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## Progressive School Reform in Comparative Perspective

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### INTRODUCTION

The historiography of education in the Progressive era has been shaped by two long-standing assumptions. The first is the acceptance by most scholars that the educational reforms of the period were the product of an easily defined, readily identifiable progressive movement. The second is the continued confidence in most published work that educational events in either the Northeast or the Midwest are typical of analogous events in other parts of the United States. Both assumptions may distort our understanding of this crucial era because both glibly assume uniformity and consistency in two areas marked by enormous diversity and change-- educational politics and policy, on the one hand, and local and regional history, on the other.

This essay examines these assumptions and questions their validity. The preceding chapters on Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans challenge the conventional wisdom on progressivism as a movement and shed new light on the generalizability of the Northeast-Midwest model. In this essay I will survey the general historiography of educational progressivism, speculate on a new interpretation of educational reform in the Progressive era, and apply that interpretation to the development of public schools in Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans.

### EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In 1970, Peter G. Filene threw the field of American political history into turmoil by arguing that the progressive movement had never existed. Filene defined a movement as "a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in society." Specifically, he noted, "[t]he members of a social movement combine and act together in a deliberate, self-conscious way, as contrasted to a noncollective or 'aggregate' group (such as blondes or

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lower-income families) which has a common identity in the minds of social scientists or other observers rather than in the minds of the members themselves.<sup>1</sup> Filene claimed that the disparate nature of progressivism precluded the use of the term movement to describe the political developments of the first part of this century. He based this conclusion on three factors. First, progressivism rarely, if ever, agreed on goals and values. Second, "progressivism lacked unanimity of purpose on either a programmatic or philosophical level." Third, the proponents and opponents of progressive reforms were almost indistinguishable from one another in terms of their social and economic characteristics.<sup>2</sup> Far from being a period dominated by a self-conscious political movement, Filene sees the era between 1900 and 1920 as one of "shifting coalitions around different issues, with the specific nature of these coalitions varying on the federal, state and local levels, from region to region, and from the first to the second decades of the century."<sup>3</sup> Filene's argument prompted American political historians to reconsider their assumptions and reassess the era. By contrast, his influence in the field of educational history remains minimal. To this day, few educational historians question the existence of a progressive movement in education.<sup>4</sup> David Tyack's influential book, *The One Best System*, for example, rests on the premise that the administrative progressives "were members of a movement composed mostly of business and professional elites, including university people and the new school managers." Moreover, Tyack argues, this movement implemented a remarkably uniform series of reforms in school systems across the nation between 1900 and 1930.<sup>5</sup> Tyack is not alone in his assessment. Regardless of where one stands in the historiographic debates about progressivism in education, the existence of a progressive movement is practically axiomatic among educational historians.

By failing to question this supposed axiom of educational history, however, we have left a number of the vital questions suggested by Filene's work unanswered or, at best, half answered. Was there a common set of goals and values that educational progressives espoused? Was there unanimity among educational progressives regarding specific issues and programs? What separated progressive reformers from their opponents? Were progressive reforms implemented uniformly in all parts of the country?

Certainly many of Filene's questions about a progressive movement in politics apply to education as well. Educational historians, for example, must justify using the term movement to describe the activities of so varied a group as Jane Addams, Leonard Ayres, Ellwood P. Cubberley, John Dewey, Harold Rugg, David Shedd, Lewis Terman, E. L. Thorndike, and Ella Flagg Young. Given that the goals, values, philosophies, and programs of these individuals differed widely, and often conflicted sharply, how can we label all of them Progressives? Unfortunately, the answers that educational historians have proposed to this and related questions have been less than satisfying.

The seminal work on educational progressivism is Lawrence Cremin's 1961 study, *The Transformation of the School: Progress-*

ivism in American Education, 1876-1957. At the outset, Cremin notes that "the [Progressive] movement was marked from the very beginning by a pluralistic, frequently contradictory, character."<sup>6</sup> Despite these contradictions, however, he sees the movement generally as having a positive impact on American education: "[Progressive education] had its origin during the quarter century before World War I in an effort to cast the school as a fundamental lever of social and political regeneration. It began as a many-sided protest against a restricted view of the school, but it was always more than this; for essentially it viewed education as an adjunct to politics in realizing the promise of American life."<sup>7</sup> Cremin identifies the "unmistakable imprint" of the progressive reform effort in ten different areas of American education ranging from the expansion of educational opportunity both upward into the high school and downward into the kindergarten; the broadening of the curriculum to include vocational, physical, and aesthetic education; and the growth of educational bureaucracy that facilitated the professionalization of administrators and the specialization of teachers.<sup>8</sup>

*The Transformation of the School* laid the foundation for all future inquiry into educational progressivism. Later historians have not so much questioned the scope or content of Cremin's study as his overall position on the value of the reforms. Critics have, particularly his benign view of progressive reforms. First, pointed to three main problems with Cremin's interpretation. First, since Cremin refuses to define progressive education,<sup>9</sup> he discusses virtually every major educational change and practically every important educational leader of the era as if they were "progressive."<sup>10</sup> Second, critics claim that many progressive programs such as Americanization, standardized testing, ability grouping, guidance counseling, and tracking have had far more negative consequences than Cremin admits. Third, for all his emphasis on the links between educational and political reform, that is between progressive education and the larger social changes caused by industrialization, Cremin actually pays little attention to the politics of education or to the relationship between the schools and the economy.

Historiographically, these criticisms have coalesced into an interpretation that "solves" the apparent problems in Cremin's work. In the process, however, this interpretation totally overturns his positive vision of progressive reform. Central to this new interpretation is the conviction that a reform movement clearly existed, but that it was a movement with suspect rather than benign motives.

Many of the critics of Cremin's work draw their initial inspiration from Raymond Callahan's 1962 book, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. Callahan focused on one important aspect of educational progressivism, the adoption of business ideology and values in school administration. Callahan's most important finding concerns the "extent, not only of the power of the business-industrial groups, but of the strength of the business ideology in American culture on the one hand and the extreme weakness and vulnerability

of the schoolmen, especially school administrators, on the other".<sup>11</sup> In other words, Callahan appears to have found an even more identifiable movement in progressive education than Cremin. Rather than a broad-based humanitarian effort, however, this movement was composed of business leaders and their pliant educational pawns. From his new vantage point, Callahan sees many of the reforms that Cremin applauds, such as the introduction of vocational courses or the Gary Plan for elementary schools, as little more than programs designed to meet the narrow demands of business leaders who favored economy over education.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, in Callahan's hands, progressivism seems to play a greater role in realizing the dreams of grasping capitalists than in expanding educational opportunities for American children.

