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THE BLACK PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL AND THE REPRODUCTION OF CASTE IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1880–1935

DURING THE PERIOD from 1880 to the mid-1930s almost all of the few black high schools in the South were located in urban areas. Hence the study of the development of black secondary education necessitates an examination of the interrelationship between education and political economy in the urban South. The most oppressive feature of black secondary education was that southern local and state governments, though maintaining and expanding the benefits of public secondary education for white children, refused to provide public high school facilities for black children. Almost all of the southern rural communities with significantly large Afro-American populations and more than half of the major southern cities failed to provide any public high schools for black youth. The virtual absence of black public high schools reflected the opposition of the vast majority of white southerners, particularly in the rural communities and small towns, to black secondary education. Blacks in the rural South were excluded from the revolution in public secondary education that characterized the nation and the region during the period 1880 to 1935. Blacks in the urban South were not affected significantly by the marked extension of public secondary education until after 1920, when increased migration, changes in the labor market, and a growing population of black adolescents forced a new attentiveness to the need for black public secondary education. This movement, however, was quite different in character and content than the general expansion of both northern and southern public secondary education.

Both contemporary observers and later scholars agree that it was in the period 1880 to 1930 that the American high school was transformed from an elite, private institution into a public one attended by the children of the masses. At the beginning of this era less than 3 percent of the national high school age population—either those aged fourteen to seventeen or fifteen to nineteen—was enrolled in high school and even fewer attended regularly. The National Survey of Secondary Education reported that, in 1930, some 47 percent of the nation's children of high school age were enrolled in public secondary schools. This enrollment, in the words of the then commissioner of education, was so unusual for the secondary level that it attracted the attention of Europe, where only 8 to 10 percent of the high school age population attended high school. By 1934, the proportion of American children of high school age enrolled in public high schools had increased to 60 percent, and, including private school enrollments, it approximated 64 percent. Decades earlier, in 1880, American secondary education was mainly private and attended largely by children of well-to-do families. The relatively high increase in secondary school enrollment was caused by the expansion of public high school facilities. In the late 1880s, as more public school facilities were established, public secondary enrollment exceeded private for the first time. Over the next four decades public high schools were built in large numbers; city, state, and federal school reports, as well as reports by private philanthropic foundations, bulged with photographs and feature stories on the new fortresslike public high school buildings. State by state public high schools were made available to the masses, and enrollments in secondary education increased rapidly. By 1934, it had become the "people's college."[1]

The white South, in spite of its relatively impoverished economy, managed with the help of northern philanthropy to keep pace with the nation. In 1930 some 38 percent of the region's white children of high school age were enrolled in public secondary schools as compared with 47 percent for the nation as a whole. By 1934, for the nation as a whole, sixty pupils were enrolled in public high school for every one hundred children aged fourteen to seventeen, inclusive; for every hundred white southerners of the same ages, fifty-four pupils were enrolled in public secondary schools. Thus in the southern states the proportion of white children enrolled in public high school was 93 percent of that for the nation as a whole. In some southern states, notably Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the proportion of white children enrolled was equal to or greater than the national proportion of 60 percent.[2]

The treatment accorded black children during the transformation of American secondary education helps to disentangle general class discrimination from its more specific form of racial oppression. By the early 1930s, state-sponsored and state-funded building campaigns had made public secondary schools available to all classes of white children. Afro-

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Americans were generally excluded from the American and southern transformation of public secondary education. As illustrated in Table 6.1, in 1890 only .39 percent or 3,106 of the 804,522 black children of high school age were enrolled in high school and more than two-thirds of them were attending private high schools. The proportion of southern black children enrolled in secondary schools increased to 2.8 percent by 1910, as illustrated in Table 6.2, and the majority of these high school pupils were still enrolled in private schools. Although in 1910 black children represented 29 percent of the total secondary school population, they constituted only 5 percent of the pupils enrolled in the secondary grades of southern public schools. By 1930, the ratio of black public high school enrollment to school population reached 10.1 percent, and it jumped to 18 percent during the 1933–34 academic year. Even then it was 10 percent or less in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi. The proportion of children enrolled in high school in 1934 was nearly four times as great for the white population as for Afro-Americans in Alabama, between four and five times as great in Arkansas, Florida, and Louisiana, and slightly more than five times as great in Georgia and South Carolina. The disparity was greatest in Mississippi, where there were proportionately more than nine times as many white as black children enrolled in public high schools in 1934. Significantly, Mississippi was at that time the only state in America in which black children constituted the majority of the total secondary school population. By the early 1930s, therefore, when rural whites, urban working-class whites, and the children of European immigrants had been brought systematically into the "people's college," black children as a class were deliberately excluded. In 230 southern counties blacks constituted 12.5 percent or more of the total population, but no high school facilities were available for black youth, and 195 other counties, with a similar proportion of blacks, had elementary schools with one or two secondary grades attached but had no four-year high schools for black children.[3]

A major factor that shaped the discriminatory nature of black secondary education during the first three decades of the twentieth century was the United States Supreme Court's 1899 decision in the case of *Cumming v. School Board of Richmond County, Georgia*. This case reflected the unique oppression of Afro-American people and set their experience apart from the prejudice and ethnic discrimination encountered by European immigrants and the more general discrimination against working-class people. The case began in 1880, when the Richmond County School Board, after a long-standing demand by the local black community, established Ware High School in Augusta, Georgia. It was the only public high school for blacks in Georgia and one of perhaps four in the eleven former Confederate states. Ware High became a solid academic

TABLE 6.1

High School Enrollment by Age, Race, and Southern States, 1890

State	Total population 15 to 19 years of age		Number enrolled in public and private high schools				Percentage high school enrollment is of population 15 to 19 years of age	
			Black		White			
	Black	White	Public	Private	Public	Private	Black	White
Alabama	81,558	93,035	0	90	693	2,508	.11	3.4
Arkansas	37,241	95,122	56	29	1,106	640	.22	1.8
Delaware	3,091	14,173	0	0	1,255	297	.00	10.9
Florida	19,203	23,996	10	46	866	211	.29	4.4
Georgia*	100,241	108,946	0	316	2,330	9,764	.31	9.3
Kentucky	30,473	178,569	155	67	2,597	2,609	.72	2.9
Louisiana	62,012	62,042	0	111	778	1,280	.17	3.3
Maryland	23,673	86,764	0	68	1,255	1,695	.28	3.4
Mississippi	90,611	62,693	0	90	561	2,104	.09	4.3
Missouri	17,106	279,516	354	54	7,243	3,936	2.40	4.0
North Carolina	69,593	113,732	70	379	510	4,524	.64	4.4
South Carolina	80,609	50,890	22	355	669	1,532	.46	4.3
Tennessee	52,489	153,227	0	263	1,031	4,648	.50	3.7
Texas	55,893	189,361	209	190	3,693	4,041	.71	4.1
Virginia	76,702	112,447	62	90	2,122	3,081	.19	4.6
West Virginia	4,027	81,800	20	0	467	200	.49	.81
Totals	804,522	1,706,313	958	2,148	27,176	41,070	.39	4.0

Source: U.S. Commissioner of Education, *Annual Report, 1890–91*, 2:792, 1470–71; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Report on Population of the United States at the Eleventh Census*, 1890, pt. 1, pp. 832–78.

**Report of the State School Commissioner of Georgia, 1890* (Atlanta, 1890), pp. 156–60.

TABLE 6.2
High School Enrollment by Age, Race, and Southern States, 1910

State	Total population 15 to 19 years of age		Number enrolled in public and private high schools				Percentage high school enrollment is of population 15 to 19 years of age	
			Black		White			
	Black	White	Public	Private	Public	Private	Black	White
Alabama	99,130	130,280	1,680	1,290	14,025	2,012	2.9	12.3
Arkansas	50,309	123,518	366	606	6,227	1,304	1.9	6.1
Delaware	3,228	16,230	65	86	1,661	227	4.7	11.6
Florida	30,891	45,190	187	433	3,099	375	2.0	7.7
Georgia	129,923	150,446	648	1,528	19,833	3,063	1.7	15.2
Kentucky	28,163	213,423	1,342	563	6,874	24,537	6.7	14.7
Louisiana	76,868	98,251	98	1,101	4,778	864	1.6	5.7
Maryland	23,398	104,997	496	318	7,641	1,786	3.5	9.0
Mississippi	112,527	83,576	387	1,427	7,349	1,111	1.6	10.1
Missouri	14,765	319,266	1,183	363	31,705	3,237	10.5	10.9
North Carolina	80,253	161,587	880	2,224	13,470	4,347	3.9	11.0
South Carolina	99,118	73,519	198	919	7,964	488	1.1	11.5
Tennessee	54,363	183,283	538	1,296	9,094	5,728	3.4	8.1
Texas	77,329	345,830	1,363	1,488	29,096	3,600	3.7	9.5
Virginia	75,047	142,144	688	2,405	10,879	3,165	4.1	9.9
West Virginia	6,575	118,560	87	300	3,949	779	5.9	4.0
Totals	961,887	2,310,100	10,206	16,347	177,644	56,623	2.8	10.1

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Negro Population, 1790–1915*, p. 192; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States, Population*, vol. 3, Table 7; U.S. Commissioner of Education, *Report for the Year 1909–10*, vol. 2, pp. 1142, 1153, 1261–62; Alabama State Department of Education, *Annual Report of the Department of Education*, 1912, pp. 307, 317; North Carolina State Department of Public Instruction, *Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1910–11*, pp. 17, 19; Georgia State Department of Education, *Thirty-Ninth Annual Report to the General Assembly of Georgia*, pp. 266–83; Kentucky State Department of Education, *Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1910–11*, pp. 11–16, 84–88, 118–22; South Carolina State Department of Education, *Forty-Third Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Education, 1911*, pp. 137–39, 161.

secondary school, a source of pride and an avenue of mobility for Augusta's striving black community. Yet on 10 July 1897, the school board, pointing to the need for more black elementary schools and claiming that the schools were financially hard-pressed, voted to terminate Ware High and to use its annual budget of $845 to hire four new teachers for the black elementary schools. This decision aroused a storm of protest in the local black community and set in motion a series of lawsuits that started in the local superior court and ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court.[4]

The lawyers for Augusta's black plaintiffs pointed out before the U.S. Supreme Court that the *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* case of 1896 allowed states to establish racial segregation only if the accommodations and facilities in public institutions were equal. In other words, even if the racial segregation of schoolchildren was constitutional, the opportunities offered students of each race had to be substantially the same, if courts followed the "equal, but separate" rule of *Plessy*. The vast majority of previous decisions in both southern and northern courts favored this interpretation of *Plessy*. Yet in his opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan circumvented the question of whether *Plessy* required equal school facilities by simply not discussing the issue. Upon his belief that the school board would respond to a court injunction by closing the white high schools instead of reopening Ware, Harlan concluded that the black plaintiffs' demand for substantially equal facilities would damage white children without assisting blacks. This was a gross violation of the separate but equal principle established in *Plessy*. Harlan ruled that to sustain an equal protection claim, the plaintiffs had to show positively that it was race and race alone that led to the school board's action. In behalf of the Supreme Court, Harlan ruled that no such case was established. This ruling was issued even though the plaintiffs' lawyers demonstrated that the Richmond County School Board provided sufficient elementary schools for whites but not blacks, paid substantially higher salaries to white than to black teachers, and closed Ware, the only black public high school, while continuing two white public high schools. If this was not proof of racially discriminatory behavior, then blacks throughout the South had virtually no hope of sustaining an equal protection claim, and, consequently, both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the "equal, but separate" rule of *Plessy* were meaningless.[5]

The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Cumming* transformed the promise of equal protection into "a derisive taunt." More specifically, the peculiar ruling meant that southern school boards did not have to offer public secondary education for black youth. This was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the problem of racial discrimination in edu-

cation, and its decision was significant in the development of southern black secondary education. It was not until 1945 that a full four-year public high school, which was what Ware had been, was reestablished in Richmond County, Georgia. Indeed, black southerners in general, especially in rural areas, did not receive public secondary schools until after World War II. Even in the major urban areas little was done between the closing of Ware High in 1897 and 1930. A survey of black secondary education, as illustrated in Table 6.3, reveals that, in 1915, most major southern cities had no public high schools for black children. Twenty-three cities of twenty thousand or more inhabitants, with black high school age populations ranging from 18 to 59 percent of the total high school age populations, had no three- or four-year public secondary schools for black children. In 1915, there lived in these twenty-three cities 48,765 black and 76,708 white children between the ages of fifteen and nineteen, inclusive. In the same cities there were 17,814 white children and no black children enrolled in four- or three-year public high schools. Although they represented 39 percent of the total secondary school age population, black children constituted zero percent of the enrollment in public high schools.[6]

