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Pushing the boundary: state restructuring, state theory, and the case of U.S.–Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s

Mark Purcell^{a,*}, Joseph Nevins^b

^a*Department of Urban Design & Planning, University of Washington, Box 355740, Gould 410, Seattle, WA 98195, USA*

^b*Department of Geology and Geography, Vassar College, Box 66, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604-0066, USA*

Abstract

This paper is a sympathetic critique of the current view of the state and state restructuring in the literature on geographical political economy. We contend that although this literature has developed a view of the state that is far more complex than a crudely determinist or economistic reading, it nevertheless remains limited. The literature analyzes the imperatives that shape state restructuring in a way that ultimately always refers back to the need to preserve capitalist accumulation and maintain the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. We suggest that an effective strategy for moving beyond these limits is a more explicit methodological focus on imperatives beyond capitalist accumulation. To illustrate this strategy, we focus on one such imperative: the need to reproduce a relationship of political legitimacy between state and citizens. We present a case study that examines the significant build-up of U.S.–Mexico boundary enforcement in the 1990s. The case highlights the importance of the political–geographical relation between state and citizen for shaping state policy choices. We find that a critical impetus for the boundary build-up in the 1990s was a complex set of concerns about security that grew dialectically out of interactions between particular state actors and particular groups of citizens. While the build-up could be analyzed insofar as it helped reproduce the relations of capital, such an approach cannot capture the whole story. We conclude the paper by calling for an analysis of the state and state

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: mpurcell@u.washington.edu (M. Purcell), jonevins@vassar.edu (J. Nevins).

restructuring that extends the current focus on accumulation and capitalist social relations to include a much wider range of imperatives.

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Introduction

This paper argues for expanding the view of the state and state restructuring that currently exists in the literature on critical political economy in geography. While contemporary political-economic analyzes have developed a view of the state that is far more complex than a crudely determinist or economic reading, we argue it is still incomplete. Currently, much work on the state in geographical political economy is centrally concerned to understand the role of the state in the ongoing round of global economic restructuring (e.g. Brenner, 1998; Goodwin & Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1995; Jones, 1997; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Peck & Jones, 1995). In this account, the economy is seen as endemically prone to crisis, and the state is interpreted as a crucial actor that helps secure social cohesion and political stability so that economic crises do not lead to the collapse of capitalist economic relations. Thus, the literature is concerned to analyze the state insofar as it helps reproduce the social relationships that underpin capitalist accumulation. Political questions are important in this account, but they have to do almost entirely with the political stability of capitalist social relations.

This analysis is by no means wrong: the role the state plays in reproducing capitalist social relations is a crucial issue and deserves the careful study it has received. However, we argue that there is much more to the imperatives shaping the state than just the reproduction of capitalist social relations. The state and state actors are pulled in many different directions, only some of which can be traced to concerns about accumulation. To illustrate this point, in the paper we highlight one such direction: how state actors are motivated by the need to legitimize and reproduce political–geographical relationships between the state and its citizenry.¹ Our goal is not to develop an original theoretical statement on this relation; it is rather to illustrate our critique by detailing how an imperative not reducible to accumulation can shape state structures and policies. We suggest that the complex relationships between state actors and groups of citizens have an important effect on the decisions state actors make, the institutional forms the state takes, and the policies it enacts. In order to maintain political legitimacy and effective authority

¹ Throughout the paper, when we use the terms “citizen” and “citizenry” we do not mean to refer only to formal citizens, nor do we mean to imply a relationship that can be reduced to electoral politics. Rather we use the terms to refer broadly to all people subject to the state’s rule (no matter what their formal citizenship status). We are addressing state–citizen relations in the most catholic sense. In order for the state to remain in power, this political relationship must remain stable.

over its people, the state must reproduce a politically stable relationship between state and citizen. While these expectations are tied to the maintenance of capitalism in important ways, they are not reducible to that imperative. There are significant elements of state–citizen relations that cannot be comprehended by tracing them back to accumulation and capitalist social relations (see Coleman [this issue](#) for a similar argument about the limits to capital-centric analyzes).

To demonstrate empirically how an imperative not reducible to accumulation can shape state policies and structures, we present a case study of the production of the immigration enforcement apparatus along the U.S.–Mexico boundary in the 1990s. The case suggests that while ensuring economic accumulation and reproducing capitalist social relations are both relevant to understanding U.S. policy on the boundary with Mexico, a set of imperatives more closely connected to the political–geographical relation between state and citizen has been crucial in shaping the decisions of state actors. Concerns about the sanctity of national territory, the power of narratives, ideologies, identities and discourses as they relate to a national “we” and a foreign “Other”, and the instability that often accompanies the “thinning out” of places brought about increased global flows (see [Doty, 1999](#); [Nevins, 2002](#); [Newman & Paasi, 1998](#); [Paasi, 1996](#); [Sack, 1997](#)), for example, have all been highly significant factors in motivating individual and collective sentiment vis-à-vis the U.S.–Mexico boundary and immigration enforcement. Hence, we argue that in the case of the boundary build-up, complex interchanges between state actors and groups of citizens produced a set of deep concerns about the ethno-cultural, socio-economic, and bio-physical security of the nation, all of which are inherently geographical given their inextricable relationship to a particular territory. The boundary build-up was thus a territorial strategy to achieve that security and assuage those concerns ([Nevins, 2002](#)). Many felt that unauthorized immigration undermined the stability of the geographical and social boundaries between “us” and “them”, and therefore threatened the ethno-cultural integrity of the nation. Also important was a perceived threat that immigrants posed to socio-economic security, in terms of the jobs they filled and the public services they used. Lastly, there was a perception that unauthorized immigrants were likely to commit crimes, and they therefore threatened the bio-physical security of Americans. Important sections of the citizenry pressed the state to respond to this threat by policing the border more aggressively. The case illustrates that understanding the state requires more than an emphasis on accumulation and capitalist social relations. It also requires an emphasis on the more purely political relations between state and citizen.

Before turning to the case, we begin by presenting a review and critique of state theory in critical geography. We then briefly develop what we mean by the state–citizen relation in order to show that it cannot be reduced to the goal of maintaining capitalism.