Almost a decade after the appearance of *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, a new generation of historians expanded on Callahan's vision and introduced a sweeping, controversial interpretation of the progressive movement. In addition to being more precise than Callahan about the goals and strategies of the movement, these "revisionist" historians based their work on a very different set of assumptions than either Cremin or Callahan regarding the nature of American society and the function of American education.<sup>13</sup> While recognizing many serious problems in the American educational system, neither Cremin nor Callahan ever questions the positive character of American political institutions, in general, or the public schools, in particular.<sup>14</sup> The revisionist historians, however, began from an opposite position. As Clarence Karler, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring argue in *Roots of Crisis*, "If one starts with the assumption that this society is in fact racist, fundamentally materialistic, and institutionally structured to protect vested interests, the past takes on vastly different meanings."<sup>15</sup> Schools are hardly "levers of social and political regeneration." Instead, as Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis claim, "the schools are constrained to justify and reproduce inequality rather than correct it."<sup>16</sup>

The purpose of public schools, the revisionists argue, is to maintain the social and economic inequalities of American life. Since capitalism is at the root of these inequalities, it is no surprise to find business leaders at the center of the progressive reform movement. The revisionists further contend that social control and social efficiency were the basic goals of progressive reformers; that innovations that hardened social class lines such as standardized testing and tracking represented the essence of the movement; and that the changing needs of industrial capitalism precipitated most of the reforms. From their perspective the term "movement," as Filene defines it, seems quite appropriate. In the revisionist interpretation, the progressive reformers were led by an identifiable class, and guided by a common set of goals and values. They institutionalized these goals and values through a fairly uniform program of educational reforms.<sup>17</sup>

During the 1970s, revisionist historians reinterpreted practically every phase of progressive educational reform. For example, rather than seeing progressive efforts to replace ward-based school

boards with boards elected at-large as campaigns to end corruption and increase efficiency, Bowles and Gintis argue that "[t]he urban school reform movement was an integral part of the broader municipal reform movement, aimed at reducing the political power of the 'ethnic enclaves' of the urban working class and small property owners."<sup>18</sup> An essential part of that process was the shift from ward-based to at-large school board elections that made boards the preserve of businessmen and professionals.<sup>19</sup> Once in power, elite reformers rapidly transformed the schools into institutions that served the needs of industrial capitalism far better than they served those of families, children, or working-class communities. Violas, for example, sees the Americanization "crusade" within public schools as

but one of several movements within the larger effort to diffuse the potential explosiveness of an unassimilated and discontented proletariat. The Americanization crusade, however, was not an isolated effort. There were several similar attempts to restructure urban children, especially those from the lower social and economic classes, so that they might better meet the labor requirements of corporate industry.<sup>20</sup>

The other attempts to "restructure children" to which Violas alludes include virtually every progressive achievement that Cremin applauded. Viewed through a revisionist lens the expansion of the extracurriculum, vocational education, vocational guidance, and even the creation of playgrounds for urban children take on a negative cast.<sup>21</sup> Spring as well as Bowles and Gintis, for example, view the expansion of secondary education as part of an effort to differentiate and stratify children according to social class. The formation of junior high schools and the introduction of standardized testing were crucial components of this sorting process.<sup>22</sup> Testing may in fact have been the most insidious of all the reforms since its scope was vast, touching generations of school children; its consequences were indelible, determining student placement; and, above all, its reinforcement of social stratification was very subtle, maintaining the appearance of meritocracy while actually reproducing inequality.<sup>23</sup>

The revisionist interpretation of public education, and specifically of progressive educational reform, sparked a decade of fierce historiographic debates and forced a major reassessment of educational history, though along quite different lines from those proposed by Filene. Some historians challenged the basic assumptions and research of the revisionists,<sup>24</sup> while others attempted to reconcile the revisionist interpretation of progressivism with the earlier, more positive assessment of the movement. In their efforts, however, these latter historians found themselves once again caught in the contradictory character of progressive education.

The one great virtue of the revisionist interpretation is its consistency, rooted in its assumption of class conflict as the

moving force in in U.S. history. Reforms that had once appeared positive were now seen to be negative; leaders who had once been heroes were now revealed as villains.<sup>25</sup> Because of its consistent service to the interests of the business elite, the revisionists argued, the progressive movement that seemed so diverse was, in fact, quite uniform.

Many educational historians, however, have been troubled by this simple solution to the problem of defining the progressive movement. Sweeping liberal and radical reformers into the camp of the American ruling class may have a certain conceptual elegance, but it denies the sharp divisions and the bitter contentedness that marked educational politics in the Progressive era. In addition, the revisionist account reduces such revolutionary figures as John Dewey to nearly unrecognizable caricatures, and so distorts the historic record.

Another group of educational historians has sought to account for the diversity of the progressive reformers by identifying competing "wings" or "tendencies" within the movement. As early as 1964, Edward Krug presented an interpretation that tried to account for the diverse streams of educational progressivism. Krug's classic two-volume study *The Shaping of the American High School* forcefully articulated the argument that the goals of progressive era school reformers were primarily social control and efficiency. He also noted, however, that "social control was one aspect of the reform movement, but social service was another. The writings of Dewey and [Samuel T.] Dutton in this period presented the school much more as an agency of social service than as an agency of social control."<sup>26</sup> Krug thus divided the movement into a dominant conservative wing and a small, liberal wing. He concluded that it was the conservative vision of progressive reform that triumphed in American public schools.<sup>27</sup>

