

9 History, Memory, and Other Matters of Life and Death¹

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In the Census of India conducted in 1911, we have a record of a killing in a Punjabi village that may have turned murder into historiography. The passage tells us Afridi Pathans of Tirah² had no holy shrine within their precincts to serve as a site of worship, thus they had no *dargah* honoring a *pir* to whom they could apply for assistance in their daily lives. The Census recorded the story this way:

Smarting under a sense of incompleteness they induced by generous offers a saint of the most notorious piety to take up his abode amongst them. Then they made quite sure of his staying with them by cutting his throat; they buried him honourably; they built over his bones a splendid shrine at which they might worship him and implore his aid and intercession in their behalf, and thus they purged themselves of their reproach.³

Perhaps the Afridi understood that the power of history lies in the quality of one's monuments and the degree to which a monument generates a perpetual interest among people that is both social and economic. Villages around the Afridi could mark time by their *dargahs*, by the date when their *pir* passed on, and by the years clicked off by annual rituals enacted and through bygone wishes granted. We might view the actions of the Afridi as a metaphor for the work of modern historiographers (in what Hayden White might call the "trope of irony"), but perhaps with a level of subjective self-awareness that has only fully entered our scholarly epistemology with the advent of feminism and postmodernism. Consider that a *dargah*, as opposed to a living *pir*, is a permanent site of worship, attracting votaries to the *pir*'s monument who bring with them more than wishes and pleas, but also money and the mobile economy of religious pilgrimages. Consider also that such monuments under the Islamic rule of the Sultans and Moghuls, preserved to a large degree under the British, and current in contemporary India and Pakistan, were provided for by a *waqf* or stipend for the maintenance of a *dargah*. This generous gift of state was bestowed not to memorialize a living teacher of the faith, but rather, to immortalize (in stone) the mortal *pir*.⁴ The death of a Muslim saint, the

creation of an enduring memorial, and the commencement of an economy of ritual around the site—these things bring the Afridi into the realm of the state as well as into its official history. It is here, in the world of religion, economics, historiography, and social structure—rather than in any psychological sense of incompleteness—that we find the reason for the killing of a *pir*.

Modern historians should find in this incident the familiar motif of the centrality of death. Like the strange boy in M. Night Shyamalan's film, *The Sixth Sense*, the modern historian sees dead people. They haunt historical texts. Michel de Certeau describes history as something which "aims at calming the dead who still haunt the present, and at offering them scriptural tombs."⁵ At the center of the modern Western "scriptural tomb" is the nation if we follow the thinking of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm. The late Columbia Professor of History and Politics, Carlton Hayes, called nationalism a religion and asserted that the regard Western cultures had for prophets, messiahs, and martyrs they likewise held for presidents, revolutionaries, and fallen soldiers.⁶ Indeed, how could the history of Europe exist without its numerous graves, dug after the French Revolution or the two World Wars? How could America know its past without Plymouth Rock or the Alamo? Nations may exist in the imagination of social groups, but they also require physical evidence, mnemonic devices like towering obelisks, stoic statues, and carved mountainsides. The texts of history require physical sites as well, what Pierre Nora has called "les lieux de mémoire," and this is especially true when a history purports to represent communities of identity, such as nations, ethnicities, families, and particularly religions.⁷

This chapter is likewise situated in a land of the deceased, the literal and figurative remains of thousands of religious figures in South Asia whose physical absence is repeated in the presence of places, performances, and stories that recount their extraordinary lives, and whose sites of memory become shared objects in the formation of identity, particularly through identification with the past. One finds the *dargahs* of Sufi *pirs* throughout the Subcontinent, along with the *smritisthalas* ("memorial site") and *mandirs* ("temple") maintained in memory of Hindu saints. We have what are said to be the literal remains of the Prophet Muhammad—beard hairs for the most part—in various areas of northern and northwestern South Asia. And any picture book on South Asian architecture will disclose to the reader those early marvels of remembrance, the Buddhist *stupas*, enclosing the "relics" of Gautam Buddha himself, and surrounded by "gates" engraved with his biography in pictorial form.

In this chapter, I investigate a "scriptural tomb" associated with a thirteenth-century Marathi Varkari "saint" (*sant*) named Jnandev or Jnaneshwar. In memoriam of this saint and his actions is a confluence of text and place united by the unlikely historiographic devices of a dream and a tree. Through this phantasmal medium, a shared idiom of remembrance is developed that weaves the present with the past eight centuries, not in a

haphazard, semi-lucid way that might exemplify the dream-state, but in a way that takes as a priority the rational assessment of evidence and the recification of textual material, linked to the ecstatic ritualism that characterizes memorialization in the Marathi Varkari religious tradition. I will argue that this congeries of memorial devices—site, text, and ritual—provides both a sense of history and a system of historicizing evident among the Varkaris and helps constitute this important feature of Varkari identity as a historical reality.

The story of Jnaneshwar's memorial is one for the history books. As a young man, in a small town called Alandi in what is today the Indian state of Maharashtra,⁸ Jnaneshwar underwent a ritual called "taking *samadhi*," which is the act of reaching the deepest levels of meditation or, in some instances, committing a rather peaceful ritual suicide, in order to cease the cycle of rebirth. In Jnaneshwar's case, he had himself interred in a special tomb, also called a *samadhi*, where he entered a meditative state resembling death, which is how he remains today, Varkaris believe, peacefully meditating at the very threshold between life and death. Gathered around him were his principal friends and colleagues, his fellow Varkari saints, and one companion in particular, the saint Namdev (thirteenth to fourteenth centuries). Namdev is remembered to have engineered the celebrations and eulogies surrounding Jnaneshwar's exceedingly ascetical decision. After the entombment, he is also said to have composed (though never written down) a threnody in memory of his friend, which he appropriately called "Jnaneshwar's *Samadhi*" [JS]. Thus the word *samadhi* maintains multiple meanings. It indicates a ritual act, a memorial place, and a text that memorializes both the act and the place. It is important to note here a hierarchy of dependence among these three meanings. The primary level is of the act itself, of Jnaneshwar's voluntary entombment, because this is the core historical moment that bears up the latter two meanings: the memorial place commemorates the act, as does the text that recounts the act in narrative form. The moment when Jnaneshwar "takes *samadhi*" is therefore the historical *subject* (the act) of the historiographic *objects* that follow (text and place). One key concern that will play out in the pages that follow is how these three elements are linked (historical act and its historiographic representation) in a way that suggests the historical veracity of the *samadhi* story, the "provability" of the truth of the events, at least within the cognitive spheres shared by many Varkaris.

