Korean population because, as General Hodge later put it, the Koreans “saw the Russians come in here and fight,” whereas the Americans were unable to reach Korea until early September, and did not fight on Korean soil.6 Yet in retrospect, Korean communists in the north must have wondered why the Soviets did not exploit their military advantage to unify the peninsula and present the Americans with a fait accompli. The reasons for Soviet moderation were two: (1) a desire not to needlessly offend the United States, when half the peninsula would in any case guarantee Soviet security; (2) the rapidity of the Japanese collapse must have upset the Soviet calculation on the ending of the Pacific War. In early August, Hiroshima, the Russians probably expected to have to advance a long and costly campaign for Manchuria and Korea; yet by mid-August it was clear that they could have half of the peninsula at little cost. Kim Il Sung and other Korean guerrillas probably ruined the rapid Japanese collapse, however, which denied them the opportunity to participate directly in the final liberation of their homeland.

The rapid end to the war also left Soviet policies toward Korea relatively unformed and thus reactive to American policies in the south. There is little indication that the Soviets thought much about Korea before the war ended; and in 1945/46 they had to cope with awesome human and material destruction at home. This period of
“domesticism,” and the general emphasis of Soviet foreign policy on Eastern Europe, meant that Korea took a back seat. The Soviets apparently had neither the resources nor the will to create full satellite states in Manchuria or Korea; thus they quit Manchuria in 1945 and allowed a degree of autonomy in north Korea greater than that allowed in several Eastern European states. Their basic goal was to assure that Korea would not again provide a launching board for attacks on Manchuria or the Soviet Far East. Within the bounds of that outer limit, Koreans were able to carve out a degree of autonomy that was particularly significant in the first year of liberation.

Soviet expansionism in 1945 was accomplished by a huge military machine; it was lateral, agglomerative, incremental expansion-in-width. As Franz Schurmann, Hannah Arendt, and others have suggested, such expansion depends on military force, having no internal economic dynamic like that of capitalist empires. It thus may be more repressive, but when stretched to the limit it is also weak. The Soviets in Manchuria and Korea were stretched across the Urals into the frontier hinterlands of the Russian land mass, unsustained by the Soviet industrial and agricultural base. This is the fundamental reason why, in my view, the Soviets perfomce had limited aims in China and Korea.

The lack of Soviet preparation upon entering Korea was manifest in contradictory policies followed during the first days and weeks after their entry into Korea. Japanese activities added to the disorder of the initial Soviet occupation. Unlike the Japanese welcome for the Americans in the south, Japanese authorities in the north extended virtually no cooperation to the Soviets. In fact, they destroyed factories, mines, banks, official records, and the like.

The Soviets seem either to have had no uniform policy for governing northern Korea or to have tailored their policies to suit conditions in different provinces and localities. Upon their arrival in Wonsan on August 31, the Soviets ousted the Japanese administration, took over government facilities, and authorized Kang Ki-dok, the chief of the Wonsan people’s committee, to take charge of peace preservation in the city. In the town of Yangyang, just north of the thirty-eighth parallel, entering Red Army troops were met by representatives of a local Red Peasant Union, part of the underground peasant movement of the early 1930s, and also by members of local workers’ and fishermen’s unions and the local people’s committee. The leader of the PC urged the elimination of all Japanese and Japanese influence through “lightning-flash action.” The leading Soviet officer stated that he wished to follow the Korean people’s views but that he had no instructions on what to do about the Japanese, or Japanese property. He said he would inform his superiors that it was “the people’s will” that they remove Japanese influence immediately; he also left administration in the hands of the people’s committee. A report of August 30 said that upon entering Hamhung on August 24, however, the commanding Soviet officer and the provincial governor of South Hamgyong Province issued a statement saying the following:

Until the political course for Korea is determined, the Soviet Army will administer [the province] through the existing government and military apparatus [Japanese]... . Those who harm or destroy public peace will be severely punished or given the death sentence.

A later report said that as soon as the Soviets found that a Hamhung PC existed, however, they kicked the Japanese out and turned over administration to the committee. On August 25 the Soviet command in P’yongyang authorized the local branch of the CPK to take over the administrative powers of the Government-General and immediately nationalized major Japanese property.

In late September, a leftist newspaper in the south printed a proclamation from the political office of the Red Army entitled, “General Policy for the Establishment of People’s Power”:

What we must do is establish a completely independent country embracing all strata of the population who are not [part of] the Japanese enemy. The Soviets will to the end advocate among the four powers the setting up of workers’ and peasants’ sovereignty.

The land question: since this has become the most important question, the land must be newly apportioned among the population. With respect to indigenous [Korean] landlords, all land above that tilled by the landlord himself should be confiscated and the government should of course redistribute it to the peasants. Whether or not this is actually achieved will depend entirely on how great our efforts are.

With respect to factories now belonging to the Japanese, we will completely expel Japanese elements and the factories will be managed by the workers and technicians. If the Japanese are needed in technical areas, we will put them to work temporarily but we must train Korean technicians very rapidly. Medium and small enterprises owned by Koreans will be allowed to operate freely under the superintendence of the people’s committees. There must be a great expansion in facilities producing everyday necessities; this must be done urgently.

There will be no agricultural products sent to Japan this year, and harvests belonging to Japanese will all be requisitioned by the people’s committees. In addition there will be provision for those
things needed for emergency use and that needed for the Soviet Army. . . . With respect to peasants' taxes, this is something to be resolved by the executive department of the tax committee, but it will certainly be far less than in the past.

Evil, pro-Japanese elements will be thoroughly swept out; a strict purge of all impure elements within and without [the pro-Japanese] camp is needed.13

The remainder of the statement urged the opening of cultural, health, and educational facilities to peasants and workers, dealt with currency problems, and placed the northern banks under the control of the people's committees. It also urged that in dealing with the Japanese a distinction be made between propertyless Japanese, who were to be treated decently, and the rest of the colonizers.

The above statement appeared after the Soviets had recognized the northern people's committee structure and reflects demands made by the committees throughout the peninsula. It seems clear that the Soviets planned to establish some sort of socialist regime in the north. They brought with them into Korea an undetermined number of Koreans who had lived out part or all of the colonial period in the Soviet Union, some of whom were Soviet Communist Party members.14 The spread of the people's committees, however, provided a convenient and popular local basis for the establishment of the northern regime, and one that had the additional advantage of being at least as widespread in the south. Therefore, although the Soviets clearly followed contradictory policies in various cities and regions of north Korea, by mid-September they were working through provincial PCs and had begun the restructuring of colonial legacies. Such policies were immensely popular among the mass of Koreans in the north.

There is another aspect to the initial Soviet occupation, however, which severely tarnishes their record. The Soviet troops who entered Korea committed depredations against the Japanese and Koreans, including rape and looting, on what appears to have been a wide scale and which went quite beyond taking revenge against the enemy and its Korean allies. As a result of the terrible destruction wrought upon an entire generation of Soviet youth by the European war, the Soviets had been forced to recruit soldiers, young peasant men and women, just for the campaigns against the Japanese. The new recruits came into Korea lacking even uniforms and shoes in some cases and lived off the Korean land with no provisions for themselves, took what they needed without paying for it, and, like Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe and especially Germany, were allowed to accumulate personal booty and ship it home.15 According to Han Kün-jo, who served as mayor of P'yŏngyang under the Soviet occupation for the first few weeks, the Russians requisitioned two-thirds of the food supply set aside by the people's committees. Han also stated, however, that many Koreans participated in the looting of Japanese colonialists and Korean "capitalists," suggesting a class rather than racial basis to the depredations.16 The accounts of rape and pillage were inflated in the south by fleeing Japanese, who were in no position to cast blame, since they had done their best to destroy colonial industries, mines, and the economy itself (through printing reams of money to try to buy their way out of the north). But there remains no doubt that the behavior of Soviet occupation forces was largely uncontrolled in the early weeks and cast a pall upon the Soviet effort in the north.

By January 1946 the Soviets had brought in military police who placed strict controls on their troops; MPs were to shoot on sight any Russian caught raping a Korean.17 A German Benedictine priest, Father Hopple, who lived in north Korea from 1945 to 1949, related that early Soviet occupation contingents seemed as miserable as refugees from China, poorly clothed and hungry. They "gave themselves to rape and pillage on an extensive scale." The situation quieted down after the MPs came in, however, and from then on "the department of Soviet officials . . . was always correct," and the troops were under strict control. The Soviets continued to requisition supplies, but they issued redeemable receipts for everything.18

It is also widely believed that the Soviets carted off many north Korean factories, as they did with colonially developed industry in Manchuria. But in fact, there is no evidence that they made more than a few removals. The Pauley Commission, which documented Soviet removal of industry in Manchuria, concluded that no substantial removals occurred in Korea.19 American intelligence thought for some months that the Soviets were making significant removals but decided in June 1946 that earlier reports may have been based on destruction done by the retreating Japanese and noted that Soviet technicians were in effect doing their best to restore damaged industries and that production by mid-1946 was above 1945 levels. A Korean electrical engineer who came south in September 1946 reported that the Soviets were making "conscious efforts" to leave north Korean industry intact.20 It may be that the disfavor the Soviets earned in Korea through the behavior of individuals in the troops led them to pursue different policies on industrial removals in Manchuria and Korea; or perhaps the difference may be accounted for simply by Soviet plans to stay longer in Korea than in Manchuria.

It has become commonplace in Western writings on the period to emphasize Soviet depredations in the north (without noting the repres-
The spread of local participatory politics that we have examined in the south had its analogue across the thirty-eighth parallel. Virtually every southern leftist political grouping or organization had its expression in the north as well in the months after liberation. The difference was that the Soviet occupation provided a womb in which this politics could be nurtured and it offered no support to rightist politics: thus it stimulated a rapid mobilization across north Korea. The Soviets, like the Americans, had physical limits, which made it impossible to occupy or administer the north below the highest levels in the period from August to December 1945. Thus people's committees, peasant unions, labor unions, and other organizations were formed everywhere, and their political complexion, although oriented to the Left, varied greatly. In general, each northern province had its own people's committee structure, with its own policies and composition; thus a pronounced regionalism developed, which persisted through the first year after liberation. Uniformity began to be imposed from the top in 1946, but this process did not have its full effect until 1947 at the earliest.

Korean politics began in the north much as it had in the south, with the organization at liberation of provincial branches of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI). In P'yŏngyang, Cho Man-sik led the South P'yŏng'an Province CPKI branch. Cho was a moderate nationalist, a Christian educator who had graduated from the law course of Meiji University in 1915, had taught at a number of Korean colleges and universities, and had participated in the 1919 March First Movement. Thereafter, he was active in gradualist nationalist activities with, among others, Kim Sŏng-su and Song Chin-u. We can delineate his politics precisely, in fact, by saying that he was akin to Song Chin-u and Kim Sŏng-su, except that he had managed to keep his nationalist credentials intact during the latter stages of Japanese rule. He was not a populist like Yŏ Un-hyŏng, but like Yŏ, he was willing to work with leftists and communists in the interests of Korean unification. His vice-chairman was O Yun-sŏn, an obscure figure who apparently was also a Christian moderate nationalist. In South Hamgyŏng Province the CPKI branch was formed by what official South Korean sources term "political prisoners," that is, people who emerged from Japanese jails on August 16. Among its leaders were Song Sŏng-gwan, Kim Chae-gyu, and Pak Kyŏng-dŏk. Kim had led a well-known peasant union incident on the early 1930s in Tanch'ŏn. Other provincial CPKI branches were also established in the days from August 15 to 17.
On August 22 the Soviets arranged a merger of the South P'yøng'æn
CPKI and the P'yøngyang city CPKI branch, taking sixteen members
from each. South Korean sources claim that sixteen communists
were simply added to Cho's CPKI to form the new body. Although
this cannot be verified, it is certainly true that the addition of mem-
bers of the P'yøngyang CPKI had a radicalizing effect on Cho's group,
since most of them were released Japanese prisoners. The new orga-
nization was called the People's Political Committee (inmin ch'øng'i
uiwønhoe), a designation not used in the south. Cho Man-sik remained
chairman, with O Yun-søn and Hyøn Chun-hyøk as vice-chairmen.
Hyøn had been a student leader of leftist demonstrations against the
Japanese in the early 1920s, emerging from jail in 1945. He helped
organize the communist party in the north in the month after libera-
tion; but as Scalapino and Lee rightly note, his politics were simply
leftist, comparable to someone like Hø Høn or Yi Kang-guk in the
south. The interior department of this committee was headed by
Yi Chu-yøn, a communist, while Kim Ik-jin, a nationalist, was re-
sponsible for peace preservation and Han Chae-døk, a lawyer and
also a nationalist, became mayor of P'yøngyang. At the end of Au-
 gust, people's committees emerged throughout north Korea, often
with a similar balance between nationalists and communists. It ap-
ppears that the Soviets, or leftist Koreans, stepped in to assure at least
parity for the Left, thus rearranging the CPKI branches at the top.