A decade after Krug's work appeared, Tyack presented a compelling case for a still broader vision of educational progressivism. Tyack recognized several wings in progressivism and found the greatest influence emanating from a discrete group of conservatives whom he labels the "administrative progressives."<sup>28</sup> In tracing the impact of this group, Tyack directly challenged Filene. He stated that the administrative progressives "(1) were a movement with identifiable actors and coalitions; (2) had a common ideology and platform; and (3) gained substantive power over urban education" (emphasis added).<sup>29</sup> For all its accomplishments, however, Tyack does not see this movement as embracing the totality of progressivism in education. Tyack also recognized other factions within the movement, including a "small libertarian wing," "a small group of social reconstructionists," and a collection of "philosophers, psychologists and curriculum theorists" whom he labeled "pedagogical progressives."<sup>30</sup> According to Tyack, the pedagogical progressives had greater influence than most of these other groups, but like Krug, he saw conservative progressivism as having had a far greater influence over the course of American educational history.<sup>31</sup>

Tyack's taxonomy of progressive reformers has had considerable

appeal to subsequent historians, as it has allowed them to acknowledge the complexity of the movement while still identifying a general direction of reform.<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, however, dividing the movement into wings does not provide a satisfying solution to Filene's problem, for the "wings" interpretation is at bottom just a refinement of the revisionist approach. It categorizes and legitimates the actions of such important dissenting figures as Dewey but leaves intact the revisionist argument that a unified progressive movement closely tied to the business community imposed a dehumanizing, bureaucratic structure onto public education. The dissenters remain occasional voices in the wilderness with small constituencies and no real impact on reform.

Advocates of both the wings and revisionist interpretations miss one crucial issue. They assume that reform was essentially top-down. Interest groups including women's organizations, organized labor, the Socialist party, and politically active ethnic communities play no role in this view of progressive reform, yet all these groups participated in the educational reform politics of the era. As Daniel Rodgers has noted, dividing the progressive movement into wings does provide some conceptual clarity, but it misses the real thrust of Filene's criticism, which was "to split the progressive movement not into two but dozens of pieces, bound only by the rules of competitive, pluralist politics."<sup>33</sup>

Succeeding the "wings" interpretation in the historiography of educational progressivism is a new school of thought that does in fact pay more attention to the competitive and pluralistic nature of educational politics. The emergence of this new school of thought reflects as much a change in the research emphasis of educational historians as it reflects a change in interpretation. In contrast to previous works that attempted to describe national trends, most recent works on educational politics have concentrated on the actual processes of political reform in a specific city or group of cities. Julia Wrigley, for example, reveals that the arena of educational politics in Chicago was far more contentious than either revisionist or non-revisionist historians had allowed. Wrigley found three major groups battling over educational issues: business leaders and their allies in educational administration; middle- and upper-middle class advocates of good government; and militant teachers allied with the Chicago Federation of Labor.<sup>34</sup> Between 1900 and 1950, Wrigley argued, class conflict dominated educational struggles in Chicago, but this conflict was fought out within the arena of democratic politics. Her study described a series of shifting coalitions among these groups, internal divisions within them, occasional victories by all sides, and a considerable amount of compromise.

In a study of Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta, Paul Peterson also emphasized the pluralistic nature of educational politics, while Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir stressed the importance of class conflict and the role of organized labor in the process of educational reform in Chicago and San Francisco.<sup>35</sup> Both of these studies eschew the search for a progressive movement or

movements and concentrate instead on the political dynamics of educational change.

No recent work better exemplifies this trend than that of William Reese. Reese explored progressive educational politics in four cities--Milwaukee, Toledo, Kansas City, and Rochester--arguing that a wide variety of groups played important roles in school reform. In Reese's interpretation, schools were not open to easy manipulation by business leaders or administrative progressives, but rather were "contested terrains," arenas of social and class conflict. Rejecting the top-down interpretations that marked so much previous writing about progressive reform, Reese argued that

school innovation was a dynamic, interactive process involving diverse community groups. Women's organizations, labor unions, Social Gospelers, and Parent associations, labor unions, Social Gospelers, and Populist and Socialist parties--hardly the featured actors in analyses of progressive school reform--nevertheless played a seminal role in school innovation.<sup>56</sup>

Reese labeled all these groups Progressives but notes the difficulty that the label creates. He wrote, "After studying various cities, one encounters a fascinating problem. Turn-of-the-century reformers who had diametrically opposed political and ideological perspectives--such as Socialists and capitalist efficiency experts--often endorsed the same innovation."<sup>57</sup>

With Reese's work we have come full circle in the search for a progressive movement in education. Greenin treated practically every educational reformer of the first quarter of the twentieth century as a member of the Progressive movement, while Reese avoided using the term movement and simply called all the participants in the process of educational reform in this era progressives. Some progress has been made, but not as much as one might hope. Educational historians still need to account for the complex and often contradictory rationales and processes that lay behind the profound changes that took place in urban education in this period.

#### COMMUNITIES OF POLITICAL LANGUAGE IN A RISING DEMOGRAPHIC SEA

In an influential essay Daniel T. Rodgers argued that the key to understanding the Progressive era is recognizing that in the early twentieth century the rise of issue-oriented interest groups coincided with the erosion of political parties as the primary vehicle of American political expression. He stated:

The result was to spring open the political arena to extra-party pressure groups of all sorts: manufacturers' organizations, labor lobbies, civic leagues, trade associations, women's clubs, professional associations, and issue-oriented lobbies, all trying to directly shape policy. This was the context within which maverick politicians could vault into office and "reform" (and "antireform") coalitions

could blossom. Progressive politics--fragmented, fluid, and issue focused--was, in short, part of a major, lasting shift in the rules of the political game.<sup>58</sup>

Rodgers's account not only explains the plurality of interest groups that Reese and others have identified but also explains why, within the contested terrain of educational politics, business groups and administrative progressives seemed to triumph so often. "In the newly fluid, issue-focused political contests of the Progressive era, the better organized players--the professional lobbies, the well-disciplined interest groups, and, above all, the corporations--held massive advantage."<sup>59</sup>

Rodgers also explains how these groups managed to unite on specific reform issues despite their deep divisions on fundamental ideas and beliefs. Rejecting the notion that Progressives shared a "common, static ideological frame," Rodgers asserted that

those who called themselves progressives did not share a common creed or a string of common values, however ingeniously or vaguely defined. Rather what they seem to have possessed was an ability to draw on three distinct clusters of ideas--three distinct social languages--to articulate their discontents and their social visions. To put rough but serviceable labels on those three languages of discontent, the first was the language of antimonomopolism, the second was an emphasis on social bonds and the social nature of human beings, and the third was the language of social efficiency.<sup>60</sup>

Rodger's identification of three languages is not the same as defining three wings in a movement. Instead, the notion of social languages--what rhetoricians and sociologists call "communities of discourse"--provides an analytical framework for explaining how diverse groups came together in the many shifting political coalitions of the Progressive era. To analyze coalitions, by the languages that tie them together allows for generalization, but it also compels a close reading of the competing languages of reform.