Varkari lore recalls that all three associations of *samadhi* with Jnaneshwar—the act, the place, and the text—would have been forgotten but for the efforts of a sixteenth-century Brahmin scholar-saint named Eknath. And here is where the dream provides a linchpin in our story. Jnaneshwar appeared to the somnial scholar-saint one night, and the details of this dream led Eknath to that small town where Jnaneshwar had entombed himself three hundred years earlier. Eknath is remembered as having rediscovered the site of the *samadhi*, reinstated the ritual remembrance

of the event of Jnaneshwar "taking *samadhi*," and perhaps edited at least one textual record attributed to Namdev that describes Jnaneshwar's last moments, *Jnaneshwar's Samadhi*. The key piece of evidence that allowed Eknath to conduct these acts of archaeology, textual editing, and re-memorialization was the appearance in Eknath's dream of a tree, called an *ajanavriksha*, or a "sui generic tree," one like no other, that stood as indisputable, direct evidence. The tree was said to have grown from a staff planted in the ground by Jnaneshwar at the time of his death, a story we know since it was recounted by Namdev in his narrative about Jnaneshwar's act. The tree then appeared to Eknath in a dream, and stands today just outside the entrance to the complex of temples and memorials at the site of Jnaneshwar's *samadhi* in Alandi.

Text and place were drawn together in the sixteenth century to form a yearly ritual that endures to this day and that forms an idiom of historical memory shared for at least four centuries around Alandi. To understand this shared idiom of historical memory, we will first review the Varkari religion and the three principal figures in this tale of a tree. We will then move to an examination of the text attributed to Namdev called *Jnaneshwar's Samadhi*. From there, we will shift to place and observe how the two are linked in a way that positions the collection of phenomena surrounding Jnaneshwar's entombment somewhere between the modern descriptive spheres of memory and history. South Asia evinces many examples of narratives that accompany pilgrimage places, memorials, and physical sites—both natural and fabricated—and we have excellent scholarship that explores the connection between text and place. This article enters the same scholarly discourse, but seeks to align the meeting point of narration and site with larger questions about the interaction of historiography and religious practice. In doing so, I argue that while scholarly thinking about the relationship between memory and history provides important insights into how to understand the texts and practices that surround Jnaneshwar's *samadhi*, it still fails to adequately comprehend the idiom of historical memory shared over centuries among the Varkaris.

JNANESHWAR, NAMDEV, AND EKNATH

The Varkari community is one of the largest devotional (*bhakti*) traditions in Maharashtra, and one of the oldest as well. The Varkaris form a loosely organized religious, cultural, social, economic, and literary community in modern-day Maharashtra that trace their history back at least eight hundred years, if not more. They worship Vitthal, a deity associated with Krishna and his mythology, whose main temple is in the southern Maharashtrian town of Pandharpur. Yearly pilgrimages to Pandharpur are a central feature of Varkari practice. The most famous of these occurs on the eleventh day (*ekadashi*) of the month of Ashadh during the monsoon,

usually in early July. Varkari practice is often called “syncretistic” in that it has absorbed elements of Shaiva Natha⁹ practice, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, and Christianity over the last one thousand years, though its expressions of belief have always espoused an explicit association with the worship of Vishnu, or Vaisnava practice. The Varkaris have emphasized the principles of egalitarian access to religious practice, open temple worship, regular pilgrimage, and other aspects of devotionism. As with almost all devotional traditions in South Asia, this ethos of egalitarianism has not always transferred to practice however (hence, e.g., Sane Guruji’s fast-unto-death to open temple doors to Dalits in 1947).

The Varkari tradition recalls a number of figures who lived exemplary lives, attained great wisdom, and embodied the ideals of the tradition, thus earning the designation *sant*, loosely approximate to the English word “saint.” Of the numerous saints whom the Varkaris revere, Jnaneshwar, Namdev, Eknath, and Tukaram (seventeenth century) are the most important. For our purposes in this chapter, we will concentrate on the first three. Jnaneshwar is remembered as having been born into a Brahmin family in the late thirteenth century. Jnaneshwar’s parents had renounced the world and had therefore become “outcaste” as Brahmins. However, when Jnaneshwar and his siblings—two brothers, Nvrittinath and Sapan; one sister, Muktabai—were born, their parents reinstated their Brahminical status with a petition to a religious council in the city of Paithan. As part of the agreement, Jnaneshwar’s parents pledged to commit ritual suicide by drowning themselves in the Ganga River (an act called *jalasamadhī* [“*samadhī* by water (*jala*)”]) in Benares, which tradition recalls they did. Thus, though Jnaneshwar’s parents were outcaste, Jnaneshwar and his siblings were, by caste (*jati*) and culture, Brahmins. All four were highly literate, well educated, and indoctrinated into esoteric religious practices, such as the Natha yogi sect. Still, the songs attributed to them, and the legends that surround their names, recall them to have been egalitarian in many social and cultural respects. Jnaneshwar’s most renowned work is a commentary and translation in Marathi of the famous Sanskrit text, the *Bhagavad Gita*. This act of devout and scholarly work earned Jnaneshwar the honorific title “Lord of Knowledge.”

Said to have been a contemporary of Jnaneshwar and his siblings, Namdev is remembered by the Varkari tradition as having been born into a low-caste family of tailors (*shimpi*) in the latter part of the thirteenth century. Unlike Jnaneshwar, Namdev is quite explicitly remembered to have been illiterate—or rather, Namdev is remembered to have shunned writing and reading as appropriate modes of expressing and preserving his thoughts. Instead, Namdev is attributed with having taken an older form of ritually chanting God’s name, called *kirtan*, and transforming the practice into a complex performance art that contains moral and philosophical exposition, cultural critique, and historical narrative in the context of music, dance, and audience participation. A Marathi *kirtan* is a multifarious performance art

that ranges from a simple line of devotees dancing and singing a song under the direction of a *kirtan* leader, or *kirtankar*, to scholarly treatises, to social and political commentary, to a linguistic exposition on the meaning of a term.¹⁰ As a performance art, Marathi *kirtan* relies upon artful narrative techniques such as allegory, pathos, and humor, all in the service of imparting a moral or ethical thesis to an audience. Namdev’s ascribed distance from literacy is attributed to this commitment to the practice of *kirtan* as the most appropriate means to express his devotional and social sentiments and to address a *bhakti* public, a general audience that coheres around the various principles associated with *bhakti*.

