


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A new land: Deleuze and Guattari and planning

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A new land: Deleuze and Guattari and planning

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This article argues that planning would benefit from greater engagement with the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. It pays particular attention to their normative political vision, which is a revolutionary agenda that aims at a condition of radical freedom for humans beyond the state and capitalism. The planning literature has only just begun to examine Deleuze and Guattari's work, and so far it has avoided discussion of their normative political vision. I argue that when we confront this vision head-on, it opens up productive existential and normative questions about what planning is and if it should exist at all.

Keywords: Deleuze and Guattari; planning; revolution

Introduction

Compared to other disciplines, planning has engaged remarkably little with the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (Hillier, 2008, p. 46; Wood, 2009). Across the humanities and social sciences their work has been at the center of great innovation and debate for many years now. Their influence is equally significant in two of planning's closest cognate disciplines: geography and architecture (e.g. Katz, 1996; Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005; Massumi, 1998). Planners, on the other hand, have only recently begun to engage with Deleuze and Guattari's work. We are just beginning to explore what their ideas might mean for how we think about planning as a discipline and as a profession. Given the initial state of our investigations, what we require now is to build up a body of work in planning on Deleuze and Guattari that examines their thought from a number of different perspectives. As our engagement grows and deepens, we can begin to come to terms more fully with Deleuze and Guattari's theory, their methodology, and their politics.

This paper aims to contribute to that emerging body of work by examining an element of Deleuze and Guattari's thought that has been largely absent from the planning literature, which is their political agenda for revolution. The paper focuses primarily on Deleuze and Guattari's two books on capitalism and schizophrenia, *Anti-Oedipus* (1977) and *A thousand plateaus* (1987), and the main task it sets for itself is to provide a careful exegesis of the political vision found there. To be sure, this vision is complex, and I do not imagine my account will be exhaustive or beyond question. Rather, I hope it will engender further consideration in the planning literature of Deleuze and Guattari's politics. I argue that when we look closely at their political vision, when we apprehend the full scope of its power, we discover an unequivocal call for revolution, for moving beyond both the state and capitalism. Of course, given the very tight relation of planning practice to the state, and the state's structural dependence on capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari's vision forces us to ask both existential questions about what planning is and normative questions about whether we should be planning at all. Obviously it is beyond the scope of this paper to *answer* those existential and normative questions about planning. They are enormous questions that I hope will be debated vigorously in the planning literature for years to come. I only hope in this paper to look

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more seriously at Deleuze and Guattari's political vision, and to begin to sketch the kinds of debates that vision can open up.

Deleuze and Guattari in the planning literature

Taken together, the individual and collaborative work of Deleuze and Guattari comprises a vast and complicated corpus. Oversimplifying a bit, we can break it into three clusters. The first is Deleuze's individual work. He was a philosopher by training, and his work includes both studies of general philosophical concepts (e.g. 1990, 1995a) and critical examinations of particular philosophers including Kant (1985), Spinoza (2001), Nietzsche (1983), and Henri Bergson (1988). Deleuze was particularly inspired by Nietzsche, and that is important for his political philosophy, as we will see. He also published two influential volumes on cinema (Deleuze, 1986, 1989). The second cluster in the corpus is Guattari's individual work. He was a psychoanalyst and political activist in addition to being a philosopher. Guattari trained as a psychoanalyst under Jacques Lacan, and he worked for a long time at the innovative clinic of La Borde in France. Much of his writing is rooted in this experience as a therapist, including his concept of schizoanalysis (Guattari, 1989, 1995), which is central to his work with Deleuze. He also published diverse works on political philosophy, both alone (e.g. Guattari, 1984, 1996) and with the well-known radical political philosopher Antonio Negri (Guattari & Negri, 1990). The third cluster of work, the one I focus on here, is Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative work, which brings together Deleuze's iconoclastic philosophical investigations with Guattari's radical political-psychoanalytical ideas. The main body of this work is comprised of the two-volume series on capitalism and schizophrenia (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, 1987), but it also includes a work on Kafka and literature (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986) and one on the practice of philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).¹

Over the last five years or so, planning theorists have begun tentative engagements with Deleuze and Guattari's body of work, mostly in the journal *Planning Theory*, and largely catalyzed by the work of Jean Hillier. In some cases, authors in this literature make only passing mention, usually to Deleuze, because their project is focused more fully on other theorists (e.g. Devlin, 2011; Gunder, 2010; Healey, 2008; Jaros, 2007; Liggett, 2009; Lindholm, 2011; Mehmood, 2010; Pizarro, Wei & Banerjee, 2003; Ploger, 2006).² Such glancing mention is of course perfectly legitimate when one is engaged in a different project. However, the fact that glancing mention is the rule rather than the exception suggests that while the discipline is aware of Deleuze and Guattari's existence, it tends not to engage them head-on. Reinforcing this tendency is another, which is that in the planning literature scholars often, even usually, operate one step removed from Deleuze and Guattari's ideas. They rely greatly on the secondary literature, works by people such as Manuel de Landa (2000; 2006), John Rajchman (2000), and Jean Hillier (especially 2007). Thus Nyseth, Pløger, and Holm (2010) analyze a public planning process in Norway using Deleuze and Guattari's concepts – plan(e), becoming, line of flight, flow – without mentioning or citing Deleuze and Guattari. They rely instead entirely on Hillier's interpretation of these concepts. While there is of course great value in using secondary sources, there are also dangers. In this instance the concepts as Nyseth, Pløger, and Holm present them entirely lack the particular political power that Deleuze and Guattari give them. For example, the authors understand a "line of flight" to be merely a new possibility that can help a planning process moved beyond impasse. For Deleuze and Guattari, as we will see below, lines of flight are radical gambles; they are headlong escapes toward a world beyond the state and capitalism.