Having effectively restrained the development of public secondary education for black children, southern states proceeded with vigor to make public high schools available to white children. At the turn of the century, the public high school, as an essential part of an organized state education system, had not been developed in the South. During the years from 1865 to 1885 the need for elementary schools was so great that little attention was paid to public secondary education. As late as 1888, the United States commissioner of education reported only 67 public high schools in the southern states, and in 1898 only 796. Over the next two decades southern states, in partnership with the General Education Board, laid a solid foundation for universalizing white public secondary education. In 1905 the board initiated a reform campaign that in the long run proved extraordinarily successful. At that time many southern state departments of education did not have sufficient funds to quicken the pace of secondary school construction that had begun in the late nineteenth century. Because of the lack of money and personnel, local movements were making slow and irregular progress. At this juncture the board stated its willingness to make appropriations to the several southern state universities for the salaries and traveling expenses of a professor of secondary education. His primary work was to ascertain where conditions were favorable for the establishment of public high schools; to organize in such places public high schools in accordance with the laws of the state; and to foster in such communities a public sentiment conducive to sustaining public high schools. The board insisted that

TABLE 6.3

Southern Cities of 20,000 or More Inhabitants without Public High Schools for Blacks, 1915

	Distribution of secondary education											
	Number of public high schools		Enrollment in public high schools		High school age population (15–19)		Percentages of blacks and whites in high school age population		Total population		Percentages of blacks and whites in total population	
City	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Mobile	0	2	0	951	2,057	2,787	42	58	22,763	28,758	44	56
Montgomery	0	2	0	609	1,984	1,889	51	49	19,322	18,814	51	49
Atlanta	0	4	0	2,723	7,184	10,013	34	66	51,902	102,937	34	66
Augusta	0	2	0	549	1,968	2,212	47	53	18,344	22,696	45	55
Columbus	0	1	0	450	710	1,226	37	67	6,047	12,910	37	63
Macon	0	3	0	987	1,819	2,319	44	56	18,150	22,515	45	55
Savannah	0	1	0	657	3,059	2,970	51	49	33,246	31,818	51	49
New Orleans	0	4	0	2,895	8,755	25,088	26	74	89,262	249,813	26	74
Shreveport	0	1	0	702	1,403	1,213	54	46	13,896	14,119	50	50
Charlotte	0	1	0	623	1,311	2,247	37	63	11,752	22,262	35	65
Wilmington	0	1	0	406	1,439	995	59	41	12,107	13,641	47	53
Winston-Salem	0	1	0	414	2,693	3,277	45	55	20,735	27,660	43	57
Charleston	0	2	0	690	3,198	2,722	54	46	31,056	27,777	53	47
Columbia	0	2	0	622	1,211	1,314	48	52	11,546	14,773	44	56
Newport News	0	1	0	321	347	1,581	18	82	3,714	16,491	82	18
Portsmouth	0	1	0	594	1,088	2,304	32	68	11,617	21,573	35	65
Roanoke	0	1	0	846	936	2,753	25	75	7,924	26,950	23	77
Tampa	0	1	0	496	815	2,818	22	78	8,951	28,831	24	76
Pensacola	0	1	0	213	1,034	1,264	45	55	10,214	12,768	44	56
Jacksonville	0	1	0	576	2,738	2,514	52	48	29,293	28,406	51	49
Meridian	0	1	0	513	938	1,390	40	60	9,321	13,964	40	60
Jackson	0	1	0	517	970	943	51	49	10,544	10,718	50	50
Vicksburg	0	1	0	460	1,108	869	56	44	12,053	8,761	58	42
Totals	0	36	0	17,814	48,765	76,708	39	61	463,759	778,955	37	63

Source: Included are all public schools (except colleges) offering either a four-year or three-year course of secondary study. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Population*, 2:44, 318, 370, 726; 3:292, 656, 742, 802, 954; *Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Population*, 2:342; U.S. Bureau of Education, *Negro Education*, Bulletin, 1916, No. 39, vol. 2, pp. 27–668; U.S. Commissioner of Education, *Annual Report of Education for the Year Ended June 30, 1917*, pp. 116–33; Florida State Department of Public Instruction, *Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Florida*, p. 217.

these professors be state and university officials, answerable only to their state and university superiors. The board, claiming that it did not dictate or even suggest the lines along which the professors exerted themselves, paid the professors' salaries and expenses and required them to file with the board monthly reports of their activities.[7]

State by state the board pushed this plan across the South. The first contract was made in Virginia in 1905, and cooperative work was under way by 1910 in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Some of the professors of secondary education, such as Bruce R. Payne of Virginia, went on to brilliant careers in southern education; all were educational crusaders, dedicated to the proposition that all white adolescents deserved access to a good public high school. Their reports contained detailed accounts of state statutes supporting the establishment of public high schools, the number and value of high school buildings, school equipment, cost, curriculum, teaching, and enrollment. Such information was diffused through special bulletins and the reports of state superintendents, so that white southerners were informed of their situation. These professors traveled extensively to address lay people, local school authorities, teachers, business organizations, and county and state conferences. Their investments soon paid high returns. By 1914, Virginia had 186 new high schools, Georgia had more than 200, Arkansas and South Carolina more than 100 each. Tennessee established 74 new public high schools; Alabama organized 60; Florida 45; Mississippi more than 30; and West Virginia, in spite of a late start, constructed 27 new public high schools. The location of these new schools was planned carefully so as to extend the benefits of secondary education to as many white youths as possible in the rural South. Of the 110 new four-year public high schools established in North Carolina between 1905 and 1914, 62 were rural and 48 were urban. This pattern was typical of the regionwide transformation of white secondary education. By 1935, the majority of southern white public high schools were located in rural areas. This distribution accounts in large part for the dramatic increases in southern white secondary enrollment and helps to explain how it reached virtual parity with the national enrollment by 1935.[8]

Black children were excluded from this emergent system of public secondary education. The number of four-year white public schools in Georgia, for instance, increased from 4 in 1904 to 122 in 1916. At that time Georgia had no four-year public high schools for its black children, who constituted 46 percent of the state's secondary school age population. This was not merely a condition of inequality but a process of racial oppression extending throughout the South. Similarly, in 1916, Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, and North Carolina had no four-year public high schools for black children. Afro-American youth constituted 57 percent of Mississippi's secondary school age population, 57 percent of South Carolina's, 44 percent of Louisiana's, and 33 percent of North Carolina's. Florida, Maryland, and Delaware each had one public high school for black youth. In 1916 there were in all sixteen of the former slave states a total of only 58 public high schools for black children. Of this number 37 had four-year courses, 18 had three-year courses, and 3 had less than three-year courses. Over one-half (33 of the 58) of these public high schools were located in the border states of West Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, and Kentucky. Practically all the four-year and three-year black public high schools were located in large southern cities. Virtually no public high schools for black youth, even of two years, existed in southern rural communities, where more than two-thirds of the black children of high school age resided.[9]

Before 1920 southern black public secondary education was available primarily through private institutions. The total number of blacks enrolled in public and private secondary schools in 1916 was 20,872. Of these, 11,130 were enrolled in private high schools, 5,283 in public high schools, and 4,459 were in the secondary education departments of the twenty-eight land-grant and state normal schools and colleges. There were about 216 private black high schools in the South in 1916, and 106 of them offered four-year courses of study. Although black children throughout the former slave states depended heavily on the private system for the rare opportunity to attend high school, such dependence was greater in the deep South. Although scarcely a fourth of the black pupils enrolled in secondary grades in the border states were in private schools, slightly more than three-fourths of the pupils in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina combined were in private institutions. In 1916, fully 95 percent of the southern black secondary school age population was not enrolled in public institutions, and in the deep South the proportion not enrolled in public secondary schools was 97 percent. The few high schools that did exist were grossly overcrowded; there was literally no place to sit for those not enrolled. Black children had been bypassed by the southern revolution in public secondary educational opportunities.[10]

This state of affairs reflected in part the relative power and consciousness of different classes of white southerners as they interacted with different segments of the Afro-American South. One group—the planters and their white working-class allies—formed a large majority of the white southern people in most states and counties, particularly in the country districts and small towns. This coalition did not believe in the education of black children and accepted only the barest rudiments of a

black elementary school system, which they conceded only after realizing that the masses of black farmers, sharecroppers, and day laborers could not be forced or persuaded to tolerate less. The planters bitterly opposed any education for black children beyond the elementary grades. They used their influence in state and local governments to exclude black youth from the system of public secondary education. During the period 1880 to 1920, they were successful except in a few cities. The few black public high schools that did exist in this era were the result of joint efforts of local black leaders and urban white southerners. A few urban white southerners believed that the solution to the "race problem" and political stability in the region lay in part in a reasonable implementation of the "equal but separate" principle. This class remained small, and in most cases it had little influence. But here and there the "good white folk," as they were known, helped local blacks to acquire fairly decent high schools. One such white southern educator was John Herbert Phillips, the school superintendent of Birmingham, Alabama. In the late 1890s, Birmingham's black leaders, led by Dr. W. R. Pettiford, launched a campaign for a black high school. They won the crucial support of the president of the school board, Samuel Ullman. Despite the political disfranchisement campaign going on at the time and the opposition of some important local white political leaders, blacks gained approval for a public high school. Phillips supported their efforts. The high school was established in 1901 under the principalship of Arthur H. Parker. Such outcomes reflected black leaders' negotiations with local white business and professional "progressives" in an era when public black high schools were extremely rare. Their achievements in some of the major southern cities are illustrated in Table 6.4. The high schools growing out of these interracial efforts were about the only public high schools available to black children, and they constituted a fragmented system of secondary education for a few urban poor children who could not afford to go to private schools.[11]

This system of black public secondary education, however limited, is a significant indication of educational alternatives for black children in the South during the age of Booker T. Washington, 1895 to 1915. Both contemporary observers and later historians have portrayed the white South as taking a monolithic view of black education. Indeed, we are told that Washington and northern philanthropists placed prime emphasis on nonacademic, industrial education because that was all the white South would tolerate. Hence, when Thomas Jesse Jones, an agent of northern industrial philanthropy, conducted a study of black secondary and higher education in 1916, he was startled to find "the large place given to foreign languages and especially to the ancient languages" in southern black public high schools. Because these schools were established, regulated, and funded by local white school boards, and southern whites were supposed to tolerate only industrial education for black youth, it made no sense to Jones that virtually all of the few black public high schools in the region were of the "classical or college preparatory" type.[12]

In 1916 Virginia maintained six black public high schools. All emphasized the classical liberal curriculum. Many required their students to take Greek, and nearly all made Latin the central subject. Interestingly, the black public high school in Lynchburg was headed by Helen D. Urghart, a southern white woman, and taught by four southern white female instructors. Three years of Latin and algebra were offered along with history, physics, and English. The industrial education amounted to an elective course in manual training for boys, taught by a teacher from another city school, and cooking and sewing for girls. The black public high schools at Danville, Norfolk, Petersburg, Mount Hermon, and Richmond also emphasized the college preparatory curriculum. Similarly, the five black public high schools in Tennessee were academic rather than industrial institutions. The black high school at Chattanooga required its students to take four years of Latin; three years of Latin were required by the black high schools in Nashville, Knoxville, and Memphis. Lincoln Public High School, less classical than the other four, demanded only one year of Latin. Texas, with more than thirty black public high schools, had more than three times as many as any other southern state. The black secondary schools in the larger cities of San Antonio, Houston, Fort Worth, Dallas, and Beaumont, as well as those in the smaller towns of Temple, Dennison, and Palestine, offered the classical liberal curriculum. The black public high schools in Louisville, Paris, Frankfort, Bowling Green, Owensboro, Paducah, and Lexington, Kentucky, were of similar orientation. The classical liberal curriculum also pervaded the black high schools in Birmingham, Little Rock, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Kansas City. Indeed, during the period 1880 to 1920, despite the widespread advocacy of industrial education for black children, the limited system of black public secondary education in the South remained classical or college preparatory. This was possible because of the activities of local black leaders and the cooperation of a small class of moderate southern whites who believed in academic education for black children.[13]

After 1920, a particular coalition of southern white school reformers and northern industrial philanthropists combined to create a marked expansion of black public secondary education. Unlike the planters who opposed black secondary education, or the white southerners who cooperated with black leaders to establish classical liberal public high schools, this coalition came reluctantly to support a brand of industrial secondary