It is unlikely that the Soviets were able to dominate or manipulate
the provincial committees. American intelligence stated in December
1945 that the Soviets did not set up a military government, having no
civil affairs personnel with them; nor did they establish a central
government, but instead "recognized People's Committees as governing
bodies from the provincial level to the ward or township level." The
Soviets were "said to have been very careful in pointing out that
Northern Korea was not Russian territory," and one American re-
ported a conversation with a Soviet official who remarked, "We like
the English and the Americans, they look like us. . . . We don't like
the Koreans. We will stay until a suitable stable government has been
set up, then we will go." American intelligence suggested that no cen-
tral government emerged because the Soviets thought the north would
soon return to the control of a central administration in Seoul.

It is unlikely that communists and leftists just released from jail
would tolerate nationalist dominance in the committees, especially
when the region was under Red Army occupation. What remains
surprising is that throughout 1945 these committees continued to recog-
nize Seoul as the political center and to retain the moderate national-
ists. Cho Man-sik's committee immediately recognized the Korean Peo-
When the KPR was not recognized in Seoul, the northerners estab-
lished a Five Provinces Administrative Bureau (Puk Chasøn o-do
haengjøngguk); but it did not claim to be a central body. It was in
fact based mostly on the South P'yøng'æn Province People's Political
Committee, with the same chairman, Cho Man-sik, and vice chair-
men. This bureau remained the only central grouping in the north
above the people's committee structure until February 1946, but it did
not constitute a real political center at all. Under its aegis, real power
was exercised on a regional basis by the provincial people's com-
mittees. An informant from north Korea told American intelligence in
January 1946 that the center was "weak and poorly organized" and
that it had to depend almost entirely on the provincial people's com-
mittees for administration. This came to an end only in the after-
hmath of the trusteeship imbroglio and the apparent inability or un-
williness in the south to implement the Moscow decisions. There is
simply no evidence to support the assertion that the Soviets or their
allies planned for a separate regime in the north before February 1946.

For most north Korean citizens, their concerns in the first months
after liberation were with life and politics at the local levels. Be-
low the provincial people's committees, they were largely free to
improvise county, township, and village politics along the people's
committee, peasant union, and worker's union lines. Although infor-
mation is severely limited on this aspect of northern politics, subse-
quent policies adopted at the center to remedy "defects" in the
localities pointed to the same spontaneous, amorphous, and popular
qualities that we noted in the provinces of the south. In this period,
Koreans took their destinies in their own hands and fashioned a politics
that reflected the complex of social forces in each locality. As we saw
earlier in the town of Yangyang, Red Peasant Union members from
the 1930s emerged from the woodwork to greet incoming Soviet forces,
having already established a local people's committee. A proclamation
from a PC in South Hamgyøng Province perhaps catches the flavor of
local politics: it gave all men and women over 18 the right to vote and
to be elected to office; it maintained, "the sovereignty of the Korean
nation resides in all the people themselves"; it said that all factories,
mills, farms, transportation facilities, utilities, and so on, belonging
to the Japanese or to pro-Japanese Koreans would be confiscated and
appropriated by the state and would be managed by worker commit-
tees. In general, the proclamation urged Koreans to take Korean af-
airs into their own hands and exert all efforts on behalf of themselves
instead of a colonial master.

From October 8 to 10, 1945, representatives of local PCs met in
P'yøngyang to attempt to work out a uniform structure for all the
members at the provincial PC level, fifteen to seventeen on city committees, thirteen to fifteen on county (kun) committees, and seven to nine at the neighborhood (long) level. In the villages, the committee head was to be elected by the whole population, not chosen by village elders (as had been the case among many PCs). Village electors would in turn choose district committees, and electors from the districts would choose county committees, who in turn elect provincial committees. City PCs were to be elected by the whole urban population. Like most bureaucratic organizations, the committees quickly proliferated offices and members such that by April 1946 the typical structure looked like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PC Type</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial PCs</td>
<td>45-47</td>
<td>3,154-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County PCs</td>
<td>15-17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City PCs</td>
<td>25-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township PCs</td>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The degree to which policy percolated up from the localities rather than trickling down from the top during the six months after liberation is revealed in the pages of various local newspapers. The People's Daily (Inmin ilbo), published in South Hamgyǒng Province during the period, proclaimed in its September 6, 1945 issue, "sovereignty is in the hands of the people." Issues on each of the next four days proclaimed new educational programs, plans for reorganizing the province government administration, and warnings to the population to continue paying taxes as usual and to preserve Japanese property in the interests of Koreans. The same process, with differences in emphasis, was detailed in the daily issues of a myriad of northern newspapers: Ch'iyu Huanghae (Free Kwangwae), Pyǒngbu sinbo (North Pyǒngan News), Pyǒngyang minbo (Pyǒngyang People's Report), and others. All carried extensive articles on policies in education, health, justice, forestry, and so on. Provincial peace maintenance groups (poandae) were given "ten commandments" in their dealings with Koreans, guidelines analogous to the famous "eight points for attention" of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: be kind with the people, lead a disciplined social life, pay for what you need. American intelligence reported that the northern PCs were the effective local governing agencies and the poandae the only police; the poandae aided PCs in collecting rice and taxes and in examining people in transit from one place to another. The unanimous view of Koreans coming south who talked to intelligence officials was that "the Russians themselves do not mix in local administration."  

In mid-October rents paid by tenants were readjusted according to the KPR's "3/7" system, whereby the landlord received 30 percent and the tenant 70 percent of the crop in kind. It is likely that the wealthier landlords had earlier been subject to attack and ouster; certainly collaborators were weeded out quickly, often violently, and there is some indication that people's courts were used to oust colonial county magistrates and township chiefs. The presence of Korean landlords, colonial officials, and police was, of course, much thinner in the north than in the south where the overgrown bureaucratic center existed, and the higher-ranking colonial accomplices fled south quickly at liberation. This may explain in part why the postliberation revolution in the north could be accomplished quickly and with little apparent bloodshed.

The scholarly literature on North Korea has paid little attention to this early period after liberation in the north and has explicitly or implicitly denied that any revolution took place or that, if it did, it was imposed from without. Chong-sik Lee argued that "an alien system" was imposed upon the north by the Soviets, "transplanted outright and made to grow," and that the numbers of actual communists in the north were miniscule, and their overall influence "minute." Such a judgment is impossible to reach unless one concentrates upon only the handful of leaders at the top and declares them, for one reason or another, to be alien to Korea, a matter we will get to shortly. Taking the society as a whole, however, it is undeniable that the people's committees provided a broad forum for participation at all levels and were populated by leaders who derived a raw legitimacy from their resistance to the Japanese. A sampling of the PC leadership demonstrates this. We have seen that in the Pyǒngyang PC, at the center, resisters who had fought the Japanese in the early 1930s and who had spent an average of perhaps a decade in colonial prisons emerged into the light on August 15 and immediately assumed positions of authority. Some of them, like Pak Chǒng-nak (a woman), remained in the highest ranks of the northern leadership thereafter. The head of the Hwanghae Province PC, Kim Tok-yǒng, had also done time for political crimes at several points before 1945. The head of the education department of the Kangwǒn Province PC, Yi Ki-yǒng, was a famous writer of proletarian literature whom the Japanese had arrested and whose works had been banned. The early chief of the Hongwǒn PC, later to become chief of the industrial department of the South Hamgyǒng PC, was Yi Pǒng-su, a native of Hongwǒn who had majored in economics at Meiji University, was active in the March First Movement, edited the financial page of the Tonga ilbo, and had done "numerous stretches in prison." It is fair to say that, from the standpoint of the majority of Koreans, the Soviets followed policies (or allowed Koreans to do so) that were
a stark contrast to those pursued by the Americans in the early months of Occupation. Whether by design or simply because the people’s committees were convenient, the Soviets gave Koreans their head and retreated to the background, to what George McCune aptly called a position of “inauspicious but firm authority.” It goes without saying that Soviets were concerned with the top command in P’yŏngyang, as we will see. But elsewhere, they left real authority in the hands of Koreans. American intelligence noted these policies in December 1945, thought they indicated “a limited occupation,” and reported the “lack of any move to establish a central government.”

Thus in north Korea in the months after liberation, an entirely new elite emerged from the colonial abyss, which was drawn, as an official American source grudgingly acknowledged, “almost exclusively from the ranks of workers and peasants.” The colonial hierarchy was turned on its head; in American democratic argot, the bastards were thrown out. Of course, from the standpoint of Americans in the south, new bastards were thrown in.

**Politics From the Top Down**

We have seen in earlier chapters that the people’s committee structure tended to take on a cellular organization in which lines of authority and disciplined hierarchy remained undeveloped. Each committee at each level was intent on running its own affairs and had little concern for those committees above or below. This is precisely what is to be expected in a fundamentally peasant society. Six months after liberation, however, northern authorities began to reverse the flow of politics; the spontaneous organization moving up from the bottom was met by an articulated and disciplined politics coming down from the top. The essence of this assertion of central authority was to give vertical coherence to the horizontal and cellular structure of the people’s committees, to make them responsive to the desires of the center as well as to the pressures of the localities.

What we may inelegantly call “top-downism” has been a characteristic of Soviet socialism from the beginning, more especially a characteristic of Stalinism. The Soviet revolution proceeded from the center or the cities outward; in China it was the reverse. Therefore the Soviet revolution did not have the rich development of peasant politics that we find in China. Instead, the peasantry was at best a vehicle and at worst a victim of the Soviet revolution. As Teodor Shanin notes, Stalin himself saw agrarian revolution as a species of bourgeois revisionism: “The peasantry had to have achieved its aims under the leadership of the urban proletariat; the land had been *given* by the

Soviet state and not taken by spontaneous action” (emphasis in original).

The north Korean leadership had experience with both the Chinese and Soviet revolutions and confronted a situation in liberated Korea in which all the inchoate spontaneity of peasants in revolt seemed to well up before their very eyes. This leadership, and its policies, therefore came to embody a combination of central and peripheral impulses and an ideology that mixed Stalinist top-downism with Maoist mass line politics. Quintessential Stalinist slogans such as “cadres decide everything” were blazoned alongside quintessential Maoist slogans such as “from the masses, to the masses.” Mao himself once remarked on this matter:

> [Stalin] did not undertake the class struggle from the bottom to the top, but introduced peaceful land reform in Eastern Europe and North Korea, without struggling against the landowners and rightists, only proceeding from the top to the bottom and struggling against the capitalists. We proceed from the top to the bottom, but we also add the class struggle from the bottom to the top.

Mao was only half right, Stalin did not dominate events in North Korea as he did in Eastern Europe, thus there emerged a unique brand of socialism that melded Stalinism and Maoism, or, more accurately, molded a Korean socialism in the space between. A key agency of this melding was Kim Il Sung, who had himself been attached to both Soviet and Chinese communism before 1945.

**The Rise to Power of Kim Il Sung**

It is most remarkable that the two Korean leaders who emerged on top during the liberation period, Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, should have returned from exile to their native land in such similar fashions. At the end of September 1945, neither had appeared in Korea, although both were known through legend surrounding their names. (Whether either was known to the average Korean, by name or legend, is quite another matter.) In mid-October both men were given fulsome introductions to their compatriots by the respective foreign commands, and by February 1946 Kim, as chairman of the North Korean Interim People’s Committee, and Rhee, as head of the Representative Democratic Council, seemed to be the designated leaders of the northern and southern halves of Korea.

Kim, like Rhee, became the focus of further mythmaking and hagiography by his supporters, a phenomenon that continues today as a major industry in North Korea and that has spawned its opposite in
South Korea, where the truth about Kim's past is obscured behind a smokescreen of opposing propaganda. It remains difficult to separate fact from fancy in the career of this controversial individual. It might be useful in describing Kim to begin with the mythology. In the north, especially in recent years, Kim and his guerrilla allies are given credit for the liberation of Korea in 1945, with little or no reference to Soviet aid. Furthermore, Kim is said to have become the leader of the Korean communist movement by the mid-1930s if not earlier, introducing ideology and organization into the ranks of an immature, factional, and scattered group of intellectual and petty-bourgeois types claiming to be communist leaders. In the late 1930s Kim reportedly dealt telling blow after blow to Japanese imperialism, until approximately the time of Pearl Harbor. For the next three years until the liberation, the northern literature betrays a deafening silence about Kim's whereabouts.5

In the south, and to some extent in scholarly American literature, the line on Kim's past runs from denying outright that he played any role in the anti-Japanese struggle, to charging that he impersonated the real, legendary Kim II Sung, to labeling him variously a Soviet-Korean, Chinese-Korean, or an alien to Korean communism. The dominant interpretation, however, identifies Kim as a distinctly minor anti-Japanese guerrilla with a tiny band of followers who struck a blow here and there against the Japanese, but whose eminence is to be explained almost entirely by his being hand-picked by the Soviets as their man in the north. How Kim came to the attention of the Soviets is a question never explained well or documented these accounts, but they seem to suggest that he had to do with the rumored service in the Soviet Army, including action at Stalingrad, or training by the Soviets in the vicinity of Khaborovsk during his dark period, 1942-1945.