State theory and state restructuring

Recently there has been a great deal of work in geography and beyond on global political and economic restructuring. In general, scholars of all kinds have become

fascinated with globalization, and, in particular, critical political economists have tried to understand how the global political economy is being broken apart and reassembled into new institutions, new arrangements, and new relationships (see, among many others Brenner, 1999b; Dicken, 1998; Harvey, 1995; Held, 1995; Hirst & Thompson, 1995; Kelly, 1999; Kofman & Youngs, 1996; Lechner & Boli, 1999; Mittelman, 1997; O'Meara, Mehlinger, & Krain, 2000; Waters, 1995). An important strain of critical political economy has focused specifically on the state (Brenner, 1999a; Cerny, 1997; Jessop, 1990; Jones, 1997; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Peck, 2001; Swyngedouw, 1996; Tickell & Peck, 1996; Yaghmaian, 1998). The work on the state draws on several intellectual sources, among them Poulantzas (1976, 1978), Habermas (1975), Offe (1975), O'Connor (1973), and Gramsci (1971). More recent inspirations have come from the French 'regulationist' school (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1987).

These various sources are diverse, and there are certainly significant points of contention among them. However, we want to highlight a general tendency that we contend they share. Each of these sources grapples with and tries to overcome the same important paradox in critical theory. Marx argued that capitalism is characterized by fundamental contradictions; it is inherently unstable and prone to socio-economic crises that threaten its continued existence. If Marx was right, the normal workings of capitalism should cause it to collapse under the weight of this inevitable crisis. On the contrary, however, capitalism has persisted as a dominant form of socio-economic organization for over 300 years. The work on the state in critical political economy strongly retains Marx's premise that capitalism is prone to crisis; in fact the notion of crisis can be seen as the main focus of the literature. Because capitalism is prone to destabilizing and self-generated crises, and because the system has nevertheless persisted, there must be some complex of economic, social, cultural, and political "regulation"² that works to soothe, mute, and partially resolve the contradictions and crises of capitalism (Jessop, 1997b). Critical state theory struggles to understand and describe the complex system of governance and regulation that allows for the preservation of accumulation and the continuing hegemony of capitalist economic relations.

Quite understandably, then, these state theorists analyze the state with respect to its role in the regulation of capitalism (examples include Brenner, 2002; Collinge & Hall, 1997; Jessop, 2000; Jones, 2001; Lauria, 1997, 1999; Majone, 1999; Martin, 1997; Painter, 1997; Painter & Goodwin, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2000). As an important and even primary institutional actor in society, the state has a central role to play in regulating capitalist crisis. It is uniquely positioned to coordinate, routinize, and stabilize the complex whole of regularizing practices. Because this account represents the state primarily with respect to its role in the management of capitalism, it is tempting (especially among those in the liberal, Weberian, and post-structural

² We will use the terminology of regulation theory to capture this idea, but all the state-theory traditions we identify incorporate some similar concept of the regulation, legitimation, management, or reproduction of accumulation and capitalist social relations. Moreover, they all analyze the state in relation to this wider process of socio-economic "regulation".

traditions) to oversimplify this view of the state as plainly reductionist, functionalist, or economistic. Critical state theory might be read as arguing that the state (and by extension every other aspect of society) is simply responding straightforwardly to economic imperatives.

But such a critique is wrong. First, much of this work on the state is sensitive to the critique of functionalism, and many explicitly reject a functionalist and reductionist reading of the state. As Jessop (1990: 79) argued more than 10 years ago, “for some time there has been a strong reaction among Marxist theorists against economic reductionism”. Theret (1994: 2) stresses the importance of outlining “a non-functionalist theoretical conception of how [the state] interacts with capitalist relations that structure the economic order”. It is the explicit theoretical position of most state theorists in critical political economy that the forms and functions of the state are *not* reducible to the needs of the economy. However, despite this fact, much of this state theory exhibits strong overtones of reductionism. One hunts in vain for an analysis of state restructuring that does not ultimately lead back to the preservation of either accumulation or capitalist social relations.

We propose that despite its clear theoretical rejection of economism, the research program of the literature has produced the effect of a *de facto* reductionist account of the state, even if that reductionism is theoretically rejected. Because the project of this work is, in the last instance, to explain the enduring hegemony of capitalism, the state is rarely the ultimate object of explanation. As a matter of research and writing practice, state restructuring is virtually always examined with respect to economic relations. As a result, the analyzes of the state that are actually produced are almost entirely confined to the role the state plays in preserving accumulation and capitalist social relations. Therefore, state theory in critical political economy presents a strong impression that the state exists to serve the needs of capital. Because the apparent reductionism in state theory is the result of its research focus and discursive conventions rather than its theoretical principles, we contend that a more complete account of the state does not require a rejection or retooling of the *theoretical* principles of the literature. Rather, it requires more explicit attention *in research practice* to imperatives beyond accumulation that influence the state and state restructuring (this argument has been developed in greater detail in Purcell, 2002).

Second, it is wrong to accuse the literature of economism specifically, since it offers an explicit and sustained analysis of the political, cultural, and social aspects of regulation. Particularly relevant to this paper is that many have written extensively about the role the state plays in securing not just accumulation, but political legitimacy as well. Here the work of Gramsci (1971), Habermas (1975), and Offe (1975), is particularly used to argue that the state plays a critical role in securing an overall political legitimacy in society (Collinge & Hall, 1997; Jessop, 1997a; Kipfer, 2002; MacLeod, 1999; Majone, 1999; Martin, 1997; Papadopoulos, 2000; Torfing, 1989; Wolfe, 1977). However, this work tends to conceive of political legitimacy in terms of the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. This legitimacy allows capitalism, with its inherent class divisions and contradictions, to function without crippling political and social upheaval. When such an overall societal stability is secured, the argument goes, the majority of a society’s members consider themselves

to have a stake in the present social, political, and economic structure. For example, Jessop's influential work draws on Gramsci to talk about the state pursuing "hegemonic projects" through which it secures a societal political compact that stabilizes and institutionalizes a particular set of capitalist social relations (Jessop, 1983, 1990, 1997a).