TABLE 6.4

Southern Cities of 20,000 or More Inhabitants with Public High Schools for Blacks, 1915

City	Distribution of secondary education: Number of public high schools		Distribution of secondary education: Enrollment in public high schools		High school age population (15–19)		Percentages of blacks and whites in high school age population		Total population		Percentages of blacks and whites in total population	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Birmingham	1	2	343	1,924	4,878	7,578	39	61	52,305	80,369	39	61
Little Rock	1	1	100	1,175	1,586	2,883	36	44	14,539	31,402	32	68
Fort Smith	1	1	60	734	446	1,945	19	81	4,456	19,519	19	81
Covington	1	1	34	483	237	5,175	3	97	2,899	50,371	5	95
Lexington	1	1	111	537	1,028	2,158	32	68	11,011	24,088	29	71
Louisville	1	2	402	2,847	3,607	18,545	16	84	40,522	183,390	18	82
Baltimore	1	2	788	4,471	7,607	46,636	14	86	84,749	473,387	15	85
St. Louis	1	5	811	7,221	3,335	63,075	5	95	43,960	642,488	6	94
Kansas City	1	4	462	5,439	1,279	19,429	10	90	25,566	224,677	10	90
Springfield	1	1	52	1,057	229	3,466	6	94	1,995	33,206	6	94
Knoxville	1	1	253	788	872	3,262	21	79	7,638	28,708	21	79
Memphis	1	2	303	1,244	4,885	7,083	41	59	52,441	78,590	40	60
Nashville	1	1	281	1,479	4,016	7,586	35	65	36,523	73,831	33	67
Dallas	1	4	243	2,907	1,696	7,069	19	81	18,024	74,080	20	80
El Paso	1	1	26	625	122	3,370	3	97	1,452	37,827	4	96
Houston	1	2	199	2,167	2,262	5,252	30	70	23,929	55,508	30	70
Fort Worth	1	2	133	2,310	1,648	5,510	18	82	13,280	60,032	18	82
Waco	1	1	169	1,256	613	2,194	22	78	6,067	20,358	22	78
Lynchburg	1	1	144	633	1,114	2,166	34	66	9,466	20,028	32	68
Norfolk	1	1	181	1,313	2,307	3,779	38	62	25,039	42,413	37	63
Petersburg	1	1	175	320	1,211	1,300	48	52	11,014	13,113	46	54
Richmond	1	3	394	2,124	4,808	8,057	37	63	46,749	80,879	37	63
Totals	22	40	5,664	43,054	49,786	229,684	18	82	533,624	2,348,264	19	81

Source: Included are all public schools (except colleges) offering either a four-year or three-year course of secondary study. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Population,* 1:132, 178–80, 272, 437–63; U.S. Bureau of Education; *Negro Education,* Bulletin, 1916, No. 39, vol. 2, pp. 128, 573–672; Virginia State Board of Education, *Annual Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1914–15,* pp. 289–308; Birmingham, Alabama, Board of Education, *Annual Report of the Birmingham Schools, 1915,* p. 9; Covington, Kentucky, Board of Education, *Report,* pp. 36–37; Louisville, Kentucky, Board of Education, *Fifth Report of the Board of Education of Louisville, Kentucky, 1915 to 1916,* p. 254; Baltimore, Maryland, Board of School Commissioners, *Eighty-Seventh Annual Report,* pp. 42, 69; Missouri State Department of Education, *Sixty-Seventh Report of the Public Schools,* pp. 286–88, 304; Houston, Texas, Board of School Trustees, *Annual Report of Public Schools, 1917–18,* pp. 119–21; El Paso, Texas, Board of School Trustees, *Report of the Public Schools: 1914–15,* p. 36; Nashville, Tennessee, Board of School Commissioners, *Annual Report of the Public Schools, 1915–16,* p. 21; Memphis, Tennessee, Board of Education, *Annual Report, 1914–15,* p. 62; Knoxville, Tennessee, Board of Education, *Forty-Third Annual Report,* p. 13; U.S. Commissioner of Education, *Annual Report of Education for 1917,* 2:116–33.

education designed to train black children as a docile, industrial caste of unskilled and semiskilled urban workers. Before the 1920s, northern industrial philanthropists, though contributing millions of dollars to Hampton-Tuskegee-style industrial schools, had resisted contributing to the development of black high schools. This was in sharp contrast to their contributions toward the development of southern white public secondary education. Even Booker T. Washington, who certainly tended to ignore the faults of northern philanthropists, expressed his unhappiness with this situation. In 1910 he wrote anxiously to Wallace Buttrick of the General Education Board: "I very much fear that if the General Education Board continues to employ people to encourage white high schools, and does nothing for Negro high schools, the southern white people will take it for granted that the Negro is to have few if any high schools." The board, citing the failure of southern state departments of education to request such help for black secondary education, refused to support black high schools. This argument, however, did not explain the philanthropists' failure to support black public secondary education in those southern cities willing to support black high schools. Basically, the philanthropists, in concert with most southern urban school boards before 1920, did not view black secondary education as relevant to its schemes for the social and economic development of the New South. This situation soon changed.[14]

The significant shift of the black population from the rural to the urban South during the period 1916 to 1930 forced a new attentiveness to secondary education for black youth. As early as June 1916 the U.S. Department of Labor called attention to a disturbing labor condition in the South. A great migratory stream of black laborers was flowing out of the rural South into the urban areas of southern and northern states. Economic depression struck in full force in the rural sections of the South early in the decade 1920–30, and an ever-increasing number of rural black boys and girls were moving with and without their parents to southern cities. Until 1929, most of the urban portions of the nation enjoyed a high degree of prosperity, and not surprisingly this tremendous flow of population from the farms to the cities took place, at a rate much faster than could be absorbed by the urban labor markets. For black southerners, the economic depression in the rural areas was only one primary reason for migrating. The general social and political oppression in the plantation South, including the absence of schools for black children, were long-standing causes of a steady stream of black migration into southern and northern cities. The underlying discontent with the plantation economy is one reason why the black migration from the rural South to the urban South, in sharp contrast to the migration from

the South to northern cities, did not slow down during the Great Depression.[15]

City officials and public school authorities in the urban South were shocked and alarmed by the rapid increases in the black youth population. The cities, unlike the plantation economies, did not afford a smooth transition from the home to the labor market. Adolescents in the urban South, as elsewhere in urban America, could not be absorbed into the industrial labor market. If they were not in school, generally there was little else for them to do but roam the streets. This led invariably to intolerable numbers of juvenile delinquents and posed serious social crises for youth, families, and cities. In rural societies, especially in good economic periods, youth could be easily absorbed into the agricultural economy as farmhands or domestic helpers. The urban labor markets even in times of economic prosperity could not absorb major portions of its youth population. Hence, elsewhere in America and for white youth in the South, urban reformers championed prolonged schooling as the best method to keep teenagers off the streets, out of the already saturated labor markets, and to train them properly for their later roles as adults, wage earners, and citizens. Until the decade 1920–30, city and school authorities in most of the urban South resisted prolonged schooling for black youth. They feared the educational advancement of black youth more than the social problems caused by the absence of public secondary education. But as the region's urban black youth populations grew rapidly during the second and third decades of the twentieth century, the sheer magnitude of the problem forced a new attentiveness to the question of black public secondary education. Consequently, the same coalition that transformed white public secondary education—northern philanthropists and southern school officials—joined to forge a new system of urban black secondary education. But they did not build on the tradition or precedents of black public secondary education that had been hammered out in the urban South between 1880 and 1920. Indeed, they rejected the existing model of black public secondary education as inappropriate to the "needs of the Negro" and sought to translate their own conceptions of blacks' economic roles in the urban South into a new model of secondary black education.[16]

It was not northern philanthropy but the urban South's response to the post–World War I demographic, economic, and political changes that stimulated the growth in black public secondary education. No philanthropic foundation became actively involved in the development of black public high schools in the South until after 1926. By that time all of the larger cities in the South had already established at least one black secondary school. North Carolina, for instance, had no black public high

schools in 1917 but had established 21 accredited black high schools by the 1924–25 academic year. Of these high schools 4 were departments of state normal schools, 3 were rural schools, and 14 were city schools. These schools followed the academic model. In 1926 the state's 49 accredited black four-year high schools (23 private and 26 public) sent out 1,220 graduates, of whom 627 or 51.3 percent continued their study beyond the secondary level. Mississippi, which lagged behind North Carolina and most of the southern states in the development of black secondary education, had only 3 public high schools for black children in 1924. They were located at Vicksburg, Yazoo City, and Mound Bayou. Barring the Mound Bayou school, which cost $115,000, entirely built with money contributed by blacks, the facilities for secondary education at the other two schools were quite limited. Over the next two years, however, Jackson built a black high school at a cost of $125,000, Natchez built one costing $115,000, and the state built an agricultural high school at Coahoma County. This was virtually nothing compared to the 1,020 public high schools for whites, valued at $13,338,623, but for the first time even Mississippi built high schools for blacks in its larger cities.[17]

These trends caught the attention of northern philanthropists in 1925. In January of that year representatives of the General Education Board, the Jeanes Fund, the Slater Fund, and the Rosenwald Fund, attending a conference on southern education in Gulfport, Mississippi, set aside time to discuss the development of black public high schools. At this meeting the philanthropists heard several anecdotal accounts of the building of black public high schools in major southern cities. Wanting more detailed and accurate information, they requested a report on the recent development of black public high schools in the eleven former Confederate states. This report, prepared by Frances Mathis, secretary to Leo M. Favrot of the General Education Board, circulated among the key philanthropic agents. Mathis demonstrated that in 1925, the former Confederate states maintained a combined total of 143 four-year public high schools for black children. In 1915 these same states had had only 21 black public secondary schools. Mathis's report included statistics on the cost of high school buildings established and equipment purchased from 1918 to 1925. Alabama had erected 14 new buildings at a total cost of $785,807; they ranged in cost from $3,400 to $125,000. Between 1918 and 1924, Tennessee erected 22 new high school buildings for black children, ranging in cost from $9,000 to $122,000. New buildings were also erected in Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Virginia, Florida, and Arkansas.[18]

Northern philanthropists had avoided aiding the development of black secondary education, and they seemed unaware of and surprised

by this growth. In January 1925 Julius Rosenwald wrote to Abraham Flexner of the General Education Board, asking his opinion regarding the "opportunity to do something for Negro education by way of stimulating the building of high schools in one or two southern states." Once the Mathis report reached the Rosenwald Fund, its members realized that substantial progress had been made already and apparently in some instances with a "fair spirit" of cooperation on the part of whites and blacks in the urban South. "Indeed," responded Francis W. Shepardson, acting director and secretary of the Rosenwald Fund, "the figures which have reached me have been rather surprising, so much so that I have wondered whether there was any need of a stimulus." Wallace Buttrick of the General Education Board, noting that "the larger cities have already expended hundreds of thousands of dollars each on high schools," reasoned that if there was any work left for philanthropy, it was in the smaller cities. Northern philanthropists, having convinced themselves that the main reason they did not support black secondary education was southern white opposition, found themselves in a predicament. The urban South, however prejudiced against secondary education for black children, was substantially ahead of the policies and practice of northern philanthropy. In view of this reality representatives of the General Education Board called a conference in April 1925, at their New York office to discuss black public secondary education in the southern states.[19]

When the philanthropists met to discuss the development of black public secondary education on 30 April 1925, most of the key agents were present. From the General Education Board were Wallace Buttrick, Wickliffe Rose, E. C. Sage, H. J. Thorkelson, Frank P. Bachman, Jackson Davis, and Leo M. Favrot. The Rosenwald Fund sent its chief school officers, S. L. Smith and Francis W. Shepardson. James H. Dillard, B. C. Caldwell, and W. T. B. Williams represented the Jeanes and Slater funds. Abraham Flexner of the General Education Board attended several sessions. The informal sessions touched various issues regarding southern black education but centered mostly on the development of black high schools. Many points were considered important enough to record. Yet three of them were most critical in shaping philanthropic involvement in the development of southern black secondary education. First, Favrot, arguing that many mistakes in curriculum planning and construction had attended the expansion of southern white secondary education, urged that similar mistakes be avoided in the development of black secondary education. Second, Buttrick, assuming that philanthropic agents would become involved in shaping black secondary education, stressed the need to downplay philanthropic intervention: "It should appear that people of the community themselves are doing the thing rather than agencies from the outside." Third, after recognizing that the southern

black high school movement was going forward without any stimulus from northern philanthropic foundations, the agents concluded: "There is no need to stimulate it. The main thing is to control it and direct it into the right channels." Why did the philanthropic agents feel it was necessary to control the black secondary education movement and what were the "right channels" into which it was to be directed? These questions were answered as the philanthropists entered a series of black high school reform movements in several southern cities.[20]