Hannah Jones (2007) similarly works with secondary sources, in this case with Rajchman's book on Deleuze.³ To construct her concept of "spaces of indetermination," she begins by quoting Rajchman: "Deleuze's basic principle is that society is always en fuite [sic] (leaking, fleeing [sic]) and may be understood in terms of the manner it deals with fluites [sic]." But Deleuze and Guattari

speak of *fuite*, not *fluite*. *Fuite* means flight or escape; *fluite* does not exist in French. The error is Jones's, not Rajchman's. Rajchman (2000, p. 12) correctly says "*en fuite* (leaking, fleeing)". This is very much the kind of misstep that results from reliance on secondary sources. If one has spent time with Deleuze and Guattari's work, the concept of flight/*fuite*/escape is entirely familiar; it is absolutely integral to their argument. As with Nyseth et al., (2010) the particular power of the concept of flight, its active and radical character is lost when it is misrepresented as "fleeing" rather than "fleeing". That is because even if the act of fleeing sometimes is temporary or fleeting, Deleuze and Guattari very much hope it can endure, that it does not remain fleeting at all, but becomes generalized in what they call a new land.

This over-reliance on secondary sources is a particular danger with Deleuze and Guattari because their work is extremely challenging and requires a significant investment of time and effort to engage with fully. Moreover, I fear that this operating one step removed from their work is particularly dangerous for planners. That is because planners exhibit a broad tendency to favor social harmony over political upheaval (Harvey, 1978), and that tendency will induce them to try to tame Deleuze and Guattari's dangerous spirit, to find ways to make them more palatable to existing norms and structures. I hope to show below that when we stand face-to-face with their work it is impossible to miss this dangerous spirit. Rather than tame them, we must decide instead how we will respond to their relentless desire to undermine existing norms and structures, and to incite a revolution.⁴

Perhaps the largest and most important tradition in the developing literature in planning on Deleuze and Guattari uses them in the service of a methodological project. That is, this body of work uses Deleuze and Guattari to produce a particular way to think about the world. It then uses that way to think about the world to guide right action. For example, Wood (2009) employs Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as a lens through which to apprehend the politics of planning in Melbourne. The argument is that Deleuze and Guattari offer us a set of concepts that help us think more effectively about how the world actually works. If we can apprehend the world better, it follows that our planning interventions can be more effective. Similarly, Van Wezemaal (2008) draws primarily on Manuel de Landa (2006) and to a lesser extent on Deleuze and Guattari to argue that the concepts of "assemblage" and "minor politics" can help us more fully understand how democratic governance works (though difference and contestation rather than through agreement and unity), and therefore how we can act within it more effectively.

It is in this last, analytical, tradition that the work of Jean Hillier fits best. Her work is without doubt the most sustained and influential engagement with Deleuze and Guattari in planning (Gunder and Hillier, 2007; Hillier, 2005; Hillier, 2007; Hillier, 2008). Her larger project is to argue that "spatial planning practice requires both redefinition and a new theoretical foundation" (Hillier 2008, p. 25), in which Deleuze and Guattari figure quite heavily. She argues that planning should approach the world from an ontology of becoming, rather than from an ontology of being. The latter is a Platonic (and Kantian) approach to the world that imagines it to be made up of objects with transcendental and fixed essences. An ontology of becoming, rooted in Aristotle, developed by Nietzsche, and embraced by Deleuze and Guattari, insists that objects in the world are continually in the process of becoming something else, that reality is a continual unfolding of events that do not necessarily move toward a larger end goal. For Hillier, when planners embrace becoming, they are forced to let go of the search for stability and certainty. She reports that she was drawn to Deleuze and Guattari's approach as she became "increasingly irritated by some planners attempts to impose what I regard as a futile 'certainty' on a contingent, uncertain world" (2007, p. 15). She wants planners to "feel comfortable with the idea of an unpredictable future, with improvisation bringing together or pushing apart disparate flows, energies, events, entities and spaces in more or less temporary alignments" (2007, p. 16). "As planning theorists and practitioners," she argues (2005, p. 273), "we seem to have had a pervasive commitment to an ontology of being which privileges

end-states and outcomes, rather than an ontology of becoming which emphasizes movement, process and emergence.”

If we accept reality as a continually emerging, fluid process of becoming, she argues, we will require a new understanding of what planning is.

I would hope that planning practice might become a kind of “magic” (Thrift, 2000) “spatial investigation” proceeding by experiment and induction, which allows disparate points of view to coexist; which has a concern for indeterminate essences rather than contoured, ordered ones; for dynamic or emergent properties rather than fixed ones; and for allowing intuition and uncertainty, multiplicity and complexity rather than systematic certainties (Hillier, 2005, p. 291).

She avows that this approach is descriptive rather than prescriptive. That is, she sees herself as presenting us with how the world actually is, thereby helping us devise the most effective planning practice for that world. She is explicit that her approach is not prescriptive or normative; she does not aim to argue for a particular political and ethical agenda for planning. “My work is non-normative in that I do not attempt to tell anyone what they should do. Rather, I hope to facilitate an increased understanding of practice situations” (Hillier, 2007, p. 17). “I do not venture to propose what ‘must be’ or ‘should be’ done as this would be to fall into an abyss of my own making” (Hillier, 2008, p. 44). This refusal to be prescriptive is true to an important current in French radical thought, associated most closely with Michel Foucault, that believes the role of the intellectual is not to propose a fully formed political agenda, but to analyze the terrain of the political battlefield and to let popular movements take whatever action they see fit (see especially Foucault, 1980, p. 62).

I do not disagree that approaching planning and urban politics from an ontology of becoming is preferable to approaching it from an ontology of being. But what I want to try to make clear in the discussion below is that there are far more radical implications to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought than Hillier’s methodological and purportedly neutral approach reveals. To fully appreciate those radical implications, we must confront the deeply normative and political nature of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Unlike Hillier, Deleuze and Guattari are very much proposing what should be done. They offer us, especially in the *capitalism and schizophrenia* series, an unapologetically normative political agenda. That agenda is a ringing rejection of the state, capitalism, and Oedipal psychoanalysis. It is an elaborate and compelling morality play that celebrates the productive potential of desire and cries out against the apparatuses that capture and imprison it. Their normative vision is an unmistakable rejection of any form of state-led planning, and it very possibly opposes even planning activity beyond the state. The next section provides an exegesis of that normative vision. It is a vision that has been, as far as I can tell, almost entirely absent from the body of literature on planning theory and practice.

