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I’ve also
been fortunate to have Ellis Krauss of the University of
California San Diego as my partner in a multi-year
investigation of how political parties adapt to changes in
electoral systems. Our research strategies combine
qualitative and quantitative methods.
On the
qualitative side, I have conducted dozens
of interviews with Japanese politicians and party officials,
including more than 50 Diet Members and several former Prime
Ministers, Ministers and top party officials. I also spent
time on the campaign trail myself, shadowing Diet Members
during the campaigns in 2003 (Lower House), 2004 (Upper
House) and 2005 (Lower House) in Tokyo and in several other locations
on and off Honshu.
Ellis and I
have also developed the Japan Legislative Organization (J-LOD)
Database. We painstakingly created a database of
party, Diet, and government posts from 1980 to 2005. Most
posts are shuffled annually, in order to “spread the wealth”
of serving in leadership positions around to as many party
members as possible, necessitating that the dataset cover
not simply the posts assumed after each general election,
but also following subsequent cabinet and leadership
reshuffles. The database includes all LDP and DPJ
politicians. Since the unit of observation is thus the Diet
Member-Year for all Diet Members over an extended period, the
number of observations is in the thousands.

September 10th, 2005: (L-->R)
Jun'ichiro Koizumi, Martha Leche, Ellis Krauss, Robert
Pekkanen
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We have
planned a series of articles utilizing this database to
investigate and illuminate issues in party politics. And, we
have already published the first paper to make use of this
database (co-authored with our colleague Ben Nyblade of University of
British Columbia). This paper appeared in the
American Political Science Review (APSR) in May 2006.
2006. Pekkanen, Robert,
Benjamin Nyblade and Ellis S. Krauss.
"Electoral Incentives in Mixed Member Systems: Party, Posts,
and Zombie Politicians in Japan." American Political
Science Review. 100 (2) May, 183-193.
Here’s the abstract.
Abstract:
How do
electoral incentives affect legislative organization?
Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral
system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is
strongly influenced not just by the individual
legislator's reelection incentives, but also by their
interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a
strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators
are given choice legislative positions to enhance their
prospects at the polls, while (potential) party leaders
disproportionately receive posts with greater influence
on the party's overall reputation. MPs elected from PR
lists and in single member districts also receive
different types of posts, reflecting their distinct
electoral incentives. Even small variations in
electoral rules can have important consequences for
legislative organization. In contrast to Germany’s
compensatory mixed member system, Japan’s parallel
system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie”
provision) generates incentives for the party to
allocate posts relating to the distribution of
particularistic goods to those elected in PR.
Abstract in Japanese:
論文要旨
選挙のインセンティヴは立法組織にどのような影響を与えるのだろうか。日本の小選挙比例代表並立制の分析を通して、我々は、立法組織は個々の議員による再選のインセンティヴだけでなく、所属政党が政権を獲得することや党として強固なレーベル評判を維持することへの議員の利益からも、強い影響を受けることを示す。選挙基盤の弱い議員には、得票の増大が見込める立法ポストが与えられ、一方明らかに党のリーダー(あるいはリーダー候補)は、党全体の評判により大きな影響を与えるポストに就任している。また、比例代表選出議員と小選挙区選出議員は、それぞれの異なる選挙インセンティヴを反映して、異なるタイプのポストに就いている。選出方法の小さな違いでさえ、立法組織に大きな影響を及ぼしうるのである。ドイツの復活当選可能な併用制と異なり、(惜敗率に基づき小選挙区で敗れた候補者が比例代表で復活当選できる条項を有する)日本の並立制は、政党に対して、比例代表選出議員を個人限定の財の分配に関わるポストに配置するようなインセンティヴを与えている。
Ben, Ellis, and I are
collaborating on several of papers investigating
legislative organization and party organization in Japan.
Ben's website is linked
here.
For a link
to Ellis Krauss’s home page, click
here.
A Japanese version of this
article appears as
2008. "小選挙区比例代表並立制と役職配分” in日本の民主主義
変わる政治、変わる政治学
edited by Sone Yasunori and Oyama
Kosuke. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2008.
(in Japanese)
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Another
publication from this project looks at changes in the
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. The APSR
publication focuses on issues of legislative organization,
but this Journal of Japanese Studies article examines party organization.
2004. “Explaining Party
Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the
LDP?” Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen.
Journal of Japanese Studies
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2004)
Abstract:
This article traces the effects of Japan's 1994 electoral
reform on Japan's governing party, the LDP. Factions have
lost their central role in nominating candidates and
deciding the party presidency but remain important in
allocating party and Diet posts. Unexpectedly, koenkai
have grown stronger because they perform new functions. PARC
remains important but diminished by the enhanced
policymaking role of party leaders in the coalition
government. A central theme is unpredicted organizational
adaptation—"embedded choice"—since 1994. We speculate on how
this flexibility of the LDP, adapting old organizational
forms to new incentives, its "discreet charm," may affect
Japanese politics and the LDP's potential longevity in
power.
Ellis and I
are also co-authors on an article in British
Journal of Political Science with a Ph.D. student
at UCSD, Kuniaki Nemoto. The article
is entitled "Policy Dissension and Party Discipline: The
July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan." As the
title implies, it is a study of party discipline. This
article also uses the Japanese Legislative Organization
Database.
2008.
"Policy Dissension and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote
on Postal Privatization in Japan." Kuniaki Nemoto, Ellis
Krauss and Robert Pekkanen. British Journal of Political
Science 38 (3) July: 499-525.
Abstract:
This
article examines
party
discipline and party cohesion or defection,
offering
as an illustration the rebellion over postal
privatization in 2005 by members of Japan’s Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). We explore the importance of party
rules – especially the seniority rule and policy
specialization for district rewards – as intervening
variables between election rules and party defection in a
decentralized and diverse party. We argue that in such
cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent
defection. When these rules are changed, as in the postal
case of 2005, defection is more probable, but we find that
the relationship between defection and seniority is likely
to be curvilinear. We also find that the curvilinearity is
conditional upon each legislator's
having different incentives for vote, policy
and office.
Abstract
in Japanese:
論文要旨
この論文は、日本の自民党所属議員による2005年郵政民営化法案に対する反党行動を題材に、政党の内部規律と分裂行動を検証する。年功序列、並びに選挙区への便益として提供される政策的な特化を中心に、党則の重要性を分析し、これら変数が分権的で多様性の強い政党では選挙制度と分裂行動との間で媒介変数として作用することを示す。年功序列等の党則は分裂行動を防止するものとして作用するが、2005年の事例のように党則が変化する際には分裂行動が起こりやすくなる一方、分裂行動と年功序列は曲線的な相関関係にあることが発見される。また、そのような曲線的相関関係が選挙、政策、キャリアという各議員の異なる動機にも依存することが明らかとなった。