Although all of the northern philanthropic agents contributed funds and personnel to shape the course of black public secondary education, the vanguard role was assumed by the Rosenwald Fund. By 1928, when the fund became actively involved in the development of an urban black high school, its trustees and agents had decided to promote secondary industrial education. Little Rock, Arkansas, was chosen as the city for the fund's first program. In November 1928 Alfred K. Stern, trustee of the Rosenwald Fund, wrote to R. C. Hall, Little Rock's superintendent of schools: "We have selected Little Rock as the first of the cities in which we are willing to participate in the experiment of providing an industrial high school for Negroes." Superintendent Hall was grateful and shared with the fund the hope that its experiment would be successful, "both for its usefulness in Little Rock and as a model for development in other cities." The city certainly needed financial assistance. It had just completed a new junior and senior white high school, and the black children's portion of the school fund had been diverted to create superior facilities for white children. The black school, Gibbs High, was near condemnation, and the Little Rock School Board authorized the construction of a new building for black pupils. Having spent nearly all of the city's school building fund on the construction of the new white high school, however, the School Board had insufficient funds to erect a black high school. Little Rock school officials saw the fund's interest in the development of black industrial secondary education as an opportunity to secure the additional money needed to finance a new black high school. The city secured from the fund a pledge to pay one-third of the total cost of the proposed building and thus authorized $200,000 to $250,000 to construct a building large enough to house a combined elementary and secondary school for black children.[21]

From the outset the Rosenwald Fund's representatives made it clear that their primary interest was in the development of black industrial education. They soon discovered, however, that the Little Rock school officials were concerned mainly with acquiring outside money to help finance their racially dual school system. In a conference between the fund's agents and the Little Rock School Board, held in October 1928, the philanthropists learned that the city did not intend initially to include

industrial education courses in the proposed black high school. First, it was the city's view that rooms and equipment for trade courses would increase the total cost of the building beyond the amount of construction funds available to the School Board. Second, the black citizens of Little Rock expressed plainly to the School Board their opposition to increased emphasis on industrial education. "The School Board and I have given them as much industrial education as it is wise to give," said Hall to the philanthropists, "you will find the Negroes here wanting only the literary courses." Continued exchanges clarified further the differences between the Rosenwald agents and Little Rock's school officials. The fund's agents wanted the new black high school to align its industrial education curriculum with the occupations that black workers usually found in the Little Rock area. In view of this interest, the agents requested Hall to supply social and demographic data showing the number of children to be accommodated by the new school, projections of changes in the black population over the next decade, existing opportunities for blacks in the local industries and information about any industry expecting to increase its number of black workers, and the city's capacity to absorb potential black high school graduates into the local economy.[22]

Whereas the philanthropists' inquiry was based on the fundamental assumption that black secondary industrial education could train black youth for "Negro jobs," Hall's reply suggested strongly that in Little Rock there was no relationship between secondary education and the type of jobs held by black workers. Hall wrote to George R. Arthur, manager of the fund's "Negro Welfare" department:

> First, we have about nine hundred pupils available for the new school from seventh to twelfth grades, inclusive. Second, we cannot forecast now that there will be any material change in the industrial development of this community that will affect the negro population. Third, we have no large industries employing negro labor, and I hardly believe that such industries will come in the next ten years. Fourth, there is now very little [opportunity] for the pupils of vocational courses in high school, and there has been no demand from the negroes for such courses though we have tried hard to introduce some of them, especially laundry and vocational sewing.

Hall further informed Arthur that "most of the negro labor in this section is common day labor, janitors, porters, chauffeurs, and draymen," and "there is no industry where negro laborers are the main working force." Hall knew well that black workers in Little Rock were generally hired in jobs requiring no secondary education. In fact, most "negro jobs" required no schooling at all. Hall, therefore, showed little interest in the industrial features of black secondary education.[23]

President Embree of the Rosenwald Fund understood Hall's message. As he wrote in the margin of Hall's letter, "well, maybe they don't need a trade school in Arkansas." Indeed, blacks did not need the type of industrial high school the Rosenwald agents had in mind. It made little sense for black pupils to spend their time studying to become janitors, porters, chauffeurs, cooks, and laundry women when such jobs did not require even an elementary education, not to mention a high school education. The Rosenwald Fund did not intend, however, to develop black industrial high schools that would produce technically trained young men and women for skilled jobs or for occupational mobility. The fund sought to develop a secondary industrial education that rationalized and reproduced the existing structure of "Negro jobs." Hence the philanthropists brushed aside Hall's concerns and insights and pushed ahead with their plans to transform southern black secondary education into a system of training and socialization primarily for prospective unskilled and semiskilled workers.[24]

To accomplish its goal the Rosenwald Fund adopted a new approach that came to characterize its reform campaigns in several southern cities. The fund hired its own team of experts on school architecture, industrial education curricula, and the social and economic characteristics of urban black communities. Walter R. McCornack of Cleveland, Ohio, one of America's finest school architects, was hired to make certain that each high school supported by the fund would be built with the appropriate rooms and the necessary equipment for secondary industrial education. The fund's experts on industrial education curricula were Frederick E. Clerk and Franklin J. Keller. Clerk was the principal of the New Trier High School in Illinois and Keller was principal of New York City's East Side Continuation School, which ten thousand students attended part time for vocational training. The well-known black sociologist Charles S. Johnson was contracted to supervise studies of the social and economic life of blacks in each southern city where the fund chose to help build a black industrial high school or establish an industrial department within an academic high school. Most of the field research was conducted by Mabel Byrd of Fisk University's Social Science Department. This team of consultants distinguished the Rosenwald approach to school reform. First, the social scientists would conduct a study of the black population, its occupational structure, and projections of its industrial future in selected southern cities. Then the curriculum experts would use these findings to develop an industrial education program unique to the Negro job structure of each city. The architect would design a school or department in which the rooms and equipment reflected the particular alignment between curricula and industrial opportunities or prescribed occupations for black youth.[25]

In late 1929 Byrd made a thorough survey of the white and Negro industrial and business communities of Little Rock, interviewed "leading citizens" of both communities, and visited twenty industrial establishments. She distributed questionnaires to students at Gibbs High School, to graduates of the school, and to local black mechanics. Byrd found that Afro-Americans made up 25 percent of Little Rock's total population. Practically all of the employed adults were engaged in common labor occupations. The black men were employed mainly as helpers in the various trades, or as cooks, gardeners or "yard boys," barbers, chauffeurs, truck drivers, laundry men, railroad workers, or agricultural laborers on farms just outside of the city. Black women worked as seamstresses, cooks, laundry women, and "fancy pressers." In the entire city of Little Rock there were only three black plasterers and five bricklayers carrying union cards. Black men worked as unskilled and semiskilled auto mechanics. Five hundred black men were employed in the Missouri Pacific railroad shop as helpers to white skilled operators. Byrd discovered that black men, "excepting in their own businesses," were employed as helpers in electrical work. Byrd concluded her survey by recommending, on the basis of the jobs held by the city's black adults, that the new black high school offer the following trades: household management, dressmaking, beauty culture, farming, plumbing, commercial cooking, building trades, auto mechanics, electricity, and machine shop.[26]

This investigation represented the best of the sociological and school survey movements of the era. Early twentieth-century school reformers borrowed the term "survey" from the field of sociology. By the late 1920s, it was a relatively new idea in education, though it was obviously an expansion of a standard idea and practice in sociology. The New York City School Survey of 1911 convinced school reformers that the survey method had great practical possibilities. Because the science of engineering was based on a thorough survey of conditions and problems, exact measurement, experimental control of process, and adjustment of procedures in light of facts, "educational engineers" viewed the survey method as a scientific way to adapt the aims and processes of education to the local political economy. It was a means of "educational diagnosis" based on the school population and community to be served. Byrd's survey of Little Rock furnished the sociological characteristics of black living and working conditions and recommended a program of studies that would train black youth for what were generally regarded as "Negro jobs."[27]

The survey of Little Rock was then submitted to the curricula experts, Keller and Clerk, for their analyses and recommendations. They visited Little Rock early in 1930, several months after the opening of the new black elementary and secondary school. Their task was to conduct a firsthand inspection of the school's curriculum in practice as it related to

the sociological position of blacks in Little Rock. Keller and Clerk discovered that the proposed industrial curriculum had not been translated into instructional practices. Particularly, the equipment in the industrial shops was meager and not suited to the industrial training recommended by the Rosenwald agents. "The present administration frankly admits that the so-called industrial work has up to the present time been only manual training (except for the vocational sewing class) and is of value only as a cultural accompaniment to college preparatory subjects," stated Keller and Clerk. The best equipment for boys was in the mill room, but Keller and Clerk reported that "none of it is being used." Clearly, things were developing contrary to the philanthropists' plans. They had hoped to see an industrial training program that approximated the actual work situations of black adults and that deemphasized college preparatory subjects.[28]

This plan was thwarted in Little Rock largely because of the behavior of local black leaders. As early as December 1928, leaders of Little Rock's black community began protesting against the establishment of an industrial high school. Upon learning that the new high school would be named Negro Industrial High School, W. A. Booker, a local black attorney, wrote anxiously to Arthur of the Rosenwald Fund: "Our people here have been waiting patiently over a span of years for a real high school, one that would not be a subterfuge; one that would give a thorough educational training and literary background, and a curriculum upon which a college education could be well predicated." Booker informed Arthur that "serious objection" had "already gone forth on the part of our Negro taxpayers and citizens of the proposed change of the name from Gibbs High School to that of the 'Negro Industrial High School.'" Booker argued that the black taxpayers' objections were well grounded and should be sustained. It made no sense to Booker that black citizens should have to accept industrial training to attain for black children "what justice urges and what we as the taxpayers and the fathers ahead of us have long since earned." Almost a year later, in September 1929, Booker was still protesting the name of the new high school.[29]

By the time Little Rock's new black high school held its official opening ceremonies in the fall of 1929, Booker and the local black community had defeated the efforts to name the school Negro Industrial High. It was called Paul Laurence Dunbar High School. Hailed as "the finest high school building in the South for Negro boys and girls," Dunbar had a seating capacity of sixteen hundred, an auditorium, cafeteria, library, sixteen hundred lockers, forty classrooms, and seven industrial shops. The Rosenwald Fund contributed $67,500 and the General Education Board gave $30,000 toward the total cost of $400,000. The program of studies provided three routes to a diploma: a classical liberal academic

course for college-bound students; a combination course that allowed students to graduate with enough credits for college entrance and at the same time earn special vocational certificates; and an industrial curriculum in which pupils could earn enough credits to attain a diploma but would not have enough academic credits to enter college. The influence of the industrial education philosophy on the overall curriculum was evidenced by the absence of a required academic core curriculum. In the tenth and eleventh grades, for example, only English and history (with special emphasis on auto mechanics) were required, and in the twelfth grade only English was required. Yet the academic electives included Latin, algebra, biology, world history, geography, plane geometry, American history, chemistry, physics, trigonometry, economics, biology, and fine arts.[30]

A report on the distribution of Dunbar's pupils in various courses revealed that in the fall of 1930, 1,106 of the school's 1,163 junior high and secondary students were enrolled in industrial courses. Of these 831 were females enrolled in Regular Sewing I (205), Regular Sewing II (237), Home Making I (115), Home Making II (174), Vocational Sewing (40), and Laundry (60). Most of the male pupils were enrolled in Manual Arts I (151) and Manual Arts II (134), with a few in Bricklaying (15), Carpentry (15), and Auto Mechanics (27). No classes were offered in sheet metal work, electrical work, plumbing, or printing. This occupational training was congruent with the domestic service, cooking, serving, laundry, and industrial helper jobs held by Little Rock's black adults. Few students, however, majored in the industrial curriculum, though many took a course or two. Black parents counseled their children to take the academic courses. In addition, Little Rock was home for three four-year degree-granting black colleges: Philander Smith, Arkansas Baptist, and Shorter. The state college for black students, Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical, and Normal College, was located only forty-five miles away, in Pine Bluff. As Faustine Childress Jones has demonstrated, the proximity of these schools meant that Dunbar's graduates who had aspirations for higher education could attend college. In the short run, the philanthropists' efforts to redirect black secondary education in Little Rock into the "right channels" or industrial training had very limited success; in the long run Dunbar became a model of academic excellence. The black citizens, taxpayers, and educators outmaneuvered the philanthropists.[31]