Make rhizome everywhere

Desiring-production and the apparatuses of capture

For Deleuze and Guattari, it all starts with desire. *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977), the first book in the *capitalism and schizophrenia* series, opens with a discussion of what they call desire, which goes on to take up the role of hero in their morality play. The lineage of desire goes back to Plato, who saw it as one of the three components, with spirit and reason, of the human soul. He sees desire as a troublesome force that must be governed by rational thought. Freud famously takes up this tripartite model, casting desire in the role of the Id, the part of us where basic needs and drives arise and which, similarly, must be managed by the ego and superego. Deleuze and Guattari, drawing on Nietzsche, seek to stand Plato and Freud on their heads. They seek to rehabilitate desire, to cast it not as an impulsive troublemaker that must always be held in check, but as the very source of life, as a human power to be liberated. For them desire is the source of *all* human creation and production. It is the power in the world that actually drives the process of becoming, of change, of

transformation from one thing into another.⁵ It is what Aristotle calls in *The Nicomachean ethics* the vegetative or nutritive element of our soul, the part that causes us to grow and develop (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 1102a–1103a). Desire is that power that is within us, both as individuals and as a species, that drives us to survive, to reproduce, to grow, to be nourished, to “say yes to life,” as Nietzsche put it (1990). It is, in short, the engine of human society. As a result, Deleuze and Guattari typically refer to desire by a technical term “desiring-production” in order to emphasize that it is the source of all production.

Because it produces all things, desiring-production is by logical necessity *autopoietic*, which is to say that it creates itself. It is not caused by something prior to it, nor does it rely on anything else for sustenance (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, pp. 54, 127, 290). Desiring-production is, they stress, ontologically primary. Other faculties, like reason, spirit, the ego, are not autopoietic; they lack the ontological primacy of desiring-production. They cannot create life, they can only guide and shape its creative force. They depend on desiring-production for their life. Thus for Deleuze and Guattari the age-old Platonic hierarchy that places reason at the top and desire at the bottom has it backwards. We should not manage, restrict, and rule desiring-production, they argue, we should liberate it and help it to create on its own terms.

Deleuze and Guattari explore the question of desiring-production in many arenas, the most prominent of which is that of psychoanalysis. Here they explore a theme that runs throughout both books: the question of what the social order *does* with the productive force of desiring-production. Since desiring-production relentlessly initiates, produces, and moves, it tends away from routinization, away from performing one particular function over and over. They insist that desiring-production has “a real inorganization”, which is to say it resists being formed up into coherent organs that perform a fixed function and are subordinated to a larger social body (1977, p. 309). Rather, they say, desiring-production can only be captured. In Freudian psychoanalysis, the creative id is captured by the Oedipal narrative and made to act in limited ways that are consistent with the order of mommy–daddy–me (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 23). Deleuze and Guattari extend this analysis the other “apparatuses of capture” that together make up the social order, all of which function to imprison desire, to feed off its energy, to bend its anarchic nature toward the project of a social order (1977, pp. 33, 54). In addition to the Oedipal family, these apparatuses include the state, capital, the subject or self, the body, science, and the sign. This conception of capture is inspired by Nietzsche’s (1989b, p. 85) image of the lion. For Nietzsche man is a noble animal that seeks to discharge his strength into the world, but he is imprisoned by the strictures of Christian morality. He aches to break free, but all he can do is rub himself raw against the bars of his cage. Deleuze and Guattari are also working closely with Marx here, who argued that capital is “dead labor” that it cannot itself produce material goods. Capital can only capture the productive force of workers bodies (“living labor” for Marx) (Marx, 1993 [1867]), and appropriate the value produced by workers in the form of profit (capital). Capital thereby alienates productivity from its proper location in workers bodies. Similarly, in Deleuze and Guattari’s schema, the productive capacities of desiring-production are alienated from it and they are bent toward particular ends by the apparatuses of capture (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, pp. 154, 310, 333). The apparatuses are unproductive systems of control that function, each in its own way, to imprison desiring-production and use its creative force for their own ends.

Deleuze and Guattari’s political agenda, their normative vision for the world, is to free desiring-production from the apparatuses that confine it so that it can create, initiate, and produce freely. This liberation of desire, when generalized, is for them the same thing as revolution. The revolution they mean is therefore not the same thing as we find in the *Communist manifesto*, although they do see themselves very much as Marxists (Deleuze, 1995b, p. 171). For Marx and Engels, workers must be organized into a class by a workers’ party. That party then seizes the bourgeois state and uses it to abolish private property and class distinctions. As a result, both the state and capitalist

social relations will wither away, and in a free association people will assume control over their labor and their lives. Deleuze and Guattari would accept the contours of Marx and Engels' free association, but not the strategy of a workers' party or the state, both of which they entirely reject as a political strategy. Instead, they are much closer to the tradition of classical anarchism, with its insistence on a social revolution rather than a political one. In a social revolution, a workers' party does not seize the state. Instead, ordinary people directly take up the project of governing themselves, bypassing both parties and the state (e.g. Bakunin, 1973; Kropotkin, 1995; Proudhon, 1969; Rocker, 1988). Modern analogues to this more anarchist-inspired line of thinking are the tradition of Italian autonomism associated most closely with Antonio Negri (e.g. 1999), a friend and colleague of Deleuze and Guattari, and the work of Henri Lefebvre (2009), especially his politics of autogestion, or self-management. In line with these traditions, Deleuze and Guattari seek to strip away the apparatuses of capture, especially that of the state, and return desiring-production to its rightful and original autonomy.