Behind these assertions lie a raft of unstated assumptions, however. Some are based on the assumption that there was a real, legendary Kim II Sung who would have made a good leader of liberated Korea.52 Others assume that a Korean who fought on the Soviet side in World War II is distinctly suspect (whereas one who fought on the Japanese side is not). Remember that the vast majority of Koreans who did take up arms in the war fought either for Japan or the Soviets). Still others maintain that there was a coherent communist movement to which one could be alien—and that a leader of the mainstream would have been more acceptable to conservative Koreans. Finally, some argue that Kim's effort against the Japanese, although obviously small in absolute numbers of participants, was also relatively small in relation to what other Koreans were doing against the Japanese.

But all of these assumptions are fallacious. As stated in chapter one, there was no legendary Kim II Sung, and if there had been, he would have been no more willing to work with collaborators than other anti-Japanese fighters. There is no proof that Kim fought in the Soviet Army, either; and if he had, and had been decorated at Stalingrad as the story goes, this would have enhanced rather than detracted from his reputation in the eyes of most Koreans in 1945. Moreover, after 1931 there was no coherent central leadership to the communist movement. Had Pak Hŏn-yŏng, the leader with a rough sort of seniority by virtue of his scattered activities going back to the early 1920s, emerged on top in the north at Kim's expense, we can imagine that the literature would have much to say. Finally, and most embarrassing to the South, there was no other nationalist or communist force fighting against Japan after 1931 that can be proved to have been larger or more active than Kim's. The Kwangbok Army in Ch'ungking numbered about 600 in 1945, but was made up mostly of students, intellectuals, and politicians with only rudimentary military training or potency. Its leadership existed at the sufferance of the Nationalist regime and did not really begin to think about contributing to the war effort in the Chima theatre until early 1944. Koreans allied with Yenan did more fighting against the Japanese, but as a fighting force they numbered perhaps no more than 300 and were apparently not well integrated into the Eighth Route Army or the base area leadership structure.53 Thousands of other Koreans, leaders and followers, struggled valiantly against the Japanese only to find their place in history go unnoted in contemporary North Korea. But the fact remains that Kim II Sung's record was formidable compared to that of other Koreans in 1945, and he had the Japanese police records to document it. In addition, he had an armed contingent of several hundred guerrillas under his control. All of the other Korean exile leaders, with the exception of Mu Ch'ŏng and the Yenan-aligned leadership, returned to Korea either individually or with at most a coterie of close supporters, few of them armed. This was Kim II Sung's most important advantage.

The literature on Kim thus remains largely subjective, quite reminiscent of similar literature about, say, Castro, Tito, or Ho Chi Minh.54 Perhaps we can now move from mythology to what is known about Kim in the period of liberation. In recent years, the North Koreans and their advocates have claimed that Kim II Sung and his forces engaged the Japanese at Ch'ŏngjin in early August in conjunction with the Soviet attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army.55 There were, according to some sources, Koreans who participated in amphibious landings in northern Korea. Such a claim for Kim II Sung was never made in the north before the 1960s, however. In an official
This sort of Soviet involvement in Kim's exploits seems to be little different than American OSS training of Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas in the same period in Vietnam. Kim's Soviet period was also considerably shorter than the period he spent fighting with Chinese Communist guerrillas in the 1930s, during which he reputedly joined the Chinese Communist Party. This report on Kim argues that he landed at Wonsan on September 25, and there is other evidence to support this.60

Kim's public emergence in the north came only after the initial period of contradictory and unformed policy and may have been as much his doing as that of the Soviets. He was in a position to confront and face down Korean opponents, on the following bases: (1) his anti-Japanese record was known to all the parties concerned with Korean liberation, as we saw in chapter one; (2) he had never been captured by the Japanese police and subjected to their methods of interrogation, and therefore, unlike most other Korean communists, there was no possibility of his apostasy or of his having turned in or named his comrades; (3) he had an armed force under his own control; and (4) more than most Korean leaders, he was vigorous and even charismatic, and melded communism and nationalism in an appealing combination.

On October 14 some 70,000 people turned out for a ceremony to welcome "General Kim Il Sung" back to Korea.61 Cho Man-sik introduced him. The top brass of the Soviet command lined up behind him as he spoke on the podium, an endorsement identical to General Hodge's welcome for Syngman Rhee on October 20. Kim was 33 years old at the time, and, judging from the photographs, looked even younger; his age quickly became an issue in both north and south. Some sources embellish this issue considerably,62 but it was obviously difficult to argue that this Kim Il Sung was the peer of the older generation of Koreans who had resisted the Japanese throughout the colonial period. In fact, he represented a new generation, one that had contempt for the failures of their fathers;60 generational splits were added to the many others separating north and south.

The first biography of Kim to appear was highly laudatory, speaking of his exploits and those of his family members and of his myriad outstanding qualities; here we mark the opening shot in the personality cult that continues to play upon North Korea. Yet even this article noted Kim's youth and argued weakly that "his greatest accomplishments are yet to come."63 In South Korea the organ of the Chang-an KCP faction ran an article on Kim on October 27, referring to him as "our great revolutionary and national leader," likening him to Tito, but also stating that "no one in our country has seen him" and that his rise had been "comet-like."64 The rightist Independence News...
listed Kim as one of the four leaders of the Korean Provisional Government, while the Liberation Daily, under Pak Hŏn-yŏng's control, wrote a welcome to Kim Il Sung, "young hero of Korea." By mid-November south Korean leftist groups were regularly including Kim in the listings of leaders to whom they wished long life.

American intelligence sources in the south seemed unaware of Kim until late December 1945. At the beginning of November, the Americans thought Mu Chŏng was heading the northern branch of the KCP and was thus the Russian designate for leader. But a report in early January, carrying information as of late December, said the following about Kim: "He is conceded by all circles to have vast popular prestige, being credited with having killed a thoroughly satisfactory number of Japanese troops." The report went on to say that Kim was not previously regarded as a communist and suggested that the Soviets were putting him out front "to gain a wider popular following at the cost of some party orthodoxy." A declassified American study, based on intelligence reports, supported this view. It said that after his introduction in the north "Kim became immediately popular" and attributed this to his sponsorship by Cho Man-sik:

[Kim] cultivated Cho Man-sik, an able Korean Nationalist and the most respected non-Communist leader in North Korea, telling him privately that he, Kim, was a fervent nationalist and did not believe in some of the Communist plans for Korea. Taken in, Cho introduced Kim at a liberation celebration in Pyongyang on 3 October, 1945 ... describing him as an ardent Korean patriot and nationalist. Cho's reputation assured Kim of an enthusiastic reception from the general public, which did not stop to think that the real Kim Il Sung must have been a much older man.

The general thrust of this statement is probably correct, in that Kim Il Sung was not only more nationalistic than many other communist leaders but was perceived to be so by noncommunist Korean leaders. As we have seen, Yŏ Un-hyŏng held this opinion of Kim; and Kim Kyusik later said of him, "There is perhaps a ray of hope in Kim Il Sung ... he was a good guerrilla leader and had some popularity among young men."

Kim achieved no formal leadership role in the north in the weeks after his introduction. But on December 17 he replaced Kim Yong-bŏm as head of the northern branch of the KCP, which still recognized Pak Hŏn-yŏng and Seoul as the party's leader and center. Kim's own armed guards reportedly surrounded the meeting, an indication of the value of this force to his fortunes. Kim still had no position in the Five Provinces Administrative Bureau, however, and Cho Man-sik remained the top leader in the north, assisted by a mix of northern nationalists and communists. This situation held true until the trusteeship crisis at the beginning of January. Until this time, neither the Russians nor the top Korean leaders had made moves toward the establishment of a separate northern administration. The bureaucracy was functioning on a provincial pattern, the top level being the provincial capital people's committee administration; this was quite in keeping with the temporary status of the division of the peninsula. The police force consisted of those peace preservation units that had emerged with the people's committees. There were no reported or recorded moves toward the creation of a separate northern military apparatus. Political bodies, whether the committees or various parties, continued to recognize Seoul as the center of the country.

In the aftermath of the trusteeship crisis, however, this decentralized pattern ended. Beginning in February, the rudiments of a separate northern administration emerged, and soon thereafter, fundamental societal reforms were pushed through and northern military bodies appeared. The nationalist-communist coalition also broke down over trusteeship, as the moderate nationalists steadily lost power. It remains true, however, that the early and preemptive action toward the creation of separate regimes occurred in the south, during the last three months of 1945. It was only in the aftermath of the results of southern policies that the north began to follow suit. We could argue, of course, that a separate northern regime was inevitable. But the sequence remains undeniable: the south moved first.

Centralization In the North

The opening shot in the subsequent centralization process in the north occurred on December 17, 1945, when Kim Il Sung became head of the northern branch of the Korean Communist Party, in the circumstances described above. Although this event does not mark a decision to establish a separate northern administration but rather the emergence of a strong party center, still the northern KCP (hereafter designated NKCP) was the basic organ of the subsequent centralization.

Kim's speech on December 17 detailed both the agenda for creating a center and the numerous failings in communist organization in the preceding five months. In so doing, it made obvious the general lack of a cohesive central organization in the north. Kim only claimed 4,550 members for the NKCP, a figure that would increase one hundredfold within a year; and even these members had not yet received "uniform membership cards." Furthermore, he said:
Party organizations have yet to be created in a large number of factories, enterprises, and farm villages. Procedures for admission to the Party have not been established. A certain Kim, secretary of the Yangdok County Party Committee, for instance, was a police sergeant at the police station in that county during Japanese imperialist rule. The ranks of our Communist Party are infested with pro-Japanese elements.

He went on to note that there were too many peasants and intellectuals in the party and that regular reporting procedures had not been established; he then quoted Lenin as follows:

The Communist Party will be able to perform its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized manner, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline prevails in it, and if its Party center is a powerful and authoritative organ.

Kim then characteristically mixed his Leninism with a bit of Maoism, urging party members to "go among the masses," "go to the factories and talk to the workers, listen to their demands," adding:

If we do not continually strengthen our ties with the masses, teach them, and, in addition, learn from them, the Communist Party... will not be able to become a truly mass party, competent to lead the entire working people.

The December 17 meeting was important not just to the subsequent emergence of a separate center in the north but to the development of Korean communism as we know it today. Three themes ran through this event and Kim's speech that the North Koreans have yet to depart from: leader, organization, and the mass line. One wonders what the listeners thought of this brash young man, presuming not simply to chair the party but to chart its course and detail so many organizational failures. Ever since in the north, it has been this same leader who plays multiple roles of guidance, exhortation, and criticism, and physically displays his role by appearing all over the country giving "on-the-spot guidance." The ubiquitous Kim has always stressed the importance of both core organization and going to the masses. Unlike the Chinese (or Mao), Kim used phrases like "cadres decide everything," "organization decides everything," phrases associated with Stalinism and with top-down mobilization of the masses. Like Mao, Kim used many mass line phrases ("from the masses, to the masses").

The December 17 meeting also signaled the emergence of a new and separate center for the KCP. Although the northerners continued to pay lip service to the authority of the central organization in Seoul led by Pak Hŏn-yŏng, from this point on, two centers existed, and the northern one was much more powerful. This development caused much controversy among old-line communists throughout Korea, and nationwide leftist organizations such as the Chŏnp'yŏng labor union were forced to watch as their southern and northern operations inevitably diverged.

There is much evidence to suggest that Kim's urgings on December 17 hardly remedied the severe organizational defects of the northern party. A secret document signed by Kim Il Sung in March 1946 complained of illiteracy, inefficiency, and a general lack of training at all levels of the party. He was also concerned that members did not make enough use of the party newspaper (Ch'ongwo) in their work and urged them to organize small study groups everywhere to discuss each issue of the paper. Local reports forwarded to the party center, he said, should "recognize and report as vividly as possible the people's real lives and problems at hand," avoiding exaggeration and false reporting. Party correspondents should "serve the people" and be "progressives," no doubt an indication that many were not. The next month, a central committee directive urged an increase in membership from the working class and the establishment of more party schools and said that in organizational work "each locality must develop a struggle according to the local situation." Another such directive in the same period asked that membership lists be forwarded to the center, gave instructions for cell organization, stressed the importance of establishing relationships with local workers' and peasants' unions, and asked for feedback reports on any anticommunist disturbances among students and teachers.