American politics have always been shaped by distinct languages, by keywords or phrases that crystallize debate and shape policy options. As Alexis de Tocqueville recognized over a century and a half ago, some keywords such as *liberty* and *equality* represent core values in American life and are central to political debate in this nation.<sup>41</sup> While *liberty* and *equality* have become enduring parts of the American political vocabulary, other words and phrases such as *natural rights*, *the state*, or more recently *law* and *order* rise and fall in relation to specific events, crises, or trends.<sup>42</sup> Rodgers has focused on the dominant languages of the Progressive era, first to set the era apart from other periods in American history and second to distinguish among the factions of the time by the social values, principles, and priorities they projected and rallied around in their communications.

Without question, educational historians will recognize in these languages the vocabulary of educational politics in the Progressive era--the ideas and expressions that enabled diverse groups to overlook their differences and unite over specific issues. The social language perspective clarifies our understanding of the Progressive era by explaining how Socialists and Populists could join with "capitalist efficiency experts" in protesting the corruption and political manipulation of ward-based machines. As Rodgers pointed out, these groups differed sharply on numerous issues, but they all feared "arbitrary, unregulated individual power" and could speak much the same language in opposing trusts on the one hand and ward bosses and machine politicians on the other.<sup>43</sup> From this perspective, the unusual alliances that Reese and others find in Progressive reform campaigns become far more understandable.

Similarly, despite deep ideological differences, leftists, corporate liberals, and curriculum theorists could unite on curricular reforms that educators described in terms of the social nature of human beings. Leftists could support such reforms hoping they would check the destructive individualism of the Gilded Age, corporate liberals could applaud the emphasis on teamwork and institutional loyalty, and educators could proclaim that the latest psychological theories now informed the curriculum. All three groups could see curricula designed to encourage social relationships as substantial improvements over traditional practices. Despite grave philosophical disagreements over individual rights and the individual's relation to the means of production, the vocabulary of curricular reform gave these groups a common language of means, even if they sought different ends. In short, the languages of progressive educational politics facilitated the formation of successful coalitions because different groups could read their own agendas into them. Conflict erupted precisely when groups defined their objectives so clearly as to make coalitions impossible.<sup>44</sup>

While the three languages of progressivism explain how coalitions formed or fragmented, they do not explain why educational reform became so urgent a cause in the first quarter of this century. Without question, a number of major developments in urban America spurred the campaign for educational change. The enormous growth of American industry, the changing nature of American capitalism, the millions of immigrants arriving from southern and central Europe, the rapid pace of urban expansion, and even the rise of mass circulation magazines and newspapers all played a substantial role in creating a climate for reform. Yet of all the factors associated with the push for school reform, one factor had the most immediate impact on shaping school policy--the unparalleled increase in school enrollments between 1900 and 1930. Of all the "underlying organizational imperatives" that David Plank refers to in his study of Atlanta, none seems more important than enrollment. It was the great catalyst for Progressive era school reform.

Throughout most of American educational history, the fundamental condition of urban schools has been too many children and not enough funds. As David Angus has shown, the most pressing problem facing urban educators in the nineteenth century was building enough

classrooms for the thousands of children pouring into the schools.<sup>45</sup> By 1900 that problem had reached staggering proportions. In Cleveland, enrollments increased from about 45,000 to over 145,000 between 1900 and 1930. In the same period, enrollments in the Detroit Public Schools soared from under 30,000 to over 250,000. Smaller cities also experienced amazing growth. Between 1900 and 1925, public school enrollments in Atlanta jumped from 14,000 to over 64,000. In just sixteen years, 1910 to 1926, San Francisco enrollments jumped from 37,000 to 64,000. The story was much the same throughout the nation.<sup>46</sup>

Such phenomenal growth would have overwhelmed even the most resilient and efficient of institutions, but this flood of children practically flattened school systems governed according to policies and practices largely adapted from nineteenth century rural life. Ward-based school boards vested control of sites for new schools, curriculum design, and even the selection of sites for new schools in the hands of individual ward trustees, who proved unequal to the task of accommodating the enormous growth of urban school systems in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Ward-based school boards wrangled over apparently trivial issues while the schools turned more and more students away, or jammed them into already overcrowded classrooms and buildings, and the pressure for change mounted. Whether accurately or not, reformers were able to paint their opponents as "political bosses" or "educational machines" more concerned with their own power and prerogatives than with children, and they were able to channel popular dissatisfaction into campaigns for changes in school governance.<sup>47</sup>

In this context, it is easy to see why the languages of progressive reform had such broad-based appeal. Groups from all parts of the political spectrum could oppose political bosses or machines for thwarting the political aspirations of "the people" or for providing inefficient city services. As Terrence McDonald argues, the bosses and machines of the early twentieth century often failed to meet the demands of constituents for public services in their booming cities.<sup>48</sup> Few such failures touched people more directly than the failure to provide sufficient schools for their children. Thus, reformers could appeal to a wide range of voters by invoking the language of anti-bossism and the language of social efficiency in campaigns against ward-based schools or "tyrannical" superintendent. Coalitions formed quickly if people were convinced that their children were attending overcrowded schools or were being kept out of school because of the corruption and inefficiency of a "machine."