Concrete examples of this vision are many. It might involve workers retaking control over their labor power and the means of production (currently captured by capital), as when workers appropriate a factory and begin producing on their own. The long list of such occupations includes Petersburg in 1917, Italy in 1919–1920, Spain in 1936, Yugoslavia in the 1960s, France in 1973, and Argentina in 2001 (see Ness & Azzellini, 2011). Or it might involve citizens taking control over their affairs (currently captured by the state), as when workers took control of Paris in 1873, peoples' councils took control of Budapest in 1956, the Chinese people occupied Tiananmen Square in 1987, the Zapatistas began managing villages in Chiapas in 1994, or when *indignados* in Madrid and protesters in Athens in 2011 declared their governments illegitimate and began debating among themselves what to do about the financial crisis. Or it might involve each person retaking control over their own desire (currently captured by Oedipal psychoanalysis), and deciding instead to open out beyond the family and multiply their connections into the world. Or in the realm of urban planning and politics, such a return would mean urban inhabitants retaking control over the production of urban space that is currently captured by state spatial planning and capitalist land development (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 427ff), as when squatters in contemporary Italy appropriated a building or a social center to manage it themselves, or when neighborhood *asambleas* in Argentina in 2001 or Madrid in 2012 began creating their own institutions to govern their neighborhoods, or when people all over the world who were deprived of their rural livelihoods migrated to cities and began building, largely on their own, massive informal cities that are only nominally regulated by the state.

Obviously none of these examples constitutes a permanent global revolution, nor should any of them be taken as ideal archetypes of the liberation of desire. I present them only as cases in which, for a certain time and in a certain place, a radical upheaval was achieved in the system of control such that desiring-production was able to produce on its own, liberated from the apparatuses that capture it. The workers in the occupied factories, for example, for a specified period in a limited place, succeeded in overcoming private property and class relations, as well as the state laws that enforce them. They liberated the productive power of living labor, in other words, from the apparatuses that alienate workers from their own activity and expropriate the value they produce. These are concrete glimmers of the kind of thing Deleuze and Guattari are calling for. And they begin to reveal the revolutionary character of Deleuze and Guattari's project, which imagines a profound transformation of the existing order of society.

So how does this work? What are the steps? Great obstacles stand in the way of Deleuze and Guattari's project. It is not easy for desiring-production to escape the apparatuses that capture it because the apparatuses are extraordinarily well-developed and effective. Take for example the figure in *Anti-Oedipus* of Oedipal psychoanalysis (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977). "The frantic Oedipalization to which psychoanalysis devotes itself" (1977, p. 53) captures the desire of the

unconscious. It imprisons all relationships in parent–child relationships, and relentlessly reads all desire as contained within the Oedipal triangle of mommy–daddy–me (1977, p. 51). Deleuze and Guattari say the solution is a kind of counter-analysis against all odds, a practice they call “schizoanalysis”. Schizoanalysis proceeds first by attacking Oedipus as an apparatus of capture: “Destroy, destroy. The [first] task of schizoanalysis goes by way of destruction – a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete curettage. Destroy Oedipus, the illusion of the ego, the puppet of the super ego, guilt, law, castration” (1977, p. 311). This first task dismantles the cage; it clears the way for desiring-production to create as it will. However, Deleuze and Guattari imagine this destruction in a very particular way. They do not want us to confront and strike at Oedipal psychoanalysis and other apparatuses of capture. They are proposing not so much a politics of resistance as one of refusal, of secession, of escape. They do not want us to face Oedipus, but to turn away, to run, to flee.

Good people say that we must not flee, or to escape is not good, that it is not effective, and that one must work for reforms. But the revolutionary knows that escape is revolutionary – *withdrawal, freaks* – provided one sweeps away the social cover on leaving, or causes a piece of the system to get lost in the shuffle (1977, p. 277).

Destruction is achieved by this fleeing-and-sweeping-away, by an escape that carries off a piece of the cage, chunks of the whole system of cages, and weakens its integrity. In order to flee effectively, they say, we must study the contours of our cage, we must understand how an apparatus of capture works. Then we will be able to best plan our escape.

This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum [apparatus of capture], experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight . . . (Deleuze & Gattari 1987, p. 161).

Lines of flight, deterritorialization, and revolution

These “lines of flight” are a central element of Deleuze and Guattari’s political praxis (especially Deleuze & Guattari, 1986; 1987). As we saw, flight entails an escape from the apparatus of capture. The “line” is used in contrast with a point. A point is fixed in space, whereas a line represents motion between points. A point is associated with an ontology of being, while a line is associated with an ontology of becoming. An apparatus of capture holds us at a fixed point, but when we escape the apparatus we begin moving along a line. We begin a process of becoming something other, something new. A closely related concept for them is deterritorialization, which is embedded in the quote above and similarly refers to a process of breaking free of apparatuses of capture, becoming uprooted, detached from the earth in order to move across it, uncaptured, along the line (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986). For Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialization and flight are hopeful acts, but they are nevertheless extremely risky. The usual fate of deterritorialized elements pursuing a line of flight is that they are recaptured and reterritorialized in an apparatus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 316, 1987, p. 54). The image is something like a prison break: the prisoner escapes, but quickly finds s/he lacks the resources to remain free for long and is eventually apprehended. The workers’ collective seizes the factory and begins producing, but eventually the police arrive and enforce the private property rights of the owner. And so to an extent Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of flight is a cyclical one: elements flee and pursue a line of flight, they are recaptured, and they flee again, only to repeat the process. However, the vision is not purely cyclical because each escape has an effect; each flight causes some “piece of the system to get lost in the shuffle.” As a result, we can expect that repeated flights and recaptures will, over time, have the effect of marginally altering, and, they hope, weakening the system of apparatuses of capture (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 277,

see also 1986). We might imagine this vision to be something akin to Lindblom's (1959) incrementalism in planning – systems evolve, but only slowly through repeated marginal changes.⁶

But Deleuze and Guattari do not come to rest in incrementalism. Not at all. Their agenda is revolutionary, not reformist. They seek to find a way to move beyond a limiting cycle of flight and recapture. The key to this moving beyond is what they call “revolutionary connections” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 473). When an element is deterritorialized, when it escapes from an apparatus of capture and begins to construct its line of flight, it does not have to do so alone. It has the potential to connect up with other lines of flight, to link up with other deterritorialized elements and begin to form not just single lines, but flows, aggregates, collective multiplicities whose elements remain distinct but move together in a shared project to evade recapture (1987, p. 319). Deleuze and Guattari are optimistic about such linkages because, they argue, it is in the nature of desiring-production to produce connections. One of desiring-production's particular creative forces, an activity that is central to its functioning, is to join things up together into larger assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 181).⁷ Desiring-production relentlessly unsettles the apparatuses of capture, it sets elements in motion along lines of flight, and at the same time it also induces those lines of flight to seek connection with other lines. The idea is that liberated elements pursuing their lines of flight will be able in the best case to fairly explode into connection with uncountable others, each of whom is also always connecting. The connections build on and feed each other – increasing each other's power. The act of “connection indicates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows boost one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment or stoke their quanta” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 220). To return to our earlier example, worker-run factories would seek to link up with other such factories. They would seek to build a spreading network of reappropriated productive activity, a whole alter-economy beyond capitalism. The larger the network grew, the more it would be empowered psychologically and materially, and the easier it would be to ward off recapture by the state or the capitalist economy.