Thus it seems that the spontaneous origin of the people's committees and worker and peasant unions that we witnessed in the south had its corollary in the north and presented quite a problem even for committed communist organizers. The communists under Kim's direction responded with, first, emphasis on cultivating a core (haeksam) of dedicated followers and, second, expansion of the core in ever-widening concentric circles until it had under its domination the amorphous product of liberated Korea's politics.

In February the North Korean Interim People's Committee (NKIPC) emerged in response to two matters: the organizational failures of the Korean People's Republic in Seoul and the consequent necessity to provide leadership for the PGs in the north; and the emergence of separate administration in the south. In retrospect the North Koreans have come to link the development of the NKIPC with the failure, and even treachery, of the KPR leaders themselves, saying that...
Democratic Council as the southern consultative body, a council made up mostly of antitrusteeship rightists.\textsuperscript{85}

Kim Il Sung was named chairman of the NKIPC, his first major administrative post in the north. Still, however, most of his trusted followers from his guerrilla days, such as Kim Ch'ae'k and Kim II, were not among the members; the majority came from the old domestic factions and the Yenan group. His role and new-found eminence still met substantial opposition from all these groups.\textsuperscript{86}

In the aftermath of the establishment of the NKIPC, American intelligence, which in early December found no moves toward a separate administration in the north, concluded "it is quite apparent that Russia is committed to Sovietization of northern Korea."\textsuperscript{87} These events were pursued as much at Korean as at Soviet initiative, however, although they certainly had Soviet support. The Koreans had to find a means of integrating their politics, if they were to create a viable base of power. The ancient regime had foundered, in part through the weakness of its politics; and especially for the younger generation of leaders, the thought that the liberation regime would not defend itself or provide Korea with cohesive organization was an anathema. The people's committee structure, for its part, was unique in its spontaneity and breadth, but it embodied weaknesses in its horizontal and layered structure. In the south, it could not withstand the strong opposition of a centrally and hierarchically organized system. An assertion from the center was essential if the northern regime were to last. Another way of putting this is to say that in north Korea a strong state asserted itself against society, seeking to transform it. The opposite was true in the south, where a strong central bureaucracy was used to preserve and perpetuate social dominance. In both cases, the center put an end to the diverse and creative politics that had emerged with the liberation. The center in the north also put an effective end to conservative and Christian political organization, although it continued to allow religious freedom. The one religio-political organization not routed out was the Ch'\'ondogyo, which persisted because of its strong base among peasants.

The general task of establishing a center and rooting it in the countryside was not an easy one. As Glenn Paige has rightly pointed out, the Koreans had not had extensive experience with organizing masses of people in base areas, as had the Chinese. Furthermore, they did not take over and utilize the existing administration, as did the Bolsheviks in Russia. They had to create an administration.\textsuperscript{88} Soviet personnel in north Korea could provide guidance, but this had to be mainly a Korean operation. In the words of a newspaper account published at the time of the establishment of the NKIPC, Korea could not establish
either a "bourgeois democracy" or a "proletarian democracy" like that in the Soviet Union; this had to be a revolution deriving from Korea's particular characteristics, done by Koreans—a Choso'n ch'ach'e hyong-myong, in the Korean. 99

The first task was to rectify the administration of the people's committees. North Korean sources, at the time and since, no matter how much they glorify the role of Kim Il Sung, still recognize the prior existence of the committees, describing their role as "organ[s] of state power established by the people themselves on their own initiative." 90 Thus the north did not have to start entirely from scratch, but could build on the committee structure. According to the special edition of Chongno published to explain the NKIPC, a key purpose of the central organ would be to "improve the leadership of democratic rural administrative organs." 91 Two weeks later, Chongno reported that staff members of people's committees at the city and county level in South P'yongan Province were given ninety hours of training during the period February 11-25: sixty-three hours of study on organization work, twenty-one on public leadership, six on current topics. Thirty more hours were spent in debate, criticism and self-criticism sessions, and discussions of how practically to implement their training. Similar to Chinese communist practice, merit awards were given for "free and unhesitant participation in discussion." 92 Such training sessions ensued for leaders of all PCs at the county and higher levels. These leaders journeyed to provincial capitals and to P'yongyang for training, education, and political guidance. This process also provided the center with numerous opportunities to weed out undesirable elements from the committees, another purpose of the rectification.

Similar though less intense rectification occurred among the workers' and peasants' unions. Major industrial enterprises that had been controlled by workers' committees, often employing the previous Korean and Japanese personnel under committee control, were put under central direction. A newspaper in Wonsan reported that the chief of the Commerce and Industry Bureau explained that: "The enemy-owned factories have been in the custody of the People's Committee and have been managed by the custodians who were appointed by the Committee." Such factories were now being centralized under "certain powerful managing agencies," however. 93 These measures applied to heavy industrial enterprises such as steel, ship-building, and chemicals and were meant to gain economies of scale and efficiency in capital utilization as well as to assert central control. 94 Members of the workers' and peasants' unions, many of whom were illiterate, entered short-term and night schools that taught them reading, writing, and arithmetic with a heavy admixture of politics. 95 By May 1946 the northern branch of Ch'onp'yong, claiming at the time a membership of half a million, became independent of the Seoul central organization. The northern branch of Ch'onmung, however, had become independent of the south at the end of January, "because of the special situation in north Korea," 96 a reference perhaps to the upcoming land reform program in the north. The variant timing in the separation of these national organizations may also have had to do with the strength of the working class and the weakness of the peasantry in the north. The north, of course, had a true industrial proletariat, whereas the south did not, being instead the location of the majority of Korea's peasants-tenants. It must have taken longer to impose central controls on worker organizations in the north.

Developments in the police and military represent another important aspect of the centralization of early 1946. Peace-keeping forces emerged in the north with the demise of the Japanese regime on the same regional pattern existing in other organizations. They went under the names ch'landae or poandae (as in the south), "Red Guards," "People's Guards," and so on. Koreans who had served in the Japanese police force were allowed to continue only in isolated localities; for the most part they were swept out.

The new local police were mostly poor peasants; according to an official American source, such people "filled up the ranks of the ordinary police." 97 Peace preservation groups also took on the color of local politics. Thus, it appears, People's Guard organizations in North Hamgyong were guided by Koreans who had returned from Manchuria, including Ch'oe Yong-gon, whereas in South P'yongan Province, the so-called Red Guards were under the direction of Hyon Chunhyok, Kim Chang-il, and Chang Si-u, among others. 98

The Soviets, like the Americans, had to confront the problem of numerous unofficial peace-keeping and quasi-military organizations exercising power in the localities. From the standpoint of the center, the more the situation persisted, the more would centrifugal forces weaken central authority and intensify regional power. Therefore, General Chistiakov reportedly issued an order on October 12 disbanding all armed organizations in north Korea and authorized the provincial people's committees to organize peace protection units under their control. 99 Provincial police bureaus were established in October. Then in November Ch'oe Yong-gon called conferences of high poandae officials to address various problems in police administration: a lack of uniform procedure from province to province, the continued existence of numerous unsanctioned peace-keeping groups, the need to form a national peace-keeping corps. And in December Ch'oe headed a Department of Public Safety under the aegis of the Five
Provinces Administrative Bureau. Given the later prominence of Ch’oe in the northern leadership, and a report that Kim Il Sung and his allies helped supervise provincial police bureaus beginning in November, it would appear that early involvement in or control of the poandae may have been an essential advantage in their subsequent rise to power.

As late as mid-February 1946, however, American intelligence continued to report that decentralization remained such a problem in northern police affairs that poandae units continued to fight each other over jurisdiction disputes, and even to jail members of opposing units. But a central Justice Bureau appeared with the NKIPC in February, headed by Ch’oe Yong-dal (leader of the southern CPK ch’ien dan in August 1945), and a central school for police officials opened in P’yŏngyang during the same period. Thereafter, American intelligence reports depict a centralization process for the police analogous to that for other agencies in the north. In late March poandae leaders from the provinces were being sent to P’yŏngyang for two-month training courses, leading American intelligence to remark that the “formerly loose-knit semi-volunteer organization . . . [was] apparently being tightened and disciplined.” Province, city, and county people’s committees recommended candidates for schooling, a prerequisite being at least a middle school education. In nine weeks the candidates got 384 hours of lessons in politics, police affairs, and basic reading and writing. A police directive of mid-April, sent to the Ch’ŏwŏn people’s committee, stated that poandae staff dispatched for training in P’yŏngyang should be “sound in politics, thoughts, and morals” and should “have in their hearts the best interests . . . of the people.” The object of education was first to “purify and strengthen” the poandae by building its revolutionary consciousness; the rest of the curriculum was mundane: current affairs, police policy, practical police work, “political common sense,” Korean and world history, and study of the “new democracy.” Teaching methods stressed student participation; students discussed all problems thoroughly and then led more discussions, “so that they will have complete understanding and full development of ideas.” The teaching methods and the reference to the “new democracy” may bespeak the presence of many Koreans returned from Chinese communist base areas in the poandae administration, a presence that American intelligence often remarked upon.

By late April the center had succeeded in organizing proper lines of authority within the national poandae structure; police power had flowed upward to the center, but some power remained in the regions as well. The total police allocation for the north at this time was 15,500, with provincial allocations varying between 2,900 and 2,600 (except for North P’yŏng’an, which had 3,900, and Kangwŏn, which had 1,560). The center provided the appropriate numbers, but the provincial PCs appointed and allocated police within each province. The result was a popular and locally rooted police force that presented a complete contrast with that of the Japanese era. Even a hostile official American source recognized this achievement: “The new policeman [many were women] gained his experience on the job. He was expected to maintain his roots among the masses, gaining the respect and cooperation of the people.” A township police chief later interrogated as a POW during the Korean War was found to be “honest, well-informed . . . proud,” with a “most vigorous belief” in “the complete reorientation of the police force from its Japanese traditions.” Interrogations by torture and force were legally forbidden; although “used on occasion,” such methods were generally replaced by emphasis on extended questioning and reeducation. Thus the northern police “avoided the stigma of association with the symbol of Japanese tyranny—confessions induced by torture.”

It was also in early-mid-1946 that evidence of rudimentary military organization in the north appeared. A precise recapitulation of this development is impossible, in part because of poor and conflicting sources, but also because during the first two years of liberation in the north, peace preservation groups merged police and military functions, making distinctions between the two difficult. In retrospect North Korean and American official sources have located the origins of the northern military in events of November and December 1945—that is, parallel to similar American activities in the south. Baik Bong identifies the first political-military school to appear in the north as the P’yŏngyang Institute, founded in November 1945. Thereafter, the northerners established an officers’ training school in July 1946; and in August 1946 training centers for regular national security forces emerged as “the first basic units for a regular army.” An unpublished American history of the northern military supports this interpretation in its essentials, stating that a “P’yŏngyang Military Academy” headed by Kim Ch’aek, Kim Il Sung’s close ally, opened in October 1945 to train poandae officers. It says the first class from this academy graduated in the spring of 1946 and the second in August or September 1946. The first class of graduates apparently took up duties in railroad security forces, and the second went into the ranks of the poandae. American intelligence sources in the south thought in early 1946 that this academy opened in late December 1945 and that it offered a four-month course in military and police training to about 500 students. They cited evidence in late April 1946 that poandae units growing out of this academy and its
trainees had detachments of 100-300 in places like Sŏnch'ŏn and Sinŭiju, a strong presence in South P'yŏng'ang Province, but weak development in other provinces, and a total reported size of 10,000. Also finding reports of a small air force and coast guard in the north, American intelligence concluded that "the parallel with South Korea is now complete," thereby acknowledging even on their own terms a northern recapitulation of the previous military development in the south.¹²

Scalapino and Lee suggest that this "military academy" was in fact a small operation existing only in South P'yŏng'ang Province and under the control of the province people's committee poandae bureau. They find no moves toward the creation of a northern military before the end of 1946, although they do argue that poandae and railroad security police "were the basis for" the subsequent North Korean People's Army.¹³ Dae-sook Suh's account says nothing about the creation of a northern military in any form during this period.¹⁴

The declassified American history of the northern military maintains that "the actual beginning of the North Korean Army" was in September 1946, when Korean enlisted men from China arrived in the north. An intelligence report in 1947 agreed, arguing that although "the decision to form a 'National Korean Army' was made in the spring of 1946," its implementation was delayed until September.¹⁵

It is possible to reconstruct what must have actually happened when it is remembered that before liberation there were two armed Korean anti-Japanese forces—those under Kim Il Sung, and those in North China associated with Yenan, under Mu Ch'ong, Kim Tu-bong, and others. The north Korean military originated from a merger of these two forces. From November 1945 on, Kim Il Sung's forces established themselves in the northern poandae, with Kim Ch'ae'k commanding the small poandae military academy in South P'yŏng'ang and Ch'oe Yong-gŏn heading the public security bureau under the Five Provinces Bureau and the subsequent NKIPC. It is this development that Baik Bong of course chooses to emphasize, since his aim is to glorify Kim and denigrate the contributions of Yenan-aligned Koreans who were purged after the Korean War. But what about the Yenan-aligned Korean forces?