So it is inaccurate to suggest that the account of the state in this work has been apolitical. Our argument is that the notion of political legitimacy and the state's relationship to it remains incomplete. In the literature's accounts, political legitimacy refers almost exclusively to the legitimacy of the social relations between capital and labor. In this context, the state helps create the political legitimacy not for state power but for the social relations of capitalism. In this account of political legitimacy, like the account of the state more generally, all roads lead back to capitalist economic relations. Again, our argument is not that this analysis is wrong, only that it is incomplete. There are other political imperatives that influence the state beyond the need to legitimate and reproduce capitalist social relations. In the paper we focus on one among many such imperatives: the need to legitimate the relations of power between the state and those it rules. We argue that state theory in critical geography has tended to ignore this imperative, and that omission has hindered its understanding of the state and state restructuring.

Extending the analysis: the relations between state and citizen

To reiterate, our goal is not to develop a detailed theoretical account of the relationship between state and citizen. It is rather to offer a sympathetic critique of critical state theory. The state–citizen relation is one among many possible avenues for moving beyond a capital-centric state theory. Other avenues are of course equally important to explore. We highlight the state–citizen relation because we find it particularly salient for understanding the case of the U.S.–Mexico boundary. This section sketches what we mean by the state–citizen relation in order to establish that it is distinct from and cannot be reduced to the preservation of capitalism.

In order for state power to remain politically stable in liberal democracies, there must be an overall sense among those the state rules that it is the legitimate authority in its territory.³ In other words, state actors must reproduce the political legitimacy of the power relations between ruler and ruled. Because of the importance of such state–citizen legitimacy for state power, state actors must both respond to and actively cultivate legitimacy. Their decisions and policies will be shaped in part by the need to demonstrate to citizens that state actors are working to secure perceived citizen interests. Certainly one cannot draw a bright line between the political legitimacy of state–citizen relations and the political legitimacy of capitalist social

³ In other types of state, political legitimacy might be less important, such as in an authoritarian state that uses fear to control the population. But even in such states, there remains some need for ideologies that justify the state's authority to those it rules.

relations. Clearly state–citizen legitimacy is tied to the state’s ability to secure economic opportunity for its citizens and to legitimate capitalist social relations. For example, the state is routinely expected to ensure sufficient job opportunities, which in a capitalist economy is closely tied to ensuring conditions for accumulation. But we want to stress that economic imperatives are not the *only* element of state–citizen relations. For example, citizens might expect the state to ensure territorial security, provide a certain level of public services, protect their political rights, or preserve the cultural character of the nation. These more overtly political, geographical, and cultural aspects can go beyond and can even contradict the imperatives of capital accumulation. To take just one example, many states retreat from welfare provision and move toward workfare policies may be more appropriate to the present post-Fordist regime of accumulation, but such a retrenchment will almost assuredly run afoul of the welfare expectations that citizens have developed as an important component of their relationship with the state. The shift from welfare to workfare may secure some economic opportunity, but it could also precipitate a crisis of legitimacy between state and citizen, and it has for some local states (Purcell, 2001, 2002). In short, state–citizen relations cannot be reduced to economic concerns; they must instead be conceived and analyzed on their own terms. In the case of the build-up of the U.S.–Mexico boundary, the state was responding to a range of concerns only some of which can be traced to the need to reproduce capitalism.

Citizens’ political support is therefore conditioned by a contingent, differentiated, and changing set of expectations; the state must meet some combination of those expectations sufficiently in order to maintain the overall political support of citizens. Since states cannot effectively manage the crises of capitalism unless they maintain their own legitimate authority with their citizens, attention to state–citizen relations is critical to the research questions of critical state theory in geography. Despite their importance, however, state–citizen relations have not been examined actively in the account of the state. Most scholars ignore both their economic and non-economic aspects.

While it is rhetorically convenient to speak of both the state and citizenry as unitary, of course both the state and the citizenry are highly differentiated. Moreover, the boundaries of each group are not stable, clearly defined, or mutually exclusive. The identity and agenda of a given individual or group is not exclusively defined by their status as state elite or state subject. Furthermore, the politics of state–citizen relations rarely involves the state-as-a-whole legitimating its power to the citizenry-as-a-whole. Rather, particular factions of state actors seek to demonstrate their concern for the needs of particular factions of the citizenry. And the relationship is not just one-way. State actors also operate entrepreneurially by cultivating citizen expectations and desires to more closely match those actors’ particular agendas (see Calavita, 1992; Mann, 1984).⁴ So in everyday practice, certain factions of state actors engage key factions of the citizenry to produce

⁴ For example, the U.S. Republican Party might cultivate a concern about crime, since they are seen as stronger on law and order.

expectations and pursue particular agendas. In the aggregate and long term, a generalized citizenry must see the state's power as legitimate, but in practice a given project usually involves only particular portions of state and citizenry.

Despite this pluralism, however, our case highlights an important process in which these factional state projects can become generalized within the state. Because modern state sovereignty is still dominated by the national-scale state, national-scale structures and policies draw together all state actors and all state citizens to some degree.⁵ Of course, national-scale policies are not perfectly uniform, and there is always geographical unevenness in their application and enforcement. But even so, to a great degree national-scale policies can serve to generalize a particular agenda to the state as a whole. This generalization can help both legitimate and entrench the political project of a particular faction of state actors and/or citizens. National-scale policies can, in effect, extend the legitimation relationship between particular factions of state actors and citizens to the state-as-a-whole.

The case study

Our case of the U.S.–Mexico border works precisely along these lines. The decision to build up the border grew out of a relationship between factions. A particular set of citizens saw immigration from Mexico as a threat to the comprehensive security of the American nation and expected the state would take steps to defend the nation against this threat. A set of state actors believed they were advantageously situated to meet this concern, and they both cultivated and responded to it by advocating a policy to augment border control. Since immigration and border control are predominantly the responsibility of the national state, responding to the expectation required a national-scale policy. Many, although not all, of the key underlying concerns informing pro-boundary enforcement advocacy were regional or local in nature. Pro-enforcement advocates in Southern California, for example, often highlighted the medical costs to the region caused by the large numbers of undocumented immigrants seeking care at public health facilities. Such sub-national concerns about migration from Mexico could only have concrete effects through a project to “scale up” these concerns to a national population of both state actors and citizens (Brenner, 2001; Smith, 1993). A national-scale policy of border control could then address those local concerns.