The Rosenwald Fund's next major campaign to reform black secondary education took place in New Orleans and ended in failure, but it clarified, even more than did the Little Rock experiment, the philanthropists' perceptions of the "right channels" for black public high schools. On 30 March 1931, Nichols Bauer, the New Orleans superintendent

Paul Laurence Dunbar High School of Little Rock, Arkansas, 1930. This was the first industrial-academic high school aided by the Julius Rosenwald Fund. Courtesy of Fisk University Library.

of public schools, wrote optimistically to Alfred K. Stern: "As I see it, the negro trade school is a certainty." Bauer's insight was poor in this instance. In fact, the proposed trade school for black youth in New Orleans was never built, and the Rosenwald Fund, which authorized $125,000 toward the construction costs of an estimated $400,000 building, eventually withdrew the pledge as philanthropists became disappointed with the apathetic and obstructive behavior of Orleans Parish School Board members. Although the philanthropists' venture into New Orleans ended in failure and disappointment, it demonstrated more about their ideology of black public secondary education than did their involvement in more successful projects. After acquiring considerable experience in the Little Rock endeavor, the philanthropists had not only a clearer idea of what they wanted to achieve but more knowledge about methods and procedures to attain their goals. They also had observed that the Little Rock campaign strayed from their basic policies and were determined to avoid the same mistakes in New Orleans. The philanthropists were determined to do the job right and build a model program of black secondary industrial education in New Orleans.[32]

The New Orleans experiment enables us to rethink the larger process of philanthropic interest in black public high schools. By examining a

major reform campaign that was carefully articulated and, but for the resistance of local school authorities would have been translated into institutionalized behavior, we get a sharper portrait of the philanthropists' intended reforms versus their compromised achievements. When examining relationships between dominant and subordinate classes, it is important to describe and analyze unrealized movements. Such events give us a better understanding of what was intended in contradistinction to what was achieved. The Little Rock experiment demonstrates how the philanthropists' goals converged with those of white school authorities and black citizens in developing a compromised model of black secondary education; the New Orleans venture illustrates what the philanthropists might have done were they not forced to compromise.

In September 1930, the Rosenwald Fund authorized an appropriation of $125,000 toward a black secondary industrial school in New Orleans. This was the largest appropriation ever authorized by the fund for construction of a black public high school. The fund's agents hoped to establish the finest model of black public secondary education in New Orleans. "As I explained previously, we are very anxious to make this a model industrial high school in every respect; we feel that we can profit by our experience in other cities," Stern wrote to Isaac S. Heller, a mem-

ber of the Orleans Parish School Board and friend of the Rosenwald family. Late in February 1931, in a letter to Superintendent Bauer, Rosenwald agent Stern explained why the fund was so concerned about the proposed new black high school. "It will be the first secondary school for Negroes built exclusively for trade instruction to which the fund has made an appropriation." The fund's agents had often expressed their desire to support black high schools devoted exclusively to training black youth for industrial jobs in the urban South. President Embree stated that the fund's agents had reservations about the usefulness of "the old manual training," which he believed was valuable as general instruction but did not train workers for specific jobs in the labor market. Indeed, the fund's members declined to assist Birmingham, Alabama, in the development of a black high school because its industrial education component represented the old manual training as opposed to more direct training for specific industrial jobs. The philanthropists saw in New Orleans the first real opportunity to shift the direction of black secondary education toward training for specific jobs.[33]

Isaac S. Heller, a close friend of Alfred K. Stern, played the key role in articulating the fund's proposal in Orleans Parish School Board meetings. From the outset, Heller encountered stiff resistance from several of his colleagues. In December 1929, Heller detailed his opponents' viewpoints regarding the proposed black industrial high school:

> According to the point of view of those members of the School Board who are opposed to the negro trade school, they feel that it would be wrong to provide school board funds to the education of any negro children as long as there are white children who cannot be provided for, and as long as no "school board funds" are being applied to the industrial education of white boys. They raised a further argument, specious though it is, that such a school would encourage the further encroachment of the negro on trades where the whites now predominate. The undersigned [Heller] argued at length against all of this with but little success, *stressing the point, first, that this school would interest itself only in trades obviously negro.*

In an effort to gain the support of the leader of the opposition, Edmund Garland, Heller arranged a private luncheon meeting to persuade him to reverse his stand against the proposed black industrial high school. Heller's efforts were not successful.[34]

To aid in the formulation and selling of the fund's educational program, Heller anxiously called for a sociological survey of the industrial conditions and the corresponding educational needs of blacks in New Orleans. In January 1930 he persuaded the School Board to allow Mabel

Byrd to conduct a survey of New Orleans. The Rosenwald Fund paid for the survey. He met with Byrd in early January 1930 and presented her with a letter, pursuant to a resolution passed by the School Board, authorizing the sociological and school survey. Heller informed Byrd that her survey should pay particular attention to the position of black workers in the local economy. "I have asked her not only to determine the present status and needs of the trades in New Orleans with respect to negroes, but also to emphasize those trades where there is little or no competition between the races," wrote Heller to Embree. This approach was consistent with the fund's goal to develop black secondary education that reinforced racial segmentation rather than competition in southern urban economies.[35]

Sociological data on black New Orleans were collected by Byrd during mid-January of 1930. She presented a preliminary report on methods of procedure and data sources to the Orleans Parish School Board in late January. She had collected data on the occupations of black workers in twenty-five industrial plants, including shipbuilding companies, construction companies, sheet metal companies, automobile firms, cotton mills, clothing industries, and hairdressing and barber shops. Byrd interviewed the managers of these industrial plants, the commissioner of labor, the business agents of the plasterers', bricklayers', and longshoremen's unions, the director of public service, and several individual leaders in education, industry, and the media. She distributed questionnaires to the black students attending McDonough elementary and secondary school and to fifty-one of the school's 1925 to 1929 graduates. Questionnaires were also given to selected black tradesmen. Finally, Byrd investigated the local market demands for black workers through the records of the employment bureaus and the want ads of the daily newspapers. With the board's approval Byrd proceeded to organize the data and write the final report.[36]

Two main points were emphasized in the final study, "Report of the Special Inquiry Undertaken in New Orleans into the Industrial Status of Negroes." First, Byrd argued that unless New Orleans established industrial high schools to improve the labor efficiency of its black population it would be outdistanced in economic prosperity by comparable cities, which had taken steps to increase the productive capacity of their laboring population. Second, Byrd assured the Orleans Parish School Board that black secondary industrial education as conceived by agents of the Rosenwald Fund was designed to keep black workers in "their place" and that the proposed black high school would deliberately and systematically prevent black youth from acquiring trade training that would enable them to compete with white workers for the more skilled and higher-paying industrial occupations. The report stated:

> The industrial training that will presently be described does not have for its object the education of the negro element of the population, except where there is a demand, and where there will be a demand for a larger supply of colored skilled labor. In making this survey the investigators have given particular attention to the attitude of the white skilled labor and to the present status of the negro in industry today. We have borne this particularly in mind so that this school, when established, would not result in increasing competition between the races.

But how could a high school train "colored skilled labor" without increasing competition for the better skilled jobs? The Rosenwald Fund attempted to resolve this dilemma by defining skilled labor as practical knowledge, supplemented by industrial education, thereby resulting in increased labor efficiency and productivity. Under this definition, any unskilled work could be transformed by industrial education into skilled work, and workers could move from unskilled to skilled labor without changing occupations. Black housemaids without formal industrial education, for instance, were unskilled, and those with training in domestic science were defined as skilled laborers. Byrd's report pointed out that "the negro girl and woman occupies traditionally the field of domestic service in New Orleans." But the traditional method of training, the "mother to daughter variety," was "unscientific and wasteful," and it had led to an unfortunate situation in which "a well-trained, efficient, reliable houseworker is scarce and is becoming more scarce as the years pass." Byrd concluded that "thorough training in domestic science will correct this condition and put into the field a larger supply of competent houseworkers." This represented the fund's idea of how to increase black skilled labor without increasing competition between the races.[37]

From the philanthropists' viewpoint, it was the worker who was unskilled, not the occupation. Hence Byrd's report stated that secondary industrial education could produce scientifically trained and more efficient black caterers, laundry women, dressmakers, maids, gardeners, chefs and cooks, tailors, chauffeurs, auto mechanics, printers and bookbinders, bricklayers, plasterers, and sewing machine operators. These were the occupations held largely by black workers in New Orleans. Black women predominated in the occupations of laundry work, house service, and hairdressing. They constituted 96 percent of the laundry women, 79 percent of the hairdressers, and 86 percent of the house servants. Black women made up 75 to 80 percent of the labor force of many shops in the clothing industry. Black male workers were concentrated heavily in the building trades, railroads, personal service, and gardening. They were 80 percent of New Orleans' bricklayers, 95 percent of the plasterers, 50 percent of the cement workmen, and almost 100 percent of the slate roofers. On the basis of these findings, the Rosenwald Fund agents recommended to the Orleans Parish School Board that the proposed black high school offer the following trades: domestic science, dressmaking, power sewing machine operating, hairdressing, maids in doctors' offices, gardening, barbering, commercial cooking, tailoring, bricklaying and plastering, chauffeuring/auto mechanics, and printing. The survey pointed out that for black youth printing was a "limited field," though "in certain printing establishments negro printers are used and negro girls employed as book binders." When the fund recommended the training of a limited number of black youth in printing and bookbinding, therefore, it was in keeping with its advocacy of racial segmentation in the labor force.[38]

After completing its school survey and making its final report to the Orleans Parish School Board, the fund sent its school architect, Walter R. McCornack, to help the local architect draw up plans for the proposed industrial high school. His employment to help the local architect with the planning, construction, and equipment of the proposed black high school was a condition of the Rosenwald grant. McCornack's fee, 1 percent of the total cost of construction and equipment, was to be borne by the School Board. The fund thus had its first opportunity to design and equip a secondary school exclusively for industrial training in local "Negro jobs." The sketches drawn by McCornack and illustrated in figure 6.1 reflect the philanthropists' conception of how a true black industrial high school would be constructed. There were no rooms in the plans for academic education.[39]

In November 1930 Keller went to New Orleans to develop a curriculum for the proposed high school. On the basis of his own site inspections, Mabel Byrd's community and school survey, and consultation with McCornack, Keller produced a seventeen-page document which addressed all conceivable dimensions of black secondary industrial education, including purpose, method, relations to academic education, the qualifications of pupils, the design and equipment of buildings, curricula, and the general principles of vocational guidance. Consistent with the basic aims of the fund, Keller concluded: "The school should prepare boys and girls for vocations which are open to Negroes in New Orleans." Further, he recommended that academic education should not be an important part of the curriculum: "The school should accept all boys and girls who are qualified for instruction in the trades regardless of any specific academic attainment." Indeed, Keller proposed that students be admitted to secondary industrial education even without any prior formal education. He thought that the proposed high school should devote 75 percent of its classroom time to shop work and 25 percent to related

FIGURE 6.1
Architectural Sketch of an Industrial High School



Source: McCornack's sketches, Box 310, JRFP-FU

academic subjects, which would include English, mathematics, science, and drawing. The related subjects, said Keller, could be "taught incidentally by the shop teachers."[40]

By late 1930, the philanthropists were all set to build a model black industrial high school in New Orleans. There was only one major obstacle: the Orleans Parish School Board, reflecting the peculiar rationality of southern white racism, could not reach a decision to build the school. At a School Board meeting in February 1930, one member, August Schabel, opposed the plan on the ground that it would result in "all the negroes in the entire state coming to New Orleans." Schabel betrayed his awareness of the value of education among black families, and, knowing that there were no secondary schools for blacks in rural Louisiana, he could anticipate an unintended consequence not foreseen by the philanthropists. He also demonstrated another southern white viewpoint. Schabel perceived secondary education as an avenue of social advancement and could not appreciate fully the philanthropists' conception of a process of industrial education that would hold people within their racial or class position. Thus he viewed support for a black industrial high school as "advancing the negroes in our system more rapidly than we have advanced the whites." Isaac Heller quickly informed his fellow school board member of the real intent of the proposed black industrial high school:

> The establishment of this school does not in any way contemplate educating these negroes in the trade school into trades that will in any way affect the white labor or deprive the white men of their positions, and that it is not the intention of this Board to increase friction between the races or competition between the races. It is rather to educate the negroes in trades and positions to which negroes are best qualified, and under no circumstances to educate them to compete with white labor of this city.