Deleuze and Guattari propose a form for this act of mutual augmentation through connection: the rhizome. Taking their cue now from plant biology rather than geometry, they define a rhizome as an acentered, non-hierarchical network of entities in which each member has the potential to communicate horizontally with any other (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 17).⁸ Deleuze and Guattari contrast the rhizome to an arboreal structure in which all flows must pass through a single connection, in which all relations are hierarchical. In an arboreal structure, all communication must pass first through a single coordinating “trunk” before it flows out to the limbs and branches. Rhizomes, by contrast, are acentered; there is no trunk, no general, no central committee that coordinates the whole. Rather organization and coordination emerge on their own, without intentional action. The network *organizes itself*. It is only through rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari insist, that desire can operate, that it can follow its inclinations, that it can move and produce in the way that is proper to it (1987, p. 14).

The debate about whether humans are capable of self-organization has a long history in political thought, one I certainly cannot resolve definitively here. Advocates of self-organization often point to natural examples: the ant hill, the bee hive, the bird flock. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004) like the metaphor of swarm intelligence, where decisions emerge from the whole instead of being issued by a central power. Critical Mass, the alternative transportation activist group, has experimented with such intelligence in their rallies (Day, 2005). Deleuze and Guattari, too, talk of rhizomes, trees, and wolf packs. Perhaps the most visceral example is a flock of starlings. They rise together into the air, a black mass of perhaps 50,000 birds, to hunt insects. The flock is cohesive, but it is constantly changing shape, undulating purposefully as the birds move about in pursuit of prey. You are aware the flock is a multitude of individual birds, but it seems you are watching a single coherent thing, a pulsing life-form with an obvious intelligence, efficiently carrying out the task of finding, catching, and ingesting food. Scientists tell us that there is no leader, that the flock makes

decisions without any centralized system of command (Hayes, 2011). And it is fast. The flock does not take flight or turn or change shape gradually. Despite its great mass, it can change direction in less than a second, so fast you catch your breath. The flock seems not only to have a collective mind, but also to be able to change that mind in an instant. It can also change color or transparency just as fast. When the flat of their wings is facing you, the flock is solid black. But as they fly toward you or away, as they show their wings' blade-edge, the mass changes through dark gray to silver, and then it even sometimes disappears entirely. The whole flock, 50,000 birds, disappears in an instant. And then before you can process what you are seeing, it reemerges again as fast as it vanished.

Clearly, emergent organization is commonplace in the non-human world. But of course the question has always been whether humans can be like starlings, whether they can decide together, with no leader, so effectively. Again, the question cannot be resolved here, but in support of Deleuze and Guattari's position let me just make one point about the human brain. Many contemporary neurobiologists say the brain operates much more like Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome than like a discrete, self-contained organ (Damasio, 2003). The brain does not function according to a centralized model of intelligence with a unitary agent. Thought is better understood . . . scientists tell us, as a chemical event or the coordination of billions of neurons in a coherent pattern. There is no one that makes a decision in the brain, but rather a swarm, a multitude that acts in concert. From the perspective of the neurobiologists, the one never decides. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 337). According to this science, when a person makes a decision and acts on it, billions of neurons must be coordinated with billions of other kinds of cells. Every decision is the result of emergent organization. Whether one person takes action or a whole crowd does, either way an uncountable multitude must be coordinated to act in concert. The flock of starlings, the brain, the human body – these are all multitudes. Emergent organization among humans, therefore, may not be such an implausible fantasy. Not only are we capable of it, it seems, but we do it all the time. Every time “a person” makes a decision or a flock of starlings turns or an unplanned crowd gathers – emergent organization is working, and working very well.⁹

But leaving aside the *plausibility* of emergent organization, Deleuze and Guattari insist that rhizomes must operate this way. In order to form properly revolutionary connections, for them lines of flight must associate with each other in rhizomes without leaders, where coordination emerges spontaneously. And Deleuze and Guattari imagine that, like real rhizomes, their rhizomes will never come to rest, that they will relentlessly grow and spread by sending out new stems, any one of which can connect with any other in the rhizome, or with deterritorialized elements that are not yet part of the rhizome (1987, p. 190). That is why Deleuze and Guattari implore us to “make rhizome everywhere”, to free up escapes that “dismantle the strata in their wake, break through the walls of significance, pour out of the holes of subjectivity, fell trees in favor of veritable rhizomes, and steer the flows down lines of positive deterritorialization or creative flight” (1987, pp. 190–191). The more successfully we can do this, the more likely we are to create a runaway effect in which deterritorialized flows of desire “become parts and cogs of one another in the flow that feeds one and the same desiring-machine, so many local fires patiently kindled for a generalized explosion” (1977, p. 137).