Namdev also represents the advent of the Varkari biographical tradition as its first biographer. He is said to have composed biographies of many of his companions, the most famous of which is a narrative triptych that recalls three aspects of Jnaneshwar’s life. The first, called the *Adi* (or “Beginning”), is an account of the life of Jnaneshwar’s grandparents, parents, and siblings, giving particular attention to the resolution of Jnaneshwar’s family’s caste designation and the petition at Paithan. The second narrative, the *Tirthavali* (or “Travelogue”), recounts a journey by Namdev and Jnaneshwar to a handful of sacred sites in northern India. However, a majority of the story takes place in Pandharpur, and not in traveling elsewhere. Instead, we have a narrative that insists upon the supremacy of Pandharpur as a pilgrimage site, in the first third of the story, and a morality tale against the evils of “caste-ism” (*shudrati*) in the latter two-thirds.¹¹ The last narrative is the one that will receive our attention in this chapter, a piece called *Jnaneshwar’s Samadhī*, which has a companion narrative called the “The Glory of Jnaneshwar’s Samadhī,” in Marathi, *Sri Jnaneshwarsamadhī Mahima*. In the former text, Namdev recounts for us the final moments of his friend Jnaneshwar’s life, the hours before Jnaneshwar voluntarily entered a tomb (also called a *samadhī*) in Alandi to attain a meditative state that essentially holds the body in stasis, not quite dead but not animate (*sanjivan samadhī*). The latter text expounds the glories of the former, as a story, and details the place of Jnaneshwar’s entombment and the enactment of ritual remembrance that surrounds the event.

The stories of Eknath’s life recall that he was born and educated as a Brahmin, like Jnaneshwar was, in the sixteenth century in the town of Paithan, the same place where Jnaneshwar’s parents, three hundred years earlier, had brought their petition for the re-instatement of the Brahminical status of their four children. Like Namdev, Eknath is remembered as having been an excellent practitioner of *kirtan*, who would thrill audiences with his great performances. And like Jnaneshwar, Eknath is remembered as having been extremely well educated in Sanskrit and its rhetorical arts. Eknath also had a guru in Sanskrit and philosophy named Janardan, who, legend recalls, encouraged him to produce written texts on various philosophical and moral subjects. In addition to this authorial

role, Eknath is remembered to have been concerned with the conservation and preservation of texts and memorials. The two subjects that received his curatorial attentions were Jnaneshwar's *Jnaneshwari* and the memorial to Jnaneshwar, his *samadhi*; and perhaps a third, the *Jnaneshwar Samadhi* attributed to Namdev.

THE TEXT: "JNANESHWAR'S SAMADHI"

As already mentioned, Namdev is considered the archetypical Marathi *kirtan* performer who inaugurated a kind of performance art unique among the host of arts called *kirtan* in South Asia.¹² Namdev is also considered the first Marathi saint to mention other *kirtan* performances in his songs. The most common references to *kirtan* in such songs appear in accounts of the deaths and burials of Namdev's friends and fellow authors from the fourteenth century. These threnodies eulogize Jnaneshwar, Muktabai, Sopan, Nivrutti, Chokhamela, and other contemporaries. These compositions also form a distinct layer of preserved textual sources for the various written compilations of Namdev's literary corpus, represented in manuscripts from the seventeenth century onwards. Several of these "*Samadhi*" songs are ritually recited during the death anniversaries of the various saints. The most famous ritual recitation of a threnody attributed to Namdev is the *samadhi* celebration for Jnaneshwar in Alandi in the month of Kartik (usually November). During this "memorial service," Namdev's *palkhi*—a palanquin that holds "memorabilia" of the saint, such as images, busts, and sandals—is brought by his followers on foot to Alandi from Pandharpur.

The JS attributed to Namdev recalls Jnaneshwar's announcement of his desire to enter *sanjivan samadhi*, a state in which many Varkaris believe Jnaneshwar still lives. No other saint within Varkari lore has the distinction of having entered, through yogic skill, a state of "still living" *samadhi*. In contrast, Jnaneshwar's siblings and contemporaries, including Namdev, are thought to have lived and died more or less as mortals normally do.

The JS attributed to Namdev is as much about celebration as it is about lament. The composition tells us how Namdev and his group enacted a kind of before-and-after wake, filled with music, song, and tears during a procession from the local river to the site where Jnaneshwar would "take *samadhi*." A huge audience gathered around the place, and the crowd began to perform *kirtans*. Namdev's children prepared the site of the *samadhi*, cleaned it, and laid out a straw mat on the floor. At this point, we hear the voice of the deity Vitthal asking Jnaneshwar if he has any last wishes. Jnaneshwar requests that every year a celebration be held in Alandi to recount the greatness of Vitthal and, hence, to remember Jnaneshwar's *samadhi*. Vitthal is happy to oblige and says that the river and site where Jnaneshwar sits will forever be a place to receive the blessings of Vitthal.

A blueprint for the yearly ritual that commemorates Jnaneshwar's *samadhi* is then enacted in the text of the JS (and has been re-imagined in films such as *Sant Jnaneshwar* by the directors Damle and Fattelal in 1940). In a procession, Jnaneshwar, along with Namdev, Jnaneshwar's siblings, and other contemporary saints, walk to the river, called the Indrayani, in Alandi and bathe. They proceed to the Siddheshwar temple (which is now partly submerged in the Indrayani River), worship there, then proceed to the site of the *samadhi*. They ritually circumambulate the site, then sit outside the entry to the tomb and begin a series of *kirtans* that last throughout the night. For several days the group fasts and stays awake, performing songs and remembering stories. The *kirtans* involve recalling moments from Jnaneshwar's life and parsing out from them life-lessons—a kind of didactic eulogy. The *kirtans* are suspended only for Jnaneshwar to deliver a philosophical discourse (*pravacana*). On the tenth day when Jnaneshwar is to enter his *samadhi*, the group breaks their fast with a communal meal. They return to performing *kirtans* and celebrating throughout the rest of the day and night. When the *kirtans* have gone on for too long, Namdev expresses his fear that Jnaneshwar will be too tired to carry out his own demise:

They ate until the late afternoon.
When the meal was finished, the *kirtan* started up.
The vibrant performance enthralled Govinda [Vitthal],
[Yet he thought,] 'It's time for Jnaneshwar's *samadhi*.'