Heller found support for his position from board members Henry O. Schaumburg and Phillip G. Ricks. "I believe there is a need in this community for a negro trade school and the trades that will be taught there, for colored boys and for colored girls, to make them housekeepers, maids, cooks, printers, gardeners, mechanics, yard boys," said Ricks. Heller, Schaumburg, and Ricks persuaded Schabel and other board members to support the Rosenwald Fund's proposal, and it was voted unanimously to authorize the construction of a new black industrial high school.[41]

The board's authorization of funds to build a new black high school became the subject of editorials in the local newspapers, and so did the findings and recommendations of the school survey and curriculum report. The northern philanthropists were then treated to another southern

white custom, that of being open and straightforward regarding social schemes to keep blacks subordinate. The *New Orleans States*, summarizing the basic position of the board and the Rosenwald Fund, wrote: "They kept particularly in mind that, if the school is established, it must not result in increasing competition between the races." The *Times Picayune* concurred. "Trade school training will render the negro youth more efficient in their chosen tasks and lead them into settled and stable occupations." Such news coverage informed the New Orleans black community of the social and political purposes of the proposed black industrial high school. Heller informed Stern in early March 1930 that local black leaders had begun protesting the idea of a black trade school. Stern advised Heller to regard this protest as merely a reflex response by particular black elites: "It is natural to expect some opposition from the Negro group to a project of this kind. We have found in our work that a certain element among the Negroes is constantly pleading for purely academic rather than vocational education for colored people." According to Stern, the Rosenwald Fund did "not argue against the professional and cultural instruction for the minority of the Negro group." But "any man who has the interest of the masses at heart would not stand out against the other ninety percent." The structure of black secondary education in 1930 belies Stern's definition of the masses. In 1930 only 7.9 percent of the black high school age population in Louisiana was enrolled in school. Hence it was not a question of the education of the minority versus that of the masses but of what type of education would be provided for the 7.9 percent. The black leaders in New Orleans waged a legitimate protest. Because only a small fraction of high school age black youth was actually enrolled in secondary schools, it made no sense to channel that minority into low-level industrial training.[42]

By the spring of 1930, the Rosenwald Fund was ready to proceed with the construction of the proposed black industrial high school, but various problems in New Orleans prevented the start of construction. Finally, in January 1931, to clear the final hurdles, the fund agents called a conference with the Orleans Parish School Board. The fund was represented by its president, Embree, its director, Stern, its curriculum expert, Keller, and its school architect, McCornack. Superintendent Bauer reported on the progress of the proposed high school, revealing at every turn that the School Board was at best lukewarm toward the idea. The board had purchased a lot for the proposed high school, but it had used the $275,000 originally allocated for building a combined academic and industrial high school to purchase the School Board's administration building. This action expressed the board's lack of commitment to black secondary industrial education. Moreover, the philanthropists learned from Bauer that the board had not allocated any of the city's Smith-

Hughes funds to black pupils. Because there were no facilities for black industrial education, explained Bauer, the Smith-Hughes funds were distributed entirely to white trade education.[43]

The Rosenwald Fund's agents tried one more time to convince the Orleans Parish School Board of the economic and racial benefits of a black industrial high school. "At no time should the school be regarded as another academic high school for negroes," said Embree. "It should be an out and out trade school, the fundamental purpose of which would be trade training and preparing negroes as fast as possible for jobs." Heller explained once more that the proposed black industrial high school would "avoid as far as possible training negroes in highly competitive fields where white mechanics were highly organized." The purpose of the school, Heller maintained, was to train black youth for "trades that are really negro trades." To extend the point, Heller argued that there were few opportunities for blacks trained in commercial subjects and hence there was no need to include such courses in the proposed school. Significantly, the proposed curriculum as drawn up by Keller and approved by the fund did not include such commercial subjects as stenography, accounting, and bookkeeping. In these and other ways the philanthropists tried to convince the School Board that the proposed high school would increase the productivity of the city's black work force, help rationalize the racially segmented labor market, and establish an appropriate model of black secondary education.[44]

The New Orleans school officials could not be persuaded to build a black industrial high school. They could never see the need to expend $400,000 to build and equip a high school to train black youth for "negro jobs" because they had already accomplished this goal without the aid of formal schooling. With each passing month the philanthropists became increasingly isolated as the sole champions of the proposed black industrial high school, and local white southerners ranged from indifferent to resistant. As Embree wrote to Heller in September 1931, "It seems to us that the school officials are so indifferent, if not positively obstructive, that there is little likelihood of real success." Hence, as the year 1931 ended, the Rosenwald Fund withdrew from its New Orleans venture, promising its hearty support if in the near future the city renewed the campaign to build a black industrial high school but knowing that the project had failed. This reform campaign provides an understanding of what might have occurred in the absence of local indifference and resistance. The undistorted values and beliefs of the philanthropists and their ideological interests in southern black education are illuminated in this effort, which was no less real because it ended in failure.[45]

In other campaigns in Columbus, Georgia, Greenville, South Carolina, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, the Rosenwald Fund found much

greater success. One of its more successful endeavors took place in Columbus, Georgia. The William H. Spencer High School of Columbus was dedicated in January 1931. The out-of-town guests included George Foster Peabody, Keller, and Stern. The fund contributed $22,500 toward the building's total cost of $112,000. In Columbus, the fund acquired the enthusiastic support of the local school superintendent, Roland B. Daniel, and the principal of Spencer High, F. R. Lampkin. Daniel was fundamentally opposed to academic education for black high school pupils, particularly in college preparatory subjects. "It is my opinion that we should give little attention at this time to the preparation of pupils for college," he wrote to Stern in December 1930. Moreover, he continued, "we have more Negro doctors and preachers now than the Negro population can support comfortably and it is easy for Negroes to be misled along this line." Daniel made it clear to the fund that he was committed to denying Columbus's black youth the opportunity to pursue academic courses of study. He also informed them that the principal he had selected, F. R. Lampkin, measured up "to our expectations." Daniel's perspectives on black secondary education made the philanthropists eager to participate in the Columbus experiment.[46]

Keller developed the curriculum for Spencer High as he did for all of the urban black high schools aided by Rosenwald money. Having become aware of black aspirations for academic education, Keller faced squarely the question of classical liberal versus industrial education for black high school pupils. In Keller's words, "On a number of occasions during my contact with pupils, teachers and parents, the question has been asked, 'Will the Spencer High School prepare me for college?' " Keller did not favor leaving the choice of curricula to black teachers and their pupils. Indeed, he praised the Columbus school authorities for not including college preparatory courses in Spencer High's curriculum. "There is exhibited commendable courage in eliminating traditional subjects which have no value for the more hand-minded boys and girls and especially for the negroes whose opportunity to make use of such traditional subjects is much more limited." On many occasions Keller advanced the argument that because black people were denied access to occupations in which they could apply academic training, it was the duty of school officials to eliminate the traditional academic subjects from black high schools. In place of the traditional academic curriculum, Keller offered a curriculum for "hand-minded" Negro boys and girls whose economic opportunities were restricted.[47]

In Keller's educational philosophy, "the culture of the hand-minded person was not that of the scholar." Taking the bricklayer as an idealized "hand-minded" person, Keller distinguished the education suited to "hand-minded" people from that appropriate for the scholar. The bricklayer's English, he contended, should relate "almost entirely to its use by contractors in contracts, specifications, and business letters." Keller then articulated the mathematics, social studies, and chemistry that were fitting for the bricklayer. His philosophy merits quoting in full:

> It would appear that for boys preparing to be bricklayers, for instance, algebra and plane geometry would be too heavy mental fare. While they should have command of the elementary operations and certainly should be able to erect a perpendicular to a horizontal surface, they need not be able to prove the propositions of Euclid. It is therefore suggested for boys and girls of this type there be substituted for the more advanced subjects, such as mathematics, chemistry and history, two general subjects. History might well be replaced by that type of information known variously as social science, current events, vocational civics, and the like. All of this is designed to adjust the worker to the society in which he lives and therefore to make him a more desirable and worthy member of the community. Mathematics and chemistry might well be replaced by that type of information sometimes designated as related technical knowledge. For the bricklayer this includes such topics as kind of clay, sand, and lime from which bricks are made, methods of making bricks, various kinds of brick and the purpose for which they are used, the history of building materials, the theory of arches, etc.

Although this curriculum theory reflected a system of values and beliefs that subordinated the freedom and choices of black children to the interests of an unequal and unjust southern society, Keller chose to view his own educational philosophy as one which "met the needs of the child." Keller's view, however, equated the "needs" of black children with the "needs" of a racially segmented and repressive labor market.[48]

When the aspirations and educational choices of black students ran counter to the roles prescribed for them by the philanthropic reformers, Keller invariably concluded that blacks were making choices not on the basis of need but out of hunger for prestige and a tendency to imitate whites. For example, the sociological survey of Columbus, Georgia, included an examination of the career aspirations of Spencer High's tenth grade pupils and of their parents' vocations. Seven of the eighty-four tenth graders listed stenography as their desired vocation. Yet Keller recommended specifically that Spencer High's pupils not have the opportunity to take stenography or typing, bookkeeping, and other commercial courses. The basis for his recommendation was that the sociological survey of black industrial opportunities in Columbus did not discover careers in commercial work for black high school graduates. Thus, said Keller, "If commercial courses were offered in the negro school there

would no doubt be tremendous pressure to get into them and the only result would be keen disappointment for nearly everyone." The reason for this disappointment would be that black pupils, once trained in commercial fields, would be denied jobs in those occupations. Keller's curricula recommendations were adopted by Columbus's school officials, and black pupils at Spencer High were denied the opportunity to take courses in commercial fields. This was Keller's idea of "meeting the needs of the children."[49]

Spencer High's tenth graders, largely children of working-class parents, aspired to occupations more prestigious and higher paying than those held by their fathers and mothers. Of the eighty-two parents, fifty-three, or 67 percent, were common laborers, fifteen, or 18 percent, were skilled laborers—carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths, tailors, plumbers, and the like—and twelve, or 15 percent, were professionals, for example, teachers, ministers, and merchants. Seventy-four of the eighty-four tenth graders aspired to occupations above those of their parents. The majority, forty-five, or 54 percent, desired professional careers, thirty-six, or 43 percent, aspired to skilled occupations, two were undecided, and only one pupil listed a semiskilled job as a desired vocation. These pupils held career aspirations that the philanthropists and local school officials sought to repress. Spencer High's curriculum, which emphasized careers for cooks, maids, laundresses, seamstresses, auto mechanics, carpenters, bricklayers, and the like, was well aligned with the parents' occupations and was thus structured to reproduce those vocations in the children. The philanthropists confronted this problem in city after city, and in each case they recommended the reproduction of the local racially segmented labor market.[50]

The Rosenwald-sponsored survey of Greenville, South Carolina, demonstrated that, in 1930, black men worked mainly as janitors, porters, waiters, bellmen, butlers, hospital orderlies, elevator operators, cooks, farmers, mechanics, bricklayers, carpenters, tailors, welders, stationary firemen, and barbers. The principal occupations of black women were home and child nursing, cooking, waiting, house service, beauty culture, and laundering; 92 percent of the high school pupils' mothers were employed in those occupations. The sociological survey of Greenville included a study of the occupations of 1,824 parents and a study of the vocational choices of black pupils in the upper grades of the high school. Eighty-three percent of the parents were engaged in unskilled or semiskilled jobs. The study of parents' occupations also presented data on the average years of schooling and average wage per week by occupational category. Black mechanics averaged five years of schooling and earned a weekly wage of $25; greasers and washers in the automobile industry averaged four years of schooling. Beauty culture workers averaged eight



The newly completed William Spencer Industrial High School in Columbus, Georgia, 1930. Courtesy of Fisk University Library.

years of schooling and $10 per week. Janitors, with a mean of three years of schooling, earned $10 per week, and porters averaged four years of schooling and $8 per week. Their children had already achieved higher levels of education and desired more skilled and better-paying jobs.[51]

Although the fund's researchers discovered and reported to the philanthropists and local school officials that Greenville's black high school pupils showed virtually no desire to follow in their parents' occupations, it was still recommended that the high school train and socialize black pupils for occupations similar to those of their parents. As the Rosenwald survey observed:

> Studies of the occupations of parents show that there is no general tendency of pupils to follow the vocation of their parents, but a study of this type does show the occupations around which the vocational life of the Negroes of the community is built, and regardless of the expressed desires of pupils in the elementary school and even in the high school to enter vocations other than those engaged in by their parents, because of factors over which children have no control, many of them will finally fall into the "major vocations" of the community.