Rapid enrollment growth also shaped the ways in which reformers implemented their new policies and practices. The predominance of school reforms steeped in the language of social efficiency, particularly in regard to the bureaucratization of schools, may be viewed as a response to enormous increases in enrollment. No other organizational structure could have dealt with the flood of children. Even the curricular reforms of the era, rooted in the language of social bonds, can be viewed as part of the response to the rapid growth in enrollment. As David Swift pointed out, the

vast increase in the number of children attending school forced school leaders to search for new methods to address the very immediate problems of school and classroom management. He stated:

Faced with problems of retention and control, and unable to use traditional methods of maintaining order, new procedures were necessary. Instead of using force and coercion, public schools now sought the pupils' willing participation. This was done by minimizing the pressures, especially those of an academic nature, and, in general, by making school as pleasant as possible. Whatever the pedagogical shortcomings of this approach might have been, it did enable the school to win the cooperation of many pupils who would have resisted a more traditional program.<sup>49</sup>

In other words, the pressures of maintaining order in schools overflowing with children created an environment in which reformers promoted curricular reforms that made school easier by stressing relevant subject matter, social relationships, nonacademic enrichment courses, and extracurricular activities. Curricular reformers justified these innovations as encouraging the growth of the social nature of human beings.<sup>50</sup>

In this view, the substantial increase in school enrollments was the catalyst for a series of reforms. As ward-based school boards proved incapable of dealing with these enrollment increases, reformers launched campaigns couched in the languages of anti-bossism and social efficiency, promising to do a better job in providing public education. Similarly, enrollment increases also encouraged new policies and practices that made school and classroom management easier. These changes, often implemented by principals and teachers who faced the problems of overcrowded classrooms and disciplining students every day, were less directly tied to the reform campaigns. Indeed, in some cities school leaders introduced curricular reforms designed to smoothly process large numbers of children through the system prior to the abolition of the ward structure.<sup>51</sup>

New York provides almost a textbook example of this process, albeit somewhat earlier than other major cities. Beginning in the 1890s, the New York public school system was chronically short of accommodations, and the ward-based board of education was unable to deal with the flood of students. In 1893, some 10,000 children were turned away from the schools because of a lack of seats. As Diane Ravitch shows, the exclusion of children from school was one of the main factors behind the ultimately successful campaign to centralize and bureaucratize the New York schools.<sup>52</sup> There were, of course, exceptions to this pattern. Some cities such as Memphis and Kansas City went from ward-based to at-large representation in the 1870s and 1880s without the pressure of massive enrollment increases and well before anyone spoke the languages of progressive reform.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, some cities such as Muncie, Indiana implemented progressive curricular reforms amid relatively undramatic enrollment increases.<sup>54</sup> These exceptions must temper generalizations about

the impact of enrollment increases on urban school reform, but they do not negate the importance of such demographic changes. It may be that the most dynamic interaction of enrollment increases and educational reform occurred in the "light-house" school systems of the great industrial cities, whose school systems ultimately set the standards for high quality education in the Progressive era.

#### PROGRESSIVE SCHOOL REFORM IN THREE SOUTHERN CITIES

The fundamental problem in comparing progressive educational reform in the North and South lies in the considerable differences in the economic, social, and political development of the two regions in the first part of this century. While the Progressive era did see considerable industrial growth in the South, such growth was on nowhere near the same scale as industrial expansion in the North. Nor did the South face the problem of accommodating and assimilating huge numbers of eastern and southern European immigrants. The conflicts over ethnic politics and Americanization that figure so strongly in the educational history of northern cities were not observed to any great extent in southern cities. Racial politics, including the disenfranchisement of black voters and the creation of unequal school systems, played a crucial role in urban educational history in the South, but did not play a major role in educational politics in northern cities at this time.<sup>55</sup> Despite these differences, however, progressive school reform did come to many southern cities. The case studies of Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans provide evidence that the three political languages of the Progressive era were spoken with a southern as well as a northern accent.

Perhaps the most striking feature of progressive school reform in Atlanta and New Orleans is the similarity to contemporary changes in northern cities. Both northern and southern cities saw school politics marked by factional battles within a single political party rather than struggles between political parties in reform campaigns. Whatever class conflict was generated by these struggles occurred between middle- and upper-class activists rather than between members of the working and upper classes. All the groups vying for power used languages of reform. Changes in school governance, usually from school boards elected by wards to boards elected at-large, were as much a feature of southern school reform as they were in the north. Lastly, southern cities also introduced curriculum changes that stressed more modern, "socialized" courses and programs. As the previous chapters have shown, the exigencies of local politics gave a special flavor to the southern reform campaigns. What is surprising, however, is that even when local factors are considered, both the process and the outcomes of reform appear to have been quite similar in both regions. Memphis is the main exception to this generalization. Perhaps the most important aspect of educational history in Memphis is the fact that the city underwent some progressive-style reform long before the Progressive era. As Lynette Wrenn points out, Memphis

shifted from ward-based to at-large school board elections in 1883. This shift was not the result of problems caused by a massive jump in enrollments<sup>56</sup> but rather was a consequence of more general financial and administrative reforms brought on by concurrent fiscal and public health crises. The Memphis campaign to create a small, at-large school board has many of the hallmarks of later progressive reform, but it did not produce any of the other reforms usually associated with progressivism. Indeed, almost all other educational innovations in the city were postponed for more than half a century.

With the change in school governance, the members of elite Memphis society who set policy for the public schools insulated themselves from the demands of the people of the city. In this they were abetted by the racial division of the city's working class, and by the political quietism and anti-tax ideology of poor whites. The reform effort in Memphis remained exclusively focused on "more efficient management" of the schools, meaning low taxes and skeletal educational services. Other reform issues never even received a hearing.

What is most striking about school reform in Memphis is how similar it was to reform in Kansas City. Kansas City shifted from ward-based to at-large elections in the 1870s. In the years that followed, an elite group of business and professional leaders controlled the schools, and well into the twentieth century progressive educational reform in Kansas City lagged behind other cities of comparable size.<sup>57</sup> The parallel between Kansas City and Memphis is provocative. School board reform in these cities may have been part of the larger reform effort that Michael Katz claims bureaucratized eastern and midwestern urban systems by 1875.<sup>58</sup> But the timing and location of these two cases call into question the link that revisionist scholars find between educational change and deep structural economic change.<sup>59</sup> In the 1870s and 1880s neither Kansas City nor Memphis was on the cutting edge of America's economic transformation, but both cities nevertheless adopted governance reforms that we associate with a dynamic era of enormous economic and educational change.