A complete analysis of the build-up along the U.S.–Mexico boundary must therefore grasp both its economic and extra-economic elements. Much work on the issue highlights how the interests of capital have shaped U.S. policy on the border (Calavita, 1992; Galarza, 1964; Samora, 1971). Recent work reiterates that economic factors continue to inform the levels of enforcement of the boundary (Andreas, 2000;

⁵ We are well aware of the literature arguing that state sovereignty is currently undergoing profound shifts (e.g. Behnke, 1997; Castles, 2001; Duchacek, et al., 1988; Krasner, 2000; Leitner, 1997; Newman, 1996; Purcell, 2003; Sassen, 1996; Schmidt, 1995; Wallace, 1999). However, state territorial sovereignty remains, at least for the moment, dominantly national.

Nevins, 2002). Much of this scholarship, however, also illustrates to varying degrees the importance of non-economic factors for understanding present-day boundary and immigration enforcement efforts. In particular, we suggest that state–citizen relations not reducible to the realm of the economic have been critical for shaping state decision-making and policy.

The re-making of the U.S.–Mexico boundary

Our focus is on the unprecedented growth in the 1990s of state resources dedicated to enforcement of the U.S.–Mexico boundary. While myriad short-term factors came together to bring this about, such factors by themselves do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the dramatic changes that took place in the Southwest border region beginning in the early 1990s. Longer-term factors provided the foundation as well as much of the impetus necessary for the recent boundary build-up. Thus, before exploring the actors and events in the early years of the Clinton administration that proved decisive in bringing about the enhanced boundary enforcement regime, some background is in order.

For most of the twentieth century, the U.S.–Mexico boundary was of little concern to policymakers and the public at large. It was not until the 1970s that official and public attention began to focus on matters of unauthorized immigration and the U.S. southern boundary in a significant and sustained manner (see [Dunn, 1996](#); [Nevins, 2002](#)). While there were certainly brief periods prior to the early 1970s that did reflect state and public anxiety, such as during the Depression and 1954—the time of the infamous “Operation Wetback” ([Garcia, 1980](#))—what is striking is how shallow and ephemeral such concern has been, until relatively recently.

This boundary-making and nation-state-building project, and its associated process of what we might call the “illegalization” of unauthorized entrants ([Nevins, 2002](#)), required the conquest of territory and the pacification of populations on both sides of the U.S.–Mexico divide over the *longue durée*, a process with its origins in the mid-1800s. The resulting socio-geographical context allowed for U.S. authorities to begin constructing the infrastructure to define the boundary and thus national territory, and to enforce laws relating to immigration and transboundary trade. In doing so, the state helped to create new “ways of seeing” ([Berger, 1980](#)) and thus ways of being among the populations affected by these developments. These involved perceptions of national territory and associated social identities—specifically those of “American”, “Mexican”, “citizen” and (especially “illegal”) “alien”—as well as associated practices. These new ways of seeing were inextricably tied to evolving and hierarchical notions and practices regarding race, class, gender, and geographic origins—especially as they related to the American “nation”. As the U.S.–Mexico border region became more integrated into the American national center and gained significantly greater levels of demographic and economic importance, and trans-boundary social relations increased, public awareness of “the border” grew.

This awareness increased dramatically in the 1970s, primarily as a result of the activities of state actors who successfully endeavored to raise the profile of the southern boundary and construct it as a grossly under-resourced line of defense against what were framed as invading hordes from Mexico and other points in Latin America. The pro-restrictionist sentiment in the public and in Washington officialdom that resulted translated into significant changes of the physicality of the U.S.–Mexico boundary and its associated enforcement apparatus during the 1980s (Dunn, 1996; Nevins, 2000, 2002). These efforts to fight unauthorized immigration in the border region dovetailed with the “war on drugs” to have a transformational effect on the nature and scale of boundary policing (Dunn, 1996).⁶ In this regard, the Reagan and Bush administrations also significantly helped to associate boundary enforcement and unauthorized immigrants with criminal activity (Andreas, 2000; Dunn, 1996; Nevins, 2002).

As a result of these and other developments, there was unprecedented growth in federal resources dedicated to boundary policing from the late-1970s through the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was a key development in the process, resulting in the authorization of a 50 percent increase in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enforcement budget (Massay, Durand, & Malone, 2002). Although it is not clear that such authorization of resources resulted in a significant expansion of the INS’ enforcement capacity in the short term (see Nevins, 2002), it did strengthen the foundation needed for future growth. At the same time, IRCA’s passage, and Mexico’s entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as the country’s embrace of a deregulated national economy—a move very much supported by the U.S.—marked an intensification and public acknowledgment of what had long been Washington’s *de facto* boundary policy: a seemingly contradictory one that championed growing economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico while endeavoring to achieve greater levels of control over transboundary labor migration (see Massay, et al., 2002).

Whatever the short-term effects of IRCA on boundary enforcement, the boundary build-up that began during the first years of Clinton administration was far more dramatic. The INS budget for enforcement efforts along the Southwest boundary, for example, grew from \$400 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 to \$800 million in FY 1997 (*Migration News*, online version, November 1997). The number of Border Patrol agents rapidly expanded from 4200 in Fiscal Year 1994 to 9212 agents at the end of FY 2000. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, plans were that the number of agents would reach 10,000 by 2005 and that the amount expended on boundary enforcement would increase to \$3 billion (Ellingwood, 1999; *Migration News*, online version, May 1999, September and December 2000). These resources are not deployed evenly across the border landscape, but tend to be concentrated in varying forms in largely urbanized areas where unauthorized

⁶ Dunn refers to the process of boundary build-up begun during the second half of the Carter administration as the “militarization” of the boundary.

crossing are most common, especially in California. Nevertheless, the border region as a whole has been dramatically affected by these changes. Thus, in border locales ranging from El Paso, Texas to Nogales, Arizona to Calexico, California, there has been a significant build-up of the boundary in the form of major increases in the number of agents, fences and walls, new technologies and other enforcement-related resources.

In sum, one cannot understand the boundary build-up that took place in the 1990s without taking into consideration longer-term developments and the thinking that informed them. The 1970s marked the beginning of a significantly intensified process involving the making of the U.S.–Mexico boundary, the U.S. polity, and associated political geographical identities. While this process had long been largely a national one, in terms of its ideological and practical origins, localities in the border region became increasingly important players over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In important ways, localities—especially in southern California—became “the tail that wagged the dog” in that they pressured the national state to fulfill its perceived duty of making the boundary “real”. While much of the initiative for heightened boundary enforcement measures came from the federal government—given, among other things, its responsibility for regulating immigration and the boundary—local state officials and citizen organizations played a significant role in raising the boundary’s profile as it related to a whole host of issues concerning extralegal immigration and its effects on the border region in the 1990s. In this regard, the state–citizen and national–local relationships became increasingly dialectical in nature. Thus, the policy of the boundary build-up in the 1990s was in large part an outgrowth of political–geographical imperatives rooted in the dynamic relationship between the state and its citizenry (Nevins, 2000, 2002). Some of these can be traced to the state’s concern for reproducing capitalism, but many cannot.