Korean forces fighting with the Eighth Route Army, going under the name Korean Volunteer Army (KVA), and numbering perhaps 300 before liberation, headed home after August 15, picking up recruits as they moved through Manchuria. In late September or late October (depending on the source), they materialized in the Sino-Korean border town of Antung, numbering by this time between 2,000 and 3,500. According to one account, the commanders of the detachments were very young (like Kim Il Sung himself); one, Kim Kang, was 26 years old, with much of his young life spent in the Eighth Route Army; another, Kim Hŏ, was a 35-year-old graduate of the famous Whampoa Academy in China.¹⁶ Both South Korean and American accounts state that this force was stopped by Soviet security forces at the border. Those who wished to come into north Korea were disarmed, and the majority of the footsoldiers were returned to Manchuria.¹⁷

These sources make much of these events, arguing that the Soviets and Kim Il Sung were afraid to let armed Yenan-aligned units enter the north, lest they rival Kim's power. This is not an unreasonable assumption, except that it is impossible to argue that the Yenan-aligned Koreans failed to win power and position subsequently in the north; as we will see, Kim Tu-bong and others quickly joined the top ranks of the northern leadership. Furthermore, what would the Americans have thought had the Soviets allowed more than 2,000 soldiers to enter the north and encamp above the thirty-eighth parallel in the fall of 1945? The disarming of those who did enter was entirely in keeping with Soviet-American agreements on Korea.

The significance of this action is much broader than its presumed effect on high north Korean politics. The Soviets reportedly told the armed detachments of the KVA to return to Manchuria to fight with the Chinese Eighth Route Army,¹⁸ where they spent the next several years growing in size and gaining extensive experience. By 1949 when the Chinese civil war ended, tens of thousands of crack Korean troops were available to form the main shock units of the Korean People's Army. This important development, to be treated at length in the second volume of this study, means that the northern army had two mothers—Kim's partisan force, and that of the Yenan-aligned Koreans. One grew after liberation within the north, through the poandae and railroad security ranks, while the other grew to maturity in the Chinese civil war. Thus, from the fall of 1945, it can be said that the north had an army, but it existed in China; until 1948 there existed in north Korea proper only lightly armed security forces. These latter, too, were made up of both Kim's forces and parts of the Yenan-aligned group, as we know from American intelligence reports, which found that small detachments of poandae in Sŏnch'ŏn, Sinŭiju, and elsewhere in late spring 1946 consisted mostly of KVA veterans.¹⁹ Instead of being disarmed, then, the KVA forces were armed, expanded, and tempered in China. We would suspect that this shrewd strategy had the complete support of Kim Il Sung and the Yenan-aligned leaders, Mu Ch'ong and Kim Tu-bong.

Thus we can say that both the Soviets and the Americans supported
the creation of Korean military forces beginning in the fall of 1945, but that Soviet policy was strictly correct within the borders of the north. They and their Korean allies used Manchuria as a convenient training ground. The American Occupation command was forced to create a southern military force within the confines of south Korea, both for internal security reasons and because their intelligence apparatus made them aware of the existence of the KVA both in north Korea and Manchuria. Like MacArthur during the Korean War, however, they had trouble recognizing the boundary between Korea and China as one they were bound to respect. It must also be emphasized, finally, that both Kim's forces and the KVA were spawned not by the Soviets, but by the Korean resistance to the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The Soviets may have fostered its development, but this was a Korean army.

Social Revolution

Shortly after the formation of the NKIPC, and as the Americans and Soviets came together at the Joint Commission meetings, the north pushed through fundamental reforms that restructured northern society and, more than any other action in 1946, served to separate the north from the south. After these reforms, unification of the peninsula could only occur in two ways: through a similar revolution in the south, or through a war that would be fought both for unification and for the domination of classes—that is, unification would occur through revolution or counterrevolution. From early 1945 on, in Korean eyes, the conflict between north and south was a conflict of nationalism, region, and generation.

In his speech of February 8, which inaugurated the NKIPC, Kim Il Sung spoke of the need for a thoroughgoing renovation of the "feudal" land situation in the north. In March the northerners attacked the problem at its roots, at the bottom of Korean society, in the villages. In so doing, they broke the power of a landed class of centuries' duration. They accomplished this by organizing those with the least to lose, making poor peasants and agricultural laborers the shock forces in some 11,500 rural committees organized under people's committee aegis to push the reform through. Much like Chinese Communist practice, poor peasants were relied on, middle peasants were cultivated, rich peasants were isolated, and landlord control was broken. The organization of the land reform committees and the work of the reform itself was accompanied by a nationwide mass campaign, in which about 1,000 urban workers took the lead in going to the countryside amid an intense hoopla of posters, handbills, and loudspeaker broadcasts that penetrated to the smallest villages, thereby mobilizing millions of people and spreading the authority of the NKIPC far and wide. At the end of the process, the central committee had a loyal village leadership that had been both tested and rewarded. In this manner Kim Il Sung and his allies "drove the flagpole to the ground," penetrating the countryside to the lowest level.

At the township level the reform committees (called nongch'ón wiuwánae) were made up of five to nine members, nearly all poor peasants who were tenants or possessed tiny parcels of land. With the help of the local people's committees and workers and cadres sent down from above, they recorded all property of the landlords, protected it, and held it for redistribution. Problems that proved insoluble at the local levels were referred to the people's committees at the next highest level.

Like later Chinese land reforms, "anti-traitor" meetings were held, and reform enforcement regulations said that all peasants must participate in compiling lists of individuals who would have their land confiscated, "in order to expose the pro-Japanese." Absentee landlords had their land confiscated for redistribution, unless they had also engaged in the anti-Japanese resistance. If landlords had already voluntarily given up their land, they were allowed to keep their homes and stay in their communities. For richer peasants who worked their own land, the emphasis was placed on whether the land had been used "parasitically," determined on the basis of the amount of land rented out to tenants. Thus if an individual owned seven ch'angbo, worked four ch'angbo and rented out the remainder, only the three rented ch'angbo would be confiscated. On the other hand, if all seven were rented, all would be taken for redistribution. A peasant who worked all seven would keep all his land, even though this exceeded the stipulated five ch'angbo limit. Redistribution to tenants was based on a point system in which males from 18 to 60 would get one point, females from 18 to 50 one point, youths 15-17, 7 points, and children 5 points. The village reform committees then reapportioned land on the basis of total points for each family and differences in the quality of the land being provided to them.

A total of 4,751 landlord households had their land taken, although most of them were allowed either to keep 5 ch'angbo or to move to different districts where they received small plots of land, if they were willing to till the land themselves without using tenants. Land was also confiscated from previous Japanese holdings and various public institutions and churches and was then distributed as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>Amount of Land Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landless peasants</td>
<td>407,907</td>
<td>583,304 ch’ôngbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholding peasants</td>
<td>255,093</td>
<td>356,099 ch’ôngbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural laborers</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>14,855 ch’ôngbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords moved to other counties</td>
<td>3,911</td>
<td>9,622 ch’ôngbo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This north Korean land reform was achieved in less violent manner than that in China and North Vietnam. Official American sources commented that: “From all accounts, the former village leaders were eliminated as a political force without resort to bloodshed, but extreme care was taken to preclude their return to power.” Former landlords were given small amounts of land, moved to different districts, and then kept under “strict surveillance.” American intelligence reports at the time noted the lack of violence, and quoted a refugee schoolteacher as saying, “If a rich man works himself, he is allowed to keep some land. However, he must move to another district. Those rich men who do not work themselves are relieved of their properties.”

The relative ease of the reform process is owed to several unique factors in the north Korean situation. First, a large number of small landlords had already fled south, and, of course, Japanese landowners were long gone. Second, only a couple of northern provinces (Hwang-hae and South P’yŏng’ān) had extremes of tenancy such as existed throughout the south; northern peasants were more often smallholders already, most working dry fields rather than paddies, and had a frugal, hardy reputation. Thus class conflict was less intense. These are just the sort of peasants who would benefit from a redistribution that puts a bit more land in their hands, some new tools or draft animals, and a strong incentive to produce. Third, the north Koreans did not begin immediately with mutual aid teams and then collectivization, as the Chinese did, but allowed the land to remain in private (although nontransferable) status. They made no moves toward collectivization until 1950. Thus the reform had a distinct “land to the tillers” flavor, making it very popular among poor peasants and lessening the degree of opposition among all agrarian classes. Last, the existence of a porous thirty-eighth parallel and a greater degree of landlordism in the south offered two advantages to the north. They could allow landlords to flee south, knowing that they could deal with them at a later point and knowing also that they would intensify the polarization of southern politics, thus weakening the moderate leftists whom the northerners feared. And they could work a “demonstration effect” on the south, showing the way toward the thorough reforms demanded by the majority of Koreans throughout the peninsula. With the influx of northern landlords and the threat implied to southern ones by the reform, there was less chance that land reform on a moderate rather than a revolutionary basis would occur in the south and win peasants away from the Left. All in all, the reform was a master stroke, since no one could claim that a bloodbath had eliminated landlordism, the hardworking northern peasants got what they and their ancestors had longed for, and the ball was placed in the southern court with a distinct thud. It was in this context, in his comments on the results of the land reform, that Kim Il Sung remarked that the southern reactionaries “are now very much afraid of the north wind.”

The land reform had two other unique characteristics. First, it was widely trumpeted as a model for the rest of Asia. Kim claimed that it would “greatly inspire the oppressed peoples of the East in their liberation struggle against imperialism and the domestic feudal forces.” This sort of modeling behavior then became quite the order of the day for the Koreans; in somewhat solipsistic fashion, they began to think that all eyes were upon them as they blazed a trail for the rest of Asia. Second, the reform was followed by ubiquitous posters saying “thank you, Kim Il Sung” for the land—as if the benevolent leader had presented each parcel to each peasant. Mao later criticized this sort of practice, arguing that it worked against the task of raising peasant consciousness and getting peasants to struggle for their own rewards.

It is true that Kim’s top-downism was not good Maoism, but then the Chinese followed very moderate land reform policies when they were locked in struggle with the Nationalists and the Japanese during the Yenan period. Moreover, it would have been provocative for the north to have embarked on the village class struggle procedures subsequently used in North China at a time when they confronted the American Occupation and the opposition of well-organized Koreans in the south. Kim referred many times to the necessity to implement the “mass line” during the reform period, however, and as we have seen, the class basis of the reform committees was similar to that in China. In short, the land reform, like other north Korean policies, mingled Maoist and Soviet practices together with some unique Korean ones.

American sources noted that the reform left the new regime with a “vast reservoir of popular goodwill.” A refugee during the period said that the “intelligentsia and the rich” had come south but that the poor were “pleased with conditions”; the “overwhelming majority” of workers and peasants supported Kim Il Sung and the NKIPC leadership, although most disliked the Russians. Furthermore, the land reform was quickly followed by a labor law that did away with the worst excesses in factories. Promulgated in June 1946, it provided fo
an eight-hour workday, social security insurance, better work conditions (or more pay for difficult or hazardous work), and equal pay for equal work, irrespective of sex. The next month a law on the equality of women appeared, a real milestone in the Korean context. It did away with concubinage, prostitution, female infanticide, and numerous other practices that exploited women (and that continued in South Korea). Although the letter of these reforms did not become practice overnight, in the aftermath, there were few reports of the sort of abuses of workers and women that had been their lot: for millennia.

Major industries and enterprises, most of them previously owned by the Japanese, were nationalized, while middle and small entrepreneurs were given permits by province and county PCs and encouraged to remain active, invest, and produce. In this manner, and with the help of remaining Japanese technicians and Soviet experts, the economy and especially the major industries were put back in order and registered increases in output by the end of 1946.