Nama says,

'Dear Lord, if this goes on much longer,
Jnaneshwar will be too fainthearted to leave us.'

Jnaneshwar is then led to the *samadhi* site, where he plants his staff in the ground, thus marking by the *ajanavriksha*¹³ the site of the *samadhi*. He sits inside the tomb, and his older brother and guru, Nivrutti, places the text of the *Jnaneshwari* in front of him, so his brother will have his prized work with him for eternity. Nivrutti rolls the stone that seals the tomb into place, and Jnaneshwar's *samadhi*—spiritual, physical, and textual—is completed. Namdev concludes the threnody by telling us that all gathered went home, in multiple directions, speaking of the experience they had just shared and vowing to return to Alandi every year to remember. Thus, this passage contains the event and person to be remembered, the injunction to remember, and the very process by which this memory can be maintained. Immortality is also importantly present here. It is explicitly the subject of the story (Jnaneshwar's eternal *sanjivan samadhi*) and implicitly the metaphor of it, the perpetuity of the memory through reenactment and re-construction. This text is very clearly challenging death (or near death) with memory.

The presence of emotionally ambivalent “celebrations” to commemorate the death of a famous figure at the site of that figure’s death or burial is so common in the Varkari tradition that the *kirtan* itself bears a distinct relationship to death. *Kirtan* is described as a cure for death, because “*kirtan* . . . can save everyone . . . [can] break the yoke of death . . . and cut the rope of the body.”¹⁴ Namdev’s songs suggest that *kirtan* can “banish the ravages of time”¹⁵ and in the act of performance, “Time and Death are trampled under the rhythm of the dancing feet, stamped out in the ringing of the ankle bells,”¹⁶ an illustration that evokes an image of Shiva as the Dancing Lord, Nataraja. The *kirtan* thus shares with modern historiography the sense of a performative immortalization, a way of accurately remembering across the generations that come and go for the bodies that remember and forget, especially if we follow de Certeau’s idea that history and religion share a preoccupation with the cultural management of death.

The physical, literary remnant of Namdev’s JS poses several problems to the text critic. It is the least represented of Namdev’s other two biographies involving Jnaneshwar. The other two are found in Marathi manuscripts (*bada*) with colophons marking their date of composition as 1581 CE. In contrast, we find no written record of the JS until the eighteenth century. However, we do find as early as 1581 CE records of the companion narrative to JS, as noted, the “The Glory of Jnaneshwar’s Samadhi,” or the *Sri Jnaneshwarsamadhi Mahima* [JSM].¹⁷ This text appears to be a performative expansion of “Jnaneshwar’s Samadhi,” as if it were a transcript or recording of a performance of the JS itself. Recall that Namdev, the purported author of both texts, is remembered to have been an expert performance artist and someone who put no faith in writing. In this light, we can view the better-documented text JSM as a record of the JS in performance, like a sound recording of a famous musical work. Furthermore, the very existence of JSM implies the contemporaneous presence of the unwritten JS. But the question arises: Why would we have manuscriptal records of the performance of a text, but not the text itself?

The answer to this question might be found in the yearly memorial service of Jnaneshwar’s death anniversary, his *samadhi* in Alandi, which is celebrated, in part, by a recital/performance of Namdev’s JS. I recently asked P. D. Nikte, the director of the Namdev Temple in Pandharpur, about the JS and its absence from manuscript sources. He suggested that because the composition was used in a particular ritual—the pilgrimage from Pandharpur to Alandi made every year to remember the *samadhi* of Jnaneshwar—it was considered “sacred” and preserved only orally.¹⁸ Nikte’s assertion implies an understanding within the Varkari tradition that this particular text was not to be written down, perhaps reflecting a view that in the particular case of this text the medium of literacy was inauspicious and inappropriate (which is also a traditional attribute of other sacred texts within Hinduism, most notably the Vedas, said to be preserved appropriately only in oral form). Thus, while a secondary

text recounting the glory of its primary source was acceptable, the commitment to writing of this primary source, intertwined with a yearly ritual, was not acceptable. Resistance to writing down sacred materials in Sanskrit and other languages has a long history, and Nikte’s observation points in this direction of practice. There is still a pervasive belief, especially with Sanskrit, that the written text is inferior to the “human” one (the text committed to the mind and heart—committed to memory). Curiously, the first anthology of Namdev’s songs, which appeared in 1849, took the form of a lithograph of the JS, perhaps auguring the shift in epistemological perspective that some scholars have attributed to the advent of the printing press in the modern world. What had largely elided literacy in handwritten media could not escape the printing press in the colonial period.

THE PLACE: JNANESHWAR’S SAMADHI IN ALANDI

The complex of temples and courtyards that now surrounds the purported site of Jnaneshwar’s *samadhi* quite overshadows the small structure that is said to hold Jnaneshwar’s still-conscious body. The “tomb,” housed inside a modest edifice, is marked by a marble slab, usually strewn with flowers. Atop the slab is a bust of Jnaneshwar, itself usually garlanded, and behind the bust, a small niche with the icons of Vitthal and his “consort” Rukmini. The Indrayani River runs just near the *samadhi* complex. Behind the *samadhi* sits the *ajanavriksha*, which figures prominently in the story of the preservation of the site of Jnaneshwar’s *samadhi* by Eknath in the sixteenth century.

The Varkari tradition and scholars of the history and literature of Old Marathi seem unequivocal regarding Eknath’s hand in conserving and preserving the text of Jnaneshwar’s *Jnaneshwari* through compiling all available manuscripts and critically editing the work in the latter part of the sixteenth century.¹⁹ What receives less attention from scholars, but remains nonetheless essential to Varkari history, is the idea that Eknath also discovered, refurbished, and set in motion the perpetual preservation of the site of Jnaneshwar’s *samadhi* in Alandi. The story of Eknath’s conservation efforts with regard to the site of the *samadhi* is a common story to hear in Alandi, among Varkaris, and in Marathi devotional scholarship about the Varkari saints.