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Ellis and I also
wrote a paper on the influence of party politics in
determining Japan's security policies. The paper is entitled
"Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies."
The paper appears in the journal Orbis in Summer
2005 (Volume 49, Number 3).
Click here for the Orbis website homepage.
2005. "Japan's
'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies." Robert
Pekkanen and Ellis Krauss. Orbis. Summer, 49:3.
The paper
abstract is here:
Abstract:
Japan’s security policy has
changed dramatically. Japan’s contribution to the US-led
Gulf War in 1991 was widely deemed inadequate because it was
“merely” money ($13 billion), yet, even with tenuous UN
authorization, there are 1,000 pairs of Japanese
Self-Defense Force (SDF) “boots on the ground” in Iraq
today. Structural variables such as the end of the
Cold War and institutional variables such as the increase in
the policy-making power of the Prime Minister tell only part
of the story. An examination of several recent cases of
change in Japanese security policy demonstrates that party
politics also matters. We investigate the cases of
Anti-Terror Legislation of 2002, the Emergency Measure Laws
of 2003, the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq in 2004, and
possible Constitutional Revision in 2005. Unlike the old
“’55 system,” Japanese party politics today is characterized
not by ideological polarization and one party dominance, but
by ideological dispersion and coalition governments.
Shifting alliances within and among parties determine how
policy changes.

Pekkanen on "The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer"
Related to security policy, I
also appeared to discuss Japan-China relations on April 22,
2005 on the "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer" program on PBS
television. The title of the segment is "Japan-China
Tensions" and the video can be viewed on the PBS website.
The NewsHour website has a "Search for NewsHour Video" page,
and entering the Keyword "Pekkanen" will find the video
immediately. Entering the Keyword "Japan" only brings up
about a dozen videos. The link is here:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/video/index.html
I appeared on the local NPR station
KUOW program "Weekday" on May 25th, 2005 9-10 AM to discuss
US-China-Japan relations with the host and
Professor David Bachman of the University of Washington.
The link to the program is
here.
See also a
July 28th, 2005 article in The Washington Times
linked
here.
And, even
though it is only tangentially related to security, a
fascinating Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force TV
recruiting ad is linked
here.

For a link
to Ellis Krauss’s home page, click
here.
There's also a very good interview with Ellis by Robert
Angel of the University of South Carolina on Professor
Angel's website. The direct link to the interview is
here.

Ellis Krauss and friend. Photo
by Robert Pekkanen.
If
you are interested, see also my research on political
parties and legislative organization outside of Japan.
O L I T I S-->
Comparative Political Parties and Legislative
Organization <--
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