Such recommendations, shared and adopted by philanthropists and Greenville's school officials, show the extent to which the implementation of an oppressive educational process for black children was a self-conscious effort. In this context the school was defined as an institution

to train black pupils for occupations prescribed as "negro jobs" and one to prevent them from studying for vocations that were closed to black workers because of racism.[52]

One area closed to black workers was the textile industry. Significantly, Greenville was known as the textile center of the South, but blacks, except as janitors, were barred from jobs in the textile mills. In the antebellum South, however, the textile labor force included a significant number of black workers. The movement away from black labor began just before the Civil War, and by the late nineteenth century almost all of the cotton mill workers were white. Mill owners advanced the idea of an Anglo-Saxon kinship between management and labor. The resulting reliance on white labor and the attendant ideology of white nationalism reinforced an economic structure in which white workers, as long as they recognized the legal and customary authority of their exalted benefactors, would not have to face the prospect of active competition from black workers. In 1930 the South's one characteristic industry, textiles, excluded black workers. Likewise, Greenville's black high school curriculum, primarily an industrial program, excluded the whole area of textiles.[53]

The Rosenwald report recommended for black high school pupils a course in "washing and greasing" to prepare Greenville's black high school pupils for jobs at automobile service stations. It also recommended training in "public service occupations such as those of janitor, waiter, bellman, cook, bootblack, etc." "A course in shoe shining would prove unpopular among certain classes of Negroes in any southern community," the report continued, "because they do not realize its economic worth, and the splendid possibilities for developing a real vocation." This argument was characteristic of the philanthropists' thinking. Rather than focus on the reality that black workers, solely because of their race, had been excluded from most decent jobs in Greenville, the philanthropists chose to emphasize the "splendid possibilities" of shoe shining.[54]

The Winston-Salem, North Carolina, experiment was unique in that it forced the philanthropists to recognize that occupations generally held by black adults did not require a high school education. The new high school for black pupils was dedicated on 2 April 1931. The buildings, equipment, and grounds cost $400,000, of which the Rosenwald Fund contributed $50,000. In Winston-Salem, the tobacco industries employed 33.3 percent of the black male adult workers and 48 percent of the black female adult workers. To the dismay of Rosenwald agents, a survey of the tobacco factories from the stemming process to the making of cigarettes showed no process that could be taught in school. Mabel Byrd reported that "the machinist who cared for the highly intricate machines, in every case, was white, and this policy has been established

over a period of years." In addition to the state of the tobacco industry, "no Negroes save janitors are employed in the Hanes Cotton Mills." The vast majority of jobs held by black adults in Winston-Salem required virtually no formal schooling and certainly none beyond the elementary school grades. This finding provoked the fund's curriculum expert, Keller, to reassess the relationship between black labor and formal education. As he stated, "It seems to me that a thoroughgoing study of many of the jobs available to negro boys and girls would reveal the fact that the actual technical knowledge represents a very small body of skills easily obtained by an intelligent pupil in a very brief period of time." Therefore, Keller maintained, "If this is true the industrial training of many young people is not a matter of very serious importance in their formal education." What, then, was the great importance of black secondary industrial education? According to Keller, its great mission was to give "purpose and motive" to the process of education and to make black adolescents "fully appreciative of their social heritage." In short, the ideological functions of black industrial education were more important than the technical functions. The primary aim was to gain the consent of black pupils to the racially segmented economy imposed on them by the dominant white society.[55]

One of the formidable problems faced by the philanthropists and their agents was to reconcile their racially distinct philosophies of public secondary education. Nowhere was this issue better illustrated than in the thoughts and actions of Bruce R. Payne, a former professor of secondary education at the University of Virginia who was then president of Peabody College in Nashville, Tennessee. An ardent believer in "democratic" ideals, Payne promoted white public secondary education. He did so in opposition to the ideas held by most southern whites that education beyond the elementary grades was not necessary except for children of social position and wealth. There was no subject on which Payne was more passionately eloquent than the right of every white child to as much education as he could absorb. Indeed, said Payne, "It is high time that under a popular government like ours, the use of the word 'masses' . . . should cease. Who are these superior beings that presume to sit thus in judgment upon their fellows, to assign them to classes, according to their high pleasure, to set for them metes and bounds beyond which they shall not go?" Yet on the subject of education of black children, Payne became one of those superior beings, presuming to sit in judgment upon his black fellows, to assign them to classes, and especially to set for them metes and bounds beyond which they were not to pass. As he wrote to his colleague George R. James of the Federal Reserve Board in August 1930: "You are dead right in saying that the problems of the negro schools and the white schools are not the same. We have got to know

definitely what objectives any school has; particularly is that true in negro education. If we train negroes to live a life which human society forbids them to live after we have educated them, then they have a right to reprimand us after they are educated. I should expect such educated persons to become Bolshevists, and it will be our fault if they do." Afro-Americans, then, were not educated beyond their social position. Throughout the period 1900 to 1935, the philanthropists and their agents pushed two philosophies of public secondary education, one for democracy and one for oppression.[56]

Between 1928 and 1932, the Rosenwald Fund contributed money to the building of industrial departments in black high schools in Little Rock, Arkansas; Columbus, Georgia; Maysville, Kentucky; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Greenville, South Carolina; and Atlanta, Georgia. It considered projects in many other cities. At no time, however, did the fund persuade any southern city to build a black high school devoted exclusively to industrial education despite its official policy of paying one-third of the total cost of such high schools and only one-fifth toward the cost of combined academic and industrial high schools. The fund did not contribute any money to help build purely academic high schools for black children. Although the philanthropists achieved limited success, the overall outcomes were far from their larger goal of establishing in the urban South a system of black secondary education that would train black youth for racially prescribed occupations and socialize them to fit into a repressive social order. The white South was too indifferent to the idea, and the black South generally resisted the philanthropists' model of secondary industrial education.[57]

In late 1931 the Rosenwald Fund withdrew abruptly from its campaigns to direct black secondary education into industrial channels. In vital respects, the fund's campaigns were the last major efforts by northern philanthropists to impose upon black children of the American South a racially repressive model of industrial education. These campaigns ended because of the lessons the philanthropists learned about race and class in the southern urban economy as the country moved deeper into the national economic depression. Northern philanthropists increasingly realized how sharp were the differences between their ideology of industrial education as a formula for racial segmentation in the labor market and the material reality of black economic oppression in the urban South. Building an ideological bridge across such intolerable contradictions was virtually impossible. The philanthropists' ideology of black secondary industrial education rested on two fundamental assumptions about black economic opportunities in the urban South. First, they assumed that certain occupations were virtually fixed as "Negro jobs" in which black workers were allegedly immune from active competition by

white workers. These were the jobs the industrial high schools would train black youth to hold. Second, the philanthropists believed that expanding industrialization in the urban South would increase the standard of living for all classes, thereby widening the occupational opportunities for those on the bottom. Yet, because of fundamental changes in the southern economy during the late 1920s, and the philanthropists' own investigation of those changes as they occurred, the ideology of black secondary industrial education came apart at the seams.

The philanthropists' conception of black education and work in the urban South started to unravel by accident. They had set out in late 1929 to investigate local industrial opportunities for black workers in selected southern cities with the intent of pointing out, as Stern said, "in what lines Negroes have openings at present and in what numbers, as well as new opportunities for trained men where positions may be available." These investigations were expected to identify the jobs open to black workers so as to develop a structure and process of secondary industrial training that would channel black youth into the racially prescribed occupations. The unintended result, however, was the philanthropists' discovery that there were no "Negro jobs" in the urban South, no racially hierarchical economy in which each constituent class held fixed occupational slots. Rather, "Negro jobs" were mostly those jobs left over after whites achieved full employment. In periods of economic prosperity this meant that about 75 percent of southern black workers were farm workers, day laborers, and laundry women. Another 20 percent formed the urban working class of semiskilled laborers, public servants, and skilled artisans. The other 5 percent, the most economically advanced group, were farm owners, professionals, and small merchants. In periods of economic regression, however, many of these workers, particularly in the urban South, were pushed downward, and long-standing "Negro jobs" became "white jobs."[58]

The decade 1920 to 1930 was one period in which "Negro jobs" were transformed into "white jobs." As the economic depression struck hard in the rural sections of the South early in the decade, whites and blacks accelerated their migration to the cities in search of better opportunities. This flow of population from the farms to the cities converged later in the decade with other factors, including rising unemployment, declining production, and normal population growth, which in turn produced a crisis in the region's urban economies. At just this time the Rosenwald Fund agents were conducting sociological surveys of southern cities for its educational reforms with particular concern for the industrial opportunities of black workers.

George R. Arthur was one of the first Rosenwald agents to understand the significant displacement of black workers in the urban South. In

October 1929, having heard rumors about displacement, Arthur wrote to Karl F. Phillips, commissioner of conciliation in the U.S. Department of Labor, to request factual information on "the replacement of colored workers by white workers throughout the country, especially in southern cities." He sent copies of the same letter to J. A. Jackson of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Albion W. Hosley of Tuskegee Institute, Jesse O. Thomas, southern field director of the Urban League, and H. J. DeYarmett, superintendent of the trade school at Hampton Institute. DeYarmett had only fragmented evidence concerning displacement of workers. He told of a large contractor in Washington, D.C., who had for years employed black brickmasons and plasterers but had been forced to change to white labor because of recent clauses in the contracts of all-white unions requiring him to use only union labor. "My own observation has been that where the unions have become stronger in southern communities, it has become more difficult for the colored mechanic to secure work," replied DeYarmett. The well-known black sociologist Ira De A. Reid responded in behalf of the National Urban League. As director of the Urban League's Department of Research and Investigation, Reid was already examining the question of black job displacement in the urban South and had in the process discovered many instances. In Charlotte, North Carolina, the heavy trucks and transfers were being manned by white workers where black workers had formerly been. Moreover, "White school boys are taking the place of Negro elevator girls," said Reid. In Kansas City, Missouri, black waitresses were dismissed from a large drugstore and replaced by white females. Reid found that "in Spartanburg, South Carolina, white men are taking many of the jobs formerly done by Negroes such as driving express wagons and portering." Similarly, in Columbia, South Carolina, white workers had replaced black workers as drivers of garbage and dirt wagons for the city. Black workers in the same city were "losing out in the building trades." In Atlanta, Georgia, there was a general feeling among black workers "that the jobs they were losing to whites resulted from premeditation and proscription."[59]

Reid discovered in Charleston, South Carolina, that black male laborers were "losing constantly in all lines of work, particularly in building trades." According to Reid,

> Union men, particularly carpenters, have been known to walk off jobs when Negroes come on. White men are driving wagons instead of Negroes who formerly performed all of this service. The streets are now being cleaned by whites, but the asphalt paving is done by Negroes. The longshoremen occupations have remained intact for Negro workers. White men, however, have taken over the scavenger positions with the city. Three years ago Negroes are reported to have laughed when white men were seen digging streets for sewer pipes. It is now the usual thing to see white men doing this work.