As we have seen, the link between Eknath of the sixteenth century and the sacred site of Jnaneshwar’s Samadhi in the thirteenth century is made by reference to a dream. In a song attributed to Eknath we hear the reason for the saint’s interest in a *samadhi* forgotten through the centuries:

Jnaneshwar appeared in a dream
And told me something bewildering.

'Divine One, radiant as the sun,
 One who speaks only of the Highest Brahman,
 The root of the Ajana tree has ensnared my throat.
 Come to Alandi and loosen it.'
 This was the dream, so I went to Alandi,
 Where I found a door submerged in the river.
 [Eknath] received his grand reward;
 I met the great teacher Jnaneshwar.²⁰

The language of the poem does not speak of a *samadhi* or any structure other than "a door" in the river. The Indrayani River runs quite close to the site of the *samadhi* in present-day Alandi, and the temple that figures in the JS attributed to Namdev is indeed partially submerged in the river. Though dreams are a fairly regular means for Varkari and other saints to communicate with one another across the planes of mortality, they are rarely symbolic in a Freudian sense. Instead, these dreams are literal moments of communication between saints, however one-way the communication may be.

In this case, Jnaneshwar gives a "clue" to Eknath, a thing that becomes a *sign* of Jnaneshwar and his *samadhi*: the *ajanavriksha*, the roots of which ensnare Jnaneshwar's throat in the song. In retellings of the story, particularly in Alandi, the *ajanavriksha* becomes the very reason Eknath could find the site of the *samadhi*. First, it was the tree's roots that instigated the dreamscape complaint by Jnaneshwar. Second, it was the site of the tree that must have guided Eknath to the proper spot. Today, in Alandi, a tree stands near the site of the *samadhi*, and it is considered the self-same *ajanavriksha*, referenced in Namdev's songs and to which people offer garlands and pay homage.²¹ Being a "unique" or *sui generis* tree, it unmistakably marks the site of Jnaneshwar's tomb because it is inimitable by its very nature, as its name implies. Furthermore, it is living, still believed to be growing near the site of the *samadhi*, and thus linking Jnaneshwar in the thirteenth century with Eknath in the sixteenth century and current visitors to Alandi in the twenty-first century as a kind of synecdoche for cultural, living memory—though people (other than Jnaneshwar) could not live to link these centuries in living memory, the tree could. The tree is a device of remembrance in this song and in the Varkari narratives that one hears in Alandi. It is also the key to understanding how this memorial practice approximates a historiography. The tree, I want to argue, stands as the link between figures or moments of living memory as a means of preserving, objectively, a historically true narrative about the past.

This is what history does, it links the memory forged in a moment (usually traced through the remnant of the archive) to the cultural memory of the present, usually presented in the form of the modern historical narrative. Oddly, perhaps, the tree serves some role in this intermediary space and hence also articulates a link between memory and history. But before

we examine the tree as a device of history, let me explain what I mean by memory and history in general.

HISTORY, MEMORY, AND A TREE

In the humanities over the last thirty years we have seen the rise of the key word "memory" as a significant historical, social, and cultural category in scholarly inquiry. We have "memory" studies, as well as a "memory industry."²² And sometimes this work is even conducted by "memoriologists."²³ We find memory configured as proto-history, pre-modern history, and post-modern history. Memory is a thing richly present in our contemporary world, or it is a thing crushed under the successive waves of modernity, the industrial revolution, the professionalizing of historiography, and the decline of religious lifeworlds. We have it and/or it has us. Individuals practice it, but they do so "collectively" and socially. Memory is both myth and the most real assessment of the actuality of past events that humans can hope to accomplish.

Despite what seems a morass of memories, some thematic unities emerge over the long discourse of memory in human life. Memory is associated with modernity as an antithetical, anachronistic way of recalling the past. This means for some scholars, memory exists in the world today as an artifact of a pre-modern era or an alternative historiography in the post-modern one, as if archeologists had discovered an ancient tool, and rather than put it behind glass in a museum, they put it to use in the contemporary world.²⁴ For other thinkers, such as Pierre Nora, memory is a victim of modernity, obliterated by the historical consciousness of modern historiography. In a pithy line germane to French academic writing, one reads, "We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left."²⁵ For Nora and others, memory went the way of "peasant culture," as well as "so-called primitive or archaic societies," foreclosed in the world by "colonial violation."²⁶ This location of memory regularly carries with it an association with "religious" thought, so often used to characterize "peasant" culture worldwide. Such arguments situate memory outside the scope of modernity, either before its advent or in the present condition of its (perhaps exaggerated) demise. A further illustration of memory's antagonism with modernity is the common codification of nonliterate recollections within the realm of memory. Thus we find memory articulated in places, physical sites, and structures, or recalled through testimony, and witnessed by the body. With the exception of the modern memoir, memory usually enters writing as evidence adjudged by the historian and composed in the authorized historical narrative form.

Underwriting memory studies is an understanding of historical consciousness that is tightly bound to Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Weber—our celestial doyens of modernity and history. We can identify two relevant

strands of thought that ought to be highlighted in the context of this chapter. The first is the relationship between Hegel's "people without history," that is, those who remember rather than historicize, and those who perceive history, the moderns. This debate cannot be heard apart from arguments about orality and literacy made famous by Walter Ong and Jack Goody, among others.²⁷ The second strand involves the imbrications of memory in religious life, a world apart from the modern in Hegel, Marx, and Freud, but one deeply intertwined with the modern in Weber's work.