This generalized explosion is their goal, and it is now very far from the incrementalism of Lindblom. Rather than merely a cycle of flight and recapture, Deleuze and Guattari imagine the possibility of lines of flight linked up in a rhizome whose purpose is to help deterritorialized elements remain in flight, to keep flowing, to ward off the formation of apparatuses of capture by continuing to move. If enough lines can manage to flow together, progressively forming a large enough mass that they begin to trace out a plane, a fluid and yet substantially consistent two-dimensional space, they can form what Deleuze and Guattari eventually call “a new land”, a generalized condition for humanity in which becoming, flow, and desire pervade the community

and choke or occlude being, fixity, and capture – a coherent but always growing and spreading rhizomatic multiplicity (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 318). This process of flight-and-connection must become revolutionary, it must be pushed “to a point where the process cannot extricate itself, continue on, and reach fulfillment, except insofar as it is capable of creating – what exactly? – a new land” (1977, p. 318). In Marcel Proust’s narrator they see the hero of this revolutionary process. He does not homestead in the familial and neurotic lands of Oedipus . . . he does not remain there, he crosses these lands, he desecrates them, he penetrates them . . . the psychotic earths . . . are traversed in their turn to a point where the problem is no longer posed, no longer posed in this way. The narrator continues his own affair, until he reaches the *unknown country*, his own, the *unknown land*, which alone is created by his own work in progress (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 318)¹⁰ His crossings, joined with the flights of multiple others and taken all together, begin to trace out “a new earth where desire functions according to its molecular elements and flows” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 319). The person doing schizoanalysis is undertaking “an intensive voyage that undoes every land for the benefit of the one it is creating” (1977, p. 319). In this way, the line of flight, the schizophrenic escape, has the potential to become revolutionary.

It does not merely consist in withdrawing from the social [i.e. the entire complex of apparatuses of capture], in living on the fringe: it causes the social to take flight through the multiplicity of holes that eat away at it and penetrate it, always coupled directly to it, everywhere setting the molecular charges that will explode what must explode, make fall what must fall, make escape what must escape, at each point ensuring the conversion of schizophrenia as a process into an effectively revolutionary force. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 341)

The new land brought about by this generalized explosion involves the collapse of the system of apparatuses of capture. In the resulting disarray, some consistencies can and do emerge, some form of coordination among the elements will come to exist. But that coordination, as in a rhizome, must always be immanent or emergent. Consistency and coordination must arise spontaneously out of the collective intelligence and activity of the rhizomatic network. It cannot be planned, or directed by a leadership, or managed from a central and more important node in the rhizome. Still, Deleuze and Guattari do not expect that liberated desire will simply live free and undisturbed in the new land. They accept that it is possible, even probable, that in the new land new apparatuses will emerge, new centralized organs of management. Therefore, desire must continuously flee. It must remain in motion, always on the line, perpetually escaping and warding off the formation of new apparatuses. That is why the new land is something of a misnomer, for it is in fact made up of flight. Its topography is traced by the movement of escaping desire. The fleeing elements can never come to rest because the apparatuses are never eradicated once and for all. Capture will continually reassert itself in forms like state agencies, private property, party organizations, corporations, planning departments, and the like. Fleeing elements of desire must always continue the active process of warding off these apparatuses, preventing the formation of institutions that will try to organize desiring-production, form it up into organs, codify it into machines that are limited to performing a narrow function. As a result, it is hard to imagine what role there would be in this new land for planning, at least as we typically think of it.

Capitalism and the state

In *A thousand plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) analyze a whole suite of apparatuses of capture, including the way major languages control what it is possible to say, the way we are trained to understand ourselves as self-contained subjects,¹¹ the way our language is dominated by master signifiers, the way a dominant racial ideal judges and orders other racial identities, even the way the refrain in music captures and orders creative possibilities, always bringing things back to the same repeated phrase. Deleuze and Guattari analyze these diverse apparatuses in order to remind us that

desire is captured in multiple ways, and revolutionary alternatives must be pursued in many different spheres. At the same time, throughout their work they remain committed to a specifically Marxist analysis, and that commitment induces them to return again and again to the question of how capitalism and the state function as apparatuses of capture.

For them the state is incapable of any kind of production; it is the pure embodiment of anti-production (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 235). Nevertheless, it sits at the heart of economic production, playing the vital role of governing economic relations and managing surplus wealth. As an economic system, capitalism tends to induce instability and upheaval, and so it requires “a whole apparatus of regulation whose principal organ is the State” (1977, p. 252). Because the state is incapable of production, it can only ever capture and control the forces of production, forces that inhere in the bodies of workers (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 427). As a result, for Deleuze and Guattari the interior essence of the state is capture. It is, in fact, the quintessential apparatus of capture. However, they stress that the state is not able to capture everything, that there is always an exterior to the state regime, always something that escapes, that flows, that remains free. Flows that escape the state occupy what they call “smooth space”, the space of the nomad, in contrast to “striated space”, the space of the state and its settlements (1987, pp. 361–362). It is in smooth space, among the nomads, that it is possible to develop what they call a “war machine”, an association of escaped and nomadic elements whose purpose is to destroy the state. But recall their “flight” approach to politics: the war machine does not destroy the state by seizing state power; rather, it flees from the state as an apparatus of capture, it *inhabits* smooth space by moving across it, warding off the formation of the state apparatus among nomads (1987, pp. 356, 410, 429). The war machine strives to prevent the formation of “distinct organs of power”, of institutionalized arrangements designed to capture and manage flows of production (1987, p. 357).

Deleuze and Guattari take the image of the war machine from the work of Pierre Clastres, but they are also very much working with Hobbes here. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes (1996) posits that in the absence of a state, humans exist in a condition of a total war of everyone against everyone else. He insists that “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man” (1996, Part I, Chapter 13). In order to bring ourselves out of the state of war, he argues, each of us must agree with everyone else to surrender our own power to an “artificial person” that we create. This artificial person is the sovereign who is authorized to use our power to preserve peace among us. In other words, for Hobbes we naturally engage each other in a state of war, and so to protect ourselves we have to create an entity outside of ourselves and surrender our power to it. In the classic formulation of the process, we exchange our freedom for security. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that this heteronomous character of the state apparatus constitutes an *alienation* of our own proper power to an external entity.¹² This entity then captures, commands, and dominates our desire. It prevents us from controlling the conditions of our own existence. And Deleuze and Guattari are not talking only about despotic states, but about *all* states. They mean the state-form in general. They argue, and Hobbes would entirely agree, that all states operate through heteronomy; ruling their population is the very nature of what states are designed to do. In order to reclaim our autonomy, in order to take control again over the decisions that affect our lives, Deleuze and Guattari argue, we must flee the state, become nomadic, escape striated space and inhabit smooth space. But we cannot do this alone, as isolated atoms. Rather, as we escape and become nomads we must seek out others in flight, connect with them, and form up into a war machine. Deleuze and Guattari’s imagination here is quite literal: the war machine is a desiring-machine that produces war. But they mean “war” in a very particular sense. It is an evocation of Hobbes’ condition of war, a condition in which we are outside of the state form. But Deleuze and Guattari mutate Hobbes’ concept, from a war of all against all into a more general condition of existence outside the state. “War” for them means merely a social aggregation that is not subjected to any state. Hobbes argued stridently that such a