The 1990s: cultivating and responding to insecurity

While the 1970s marked the beginning of deep and sustained attention toward matters related to immigration across the U.S.–Mexico boundary, the 1990s saw this attention reach previously unforeseen levels. The 1990s saw the emergence of historically unprecedented levels of concern about “illegal” immigration and, associated with that, an “out of control” U.S.–Mexico boundary. This concern was generated discursively—that is through narratives, representations and symbols through which the world is made meaningful and which both reflect and shape social practice (see, for example, Ackleson, 1999, in this issue; Yapa, 1996). Although there had long been receptiveness to such ideas, what made the 1990s different was the level of resonance these representations had and the response of the citizenry to them. While national and local state actors played a critical role in constructing these representations, citizen groups also played a significant role. Together they constructed in the American popular imagination a “real” southern boundary, with its associated practices and identities. In the 1990s, migrants were both represented

and perceived as threatening the socio-economic, ethno-cultural, and bio-physical security of the nation (see Ackleson, 1999, in this issue). Socio-economic concerns included a perceived drain on public finances and diminished employment opportunity for native-born workers. Ethno-cultural fears centered on the maintenance of a national social order tied to particular notions of American ethnic and cultural identity. Bio-physical concerns entailed the fear that immigrants would commit property and violent crimes. These preoccupations were most visible in various areas of Southern California, especially traditionally, white, middle-class areas of greater Los Angeles and San Diego (Davis, 1995; Nevins, 2002), and had been present to varying degrees in these areas for many years. In sum, it was these political-geographical imperatives related to a comprehensive notion of national security that were the most important rationale given for fighting “illegal” immigration and increasing boundary and immigration enforcement.⁷

Throughout the late-1970s and 1980s in San Diego, for example, unauthorized immigrants from Mexico became increasingly associated with crime and a deteriorating social safety net in the public mind—an image local officials helped to cultivate. In 1986, for example, Susan Golding, a member of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors, blamed unauthorized immigrants for the County’s fiscal problems due to court, jail, and health care costs and called for the County to sue the federal government for the related expenses (Reza, 1986). And a few months later, Clyde Romney, a candidate for the same elected body, called upon the Border Patrol to establish an office in the northern part of San Diego County to address increased concerns surrounding unauthorized immigrants. In doing so, he wrote: “Nowhere else in San Diego County do you find the huge gangs of illegal aliens that line our streets, shake down our schoolchildren, spread diseases like malaria and roam our neighborhoods looking for work or homes to rob. We are under siege in North County, and we have been deserted by those whose job is to protect us from this flood of aliens” (quoted in Weintraub, 1986). Federal officials in the area also helped to fan the flames. Howard Ezell, the outspoken Western Regional Commissioner for the INS, for instance, labeled the influx of unauthorized immigrants in the San Diego area “an invasion”. “Our borders are, indeed, out of control,” he asserted (quoted in Hughes, 1986).

Around the same time, several groups began protesting in the area to pressure U.S. authorities to construct a strong infrastructure of control along the boundary. Some of the groups, like the War Aryan Resistance and the white supremacist American Spring, were openly racist, while others, such as “Light Up the Border” cast their arguments more strictly in anti-immigration and/or national sovereignty terms. In practice, however, the line between these two types of pro-boundary

⁷ In addition, as in the 1970s and 1980s the “war on drugs” also contributed to the resulting boundary buildup—indeed, the antidrug budget of the INS rose 164 percent between fiscal years 1990 and 1997 (Andreas, 2000). But the drug war was not the primary force behind the calls for a build-up of the boundary in the 1990s. Instead, the primary concern was unauthorized immigration across the U.S.–Mexico boundary. The war on drugs served as an undercurrent that complemented the concerns over immigration.

control groups was often rather blurry. U.S. authorities, at times, were involved in some of the anti-immigrant groups. Howard Ezell, for example, was the founder of Americans for Border Control, which he set up while INS Western Regional Commissioner to help further anti-unauthorized immigrant sentiment (Nevins, 2002).

Although the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act led to a rapid decline in Border Patrol apprehensions (largely due to a program that legalized upwards of three million “illegals”—the vast majority of whom were Mexican—living and working in the U.S.), apprehensions along the southern U.S. boundary quickly began to rise again in 1989 (Calavita, 1994). The perceived failure of IRCA to address the issue of unauthorized boundary crossing from Mexico sufficiently helped to fuel a resurgence of anti-immigration sentiment (again, with a focus on “illegal” immigration). This was especially true in California, to where an estimated 400,000 people a year migrated (legally and extralegally) in the late-1980s and early 1990s (Schrag, 1998).

At the time, California was experiencing a serious recession (one that hit the southern part of the state especially hard), the breakdown of local government, a widening gap between rich and poor, and a massive racial recomposition. California was one of the whitest states in the U.S. in 1960; today it is the most ethnically diverse, and has a non-Anglo majority (Schrag, 1998; Walker, 1995, 1996). All of these developments dovetailed neatly with California’s history of racism and anti-immigrant sentiment and provided ample fuel for demagogic politicians, and a host of anti-immigrant groups (Almaguer, 1994; McWilliams, 1968). It is thus not surprising that California was the national leader in the 1990s in raising the anti-immigration banner, focusing primarily on unauthorized immigration from Mexico.