Famously illustrated by a long lineage of authors (especially postcolonial historians) is Hegel's idea the world can be divided into those "with history" and those without; the fault lines here generally fell between the "Oriental World" and the Greek, Roman, and German ones. Furthermore, one must not forget Hegel's physical-anthropological-historical assessment of "The Geographical Basis of History," an evaluation that concludes "[t]he true theatre of history is therefore the temperate zone," that is, in Europe.²⁸ Though Hegel does not use the language of memory, he uses several of its partners, "myth" and "dream" primarily.²⁹ India becomes the least hospitable terrain for the "Spirit" of History to reside because India, mostly among the "Hindoos," is the land of caste, the social tendency toward inequality.³⁰ So for Hegel "Dreams" and "Dream-state" become characteristic of Indian remembrance.³¹ And the "Dreams" of Indian pasts fall short of history because:

History requires Understanding—the power of looking at an object in an independent objective light, and comprehending it in its rational connection with other objects. Those peoples therefore are alone capable of History, and of prose generally, who have arrived at that period of development (and can make that their starting point) at which individuals comprehend their own existence as independent, i.e. possess self-consciousness.³²

While many students of South Asian history dismiss Hegel's presumptions about colonial India, they often take more seriously an allied set of assumptions about historical consciousness and memory imbedded in the discourse of orality and literacy. In their famous article "The Consequences of Literacy," Jack Goody and Ian Watt contend that literacy is required for history to emerge as a category of knowledge distinct from myth or fable. Without literacy there is "no enduring record" of the past and "no historical sensibility" in the present; in short, "faced with permanently recorded versions of the past and its beliefs . . . historical enquiry becomes possible."³³ Therefore, the consequence of literacy is history; the consequence of illiteracy is to be mired in myth (read as memory). In non-literate societies—Goody and Watt choose indigenous groups in Ghana and Nigeria as models—there is no distinction between history and myth.³⁴ In literate societies—the authors choose ancient Greece as their model—we

can see the clear dichotomy between the "mythical" thought of primitives (Ghana and Nigeria) and the "logico-empirical" thought of civilized man" (ancient Greece).³⁵ Literacy leads inevitably to science, progress, individuality, and other hallmarks of modernity. Illiteracy creates inertia and stunts the growth of civilizations, which, without history, have no marker of their collective successes and failures; they are cognitively incapable of history.

Goody and Watt conclude that in studying these cultures, from the point of view of their histories, the skills of the anthropologist are required for illiterate societies, whereas the history of literate societies is the purview of the sociologist.³⁶ This parceling of subjects is common: anthropologists study culture, and sociologists study societies; all societies have culture, but not all cultures of the world, and of world history, have developed societies. While Goody has emended and softened this position in subsequent writings,³⁷ he has never shied from the essential formula that language which leads to writing then leads to history and science; whereas language that remains oral leads nowhere, that is, remains within the domain of the oral, the world of myth and memory.³⁸

The opposition between literacy, science, and history, on one side, and its variously construed antitheses, on the other, raises a question too often ignored in memory studies: Could the opposition between memory and history be predicated on an understanding of memory as allied to religious, mythic, and "traditional" (as in "oral") thinking? While Hegel may have had his Spirit, with a complex, but readily apparent, relationship to religion, or rather, "Providence," the Rankean scientific approach to religion has certainly come to dominate the discipline. On the other hand, memory is awash in the language of religion.³⁹ And as a student of Durkheim, it is no surprise to see in Halbwachs a pre-occupation with religion.⁴⁰ He chose early Christian religion as his first subject for the application of his ideas about collective memory. Halbwachs argued that early pilgrims and other Christian travelers set in collective memory the locales of the Gospels, wedding memory, and place in a shared remembrance of the sacred geography attached to the life of Jesus.⁴¹ Halbwachs does not argue that religion is the exclusive domain of memory, nor that memory is the only mode of recalling the past available to religion. But his choice of subjects presages the deep connections between memory and religion that would be a standard feature in the theoretical work of the 1980s and later. Pierre Nora states, "Memory installs remembrance within the sacred; history, always prosaic, releases it again."⁴² Other, more recent explorations of memory and history, such as the exemplary article "On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse" by Kerwin Lee Klein, make plain memory literatures' "associations" with the "sacred," ranging from "cultural religiosity" and "spirituality," containing "quasi-religious gestures," to the "semireligious" and "explicit religiosity."⁴³ Klein's take on Hegel is instructive: "Divine presence and structural memory converge upon the people without history."⁴⁴

Certainly, part of the association between religion and memory is a result of the strong presence of the Holocaust as a site of memory in modernity, and Judaic traditions of remembrance as a practice of memory. However, the greater gyres of association involve memory not as a solution to crises in modern history, but rather as indicative of a cornucopia of anti-/pre-/non-/post-modern responses to positivist, objectivist, gendered, nation-centric historiography. And this line of reasoning, I have argued, is aligned with debates about orality and literacy, which are themselves reinstatements, along different lines of inquiry, of the Euro-centric world model Hegel provided for modern history. By the time we arrive at the work of Western philosophers of history like Croce, Dilthey, and Collingwood in the first half of the twentieth century, memory is clearly understood to be history's opposite in the field of recollection.⁴⁵ As Collingwood said in his lectures on the philosophy of history in 1926, "history and memory are wholly different things . . . memory [is] *subjective* [and] *immediate* . . . history on the other hand is *objective* [and] *mediate*."⁴⁶ Collingwood's point is that memory stands regardless of proof or rationale, while history must always rest upon some ground of evidence, proof, and rationality. The underlying assumption is that memory requires belief, while history requires proof.

The shape of this dialectic would largely remain intact, despite several brave postmodern interventions. Many of these interventions in the field of memory pivoted around the challenge of the Holocaust to the modern Western conceit within historiography of European progress and humanistic superiority. The difference between memory and history is so keenly entrenched that even premiere scholars of memory, like Nora, agree that history is a wholly other thing. For example, another contemporary doyen of memory studies, Jan Assmann, wrote in 2006, "the major difference between history and memory [is that] the distinction between fact and fiction is of no importance [in the context of memory]."⁴⁷ Jacques Le Goff, another star of memory studies, states plainly that "there is no such thing as history without *scholarship*," while, on the other hand, we are to understand that memory does not require the discipline of the Academy.⁴⁸ Instead, Le Goff calls memory "the raw material of history," its archive and source of substance, but memory cannot replace the historian's rational, adjudicatory charge.⁴⁹