A dry narrative done three decades after the fact strips from these events both the exhalation of those who participated in and benefited from them and the anguish and terror of those who were the objects of this revolution. The observer can find in the record of the Korean situation in the late 1940s, north and south, evidence of unspeakable brutality and atrocity on both sides. This makes Korea no different from China during the same era, or Iran, Nicaragua, or southern Africa during our era. But such situations have no place for a detached philosophy that renounces all violence directed toward political ends. What human being cannot but detest, in the abstract, violence against other humans? But it is just as human to respond in kind to the severe conflict that divided Koreans from day one after the Japanese demise. In liberated Korea neither side gave quarter; in means there was little distinction. But in ends and goals there was a large measure of difference, and it is among these that the choice had to be made. The quizzical, American, staring blankly at the situation with an amnesiac unawareness of the violence of American politics going back to the Civil War and the Revolution, even unable to comprehend how others would view a liberating army that brought in racially segregated troop contingents, found it easy to condemn the communists, north and south. The hard-bitten Russian, who learned about violence and politics the hard way under Stalin's terror, or in locked struggle with Hitlerite fascism, found the Korean situation familiar and acted accordingly. Add this to a Korean milieu that had experienced decades of Japanese brutality and that was classically revolutionary in the late 1940s, and one wonders why the opposing

### United Front Policies

In mid-summer 1946, after the social reforms had been enunciated, the North Koreans embarked upon a political course of action aimed at uniting those on the Left and cultivating waverers in the middle. The policy had two complementary goals: bringing together disparate factions in the north; and presenting an image of unity and strength to the south that would make a pointed contrast to the coalition effort then being pursued under American auspices. The summer of 1946 was a good time for seeking coalition. The north brought in a bumper summer harvest, making it possible to spread a bit of wealth to workers and peasants. The earth's bounty appeared as if to mark the first year after liberation, and to sweeten the prospects for unity.

Unity was also important for Kim Il Sung. He may have attained the chairmanship of the NKPC in February, but his position remained insecure. He faced determined opposition from older leftist and communist leaders, especially those of the potent Yenan-aligned group. Thus, as Dae-sook Suh put it, "From February to July, Kim Il Sung worked tirelessly to unite" the NKCP and the Yenan-aligned group, which had reorganized itself into a political party, the Simmin-dang, or New Democratic Party (NPP). The object was reached at the end of July, when a three-day conference was held to discuss and explain the circumstances in which merger would occur. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Tu-bong, the NPP leader, saw a class basis for the merger of the two parties: the NKCP had a majority of peasants and workers, whereas the NPP included many intellectual and petty-bourgeois elements; combining the two would thus combine all those classes included in the definition of the "people" in the north. The NPP apparently had about 120,000 members at the time, the NKCP some 300,000. A month later, another three-day conference, beginning on August 23, ratified the united front policy and created the North Korean Worker's Party (NKWP), the party that, with the later addition of the South Korean Worker's Party, has ruled in North Korea ever since. Kim Tu-bong became chairman of the NKWP, while Kim Il Sung shared a vice-chairmanship with Ch'ong Yong-ha.

The speeches given by Kim Il Sung and Kim Tu-bong at the August meeting offer an interesting contrast. Kim Il Sung spoke almost entirely about Korea and its needs. He related the formation of the NKWP to the history of Korea's independence movement and to the needs of democratic development, of building a new country, a new life: "the new Korea will be a people's Korea, built by the people themselves." The north's program, he said, was one of "complete independence" (wanjón tongnip) and "true democratization" for all of Korea; the NKWP would work with "patriots" in the south toward a "uni-
fied and completely independent country." He referred to the Japanese not as imperialists but as waemon, a racial pejorative; southern rightists were not capitalists or landlords in this speech, but "reactionaries," "country-sellers," "pro-Japanese," who go about "putting patriots in prison while every day kisaeng houses increase in number." In other words, the entire thrust of the speech was to trumpet the specifically Korean virtues of nationalism, patriotism, resistance to the Japanese, and reform of outmoded "feudal" practices. Kim's words were almost bereft of Marxism-Leninism or reference to the presence of the Soviets.

Kim also referred to a number of themes that have since been commonplace in the north. The Korean revolution would show the way for other countries of the East; NKWP cadres must "go deep among the masses"; this was the key to everything: "our party is always to be found among the masses and never leaves the masses"; all efforts should be devoted to strong, rocklike unity among all organizations.

Kim Tu-bong's speech was quite a contrast. He made many references to the "new Soviet camp," a group of nations liberated by the Soviet army from fascism who were now building a new life. He remarked on "democratic reforms" being implemented in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. He said that since October 1917 there had been but two forces in the world, socialism and capitalism, and the two were in "basic opposition"; the struggle between the two had been developing on a broad scale since the end of the war. All of these conditions were essential, he thought, in enabling Korea's own development.

Kim Tu-bong's words were more eloquent and more informed with Marxist-Leninist theory than were Kim II Sung's. He spent much effort pointing out how various classes and Korea's current stage in the world revolution could be "scientifically" distinguished and digressed on theory before coming to his central point. Apropos of the current merger, he quoted Stalin on making sure one can distinguish proper tactics for the future when one makes alliances in the present. It was Kim II Sung, however, who found his words punctuated with applause from the assembled delegates at a much greater frequency than did Kim Tu-bong.

It is entirely possible, of course, that Kim II Sung was given the most popular lines on this particular day. But it is more likely that the speeches reflected real differences between the two leaders. Kim II Sung has always been what we might call a "Korea-firster." His ideology was revolutionary nationalist rather than Marxist-Leninist; Marxism-Leninism might be important, but it could come later. The approach in Kim's speeches was designed to appeal not to Marxist int-
Pak Il-u also related that only sixty-two, or 7 percent, of the delegates had been members of either the NKGP or the NPP before August 15, 1945, which must have been the total present from among Yenan-aligned Koreans and Kim Il Sung’s followers, since neither party officially existed at that time.

A year later, the NKWP claimed nearly 400,000 members. This figure is very high for vanguard parties and represents another aspect of the north’s united front policies at the time: almost anyone could join the NKWP. Kim Il Sung said at the founding meeting that “even if a person does not understand Marxism-Leninism but actively fights for democracy” this person could become a member; through his “love of country” he would demonstrate his “progressive” nature.348 Thereafter, the idea of a “mass party” was proclaimed as yet another Korean contribution to world revolution.349 The NKWP has had the highest percentage of population on its rolls of any communist party in the world. As Scalapino and Lee have rightly emphasized, this has to do with the north Korean commitment to mass mobilization, to organizing everyone who can be organized.350 The NKWP was one more addition, albeit the most important one, to the “organization society” that emerged in the north after liberation.

The formation of the NKWP brought together three strong-willed leaders—Kim Il Sung, Kim Tu-bong, and Mu Chong—and also northern and southern leftist politicians, in the South Korean Worker’s Party, led by Pak Hon-yong, appeared shortly after in the south. These four men subsequently formed the top segment in the leadership of the northern regime, and it is possible to say something about their relationship in the fall of 1946.

Kim Tu-bong was a classically educated activist and noted scholar of the Korean language who was born in 1888 in South Kyongsang Province. He remained abroad, mostly in China, from 1919 to 1945, active in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, he subsequently became a teacher in a Shanghai school. In 1942 he traveled to Yenan, where he became a teacher in a Yenan political school (possibly Kang-Fih Tahsüeh) and a top leader of the Korean Independence Alliance. He reportedly returned to Korea in 1945 by foot. He was a somewhat frail, learned man, intellectual in fact and in appearance, and not known for military leadership in the pre-1945 period. There is little to indicate much friction between him and Kim Il Sung; he probably held Kim in contempt intellectually, but he lent his presence as a grey eminence to the NKWP and remained in the top leadership in the north until the war.

Mu Chong was the only leader in the north who could rival Kim Il Sung in anti-Japanese prowess and the only one with a clear and close relationship to Chong Communist leadership. He was born in Hamgyong Province, probably in 1905, and went to China in 1922. He apparently began his military career under the warlord Yen Hsi-shan, quickly developing an expertise in artillery warfare. He was an artillery lieutenant during the Northern Expedition and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Thereafter, he reportedly became chief of artillery in the Red Army commanded by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. Mu Chong was the only Korean to survive the Long March, among thirty who began it in Kiangsi Province; he was wounded several times during this legendary demarche. After his arrival in Yenan he commanded the Korean Volunteer Army and fought with the Eighth Route Army as an artillery commander. He was reported to be close to Chu Teh.343

Mu Chong made a big splash upon his return to Korea. Some Koreans thought he was the “vice-commander” of the Eighth Route Army, and American intelligence termed him “the Chinese Communist... choice to assume leadership” in Korea.344 One writer deemed Mu Chong along with Kim Il Sung and Ch’oe Yong-g’on to be “the greatest of the anti-Japanese fighters” in 1945.345 He held no political position in the northern leadership in the fall of 1946, however, and was reported by Y6 Un-hyung to be out of favor; he apparently had the relatively minor military position of deputy chief for artillery in the poandae.346 American intelligence sources stated that he was “intelligent, able, informed,” but too outspoken: “his temper is fierce, hot and course [sic]—he curses freely when angry.” He inspired devoted allegiance among his troops.347

It seems unlikely that the Chinese leadership had either the time or the inclination to sponsor leaders in Korea, but it is likely that the Soviets and Kim Il Sung feared Mu Chong’s Chinese connection. He seems to have been correled and cloistered in training the northern military, with Kim Tu-bong and others providing political leadership for the Yenan-linked Koreans.

Pak Hon-yong had his hands full in the south during this period and ended up being confronted by a warrant for his arrest in the fall of 1946; he also had to accommodate Kim Il Sung’s and Kim Tu-bong’s emergence on top in the north. There is no doubt that Pak, the titular leader of Korean communism, found Kim Il Sung’s newfound eminence repugnant. At a news conference in late March, when asked if he would support Kim, he responded woodenly that Kim had support in both north and south and that “therefore when he is elected president of the Korean government the northern Koreans will support him and we will also support him in the south.”348 In his speech at the NKWP inauguration, Kim Il Sung pointedly singled out Y6 Un-hyung as being responsible for the unity movement in
Yǒ wanted the Americans to arrest Pak to aid in the coalition effort. At another point, however, Kim praised Pak, defending him against criticism by Arthur Bunce.120 Although the existing literature dwells overly long on the Pak/Kim conflict, and often reads things into it through the lense of hindsight, the conflict was real. Paradoxically, the Soviets might well have preferred Pak to Kim had circumstances permitted, since Pak was much better versed in Marxism-Leninism, possessed the imprimatur of decades in the communist movement, and was much more of a proletarian internationalist than was Kim Il Sung.

The North Wind Blows South

Part of the reason for the rapidity of change in the north in the first year after liberation was its intended “demonstration effect” on the south. The image of efficient, thoroughgoing renovation of colonial legacies made, and was meant to make, a dissonant contrast to the stagnation and violence in the south. The north wind was carried south by a steady flow of refugees who had a further disordering effect and constituted a north Korean Trojan horse in the southern milieu.

Beginning in the fall of 1945, southern newspapers carried frequent reports on changes in the north. The moderate as well as leftist press lauded the various reform measures and generally tended to discount the reports of atrocities and depredations carried in the rightist press. The Kūnyōh chūbo provides a representative example in its contrast of northern with southern policies:

The Soviet Army’s policies are different from American Army policies. Immediately after entering north Korea the Soviets disarmed the Japanese army, stripped off the Japanese people’s fine clothes... gave Japanese-owned houses to homeless Koreans, gave their assets to the Korean people, and put political and economic authority completely in the hands of the Korean people.121

Whatever the sub rosa role of the Soviet command in the north may have been, the Soviets and the north Koreans convinced Koreans in the south that the people’s committees were the effective governing agencies. For example, On Ak-jung wrote that no matter where one traveled in the north, one saw the signboard of the people’s committees, a “new form” of government “established by the people with their own hands”; this was government “by the people, for the people.”122 Even in rightist sources, the north was described simply as being under the rule of the people’s committees.

The north Korean land reform in March 1946 had a particularly strong impact on the south. For days after its announcements, southern newspapers ran banner headlines about it, with highly laudatory editorials calling for similar reforms in the south and almost no criticism.123 Thereafter, many peasant demonstrations in the southern provinces were punctuated by demands for land reform like that in the north. Perusal of the southern press during this period reveals the degree to which southerners thought that Korean dynamism was emanating from the north.

South Korea received a steady, massive stream of refugees from the north during the first year. Although the American Occupation usually called these people refugees from communism and Soviet rule, the procession was more complex than that. According to a study of the problem by the USAMGIK Office of Foreign Affairs,124 the largest number of refugees flooded into south Korea during the fall and winter of 1945/46 and was composed mostly of Korean peasants returning from Manchuria and north Korea to homes in the south. In the spring of 1945 the land reform and other measures stimulated a flow of refugees from the higher classes; for the next several months the influx consisted mostly of well-educated types—landowners, merchants, doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, and government officials. After a peak in the spring of 1946, the flow tapered off and again had a more mixed class composition. There was a seasonal flow as well; bad agricultural or food conditions in the north prompted higher rates in certain months.