Similar patterns emerged throughout the urban South. In Savannah, Georgia, laundry wagons were being driven by white men when once only black men drove them. Jesse O. Thomas found in Jacksonville, Florida, an organization known as the Blue Shirt, which he described as a "Chamber of Commerce for the white working man." Its leaders drove about the city demanding the displacement of black workers. Any white employer who failed to comply with the Blue Shirt's demand was assailed in the organization's newsletter as a "nigger lover." After observing incidents of displacement in several southern cities, Thomas concluded: "There has been a complete reversal of the white South toward menial labor. A white man at the present time has no fear of losing his social cast because he digs a ditch, drives a garbage or scavenger truck."[60]

Because the philanthropists' program of black secondary industrial education rested heavily on the assumption that certain industrial occupations in the urban South belonged predominantly, if not exclusively, to black workers, they were naturally concerned whether the reports of displacement were true. Reid and Thomas had fine reputations as social investigators for the Urban League. The philanthropists, however, always contracted their own social scientists to conduct important social research. Thus the Rosenwald Fund requested Charles S. Johnson, eminent sociologist and longtime associate of the fund, to conduct a detailed and systematic sociological study of the displacement of black workers in selected southern cities. Johnson conducted inquiries in ten southern cities between 20 October and 4 November 1929. The cities were Montgomery and Birmingham, Alabama; Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; Shreveport and New Orleans, Louisiana; Atlanta, Georgia; Jackson, Mississippi; Little Rock, Arkansas; and Louisville, Kentucky. At the time Johnson completed his investigation the Rosenwald Fund was still contemplating monetary contributions toward the construction of secondary industrial high schools in all of the ten cities except Montgomery and Jackson.[61]

Johnson discovered that a cluster of economic changes "placed white and Negro workers more acutely in competition for the same jobs, with a result that white workers were frequently given preference, particularly on city, county, and state work where political influence can grant favors to voters and receive votes in return." Population growth, mechanization, the increasing number of white women in industrial occupations, and the influx of rural workers converged to heighten the competition between blacks and whites for a declining number of industrial jobs

because of the post–World War I depression of such industries as coal, lumber, iron, and steel, and, intermittently, building construction. Moreover, skilled labor in southern cities came increasingly under the control of labor unions, which either restricted or discouraged black membership. The textile industry—the dominant and most rapidly growing industry in the South—generally excluded black workers from all but janitorial service. The new occupational opportunities that opened in southern cities, including those in radio, auto mechanics, trucking, taxicab driving, and the like, offered few opportunities to black workers, and certainly none in skilled positions except in those rare instances when the owners were black. The growing shortage of jobs and increasing rates of unemployment precipitated white organizations' insistence on the employment of white workers even if that meant discharging black workers en masse. Among such white groups were the Federation of Women's Clubs, Junior Leagues, Ku Klux Klan, Blue Shirt, and White Knights. Another factor effecting the displacement of black workers was the emerging militant racist reaction to interracial contact between servants and customers, which affected black workers in hotels as bellmen, as barbers when the fad of bobbing women's hair emerged, and in certain food industries.[62]

The character and details of the displacement varied from city to city, but structurally the process was similar across the urban South. White workers who felt compelled to take jobs formerly regarded as "Negro work" resolved their frustrations by excluding black workers and by securing an increase in wages to perform the same tasks, even though they had less experience than the black workers they displaced. In Montgomery, in 1924, most of the truck drivers for the lumber, coal, and ice companies, wholesale houses, and laundries were black. By 1929, from 60 to 90 percent were white. In 1924 there were fewer than ten white carpenters in Montgomery; by 1929, about 50 percent of the carpenters were white. The same was true for brickmasonry. Johnson found that construction companies, which had used only black carpenters and brick masons at the beginning of the 1920s, used all-white or majority-white work forces at the end of the decade. Even the new buildings under construction at the Alabama State Normal School for Negroes were being erected with no black mechanics. Similarly, barber shops, insurance companies, and hotels replaced black workers with white workers. The Alabama Power Company had used many black workers as wiremen, but in 1929 all of the company's wiremen were white. A pickle factory that once had a labor force that was 80 percent black had changed to "only white workers." Johnson learned of complaints by black workers that the Federation of Women's Clubs and the Junior Chamber of Commerce, in their campaigns to find jobs for the newly arrived whites from the

rural sections, urged businesses to replace their black workers with white workers.[63]

In Jackson, Mississippi, black workers in the building trades were being displaced rapidly. From 1919 to 1925, blacks and whites were organized in the same unions, and blacks were four times as numerous as whites. The white unionists complained that their families objected to interracial meetings, and to resolve the tension the American Federation of Labor established separate locals for black unionists. Following this action the black mechanics quickly lost control of jobs in the building trades. The white foremen felt responsible only to the white locals. Consequently, in 1929, there were "practically no Negro apprentices in training." Black plasterers in Jackson lost about 50 percent of their work. Blacks had predominated as drivers of bread, grocery, and laundry wagons, but in 1929, about 95 percent of Jackson's drivers were white. Even the black street cleaners were displaced. Once blacks had done all the street cleaning in Jackson. In 1929 white workers drove the wagons and blacks lifted the garbage cans to the wagons. In the new Post Office the black mail handlers were replaced with white mail handlers. The Jitney Jingle stores replaced black porters with white porters. The displaced black workers in Jackson cited the Federation of Women's Clubs, the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor's office, and the White Knights as the key groups demanding that "the better paid jobs be given to white workers."[64]

In Atlanta, Georgia, as in many other places throughout the urban South, the economically rational principle of hiring the best-qualified workers at the cheapest wage was stood on its head. Atlanta's Sanitary Department discharged all of its black truck drivers and replaced them with white drivers. The experienced black drivers had been paid $60 per month; the new white drivers were hired at a minimum wage of $100 per month. Moreover, some of the displaced black workers were then rehired as helpers to the white drivers and paid $50 per month. Such patterns were consistent with the Chamber of Commerce's campaign to boost Atlanta as a haven for "satisfied, intelligent, contented Anglo-Saxon labor." The Jacob Drug Company, a chain of 120 stores in Atlanta, had for thirty years employed black youth as messengers. On 15 July 1929, however, the 230 black messengers were discharged and the white youth hired to take their places were given an increase in pay of $3 per week, plus a regulation uniform. Similarly, between 1919 and 1929, black truck drivers for the Hormel Company, Swift Company, Cudahy Packing Company, Wilson and Company, and White Provision Company were replaced by white drivers. The Georgia Baptist Hospital, one of the South's largest private hospitals, discharged its entire black work force and gave an increase in pay to the new white workers. The white pa-

tients, however, complained about the inexperience and inefficiency of the white workers and, after two months of trial and error, the black workers were called back. The black workers were given the same salary as before they were discharged even though the whites who replaced them were paid more during their short tenure.[65]

There were very few black workers in Atlanta's automobile industry. J. H. Wilson, general manager of the Ford Motor Company, maintained that his black employees were discharged because the company did not have racially separate washroom and dressing room facilities. Wilson also stated that he saw no future for black workers in the southern automobile industry. The regional manager of the Chevrolet Motor Company reported that none of his black workers had been displaced, but he employed only eighteen blacks among eighteen hundred workers and they were janitors and "yard boys." In Memphis, Johnson discovered that black skilled and unskilled laborers were being displaced. Black linesmen and truck drivers were being replaced with white workers. The local May Brothers Sawmill had employed three hundred black workers in 1919 but had fewer than fifteen in 1929. Black employees in railroad shops were "definitely being replaced." Further, reported Johnson: "In public works it is very noticeable that large groups of white men are doing the common labor which was formerly considered Negro jobs. Such vocations may be mentioned as street cleaning, telephone company jobs, excavating, teamsters, street grading, and repair work for the street car company." Similarly, in New Orleans the excavating, garbage collection, and cleaning of railroad cars, once done by black workers, had been taken over by whites in 1929. "Shop workers, tinsmiths, hostlers' helpers, cabinet makers' helpers before the war were all Negroes," Johnson wrote of New Orleans, "now they are all white." All of this and more were included in the report Johnson submitted to the Rosenwald Fund in November 1929.[66]

The northern philanthropists, therefore, found themselves in the peculiar position of advocating and implementing secondary industrial education to train black youth in certain occupations just at the time when black workers were being pushed out of those jobs and replaced by white workers. The philanthropists assumed that in the urban South black workers held an economic position, which, even if not absolutely fixed and permanent, was at least permanent enough to train and socialize black children into it. This economic position, albeit at the bottom of the industrial ladder, was viewed as the basis for regional social stability and economic prosperity. Hence secondary school courses in carpentry, bricklaying, plastering, painting, metal work, plumbing, shoe repairing, chauffeuring, barbering, electrical work, auto mechanics, printing, cement finishing, furniture repair, truck driving, and mill work were introduced and taught. Meanwhile, unemployed white laborers, compelled under distressed economic conditions to accept any grade of work and almost any rate of pay, collaborated with owners, politicians, editors, ministers, auxiliary groups, and militant right-wing organizations to oust black workers from those occupations. The philanthropists saw that the practical objective of their model of black secondary industrial education could not be attained. The ultimate failure of their industrial education programs had come not because of the absence of capital and devoted effort but because of changes in the southern and national economy which they did not foresee, and which, even if they had foreseen, they could not have prevented. Moreover, once they became aware of patterns of displacement they had not the knowledge or means to adapt industrial education to this level of oppression. No class of laborers could be educated for displacement.

The philanthropists now faced a blank wall. The rampant displacement of black workers from even the lowest rung of the industrial ladder posed anew the question of what could be accomplished by the industrial education of black youth. The philanthropists' astonishing answer was to terminate their movement to industrialize black secondary education and to turn their wealth and power more fully toward shaping black collegiate education. During the late 1920s, Hampton and Tuskegee abandoned their industrial training programs and soon became the two best-endowed black colleges for liberal arts education. The black federal land-grant colleges, built to foster agriculture and industrial education, were also transformed into basically liberal arts institutions. A system of higher education, however, presupposed the existence of academic high schools with adequate courses of study taught during a definite series of years by competent instructors. Yet it was that system of education which the philanthropists, in cooperation with southern state and local governments, had used their wealth and power to subordinate to the perceived necessity of training blacks to fit into the South's caste-ridden economy. Without question, the great economic expenditures and reform crusades for black industrial education contributed directly and significantly to the underdevelopment of black secondary education.

Whereas the majority, 54 percent, of southern white children of high school age were enrolled in public high schools by the mid-1930s, more than eight out of every ten black children of high school age were not enrolled in secondary schools. Table 6.5 reveals that, in 1933–34, the 152,310 black students enrolled in high schools constituted only 18 percent of the 847,163 black children of high school age in the sixteen former slave states. This pattern of southern black high school enrollment held through the 1930s. In 1940, as illustrated in Table 6.6, only 23 percent of the black high school age population was enrolled in public

TABLE 6.5

High School Enrollment by Age, Race, and Southern States, 1933–1934

State	Number of children 14 to 17 years of age, inclusive, 1930		Enrollment in secondary grades, 1933–34		Percentage ratio of enrollment to number of children	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Alabama	152,937	90,654	60,821	9,162	40	10
Arkansas	122,944	41,655	51,066	4,038	42	10
Delaware	14,623	2,368	9,573	771	66	33
Florida	78,055	33,775	52,415	5,550	67	16
Georgia	162,865	107,158	89,470	10,927	55	10
Kentucky	196,547	16,751	83,812	7,079	43	42
Louisiana	109,951	65,304	62,836	8,832	57	14
Maryland	97,122	19,714	49,781	5,536	51	28
Mississippi	87,549	93,660	57,959	6,757	66	7
Missouri	248,199	13,490	154,059	6,033	62	45
North Carolina	203,852	93,578	124,281	24,725	61	26
South Carolina	85,722	87,493	51,616	10,377	60	12
Tennessee	181,106	40,233	77,565	10,751	43	27
Texas	408,230	72,725	239,887	25,505	59	35
Virginia	147,543	60,816	80,697	12,475	55	21
West Virginia	136,638	7,789	75,114	3,792	55	49
Totals	2,433,893	847,163	1,320,952	152,310	54	18

Source: Wilkerson, *Special Problems of Negro Education*, p. 36.

secondary schools. In Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, states with large black populations, less than 18 percent of the black high school age population was enrolled in public secondary schools in 1940. For the nation as a whole and the white South, the elite public high school of the late nineteenth century was transformed into the "people's college" during the first third of the twentieth century. For blacks in the South, the struggle to attain public high schools for the majority of their high school age children would continue beyond the post–World War II era. While American youth in general were being pushed into public high schools, southern black youth, a sizable minority of black high school age children in America, were being locked out of the nation's public high schools. This oppression of black schoolchildren during the critical stage of the transformation of American secondary education seriously affected the long-term development of education in the black community and was one of the fundamental reasons that the educational progress of black Americans lagged far behind that of other Americans.

TABLE 6.6

Secondary School Enrollment and Graduates in Black Public Schools in Southern States, 1940

State	Population 15–19 years of age, inclusive	Secondary school enrollment	Percent of population enrolled	High school graduates
Alabama	104,757	17,181	16.4	2,056
Arkansas	49,534	7,304	14.7	909
Delaware	3,319	953	28.7	92
Florida	48,698	11,365	23.3	1,299
Georgia	118,155	18,938	16.0	1,991
Kentucky	19,941	6,707	33.6	898
Louisiana	86,881	15,360	17.6	1,444
Maryland	28,987	8,306	28.6	1,226
Mississippi	114,415	10,739	9.3	1,425
Missouri	19,514	9,102	46.6	1,209
North Carolina	118,716	39,550	33.3	4,504
South Carolina	102,278	17,263	16.8	1,881
Tennessee	49,952	12,918	25.8	1,670
Texas	93,908	37,285	39.7	4,227
Virginia	74,438	21,658	29.0	2,692
West Virginia	11,775	5,330	45.2	678
Total	1,046,167	240,049	22.9	28,201

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 209, 391, 899; pt. 3, pp. 177, 335, 509; pt. 4, pp. 205, 315; pt. 5, p. 269; pt. 6, pp. 349, 563, 765; pt. 7, pp. 137, 445; Blose and Caliver, *Statistics of the Education of Negroes*.