Atlanta and New Orleans followed a more typical path of educational change in the Progressive era. Both cities experienced rapid enrollment growth during this period. In Atlanta, as noted earlier, enrollments climbed from 14,000 to 64,000 between 1900 and 1930, while in New Orleans enrollments went from over 31,000 in 1900 to nearly 75,000 in 1930.<sup>60</sup> In both cities, the management of growth was a central political issue. Competing interests abounded in both cities, but the struggles between the Progressives and the Conservatives in Atlanta and the conflict between the members of the Choctaw club and the Reformers in New Orleans were all fought out within the framework of the Democratic party. This factionalism was not unique to the single-party South. It is important to recognize that urban politics in many northern cities were equally one-sided in partisan terms. In Detroit, for example, the battle over progressive reform was almost entirely decided within the Republican party.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, the

Republican party was the arena in which progressive reformers battled machine candidates in the effort to reform the Chicago public schools.<sup>62</sup>

Analysis of southern progressivism in education reveals that social class did play a part in these factional struggles, but the class conflict that occurred does not fit well with the revisionist account of elite reformers wresting control of the schools from representatives of the working class. In New Orleans the battle over the ward-based board pitted the middle-class "Boss" Behrman and the members of the Choctaw Club against progressive, silk stocking reformers. In Atlanta, the situation was somewhat reversed with the "progressives" drawn more from the middle class and the "conservatives" coming from the traditional Bourbon elite. In both these cases the one consistent element is the conflict between middle class and upper class politicians for control of the schools, which parallels the conflicts in northern cities. In his study of four northern cities, for example, Reese found that "ward-based school boards were never comprised of the poor or the dispossessed. They were primarily the bastion of small entrepreneurs or established businessmen, professionals, or manufacturers who were active in various civic affairs."<sup>63</sup> The composition of the large, ward-based school boards in Grand Rapids and Detroit was much the same. The reform leaders, on the other hand, were drawn from the upper strata of both cities.<sup>64</sup>

Other interest groups also played a role in the reform process, but usually in a subordinate capacity. Again, North and South differ not in kind but in degree. Organized labor in Chicago, for example, often participated in educational politics and enjoyed some notable successes. These successes almost always came about in thwarting policies proposed by business leaders, however, and not in initiating changes in educational policy or practice.<sup>65</sup> In southern cities organized labor was far weaker than up North, and the reactive pattern was even more pronounced. Even so, the Atlanta Federation of Trades did have some influence on school reform, in alliance with the "conservative" faction in school politics.

More important participants in southern school politics, in both Atlanta and Memphis, were the teachers. As Joseph Newman and Wayne Urban have shown, the Atlanta local of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), was a key actor in school politics in that city.<sup>66</sup> Atlanta's teachers, for example, received a pay raise in 1921 after the union threatened a strike. In Memphis, teachers did strike in 1918, and they forced the city to increase their salaries. Plank and Wrenn demonstrate that southern teachers were little different from their northern colleagues in their militant stands on this issue. Low salaries and high inflation led to to similar actions in northern and southern cities.<sup>67</sup>

Nothing belies the notion of a progressive movement in these cities more than the fact that all the contending factions and groups in educational politics could, at one time or another, be labeled progressive. The label is accurate only when we recognize that all of the participants in these educational struggles spoke the languages of progressivism in order to advance their own



political agendas. In New Orleans, as in many northern cities, the appointment of a new superintendent provided the issue over which reformers and their opponents would clash.<sup>68</sup> When Mayor Behrman appeared to overstep his power in influencing the appointment of anti-superintendent, the "progressives" invoked the language of anti-bossism in their calls for change. As Ginsberg shows, however, Behrman could also speak the language of reform: he ultimately supported the reformers' effort to change from ward-based to at-large school board elections and backed increased power for the superintendent. The result was a school governance structure nearly identical to that pursued by "progressive" reformers across the nation, but one that the Behrman machine could still dominate.

Was anyone in these events a real progressive? Was anyone not? Neither Cremin's all-inclusive embrace nor the revisionist aggregation by motive nor the "wings" interpretation adequately answers these questions. Motives were mixed. Individual and group positions were fluid, and people were progressive and anti-progressive on different days. Analyzing the political language of educational reform gives meaning to this apparent confusion because such an analysis can make sense of the paradox of simultaneous unity and diversity. It highlights, at once, the mobilizing power of language and values, yet it also recognizes the diverse circumstances that united and divided given various issues and circumstances.

Identifying the real Progressives is even more difficult in Atlanta, where the two contending factions each emphasized different reform languages. In this case, the "conservatives" and their allies in organized labor spoke of "keeping the schools out of politics" (a variant of anti-bossism) while the "reformers" called for a modernized curriculum drawing on the language of the social nature of human relationships. Both groups supported administrative centralization and social efficiency. As in New Orleans, progressive reform produced consequences nearly identical to those that occurred up North.

#### CONCLUSION

This essay set out to question the validity of two widely held assumptions about education in the Progressive era: that a unified movement produced the great educational transformation of the era and that public education in southern cities developed and changed in ways analogous to northern cities. While this brief comparison of studies on urban education in the era is hardly definitive, it does challenge these assumptions. Certainly, the notion of a progressive movement in education seems to have outlived its usefulness. The educational politics of the Progressive era involved shifting coalitions, factional battles, and competing interest groups, none of which fit easily into the categories that historians have tried to impose on them. At best, the political activists pushing progressive school reform joined together through their use of political languages, languages that enabled them to unite in pursuit of specific goals.

The second assumption--that progressive educational change was uniform across regions--seems more substantial in light of the studies of southern cities in this volume. Politically and pedagogically, southern cities differed in degree but not in kind from northern cities. To explain this phenomenon without relying on the concept of a progressive movement, we must focus on what Plank has called the "underlying organizational imperatives." This perspective moves from a focus on school reform and larger social changes to a close examination of the immediate factors that encourage or thwart reform. Analyzing these organizational imperatives means transforming the mundane into the significant. Educational historians need to inquire into the factors that shaped the everyday experiences of families, students, administrators, and teachers--factors such as enrollment growth, overcrowding, school construction, classroom management, and the like--and to uncover their role in school reform. Close analyses of these artifacts of institutional behavior are necessary to complement the more sweeping interpretations that now dominate the historiography of educational progressivism. Only with such studies will we arrive at a comprehensive picture of the dynamics of school reform.