The flow of refugees was therefore stimulated by both natural and political causes: part of it involved Koreans returning to native homes in the south, the region from which most of the mobilized Korean diaspora came; another part represented dispossessed and aggrieved classes. As the upper classes moved south, there was a corresponding movement northward. Although the numbers coming from the south were comparatively few, hundreds of thousands of Koreans left Japan for the north.125 Thus, to some extent, Korean classes realigned on a north-south basis.

North Korea encouraged the movement southward because of the disordering effects it would have on the south; there are three aspects to this. First, the returning diaspora would strain southern food supplies and relief facilities and would locate an aggrieved and dispossessed lower class in the south; as we have seen, this uprooted population figured in much of the provincial disorder. Second, by allowing landlords to flee southward, the north also located an aggrieved and dispossessed upper class in the south, while avoiding the thorny problems of dealing with a hostile, uprooted landed class in the north.
after the reform. The entrance of these northern elements, including former police and bureaucrats from the colonial period, had a polarizing effect on the south; it squeezed out moderate possibilities and left the Americans with a choice between communism and reaction. The north certainly welcomed this effect as well. At a minimum, the porous border enabled them to postpone the eventual reckoning that their radical reforms promised. Last, the southward flow enabled the north to implant their agents among the refugee mass, a cause for constant concern among Occupation officials and the southern police.

CONCLUSIONS

By the end of 1946 the Soviets and their Korean allies could reflect on the first year of liberation with considerable satisfaction. The Soviets had pursued a highly cost-effective strategy in creating a regime that was responsive both to their minimum demand—a friendly border state—and to the desires of the mass of Koreans in the liberation era. Their policy of retreating to the background and giving the Koreans their head enabled them to staff their occupation cheaply and unobtrusively, quite in contrast to the American Occupation. The Soviets contented themselves with reordering the arrangements at the top, leaving the provinces mostly to the people’s committees and the poandaere; the Americans had to mount surgical operations at both top and bottom, time and time again.

For the Korean leadership in the north, the first year gave them virtually all their demands save one. The top leadership constituted a coalition of the Left, including Kim Il Sung and his allies; Kim Tu-bong, Mu Chong, and the Yenan-aligned forces; an undetermined number of Koreans returned from the Soviet Union; and a substantial number of Korean leftists and communists who had remained within Korea during the colonial period. This leadership was overlaid upon the popular basis of the people’s committees and was allowed to carry through fundamental reforms demanded by the majority of Koreans. By the end of the year, this leadership also had effective police and military arms, with a substantial contingent gaining fighting experience in the Chinese civil war. The one thing they did not get was an end to foreign occupation. As long as Soviet forces remained in the north, Kim Il Sung and his allies could not be free of the suspicion that they had been installed and backed up by foreign power and existed only at its sufferance. For Koreans who rued a history of foreign subservience, and for a nation that had been forced for so long to work out its destiny among competing imperialisms, an authentic revolutionary regime would have to establish its independence and clearly move away from the embrace of the Soviet bear. The early atrocities of Red Army troops in the north and the continuing evidence of, if not atrocities, at least preemptive and domineering treatment of Koreans by the Soviets, simply added to the northern leadership’s problems.

If one is to strike a balance on the first year after liberation in the north, however, it must be on the positive side. An American study based on extensive interviewing of northern POWs and refugees during the Korean War found that the informants believed that northern officials and police “were less brutal than in previous governments . . . the officials gave the impression of being hardworking, efficient, and honest.” A tailor from Hamhung said that “laborers and ignorant people came to power,” while others found the extent of change “shocking”:

Farm laborers, divorced women, and party members strode about the streets running the towns . . . uneducated people, servants during the Japanese rule, and prisoners let out at the liberation became the new leaders.

A manager of a company in Wonsan said:

[The leaders of the city] were farmers and laborers. They went about enthusiastically learning the Korean alphabet and Chinese characters and in no time they got communism deeply instilled in their minds. It was amazing that these people turned from being ignorant to intelligent.

A south Korean educator who had lived in the north argued that “the best thing the Communists did . . . was to make it possible for the children of lower class families to go to school.” There was general agreement among the informants that the lot of laborers was vastly improved, and “for the first time laborers had a chance to rise to the upper ranks in politics.” The same was true for women: “it was the custom to appoint at least one woman to every People’s Committee.” Thus by the end of 1946 the north wielded a formidable challenge to the continuing stagnation and violence in the south; with each passing day the north wind seemed to blow more insistently.

121. Robinson, “Betrayal of a Nation,” p. 163. On November 14, 1946, American CIC headquarters prepared a report, “Statement of Outside Influences upon the Recent Unrest and Civil Disturbances in South Korea.” The data contained therein demonstrates that local issues and local radicals fueled the uprisings. (See XXIV Corps Historical File.)

122. G-2 “Weekly Report,” no. 56, September 29-October 6, 1946; and SKILA materials, enclosures nos. 6 and 7, anonymous memorandum of conversation with Wō Un-hyǒng; in XXIV Corps Historical File.


124. SKILA materials, enclosure no. 22, letter of November 29, 1946; in XXIV Corps Historical File.

125. Chosŏn akhŏn sillok, p. 354.


127. Tachau hyŏngch’ul ch’ŏn-ŭ, pp. 98-77; and Chosŏn akhŏn sillok, p. 380.

128. American delegation to the United States-Soviet Joint Commission, memorandum on interview with the Korean governor of North Kyŏngsang Province, October 14, 1946; in XXIV Corps Historical File.


133. Meacham, Labor Report, p. 18. Another source claimed that Korean workers’ real wages were lower in the period May-July 1946 than at any time in the years 1938-1945 (see Minjút’ŏk minjok chŏnson, Chosŏn haejang il’yon-sa [History of the First Year of Korean Liberation] [Seoul: Mun’u insŏ’gwan, 1946], pp. 315-316).


135. Seoul Times, September 17, 1946. There were numerous newspaper reports in September 1946 of Koreans attempting to return to Japan.


139. Memorandum of interviews with nineteen North Kyŏngsang officials.


141. CIC report, Seoul, September 25, 1946. The Military Government’s public reaction to Korean charges that rice was being smuggled to Japan expressed the opinion that such charges represented sheer madness.

142. CIC report, Taegu, November 9, 1946.

143. Interviews with nineteen North Kyŏngsang officials.


145. Chosŏn akhŏn sillok, p. 388.

146. Chosŏn yŏng’um, 1948, p. 158.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ELEVEN

The North Wind


3. Ibid., p. 168. Lensen gives the date as August 12, but a North Korean source says the attacks on Nongi and Najin began on August 10 (see Chosŏn kŏndae hyŏngm’yo’ng undŏng-sa, History of Korea’s Modern Revolutionary Movement, Pyŏngyang: Kwahakwŏn yŏksa yŏngu-sa, 1962, p. 429). American intelligence later reported that the attacks at Nongi and Najin began on August 10, with the Soviets successfully occupying Nongi without a shot and Najin with few losses. But on August 12 the Soviets lost 30 men at Ch’ŏngjin and were “badly mauled” the next day before capturing the city. (See “Intelligence Summary, North Korea,” no. 37, May 31, 1947, in RG 319, Intelligence [G-2] Library “P” File, 1946-1951.)

4. Chosŏn kŏndae hyŏngm’yo’ng undŏng-sa, p. 429. Baik Bong says that Kim Il Sung and his allies sided with the Soviet attacks, but no dates are given (see Kim Il Sung: A Political Biography [New York: Guardian Books, 1970], 1: 512-513). This is an official biography of Kim that has been translated into several languages. Until recently, North Korean accounts made no mention of Kim’s participation in Soviet landings in northern Korea, and Baik Bong carefully avoids saying Kim personally was involved; he only suggests that his “units” did battle at this time.

5. Hodge, monologue to visiting congressional delegation, October 4, 1947; in USAFIK, USFK 1107; file, box no. 82/98.


7. There is some evidence that in 1947-1949 the Soviets hoped to enroll Manchuria and North Korea into a Soviet-dominated sphere, a matter to be dealt with in the second volume of this study. Even then, however, the Soviets did not dominate North Korea in typical satellite fashion, nor was Kim Il Sung “a puppet of a foreign power to an extent unmatched by any individual’s relationship to a foreign power during this period [1945-1949].” This judgment by Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee (Communism in Korea 1 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972]: 181) is not supported by their own evidence and so remains polemic.


Notes to Chapter Eleven

14. Dae-sook Suh states that "300 Russian Koreans" accompanied Soviet forces into Korea, but includes Kim II Sung's forces among that total (The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1918 [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967] p. 317). Scalapino and Lee say only that "a large number" of "Russianized Koreans" came in with Soviet troops (Communism in Korea I: 319). Other sources tend to inflate greatly the numbers of "Russian Koreans" in the northern regime, mixing Kim's forces in with the total, but there is no good evidence on the total numbers involved. Some important leaders in the subsequent regime had lived most of their adult lives in the Soviet Union, and some were born there. In much of the existing literature there is the none-too-subtle assumption that "Russian Koreans" were the nefarious carriers of a Soviet bacillus and therefore not quite Korean. The fact is that the Soviet Union absorbed a large part of the dispossessed migrant diaspora of the Japanese colony and remained from 1917 to 1945 the one power that consistently backed Korean independence—often with funds and organization. Moreover, why should a Korean who lived for decades in Russia be anymore a "Russian Korean" than Syngman Rhee was an "American Korean"? Koreans tended to remain Korean wherever they lived, and the foreign-linked labels provide little guide to their behavior, or to the likelihood that they would do foreign bidding once back in Korea.
15. See, for example, T'ak Ch'ang-dok, "Naega pong samp'al-do ibuk saijang" [The Situation that I Saw North of the Thirty-eighth Parallel], in Chuns'ang [Voice of the Masses] (February 1948), pp. 27-32. After hearing many reports of Soviet pillage, American intelligence suggested that "it is doubted that the Russians intend to remain in northern Korea" (see "Intelligence Summary, North Korea," no. 1, December 1, 1945).
18. Interview with Father Hoppel, cited in U.S. Ambassador to Korea John McClellan to Secretary of State, in State Department, RG 59, national file, 740.00/1-69, January 10, 1949. Hoppel also stated that there were only a few "Soviet-Koreans" in the north; no "Soviet-Korean" troops were ever quartered there. Russian-speaking Koreans tended to come from Manchurian and Korean border regions near or in Russia.
19. Report on Japanese Assets in Soviet-Occupied Korea to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C., June 18, 1946), submitted by Edwin W. Pau- ley, orig. classification, "restricted." This report found that the Soviets, instead of stripping North Korean industry, had with them technical personnel whose function was to aid in the rapid rebuilding of industry, to get the plants "producing at a maximum scale as early as possible" (p. 18). It noted the presence in many plants of Japanese technicians and said that control of the plants was said to be under workers' and people's committees and that most plant managers were Koreans. At the Mitsui Light Metals Company, renamed the Fukjong Electro-Metallurgical Plant, a Korean manager supervised 900 employees of whom fully 300 appeared to be Japanese in military uni-
form; Japanese technicians also were in evidence, while no Soviet personnel or supervisors were observed (pp. 58-60).
23. See 68th MG Company reports of May 20, May 27, and June 17, 1946.
27. Chos' on innim-bo, September 8, 1945.
29. Chos' on innim-bo, September 8, 1945.
31. Chos' on innim-bo, September 8, 1945: Han'guk chonjaeng-sa I: 53. Other members of the Py'ong'an Committee included the husband-wife team of Kim Yong-bom and Pak Chong-se; for their activities in the 1960s, see Suh, Korean Communist Movement, p. 196.
32. "Intelligence Summary, North Korea," no. 1, December 1, 1945. This was, of course, the time when Hodge and Langdon were planning a separate southern government.
34. "Intelligence Summary, North Korea," no. 4, January 18, 1946.
37. G-2 "Weekly Report," no. 33, April 21-28, 1946; information based on an intercepted letter to the head of a people's committee in Kangwon Province. In cities over 200,000 there were six sections with 60 staff in each; the number of staff decreased according to population, with 15 staff members in cities of 50,000 or less. The five sections were: general affairs, finance, industry, vital statistics, welfare.
38. G-2 Translation Documents, no. 337, February 27, 1946; and no. 359, March 20, 1946; also G-2 "Periodic Report," no. 83, March 21-22, 1946 (all in USAMFIK 11271 file). See also Py'ongbuk sinbo [North Py'ongan News], February 1 and 2, 1946.
Pages 556—Notes to Chapter Eleven