A combination of grassroots, pro-restrictionist groups—such as the Voice of Citizens Together and the Orange County-based California Coalition for Immigration Reform—and politicians from Southern California played the lead role in advocating the border build-up. In 1991, Los Angeles-area Republican Assemblyman Richard Mountjoy tried to amend the California state budget to cut off state-funded education and health care benefits for unauthorized immigrants (Mendel, 1993). The same year, Governor Pete Wilson blamed both legal and extralegal immigration for significantly contributing to California’s budget crisis (Spivak, 1991). Wilson soon went national with his anti-immigration campaign, holding the federal government responsible for failing to compensate state and local governments adequately for socio-economic costs related to immigration and for its failure to control unauthorized immigration across the U.S.–Mexico boundary (Caldwell, 1991). Many Republican politicians in California soon joined Wilson’s efforts to increase boundary enforcement and immigration restriction, with a focus primarily on unauthorized immigration from Mexico. In October 1991, for instance, Republican Congressman Elton Gallegly (from Simi Valley, near Los Angeles) introduced a bill in Congress that would have denied citizenship to children born in the U.S. if neither parent was a U.S. citizen and the mother was not at least a legal resident (Chavez, 1997). And various national level, anti-immigration organizations

also helped to add fuel to the fire. While visiting Sacramento in his capacity as a consultant for the Washington, D.C.-based Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), former INS Commissioner Alan Nelson called upon California to cut off jobs, tax refunds, social services, and the right to drive to unauthorized immigrants. “They seriously hurt all areas of California society: Employment, welfare, health, crime, housing and our basic values,” he said (Associated Press, 1991).

It was out of these efforts that California’s Proposition 187 emerged. Also known as the “Save Our State” (SOS) initiative by its backers, 187 was a 1994 state ballot measure that denied public education (from elementary to post-secondary levels), public social services, and public health care services (with the exception of emergencies) to unauthorized immigrants. One of its authors was Richard Mountjoy, who also served as the Chairman of the “Save Our State” Committee, an organization co-founded by Barbara Coe of the California Coalition for Immigration Reform (Davis, 1995; Nevins, 2002). Numerous politicians—most famously, Pete Wilson whose re-election bid for governor in 1994 was flagging until he embraced 187—rode the ballot measure to electoral success. The largely white California electorate, for its part, also embraced 187 enthusiastically, passing it by an almost 3–2 margin.

Justifications for 187 and for cracking down on unauthorized immigration more generally took various forms. Pro-environment and neo-Malthusian population analyzes, for example, blamed a supposed over-supply of immigrants for traffic congestion, air pollution, and over-burdened schools (see Camarota, 1997; Ling-Ling, 1994; Reimers, 1998). Similarly, racialized fears of immigrant criminality, hyper-fertility among women of Mexican origin, and potential cultural and even political conquest by immigrants disrespectful of (implicitly white) “American” territorial hegemony were also important elements of the debate (Chang, 2000; Gabriel, 1998; Martinez & McDonnell, 1994). As Glenn Spencer, head of Voice of Citizens Together, one of southern California’s leading pro-restrictionist groups argued regarding Proposition 187: “This is part of a reconquest of the American Southwest by foreign Hispanics—someone is going to be leaving the state. It will be either them or us” (quoted in Davis, 1995: 28). And many emphasized the importance of protecting the country’s legal fabric, one undermined by “illegal” immigration and the putative frequency with which unauthorized immigrants commit crimes (Nevins, 2002).

Fears of the alien “other”—in terms of negative socio-economic, cultural, and bio-physical impacts—were highly important. The imagery related to such fears drew upon and reinforced long held stereotypes of immigrants from Mexico and Latin America more generally. For such reasons, many analysts have drawn parallels of the 1990s wave of anti-immigrant nativism to earlier ones. Like earlier outbursts of anti-immigrant sentiment, they contend, that of the 1990s scapegoated immigrants—especially “illegals”—for a whole host of social ills and were racist in terms of their assumptions and notions of what the U.S. is and should be (Gutierrez, 1995; Kelley, 1997; Ono & Sloop, 2002). Other analysts have emphasized what they see as the unique nature of 1990s nativism. Calavita (1996), for example, perceives

the nativism of the 1990s as “focused almost single-mindedly on immigrants as a tax burden, a focus that is unusual, if not unique in the history” of American nativism. Of course, these analyzes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As [Johnson \(1997\)](#) argues, there was “something old, something new” about anti-immigrant sentiment in the 1990s.

While pro-immigration restrictionist sentiment was most intense in California, it reached historic highs throughout the country. In this regard, the national polity proved receptive to California-origin initiatives that sought to scale up the concern over the border and immigration enforcement and prompt policy changes at the national scale. Although the national political climate at the beginning of the 1990s did not seem favorable to anti-immigrant positions, sentiment was hardening in Congress and the White House to crack down on unauthorized immigration. Among both liberal and conservative elites, the earlier pro-immigration consensus was breaking down. Most importantly, efforts by conservatives and the Republican Party over the years had provided fertile ideological ground for the issues of unauthorized immigration and boundary enforcement by the early 1990s.⁸ That 1992 was a federal election year only increased the rising tide of anti-immigration efforts on the part of national-scale politicians and organizations. Pat Buchanan, for instance, called for the construction of a solid barrier along the entire length of the U.S.–Mexico boundary ([Nevins, 2002](#)).

After the Democrats won the White House in 1992, pro-restrictionist forces at the local and regional scales in California intensified their offensive. Pete Wilson, for example, greatly escalated his anti-Washington rhetoric by castigating the federal government for failing to control the U.S.–Mexico boundary and to appropriate billions of dollars promised by the Reagan administration for health, education, and welfare services to immigrants. Such positions resonated strongly with an increasingly restrictionist California citizenry. Although boundary enforcement was a very low priority for the Clinton administration in coming to power in 1993, it was not possible for the Clinton White House to ignore the sentiment in California given the state’s electoral importance ([Barnes, 1994](#); [Conniff, 1993](#); [King & Foote, 1993](#); [Murr, 1993](#)). Moreover, congressional Republicans had begun to increase their anti-immigration rhetoric, betting their party stood to gain most from voting public that perceived immigration as an important threat. This strategy pressured the Clinton administration and the Democrats to engage the issue more as the midterm elections of 1994 approached. But Wilson and anti-immigrant politics in California, as well as Republican efforts in Congress, were not the only factors explaining why unauthorized immigration and the U.S.–Mexico boundary became issues of such unprecedented national importance. A number of other contextual factors and high-profile events in early 1993 helped to bring them to the fore and rather quickly. These

⁸ A number of right-wing groups and publishing houses began publicizing the issue of illegal immigration at the beginning of the 1980s. Two of the most prominent organizations were the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the American Immigration Control Foundation (AICF). Before immigration became a hot issue, self-identified “paleoconservatives” were waging the anti-immigrant war, while most of the Right was preoccupied with its anti-communist crusade (see [Barnes, 1994](#); [Conniff, 1993](#); [Diamond, 1996](#)).

included: fears of an impending huge influx of Haitian refugees; a persistent economic recession; the bombing of the World Trade Center by suspected unauthorized immigrants; and the assassination of two Central Intelligence Agency employees in Virginia by an unauthorized immigrant from Pakistan (Milton, 1993; Popkin & Friedman, 1993; Zucker & Zucker, 1996).