What does this have to do with Jnaneshwar, Namdev, and Eknath? The site of Jnaneshwar's *samadhi* is certainly a "memorial," a place people visit to experience and retell memories of Jnaneshwar's life and accomplishments, invoking his sacrality as a saint. It is also a place where Namdev's composition about Jnaneshwar's entombment is invoked. It is done so in order to reiterate an event understood to be "historical," which is different than the re-enactment of the event *at the site* every year to commemorate Jnaneshwar's "taking *samadhi*," an event that I would call memorial, mimetic, and intended to evoke a bodily "memory" of the event in those who actually have no direct memory of it. So we have here two orders of

activity that span the discourse associated with sites in the language of memory: the centrality of the site and the centrality of a narrative about the site—its "event" narrative. And as mentioned earlier, it is perhaps even more interesting that our narrative about the event, the "Jnaneshwar *Samadhi*," remained "unwritten" for centuries, transmitted orally through performance primarily and repeatedly performed at Alandi before its subject, the site of the *samadhi*. Simultaneously, we have a text that glorifies both a narrative and a place, the second work associated with Namdev about Jnaneshwar's entombment, and one with a very early written legacy, called "The Glory of Jnaneshwar's *Samadhi*." The presence of these two texts speaks to a complex relationship with literacy and orality, historical memory and experiential or ritualized memory. It would be hard to speak of these activities as "historical" in any modern sense of the word; the mnemonic activities of the Varkaris in Alandi sit better within the sphere of memory than history.

Literacy, however, is not absent here, but rather it is made secondary, servile to oral performance and enacted ritual, a common feature of "religions" that are construed as slavishly devoted to ritual. Hence, we have the kind of preservation of narrative vital to configurations of literacy—and likewise essential to a historical sense—yet we have this act of preservation embedded in performance, eluding writing. We also see that it was a dream (recall Hegel) that caused a textual editor, Eknath, to preserve, in the present, things of the past. He refurbished the site of the *samadhi*, and in scholarship about the event proposes that Eknath thus found inspiration for his critical editing work on the *Jnaneshwari*, another thoroughly modern practice buttressed by modern historiography's belief in the recoverability of the past via the acquisition of "good data." Eknath may also have edited or standardized the two texts attributed to Namdev—one oral and one written—that recall the Jnaneshwar's *samadhi*.

So where's the history? This question brings us back to the tree. In order to understand why I am suggesting the approximation of a historiography here, we might think about the reasons Varkaris emphasize the uniqueness of the Ajana tree. The tree is not sacred, necessarily, or even supernatural; indeed, there is no religious association with the Ajana tree in any Indian literature that I know. I wish to emphasize here that the tree serves no religious purpose. Its nature is to stand as proof because it is an entirely unique physical object, recounted in text and substantiated, as it is claimed, in real life in the tree that is outside the *samadhi* in Alandi. But proof of what? Proof of the historical accuracy of the texts and practices that surround the tomb in Alandi, proof because it is so entirely unique. If you find the tree, since there's only one, you've found the site—you have proof. As a piece of historical evidence, it is ideal, inimitable, and indisputably singular. It may serve as a sign, but its nature is its uniqueness, not its power to signify. The tree is the sign for the physical truth of the place.

Nora, I believe, would also see the tree as a device of history. He defines history as “[a thing that] belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority [that] binds itself strictly to temporal continuities, to progression and to relations between things.”⁵⁰ The Ajana tree, as a wholly unique tree, without precedent or progeny, can thus be an *object*, that is, an objective artifact, a statement about a historical truth that does not require (in theory) any belief. It is meant to be the thing upon which the historicity of the statements of Namdev’s text or of Eknath’s refurbishment must hang.

The fact that I, as an ethnographer and historian, may not accept the uniqueness of this tree is on par with whatever doubt I might have with any other historical evidence, according to Varkaris. Indeed, the tree in Alandi, from my point of view, does not look unique, and one can find hundreds like it in the area; I am confident a botanist would not find this tree to be “unique” in any scientific way. But my interest here is in the claim made, or more precisely, the reason for the claim, which, I argue, is to present as objective fact some narrative about a past event, and to buttress that claim with “proof,” which is the function of the tree. In other words, if, as with many memorial practices, the view were intrinsic, aimed toward the faithful, to those who already believed in the place, why would there have ever been felt the need to insert some object that would stand independent of the ritualistic, theological, or soteriological importance of the place? As a location for the attachment of affective memory, the very site of the *samadhi* is certainly sufficient, so why this tree? The answer, I believe, points toward an extrinsic interest in an understanding of the past that seeks toward objective evaluation and hence “historical truth” in addition to what we might call theological-memorial truth. Still, as with almost all narrative histories, one cannot separate proof from the telling of the story that is the object of proof; the narrative and the “science” remain interconnected.

Finally, the *ajanavriksha* does more than lead Eknath to the site of the *samadhi*, and continue to point people to that site today. It also serves to articulate, to join memory and history, text and practice, the past and present. It points toward Namdev’s text that recalls Jnaneshwar’s voluntary entombment, the JS. The *ajanavriksha* appears in the text and reappears in Eknath’s dream as it ensnares Jnaneshwar’s throat, and is said to stand today as a marker of the very spot as a unique memorial. A coincidence of time, the apparent fact that the first written records of Namdev’s recollection of Jnaneshwar’s *samadhi* occurred in Eknath’s life, suggest that in the sixteenth century text and place required each other to substantiate their historical authenticity. Is it anachronistic, or culturally out of place, to attribute a historicist’s intention to Eknath and his period, or to the Varkaris today? Is the rectification of text and place with reference to evidence—in this case the *ajanavriksha*—simply the revitalization of memory, the reinstatement of a memorial and commemorative

narrative? Can a dream constitute a historiographic method? Can a tree constitute historical proof?

These sites of memory and history form a shared idiom of recollection that crosses many temporal boundaries. As L. P. Hartley famously wrote, the past is another country, and such locations of recollection link continents of possible pasts.⁵¹ Time and memory are shared in a vertically integrated measure of the past, a diachronic frame that extends from the purported moment of recollection to the present, linked by a consistent reference to a place, object, or localized ritual. In this case, the shared idiom of recollection is the *samadhi*, articulated in a physical form and place (the site of Jnaneshwar’s entombment and the structures that exist there), a text (the JS attributed to Namdev), and the object of commemoration itself, Jnaneshwar’s self-enacted entombment (*samadhi*). The shared symbol of this tripartite idiom of remembrance is the *ajanavriksha*, a symbol of the “objective” facticity of the past events recounted and ensconced in the structures of narrative that I have mentioned herein. This interconnected association of place, text, and object offers some approximation to a historiographic enterprise, a Varkari historical mnemonic, if you will. This enterprise centers on the way the tree is shared by the past and the present as a marker of veracity in the narratives pertaining to the *samadhi* (such as the text by Namdev, as well as the dream narrative of Eknath) and a physical device of corroboration located in the *lieu de mémoire* of the *samadhi* in Alandi.