condition was *necessarily* a state of total war. Deleuze and Guattari reject that assumption, arguing instead, quite reasonably, that a society without a state can take a whole variety of forms, from total war to total peace. And given the unlikelihood of such total societies, the most probable form is somewhere in between. And so Deleuze and Guattari are not proposing a war machine in order to return to Hobbes's chaos of an original war of all against all. They want the war machine to produce social aggregates outside the state, to multiply escapes from the state apparatus and produce connections among lines of flight so they can augment each other's power.¹³ As each line of flight escapes, and in escaping carries off with it a piece of the state's apparatus of capture, as lines form connections with other lines to create rhizomatic networks that augment the power of the lines, they become increasingly able to ward off the formation of new state apparatuses, to prevent new organs of power. If this process can grow and feed on itself, if lines can multiply and remain in flight, they can collectively dissolve the foundations of the state apparatus, causing it to begin to crumble under its own weight. These lines of flight do not attack the state, they do not form a workers' party to seize it, or smash it. Instead they flee it, abandon it, evacuate it, undermine it and cause it to collapse. At its height, the creative power of the war machine can begin to contribute to the larger project of tracing out the contours of smooth space, of a new land beyond the state. It is only in that new land, they argue, that we will discover what we can do.

It is worth repeating that Deleuze and Guattari are speaking categorically here. They are not talking about particular states (France, the U.K., Saudi Arabia). They are not even talking about types of states (the autocratic state, or the modern state, or the liberal-democratic state). They are talking about the state-form, the state in general, any and all states of whatever kind. That is the meaning of their evocation of Hobbes by the use of the term "war." They imagine the war machine to provide an alternative not to the current state as it exists now, but to the state as a form of social organization. They are arguing for a total turning away from all states, a breakthrough to a new land that perpetually wards off state capture. It is a radical anti-state vision of unmistakable intensity. As a result, their position on any kind of planning under the auspices of the state is not difficult to infer.

They take a similarly clear stance against capitalism, but they understand it to be a more complicated apparatus of capture than the state. Here they work from Marx's argument that capital is dead labor that must survive as a parasite on the productive force of living labor. The system of capitalist relations is, in that sense, an apparatus of capture that controls and channels living labor toward particular limited ends. However, whereas the state is pure anti-production, seeking only to capture and fix the flows of desire, capitalism handles desire in a different way. Capitalism came to occupy its current dominant position by means of a revolution. This revolution broke apart the old feudal order, dismantling it by deterritorializing its fixed elements. It then reassembled those deterritorialized elements into what Deleuze and Guattari call an axiomatic, the capitalist axiomatic. This revolutionary process is in fact the origin of their concept of deterritorialization: capitalism superseded the feudal order by literally deterritorializing the peasants, uprooting them from their rural, agricultural society and moving them to cities where they were incorporated into the new factory system of capitalist production. Unlike the much more rigid structures of the feudal order and the modern state that assign stable roles to the various parts of society, the capitalist axiomatic is much more flexible and expandable. It is able to alter its structure to accommodate new realities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 238). That flexibility is essential for the capitalist axiomatic because it deterritorializes as part of its normal operation. Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism has always functioned by deterritorializing and then axiomatizing: by breaking apart established routines and structures and mobilizing the freed-up elements into new regimes of accumulation.¹⁴

To be clear, for Deleuze and Guattari capital does not have the power to produce; that power remains in the bodies of labor. The power that capital mobilizes to break apart and deterritorialize is always made up of the captured and harnessed power of labor. But capital is different than the state in

that it restlessly and actively uses that captured power to disrupt and reorganize its own axiomatic. Unlike the state, which captures by confining, fixing, and stabilizing, capitalism captures by freeing desiring-production and then shepherding and channeling it, by forcing it to flow in particular ways. Capitalism captures desiring-production, but it does so on the move, in a constantly evolving axiomatic. As a result, for Deleuze and Guattari the way to struggle against capitalism is not so much to flee from a fixed apparatus, but rather to try to speed up, intensify, and redirect the processes of deterritorialization and flow that capitalism itself sets in motion. If capitalism must always deterritorialize elements and then reabsorb them into its own evolving axiomatic, resistance might take the form of *augmenting* that deterritorialized flow to the point where it overwhelms the capitalist axiomatic's capacity to reabsorb it. Those flows that capitalism cannot reabsorb can then begin to link up into the same sorts of rhizomatic networks we saw above. As more and more flows are able to evade reabsorption, as they connect with each other and augment each other's strength, they can reach the point of a breakthrough, a generalized explosion that splinters the capitalist axiomatic to the point where it loses integrity, where the un-reabsorbed flows form a rhizome that begins to breathe on its own, begins to live outside of the capitalist axiomatic; a new land beyond capitalism.

For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to dwell on Deleuze and Guattari's (relatively subtle) distinction between the state and capitalism. For them, both operate as apparatuses of capture that limit and redirect the energy of desiring-production. Moreover, the two different modes of capture are interlinked: the capitalist state functions as a support mechanism for the reincorporation of deterritorialized elements into the capitalist axiomatic. The two modes, while distinct, typically work in cooperation. And so while there are differences between fleeing the state and fleeing capitalism, nevertheless the two are often bound up together. The project of linking up lines of flight into rhizomes that can form a new land is for Deleuze and Guattari always the project of producing a breakthrough that allows us to move beyond *both* capitalism and the state. Moreover, even if these two apparatuses are at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, they are by no means the only capture we should be escaping. Apparatuses such as Oedipal psychoanalysis, scientific rationalism, racialized norms, heteronormativity, and patriarchy, among others, also confine and control desiring-production. The political task Deleuze and Guattari set for us is enormous and complex. It is consistently and unapologetically revolutionary. They are insisting, stridently and unmistakably, on a thoroughgoing upheaval that constitutes a breakthrough, a moving beyond both the state and capitalism, a generalized explosion of escapes and connections that can create a genuinely revolutionary force.