If any single issue helped create the popular image of the U.S. under invasion from foreign hordes, however, it was the discovery offshore of ships carrying unauthorized Chinese immigrants. The discovery of the Golden Venture and its cargo of 286 smuggled Chinese immigrants off the coast of New York City on June 6, 1993 brought the issue of unauthorized immigration to the forefront of national attention. National magazines such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* all featured high-profile stories, helping to make the story “a national obsession” (Kwong, 1997: 3). While such events had nothing to do with unauthorized immigration from Mexico, they significantly contributed to a growing perception of a country under siege from without (Kwong, 1997; Rotella, 1998). While opinion was most intense in California, anti-immigration sentiment reached historic highs on the national level (Kwong, 1997; McDonald, 1997; Morganthau, 1993; Thomas, 1993; Zucker & Zucker, 1996). Perceiving this general mood, politicians began rushing to take a tough stance on boundary enforcement and unauthorized immigration. This was especially true in California. In 1993, for example, members of the California Senate and Assembly introduced almost 40 separate measures aimed at addressing both legal and extralegal immigration (Mendel, 1993). Such efforts were not limited to Republicans; fearful of the potential consequences of inaction at the ballot box, California’s Democrats also embraced many restrictionist measures (Nevins, 2002).

The Clinton administration was greatly worried about the political fallout were it not to respond adequately to such developments. Many Democratic supporters and politicians, as well as Administration appointees, had urged the Administration to get out in front of efforts to restrict unauthorized immigration in order to prevent the passage of Republican proposals even more drastic than those proposed at the time. In addition, electoral concerns—both in terms of the 1994 congressional elections and Clinton’s re-election bid in 1996—pushed the White House to take a proactive stance on the issue (Walczak, 1994). It was in this context that the Clinton administration soon announced high-profile plans to enhance control of the boundary (Stern, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c), and began facilitating the significant infusion of resources that resulted in the dramatic changes in the U.S.–Mexico boundary and immigration enforcement apparatus over the course of the 1990s. In doing so, the administration took the lead in developing a territorial strategy to “protect” the nation and its citizens from the perceived security threats that migrants posed.

Outcomes

The effect of the enhanced boundary enforcement strategy has been to push crossers away from urbanized areas and curtail short-term and local unauthorized

migrants. However, it does not appear to have significantly diminished the crossings by long-distance or long-term migrants. Instead, they are relying increasingly on costly smugglers and taking greater risks. As a result, countless migrants are still successfully beating the enforcement web. But many more than before are also dying as they are compelled to cross in more arduous and dangerous terrain (Cornelius, 2001; Nevins, 2002). Even an August 2001 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001, p. 2) declared that it “remains unclear” to what degree the efforts of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service’s boundary enforcement efforts have impacted levels of unauthorized immigration (also see Reyes, Johnson, & Van Swearingen, 2002).

The apparent lack of success is related to the fact that the enhanced boundary policing regime has occurred—somewhat paradoxically—at a time of rapid economic and demographic growth in the border region and increased interaction and integration between the U.S. and Mexico. The population of the border region, for example, was an estimated 12 million in 1999 and is expected to grow to 24 million in 2020 (*Migration News*, online version, June 1999). Currently, nearly 300,000 Mexican workers cross the boundary legally on a daily or weekly basis to work in the U.S. The number of annual authorized crossings of the boundary are in the several hundreds of millions—largely between the various “twin cities” that straddle the international divide. And annual transboundary financial transactions total more than U.S.\$6 billion (Herzog, 1999).

The boundary has proven to be not only a barrier, but also a conduit that facilitates interaction between national spaces. Beginning in the 1960s, rapid industrialization and population growth have occurred in the border area (Herzog, 1990). As of 1997, the region’s economic output was roughly \$150 billion, giving it an economy larger than that of Poland (Smith & Malkin, 1997). The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 seems to have only intensified the transboundary region’s economic integration and growth. Trade between the U.S. and Mexico, for example, increased from \$80 billion in 1994 to \$200 billion in 2000 (*Migration News*, online version, March 2000), with much of the growth in trade a result of increased production in the border region. A concrete manifestation of this intensifying binational commercial relationship is the growth in the number of trucks traversing the boundary. Such traffic has increased by 170 percent, with over 4.2 million truck crossings in 1999 alone, since the implementation of NAFTA (Schneider, 2000).

Given such changes, the enhanced boundary enforcement apparatus would seem to be in direct contradiction to the larger-scale processes that are ostensibly making the international boundary between the U.S. and Mexico increasingly irrelevant. As the INS states, “The border is harder to cross now [for unauthorized migrants] than at any time in history” (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1997: 4). On the one hand, we see a variety of state methods and strategies to denationalize and/or internationalize border space. This is most obvious in the ongoing attempts to establish a barrier-free zone to the flow of goods and capital. On the other hand, the state is employing overt methods to control and limit the levels of certain types of interaction between the two countries. It is in this context that the “NAFTAization”

or liberalization and growing “militarization”⁹ (a form of nationalization) of the U.S.–Mexico boundary simultaneously take place. While current state theory is in a position to understand the former, it is less well-equipped to analyze the latter.

Understanding both aspects of the border is critical because they are intricately related. Growing liberalization of the Mexican economy has facilitated a significant exodus from Mexico’s countryside: from 1980 to 1990, for example, the amount of the country’s population living in rural areas declined from 36 percent to 28 percent (Warnock, 1995). Numerous studies suggested that the implementation of NAFTA and the related increasing liberalization of the Mexican economy would only intensify this process. Combined with the resulting intensifying links between the two countries, the research suggested that the rural exodus would lead to a significant increase in migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Andreas, 1998–99; Massey & Espinosa, 1997)—a development of which the Clinton administration was very much aware. Such an increase in unauthorized immigration would have served to fuel even further citizen perception of socio-economic, ethno-cultural, and bio-physical “threats” emanating from without. In this regard, the boundary build-up was a pre-emptive strike against the way NAFTA was expected to destabilize state–citizen relations.