Nora described historiography in France as “running a knife between the tree of memory and the bark of history,” an act that leaves both bark and tree dead.⁵² He has argued that memory and history are symbiotic, and their separation debilitates both endeavors. However, as Michel de Certeau has argued, the split between memory and history is made concrete by the configuration of historiography as a kind of autopsy performed upon the lifeless body of the past: memory resists death while history, like the story of the Afridi that opened this article, waits upon its subject to die in order for it to “be history” as the colloquial expression for death suggests. In contrast, the Varkari system of remembrance that surrounds the *samadhi* in Alandi operates in several idioms at once, of both memory and history. That at the very center of this set of mnemonic activities is said to sit a man, deep in meditation, still living after more than three-quarters of a millennium, may speak to some of the irrational beliefs of religions, but it may also speak metaphorically of the delicate balance between memory and history that marks so many memorial practices associated with religious traditions throughout the world. The investigation of comparative historiographies is an endeavor that must make us reconsider the constituent parts of historical narratives and practices and see historical consciousness as an idiom of remembrance shared by many in multifarious forms, a new template to lay over the old Hegelian global grid of World History and its Others.

NOTES

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2. In 1911, the Afridi were a Pathan tribe inhabiting the mountains on the Peshawar border of the Northwest Frontier province of India. The area of Tirah lies between the Khyber Pass and the Khanki Valley. The Afridi are still an important community in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
3. Quoted in Annemarie Schimmel, *Islam in the Indian Subcontinent* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 127.
4. For more on the institution and distribution of *waqf* in South Asia, see G. Kozłowski, *Muslim Endowments and Society in British India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India 1556–1707* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).
5. M. de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. T. Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 2.
6. C. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960).
7. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire." *Representations* 26 (1989), 7–24.
8. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the Marathi-speaking area of India that today comprises the state of Maharashtra as "Maharashtra," though this reference is anachronistic before 1960 and 1947.
9. Shaiva Nathism is a form of Tantrism focused on devotion to the god Shiva. The Naths had a significant impact on the development and spread of hatha yoga.
10. Marathi *kirtan* is more similar to the various *katha* or "story" arts of devotional Hinduism than to *kirtan* in most other parts of India, which usually takes of the form of simple chanting and group singing (with the exception of Bengali *kirtan*, which is, like Marathi *kirtan*, more narrative and expository as well as musical and performative).
11. See Christian Lee Novetzke, "A Family Affair: Krishna Comes to Pandharpur and Makes Himself at Home," in *Alternative Krishna*, ed. G. Beck (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 113–138.
12. For more on *kirtan*, see Gobind Singh Mansukhani, *Indian Classical Music and Sikh Kirtan* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982) and S. Slawek, "The Definition of Kirtan: An Historical and Geographical Perspective," *Journal of Vaisnava Studies* 4 (1996), 57–113.
13. S. Barber et al. *Sri Namdev Gatha* (Bombay: Maharashtra State Government Printing Press, 1970), 451 [1088.3].
14. *Ibid.*, 595 [1466.1–2].
15. *Ibid.*, 144 [369.3].
16. *Ibid.*, 165 [408.4].
17. The text is also attributed to Namdev, but several Marathi scholars feel the composition ought to be attributed to Vishnudas Nama, a different figure, whose floruit is of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

18. Oral information, Pandharpur, July, 2000. My translation.
19. See R. Ranade, *Mysticism in Maharashtra* (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1982[1933]); G. A. Deleury, *The Cult of Vithoba* (Pune: Deccan Colleg, 1960); G. Khanolkar, ed., *Marathi Vagmaya Kosh* (Mumbai: Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya Samskriti Mandal, 1977); and S. Tulpule, *Classical Marathi Literature: From the Beginning to AD 1818* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979).
20. N. Sakhare, ed., *Sri Namdev Gatha [Sakala Santa Gatha]* (Pune: Varda Books, 1990), 664 [3527].
21. S. Babar et al., *Sri Namdev Gatha* (Bombay: Maharashtra State Government Printing Press, 1970), 451 [1088.3].
22. W. Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory*, 41 (2002): 179.
23. N. Gedi and Y. Elam, "Collective Memory: What Is It?" *History and Memory* 8, no. 1 (1996): 35.
24. M. Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
25. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire." *Representations* 26 (1989): 7.
26. *Ibid.*, 7–8 and M. Matsuda, *The Memory of the Modern* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
27. See Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, 3 (1963), 304–345; Walter Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (New York: Methuen, 1982).
28. G. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications [1837] 1956), 80.
29. Gedi and Elam, in their article, "Collective Memory—What Is It?," conclude that collective memory "is but a myth;" see p. 47.
30. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 162.
31. *Ibid.*, 140, 167.
32. *Ibid.*, 162.
33. Goody and Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," 311, 344.
34. *Ibid.*, 325.
35. *Ibid.*, 320.
36. *Ibid.*, 343.
37. Even in "The Consequences of Literacy," Goody and Watt add the caveat, "But, of course, we must reckon with the fact that in our civilization [the literate, modern "West"], writing is clearly an addition, not an alternative, to oral transmission"; see p. 345.
38. Goody, *Power*.
39. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, 12–13.
40. Halbwachs was a Catholic who married a Jewish woman; politically, Halbwachs was a communist. His personal sentiments about religion are not speculated upon here.
41. For a superior study in the tradition of this line of investigation, see E. Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
42. Nora, "Between Memory and History," 9.
43. Kerwin Lee Klein, "On Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 129, 130, 136, and 141.

44. Ibid., 134.
45. For example, see Robin Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 56, 221–225, 293–294.
46. Ibid., 365–367.
47. Jan Assmann, *Religion and Cultural Memory* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006), 179.
48. Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xvii.
49. Ibid., xi.
50. Nora, “Between History and Memory,” 9.
51. From L. P. Hartley, *The Go-Between* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953; reprint New York: Penguin Books, 2004).
52. Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 10.

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