42. See Chŏng T’ae-sik’s comments in a roundtable discussion in Ch’u’n’chu’a [Spring and Autumn], no. 1 (February 1946), p. 27.
44. See G-2 Translation Documents, no. 535, March 14, 1946.
45. McCune, Korea Today, p. 45.
51. In English, see Baik Bong, Kim II Sung, vols. 1 and 2. The exaggeration and mythology about Kim that is prevalent in the north bespeaks several needs: (1) the need of a people that as a result of their resistance to the Japanese continued to the end and that Korea was, in some small measure, liberated by the Koreans themselves; (2) the reaction of an isolated people to the refusal in South Korea, the United States, and elsewhere to give Kim the slightest measure of what, in fact, is due him; and (3) the needs of Kim’s monumental ego, which seems to require constant nourishment. There is no justification in sociological theory for such a personality cult, but there is justification in Korean tradition. Hagiography is prevalent, past and present; Syngman Rhee, for example, was termed “the leader,” “the prophet,” even “the messiah,” in Yang U-chang, Yi iast’omn’ngyŏng iujang-sa [History of President Rhee’s Struggle] (Seoul: Yŏnha p’innam-sa, 1949), pp. 28, passim.
52. See, for example, Hak’uk chŏn’jang-sa 1: 50, where it is argued that the “real” Kim II Sung would have made a good leader of postwar Korea.
54. Typically this literature, like that on Kim, refers to mysterious dark periods, with the whereabouts of the leader unknown, and the minuscule number of followers. Hoang Van Chi, for example, proposes as a reasonable theory for Ho Chi Minh’s activities between 1933 and 1941 the idea that he was “secretly hidden in the Soviet Union—somewhere far from Moscow.” (From Colonialism to Communism [New York: Praeger, 1964], p. 52.) For a representative attack on Tito’s partisan activities, see N. J. Krones, “Tito and the Yugoslav Partisan Movement,” in Gary R. Bertsch and Thomas W. Ganschow, eds., Comparative Communism: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1976), pp. 141-148.
55. Castro offers the best comparison with Kim, in that Castro had about 100 men with him when he attacked the Moncada Barracks in 1953, and the attack failed; in 1956 he landed in the ship Granma with but 82 men. Kim’s record was far superior to this, however. Castro also was “alien” to the Cuban communist mainstream going back to the 1920s, a charge also leveled at Kim. Finally, it simply stretches credulity to argue that Kim, who spent most four years in Russia and did not speak the language well, would be a “Russian-Korean,” whereas Syngman Rhee, with four decades in the United States, an Austrian wife, and fluent English, remained the patriotic father of his country. Yet much of the South Korean literature has it this way.
56. See, for example, Wilfred Burchett, quoted in The People’s Korea, June 19, 1974.
57. Haebang-hu samnyŏn-gon ui kungnae-ee chungyo ilgi [Chronology of Important Events Within and Without Korea in the Three-Year Period since Liberation] (Pyŏngyang: Minju Chosŏn-si, 1948), pp. 1-2 (volume to be found in RG 242, Captured Enemy Documents, SA 2005, item 279). On this point, see also Chosŏn kundae hyŏngnyŏng undong-sa, pp. 420-422.
60. See “Intelligence Summary, North Korea,” no. 90, February 16, 1947.
61. Far East Command, “History of the North Korean Army” (hereafter designated “HINCA”), Manuscript in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C. (Tokyo: G-2 Section, 1952), p. 9. A fascinating account in the magazine Amerasia, published in October 1945 and obviously based on Chinese sources of information, said that Kim and his army (wrongly estimated at 15,000 strong) were already established contact with the Eighth Route Army around the time of liberation. (See “Korea—The Crossroads of Asia,” Amerasia 9, no. 17 [October 1945], p. 277.)
62. Haebang-hu chungyo ilgi, p. 2. A handwritten Japanese police report, dated June 1945, now in the possession of K. P. Yang, head of the Korean Section at the Library of Congress, quotes two captured Koreans as saying that Kim II Sung was then sending agents into Korea and expected Korea to be liberated in August 1945.
63. See, for example, Scalapino and Lee, who quote freely from O Yong-jin’s anticommunist account: Kim’s youth, combined with his “haircut like a Chinese warrior” and his “monotonous, plain, and duck-like voice,” left the people gathered at the meeting “in the "mizing" [sic] sense of distrust, disappointment, discontent, and anger” (Communism in Korea 1: 252-253). I heard similar accounts from Koreans in the south who claimed to have attended the same meeting: there is no way to verify such impressions. Similar things were said about other exile leaders, especially Kim Ku, who said to have a singsong voice and to have waddled like a duck. These things belong in gossip columns.
64. Pyŏngyang minbu, October 21, 1945.
67. Most interesting here are the minutes of the November 24-35, 1945 meeting of people’s committee representatives in Seoul. Cho Tu-wŏn, an ally of Yŏ Un-hyŏng, referred in his speech at the meeting to Kim and his forces as follows: “After 1931 one ardent wing of the anti-Japanese struggle was en-
Notes to Chapter Eleven—559

79. Baik, Kim Il Sung 2: 105-109. Baik can criticize Pak Hŏn-yŏng because of his subsequent purge and execution after the Korean War. Pak and other southern leaders were full of criticism for the organization of the KFR, however (Minjujuji minjok chŏnsŏn, Chosŏn haebang ilŭsŏn-na [History of the First Year of Korean Liberation] [Seoul: Munun'gwan, 1969], pp. 81 and passim).

80. Pyŏngyang minbo, February 12, 1946; translated in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 351, March 15, 1946. See also the special edition of Chongno published at the time of the establishment of the NKIPC, dated February 10, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 331, February 21, 1946.

81. Pyŏngyang minbo, February 12, 1946.

82. Kim Il Sung, “Report Concerning the Present Korean Political Situation and the Problems of Organization of the People’s Committee of North Korea” in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 331.

83. See Chongno, January 27, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 337, February 27, 1946.

84. Chongno, February 1, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 332, February 21, 1946.

85. Many northern newspapers noted the timing of the establishment of the NKIPC, especially that it occurred after Shikov returned to Pyŏngyang from the Joint Conference (see various translations in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 297, February 20, 1946).


89. Pyŏngbuk sinbo, February 2, 1946.


92. Chongno, February 24, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 368, March 29, 1946.

93. Wŏmsan ilbo, February 22, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 359, March 20, 1946. A similar report said that in a flux plant in North Pyŏng’ŏn, run by its 300 Korean employees after liberation, the NKIPC took control in March 1946—although it continued in office the plant manager who had been selected by the workers (“Intelligence Summary, North Korea,” no. 37, May 31, 1947).

94. Ibid.


96. Chosŏn haebang ilŭsŏn-na, pp. 163, 172-176. For a list of northern peasant union leaders by province, see p. 172.

97. State Department, North Korea: A Case Study, p. 87. See also “HNKA,” pp. 8-9.


(gaged in direct armed battle [with the Japanese], during the [Japanese] aggression against Manchuria, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Second World War; this was the righteous armed movement [gijeum undong] with General Kim Il Sung at the center.” Cho then referred in similar fashion to KVA forces in Yanan led by Mu Chong and to forces in central China led by Kim Won-bong and Yi Ch’ŏng-ch’ŏn. However, a delegate from South Hamgyŏng Province, Kim Pyŏng-hu, referred to three individuals—Yi Chu-ha, O Yi-sŏp, and Cho Hun—as “our great leaders,” or uri widaehan chidoja. This delegate did not mention Kim Il Sung, although the widaehan chidoja term was already being used for him. (See these minutes in RG 242, Captured Enemy Documents, SA 2006, item 13/25.)


68. USAMGIK, “Political Trends,” no. 16, January 12, 1948.

69. “HNKA,” p. 90. This study claims that Kim was a captain in the Soviet army. If the date in the quotation in the text is correct (October 9), this would be a meeting in a restaurant in Pyŏngyang (see Scalapino and Lee, Communist in Korea 1: 332). Since the quotation refers to a crowd being present, however, it probably refers to the October 10 welcome for Kim (Cho Man-sik introduced Kim at both meetings).

70. See the report by Gregory Henderson of his conversation with Kim Kyu-sik; included in Embassy to Secretary of State, RG 59, decimal file, 859.00/8-1949, June 6, 1949. Kim Kyu-sik also stated that he thought Kim Il Sung was being misled by the Russians and other Koreans.


72. Cho Man-sik was removed from office because of his opposition to trusteeship. According to an American intelligence report, the Soviets asked Cho to support the Moscow accords three separate times, on January 3, 4, and 5, 1946. After his third refusal he resigned and was kept confined to a hotel in Pyŏngyang for months thereafter. (See “Intelligence Summary, North Korea,” no. 4, January 18, 1945.)

73. Han Kŭn-jo told American intelligence officers in early November (when planning for a separate southern government had begun in the south) that only provincial administrations existed in the north; he thought, however, that the Russians hoped to set up a central northern government. (See G-2 “Weekly Report,” no. 9, November 4-11, 1945.)


76. There is some question, as we have seen in earlier chapters, whether any real center existed at all in the southern party. There was no center at this time in the sense of an authoritative body at the top of a disciplined hierarchy, the lower reaches of which could be counted upon to carry out orders.


78. NKGP Central Committee directives, April 7, 1946, and April 11, 1946; translated in ibid. There had been several anticommunist student demonstrations in the north, including a violent one in Sinjūju.
113. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea I: 990-9911. The authors cite the account of “a prominently placed defector,” but he is not named, nor is there an indication of where or when the account was taken.
117. Kim, Sip’onyŏn-sa, pp. 61-69; “HNKA,” p. 6; also “Intelligence Summary, North Korea,” no. 46, October 18, 1947.
118. “HNKA,” p. 6; also “Intelligence Summary,” no. 46.
124. The account here is taken from Chosŏn haebang illyŏn-sa, pp. 341-432, 439-440; for the land reform law, see p. 424. The law is translated in Hankum Tralim, “Land Reform in North Korea.”
129. In 1946 and 1948 Mao termed this North Korean practice “favorism,” that is, bestowing “graceful favors” on the masses from on high (see Miscellaneous of Mao Tse-tung Thought, pt. 1, pp. 34, 163).
130. Belden, China Shakes the World; and Hinton, Fussien.
137. Puk Chosŏn nadodang ch’angnip taehoe [Founding Meeting of the North Korean Worker’s Party] (Pyŏngyang: Puk Chosŏn nadodang ch’ang’ang p’ohu, 1946); in RG 241, Captured Enemy Documents, DA 2005, item no. 2746. Note that these figures do not always add up to 801; probably information was not available on all delegates for all categories.
138. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
139. Ibid., p. 38.
140. See Baik, Kim Il Sung 2, p. 154, which calls this practice “creatively defining the qualifications of a party member.”
141. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea I: 375.
144. See Nadangia sinau, September 22, 1945; also “HNKA,” p. 98.
145. Kim, Chidoja kunsu, p. 71.
147. Ibid., p. 99.
148. Chosŏn innin-ba, March 28, 1946; in G-2 Translation Documents, no. 369. March 30, 1946. Something may have been lost in this translation, but the original is unavailable.
150. “Report of the Visit of Arthur C. Bunce with Chancellor Balsamov in Pyŏngyang,” October 16, 1946; in XXIV Corps Historical File. Bunce interviewed both Chon Man-sik and Kim Il Sung. He found Chon in good health and living in a room at the Pyŏngyang railroad hotel and found Kim to have “a good sense of humor, pleasant manner, and ready grin.”
151. Article by An Ki-ŏng, in Kuryŏk ch’u’bok [Korea Weekly], November 26, 1945.
# Notes to Chapter Twelve

## Liberation Denied

1. From Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852, reprint ed.; New York: International Publishers, 1969), the words mean “Here is Rhodes, leap here! Here is the rose, dance here!” As Robert Tucker put it, one of Acesop’s fables referred to a braggart who claimed he could produce a witness to prove he had once made a remarkable leap to Rhodos, whereupon the listeners said, “Here is Rhodes, leap here”—why cite witnesses? (See Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975], p. 440.)


6. Here we are concerned with Hodge’s “Commissars” of January 8 and Meehan’s rejoinder in a memorandum of February 20, 1948; both in USAFIK, XXIV Corps Historical File.


8. Undated, untitled study by David E. Mark, enclosed in American Ambassador to Korea, John Muccio to State Department, May 23, 1949; in State Department, RG 59, decimal file, 740.0019/5-2349.