As INS Commissioner Doris Meissner admitted during testimony to Congress in November 1993, she foresaw that NAFTA would most likely lead to an increase in unauthorized immigration from Mexico to the U.S. in the short- and medium-terms. For this reason she stated that “[r]esponding to the likely short- to medium term impacts of NAFTA will require strengthening our enforcement efforts along the border, both at and between ports of entry” (U.S. Congress, 1993: 36).¹⁰ In other words, at the same time the U.S. was supporting accumulation through NAFTA’s boundary liberalization, it was also militarizing the boundary to meet the security concerns of the U.S. citizenry. Moreover, the one imperative (accumulation) intensified the importance of the other (meeting citizens’ security expectations) and led to a dualized and partly contradictory policy.

While the boundary build-up does not appear to have significantly limited the numbers of unauthorized immigrants crossing the U.S.–Mexico boundary, the federal government has been successful—as evidenced by significantly diminished levels of official and public clamor vis-à-vis the U.S.–Mexico boundary and unauthorized immigration—in constructing an *image of control*, most notably in the most urbanized sections of the boundary (Andreas, 1998, 2000). In this regard, boundary policing is as much about performance and perception as it is about achieving a particular goal. In other words, the actual material outcome of the boundary build-up in many ways matters less than the citizenry’s perception of what is taking place. A perception that the state is doing something of significance and is

⁹ For an explanation of this term as it applies to enforcement efforts along the U.S.–Mexico boundary (see Dunn, 1996).

¹⁰ Nevertheless, upon ending her tenure as INS head in November 2000, Meissner wondered aloud, “What drives people from one place to somewhere else, taking all kinds of risks? It’s one of the fundamental questions of our time” (quoted in *Migration News*, December 2000.)

having an important effect on unauthorized immigration is paramount. This is not to suggest, however, that state elites are engaging in manipulative practices merely to fool the public and serve their own ends. Rather, what we are seeing is “social role taking” (Edelman, 1985). Because boundary construction and conservation are among the modern territorial state’s most important functions, state actors are doing—or at least appear to be doing—what the citizenry expects of them: defending the nation from perceived threats to its security.

While NAFTA makes it tempting to argue that the interests of liberalizing capital seem to have won out over the interests of a restrictionist national citizenry, the fact is that enhanced boundary enforcement is in large part a response to calls for greater levels of boundary and immigration restriction on the part of significant elements of the general public. Furthermore, to the extent that it has satisfied the expectations of the citizenry—by providing a greater sense of security against the perceived costs of unauthorized immigration and an “out-of-control” boundary—the build up of the U.S.–Mexico boundary that has taken place since the mid-1990s has been a strategic success for the state. It has been a success to the extent that it has satisfied a general public calling upon the state to “get tough” on the boundary and unauthorized immigrants. It has also been a success in providing a dramatic infusion of resources to elements of the state apparatus working in the areas of immigration and boundary control, while also helping to placate to a significant degree state actors who had been in the forefront of pro-restriction efforts.

Conclusion

Both the “NAFTAization” and build-up of the U.S.–Mexico boundary can be analyzed from within a traditional state theory analysis. Both trends would classically be seen as “policy fixes” designed to (1) respond to the current round of economic restructuring and ensure continued capital accumulation and (2) reproduce the political legitimacy of capitalist social relations in a turbulent era. This analysis would capture some of what was going on along the U.S.–Mexico boundary in the 1990s, but would only capture part of the story. The U.S. state was responding to these imperatives, but it was also tending to the less purely economic relationship between state and citizenry. Particular state actors were concerned to manage the political legitimacy of their relationship with the citizenry in order to ensure their continued political power. The state–citizen relationship involves economic concerns; in our case this involved the expectation that the state would protect its citizenry from immigrant competitors in the labor market and from immigrant users of collective consumption goods. The state was expected to respond to the perceived economic threat that immigrants posed. But it was also expected to protect the citizenry from non-economic threats as well. In the U.S.–Mexico case, the most important example was the threat immigrants posed to a nationalist, racialized, and territorial notion of ethno-cultural stability. Various state actors and activists in civil society were afraid that the penetration of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants threatened national territorial sanctity, while fearing that “third world” immigrants

more generally would alter and impoverish the ethno-cultural character of the American nation. Loud demands were made on the state to protect against that threat.

The policy fix that resulted in the boundary build-up was partly designed to convey the clear impression that the U.S. state was vigilant on the border, aggressively defending the nation from the putative threats that immigrants posed. In this case, we contend that the policy fix was designed more to manage state–citizen relations and to preserve the political legitimacy of the state than to preserve accumulation or reproduce the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. In order to understand the policy shifts along the U.S.–Mexico boundary, therefore, we must give explicit methodological attention to the role state–citizen relations play in driving state decisions. In particular, we must understand how relatively non-economic expectations—such as the territorial defense of the polity and the ethno-cultural nation—are central to state–citizen relations, and therefore are important for shaping state policies and institutions.

The current analysis of the state in critical political-economic state theory is not in a position to think comprehensively about the imperatives that affect the state and shape state restructuring. Given the conventions of its research practice and discourse, it will regularly miss the important role of state–citizen relations, and it will overlook in particular the non-economic aspects of those relations. We argue that this limitation is due primarily to traditional research practice, but that practice is rooted in the theoretical project of critical state theory. Because state theory is concerned theoretically to understand the role the state plays in accumulation and in legitimizing capitalist social relations, in practice it has tended to analyze the state and state change only with respect to these imperatives. But as the case of the U.S.–Mexico boundary shows, the imperatives that affect the state are not limited to accumulation and the legitimacy of capitalist social relations. Clearly a complete analysis of the state must go beyond these two imperatives. We would suggest that although the theoretical project of critical state theory has led in practice to a limitation that has weakened its analysis of the state, this need not be the case. In fact, the theoretical project of critical state theory is far better served by a more inclusive research approach to the state that takes into account a greater range of imperatives that influence state restructuring. This expanded approach—one that takes seriously the importance of state–citizen relations, among other imperatives—will produce a more complete analysis of the state and state restructuring. A better understanding of the state will allow a better understanding of the role it plays in regulating capitalist society.

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