#### NOTES

1. Peter G. Filene, "An Obituary for the 'Progressive Movement,'" *American Quarterly* 22 (Spring 1970), pp. 20-21.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-30.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
4. There are some notable exceptions. In a 1972 review essay, Carl Kaestle argued that "One problem in dealing with Progressive education, if the phrase is taken to mean all educational innovations from 1890 through the 1920s, is the bewildering variety of programs and philosophies. The liberating, conformist, individualizing, and bureaucratizing tendencies set loose in these years make almost any interpretation possible if you look at the right group of people and statements. This leads one to vote with Peter Filene to 'tear off the familiar label' and recognize the ambiguity and variety of the period." Carl Kaestle, "Social Reform and the Urban School," *History of Education Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1972), p. 216. More recently, James W. Fraser's analysis of educational reform in Boston draws heavily on Filene's essay. As I argue later, however, I find Fraser's positing of three distinct Progressive movements in education an unsatisfying solution to the problem Filene has posed. James W. Fraser, "Who Were the Progressive Educators Anyway? A Case Study of the Progressive Education Movement in Boston, 1905-1925," *Educational Foundations* 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 4-30.

5. David B. Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 126.
6. Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. x. In his most recent work, Cremin continues to describe Progressivism as a movement both in American politics and in education. See Lawrence Cremin, *American Education: The Metropolitan Experience, 1987-1980*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), pp. 226-28.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
8. The others are the shift from an eight-four system of elementary and high school education to a six-three-three system that "gave greater consideration to the special requirements of pubescent children;" the introduction of extracurricular activities such as clubs, sports, and dramatics; the increased use of intelligence and achievement tests and guidance departments to group students according to their differing needs and abilities; changes in classroom practice as teacher student relations became less formal and recitations gave way to projects, group work, and greater student activity; the improvements in textbooks, combined with the use of new materials, such as filmstrips, magazines, records etc.; the transformation of school architecture to include assembly rooms, gymnasiums, laboratories, playing fields, and so forth; and, the development of more rigorous requirements to become a teacher or administrator. *Ibid.*, pp. 306-08.
9. Cremin states in the preface to *Transformation*, "The reader will search these pages in vain for any capsule definition of progressive education. None exists and none ever will; for throughout its history progressive education meant different things to different people and these differences were only compounded by the remarkable diversity of American education." *Ibid.*, p. x.
10. See Kaestle's comment in footnote 4.
11. Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. vii-viii.
12. To compare Callahan and Cremin on the Gary Plan see Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, pp. 126-47; and Cremin, *Transformation*, pp. 154-60.
13. I am generally following Diane Ravitch's categorization in identifying the main revisionist historians as Michael B. Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Paul Violas, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis. Diane Ravitch, *The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools*, (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

14. Callahan, for example, argued that administrators essentially needed more professional autonomy in order to resist the influence of business leaders. He did not see public education as beyond repair. *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, pp. 259-96.
15. Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the 20th Century*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 5.
16. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 102.
17. Even revisionist scholars who call the label of Progressivism "unsatisfactory" and "overly simplistic" still decide reform in terms of a Progressive "movement." See, for example, Michael B. Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 113-15.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-91.
20. Paul Violas, *The Training of the Urban Working Class*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978), p. 66; for a similar discussion of Americanization see, Joel Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 62-90.
21. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State*, pp. 67-77.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 91; Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, p. 191.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-24; see also, Clarence Karier, "Testing for Order and Control in the Corporate Liberal State," in *Roots of Crisis*, pp. 108-37.
24. Ravitch, *The Revisionists Revised*.
25. Paul Violas provides one of the most startling examples of such a reinterpretation. Whereas Cremin celebrates Jane Addams as "that noble lady from Hull House" whose efforts illuminate "the spiritual nub of progressive education," Violas sees her contributing to the destruction of American individualism, the thwarting of democracy, and the triumph of social control. Cremin, *Transformation*, p. ix; Paul Violas, "Jane Addams and the New Liberalism," in *Roots of Crisis*, pp. 6-83; for similar treatment of John Dewey see Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*, p. 180.

26. Edward Krug, *The Shaping of the American High School, 1880-1920* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 255.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 249-83.
28. Tyack argues that the leaders of the Progressive movement in education "planned a basic shift in the control of urban education which would vest political power in a small committee composed of 'successful men.' They wished to emulate the process of decision-making used by men on the board of directors of a modern business corporation. They planned to delegate almost total administrative power to an expert superintendent and his staff so they could reshape the school to fit the new economic and social conditions of an urban-industrial society. . . . They ridiculed 'the exceedingly democratic idea that all are equal' and urged that schooling be adapted to social stratification." Tyack, *The One Best System*, p. 126.
29. In making those assertions Tyack applies Filene's definition of a movement. *Ibid.*, p. 128, footnote 5.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.
31. These views were refined but not substantially altered in Tyack's later work with Elisabeth Hansot. They note that "while dissent played an important part in keeping alternative conceptions of schooling alive, the administrative progressives largely succeeded in winning public acquiescence in their program of reform and their goal of depoliticizing public education." David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, *Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America, 1820-1980*, (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 202.
32. Robert Church and Michael Sedlak, for example, divide the movement into liberal and conservative wings, identify the goal of the liberals as social justice and the conservatives as social order, and ultimately contend that the conservatives had the final say in the development of educational policy. Similarly, in their study of progressivism in the schools of Gary, Indiana, Ronald Cohen and Raymond Mohl argue that the movement was contradictory and paradoxical at its core. They see the Gary Plan and its two chief advocates, the conservative William Wirt and the liberal Alice Barrows, representing the unresolved tensions of the two wings of the movement, the "administrative reform or efficiency impulse" and the "social reform or democratic camp." Robert Church and Michael Sedlak, *Education in the United States*, (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 255-60; Ronald Cohen and Raymond Mohl, *The Paradox of Progressive Education: The Gary Plan and Urban Schooling*, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1979), pp. 10-11.

33. Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* (December 1982), p. 115. The same criticism applies to James W. Fraser's claim that there were three very different Progressive movements, one espousing social efficiency, one calling for curricular reform, and one representing militant teachers. I do not see dividing the movement into three parts as being any more helpful than dividing it into two. See Fraser, "Who Were the Progressive Educators Anyway?" pp. 10-23.
34. Wrigley's three groups are quite similar to the three movements that Fraser discusses. Wrigley, however, describes a much more fluid political universe than Fraser's categorization seems to imply. Julia Wrigley, *Class Politics and Public Schools: Chicago, 1900-1950*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982).
35. Paul Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform, 1970-1940*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Ira Katznelson and Margaret Weir, *Schooling for All*, (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
36. William J. Reese, *Power and the Promise of School Reform: Grass-roots Movements During the Progressive Era*, (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. xxi.
37. *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.
38. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," p. 116.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
41. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1835; reprint, (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 191.
42. For a classic discussion of key words see Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950*, (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1963); a more recent analysis of key words in American politics can be found in Daniel T. Rodgers, *Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987); key words as they specifically apply to American education are discussed in David L. Angus, C. Phillip Kearney, and Jeffrey E. Mirel, "Politics, Policy, and Values in American Public Education," unpublished paper, 1988.
43. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," p. 123.
44. For example, in Chicago organized labor and business leaders clashed over the Cooley Bill, an effort to create a two-tiered, European-style system of secondary education. See Wrigley, *Class Politics and Public Schools*, pp. 67-68, 76-82, 85-87; and Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform*, pp. 162-63.

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45. David L. Angus, "Conflict, Class, and the Nineteenth Century Public High School in the Cities of the Midwest, 1845-1900," *Curriculum Inquiry* vol. 18 no. 1 (1988), pp. 7-31; see also Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform*, p. 75.
46. Robert Bain, "The Greatest Social Welfare System--The Public Schools: Cleveland Public School Policy Toward Deviant Children, 1917-1938." Unpublished ms., Chap. 3; The Detroit Board of Education, *Eighty-eighth Annual Report of the Detroit Public Schools [1930-31]*, (Detroit: The Board, 1931), p. 16; Phillip N. Racine, "Atlanta's Schools: A History of the Public School System, 1869-1955," (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1969), p. 346; Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform*, p. 156.
47. Jeffrey Mirel, "Beer and Pedagogy: The Politics of Progressive Educational Reform in Detroit, 1907-1917," Paper presented at the Social Science History Conference, Chicago, November 1988; Diane Ravitch, *The Great School Wars: New York City, 1805-1973*. (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 107-58.
48. Terrence McDonald, *The Parameters of Urban Fiscal Policy: Socio-Economic Change and Political Culture in San Francisco, 1860-1906*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
49. David Swift, *Ideology and Change in the Public Schools*, (Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill, 1971), p. 49.
50. Other examples of policies and practices based on these types of considerations are age-grading and social promotion. See David Angus, Jeffrey Mirel, and Maris Vinovskis, "The Historical Development of Age-Stratification in Schooling," *Teachers College Record* 90 (Winter 1988), pp. 211-36.
51. In Detroit, for example, the ward-based board of education introduced virtually all the key "progressive" curricular reforms well before the city shifted to at-large elections. Mirel, "Beer and Pedagogy." See also Angus, Mirel, and Vinovskis, "The Historical Development of Age Stratification in Schooling;" and Joseph Tropes, "Bureaucratic Order and Special Children, 1890s to 1940s," *History of Education Quarterly* 27 (Winter 1987), pp. 35-40.
52. Ravitch, *The Great School Wars*, pp. 107-158.
53. On Kansas City see Reese, *Power and the Promise of School Reform*, pp. xxviii, 92, 97-98, 143-46.
54. Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1929), pp. 181-222.
55. As Michael Homel has shown, racial politics, in many ways similar to those of the South, did play some role in northern cities. But because of the small numbers of blacks in these cities,

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- racial issues rarely received a great deal of attention. Michael Homel, *Down From Equality: Black Chicagoans and the Public Schools, 1920-41* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
56. Enrollments went from only 4,370 in 1880 to 6,620 in 1890. David Moss Hilliard, "The Development of Public Education in Memphis, Tennessee, 1848-1945," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1946), p. 146.
57. Reese, *Power and the Promise of School Reform*, pp. xxviii, 92, 97-98, 143-46.
58. Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy and Schools*, pp. 56-104.
59. Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling and Capitalist America*; David John Hogan, *Class and Reform: School and Society in Chicago, 1880-1930*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).
60. Racine, "Atlanta's Schools," p. 346; M. A. Kelly, "Compulsory School Attendance in New Orleans," (Masters thesis, Tulane University, 1930), p. 83.
61. Mirel, "Beer and Pedagogy."
62. Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform*, pp. 138-53.
63. Reese, *Power and the Promise of School Reform*, p. 93.
64. David Angus, "The Politics of Progressive School Reform, Grand Rapids, 1900-1910," *Michigan Academician* 14 (Winter 1982), pp. 239-58; Jeffrey Mirel, "The Politics of Educational Retrenchment: Detroit, 1929-35," *History of Education Quarterly* (Fall 1984), pp. 324-25.
65. Wrigley, *Class Politics and Public Schools*; Peterson, *The Politics of School Reform*; Katznelson and Weir, *Schooling for All*.
66. Joseph Newman, "A History of the Atlanta Public School Teachers' Association, Local 89 of the American Federation of Teachers, 1919-1956," (Ph.D. diss., Georgia State University, 1978); Wayne J. Urban, *Why Teachers Organized*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1982), pp. 44-65.
67. In Boston, teachers threatened to strike in 1919, forcing the school board to give them a raise. In 1920 a group of Detroit teachers organized an AFT local to press for higher salaries and greater political freedom. See Fraser, "Who Were the Progressive Educators Anyway?" pp. 17-18; and Jeffrey Mirel, "Politics and Public Education in the Great Depression: Detroit, 1929-40," (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1984), pp. 161-62.

68. For examples of the link between superintendent appointments and reform campaigns in northern cities see Mirel, "Beer and Pedagogy;" and Wrigley, *Class Politics and Public Schools*, pp. 153-99.

## PART IV

# ISSUES IN BLACK SCHOOL POLITICS