Intermezzo: Informal settlements

A particularly vibrant example of how this process might begin to take shape is the proliferation of informal settlements on the outskirts of megacities in the Global South. In places such as Turkey, Kenya, Brazil, China, and India, capitalist industrialization, commodification, and financialization of agriculture in rural areas has destroyed the livelihoods of countless peasants, dispossessed and uprooted them, and caused a migration to the cities so rapid that formal state and capitalist economic structures are woefully unable to absorb the flow of people. Those formal structures are literally overwhelmed. What we are seeing is an instance of capitalism setting free flows of people so large that the axiomatic is overwhelmed, at least for the moment. It has not been able to recapture the flows, and so people are outside, unincorporated, and they have set about constructing and managing informal settlements largely on their own. In cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Nairobi, Mexico City, Mumbai, and Jakarta they have created enormous urban worlds that to varying but always significant degrees exist outside the normal institutions of the state and market. They are typically managed, instead, by an incredibly complex and shifting system of land tenure, social relations, methods of commodity exchange, construction practices, etc. that has emerged to fill the

state–capital vacuum (Davis, 2006). Of course, these places are not utopias. The process has not created a generalized deterritorialization; it has only uprooted some people, typically the most poor, in some places, typically the Global South. Life in informal settlements is extremely hard and dangerous. The point here, obviously, is not to think the slums are the realization of Deleuze and Guattari’s new land. They should be seen, instead, as a concrete manifestation of how capitalism can initiate flows of deterritorialized elements that are too large and rapid for the axiomatic to reabsorb. The result of this unmanageable flow has been to open up a space beyond, a largely auto-produced space in which people manage their affairs without the normal apparatuses of capture. Deleuze and Guattari would not enjoin us to “make slum everywhere”. Rather, they would have us pay attention, not just to the deprivation and misery in the slums, not just to the injustices they produce, but also to the creation that is going on there. They would have us seek out the new ways people are inventing to survive beyond the state, beyond the market, on their own. In no sense can they be expected to have achieved an ideal, or even a good society, given the massive limitations imposed by their circumstances. But even so, they are restlessly inventing, producing, creating new strategies on their own. The planning establishment in these cities typically wants to figure out ways to plan the slums, to include them, to fold them back into the regime of the formal city. Deleuze and Guattari might suggest that our approach to the settlements should be instead to seek to intensify their flight, to help them invent, produce, and create better cities than they are currently able to. Not to save them by recapturing them, but to support and nurture their already existing practices of self-management.

Conclusion

It is not difficult to see that Deleuze and Guattari’s vision opens up myriad questions, debates, and directions for investigation. It is in the nature of their work to generate new possibilities. It is also not difficult to see that this paper cannot address or resolve all the questions Deleuze and Guattari prompt us to ask. It cannot even be expected to identify them all. Is self-organization possible? How has it been done in the past? How is it being done now? Is it possible to live beyond the state? What kinds of associations can and should we create in a new land? Even if I could tap into some sort of divine intelligence to identify and answer all the questions Deleuze and Guattari provoke, to do so would be a mistake. It would close down the debates before they began. What I can do, however, what is appropriate, is to try to map out some of the terrain of the debates that I think Deleuze and Guattari make possible, debates I think will invigorate planning theory and practice.

As I say above, planning as a whole has yet to engage Deleuze and Guattari’s thought very extensively. Moreover, what planners have done so far has been tentative and understated. I think to take Deleuze and Guattari seriously, to feel the full weight of their thought, requires an honest engagement with their normative political vision. If we enter into such an engagement, we will be confronted with existential and normative questions about planning, questions about what planning is, and if it should exist. For example, it is not hard to see that Deleuze and Guattari stand against state-led planning of all kinds, from rational, expert-driven planning to more participatory and communicative forms. And of course we might suspect that this fact is precisely why planning theory and practice have studiously avoided them. But instead of seeing their existential challenge as a threat and steering clear of it, we can choose to see it as invigorating and embrace it. If we do so, we would have at least two options. We could *disagree* with them and maintain that state-led planning should still exist. In that case their argument would prompt us to marshal a vigorous defense of state planning. Of course we have a long history of defending the need for such planning, but almost always that defense is against an unregulated capitalist alternative (classically, Klosterman, 2003). That is not at all what is at stake here. It is apparent that unfettered capitalism is a disaster for cities. It has been proven repeatedly, only most recently in the crash of 2008.

But Deleuze and Guattari's challenge is of a higher order. Clearly state-planned capitalism is more just and humane than capitalism without state planning. But Deleuze and Guattari are asking us to not come to rest, fat and happy, at a state-managed capitalism in which planning intervenes when the market cannot produce the right outcome. They want us to aspire to more, to a world without both capitalism and the state. When we engage with Deleuze and Guattari, we are no longer in the position of defending state-led planning against free-market capitalism. Rather, they prompt us to defend state-led planning against something very different: emergent organization in a stateless society. How would that defense of state planning be different than the ones we have? Why is it better to have state-led planning than emergent organization? We could offer a lazy defense, saying emergent organization is impossible and so we have to have a state.¹⁵ Or we could generate a strong defense, making a case for why state-led planning is *preferable* to emergent organization. That would invigorate planning indeed, if it were successful: not to show why it is preferable to a pitilessly rapacious system such as capitalism, but why it is preferable to people collectively managing their affairs for themselves.

Conversely, if we *agree* with Deleuze and Guattari we are forced to abandon state-led planning as a practice. This, of course, prompts us to explore what a city without state planning has been, and, more importantly, what it could be into the future. It demands that we invent and debate what kinds of other practices we should be engaging in instead. How has emergent organization manifested itself in the past? What practices are there for nurturing it? How do we help it grow along the path it determines, rather than channel it according to a logic not its own? When we encounter a human group that is functioning (however well) outside of state control, we would try to understand not how to integrate it into the existing society, the existing logic of state planning, but how to augment the group's already existing autonomy beyond the state, how to speed it up, and help it connect with others. This would prompt us to consider a whole new way to confront the challenge of informal urbanization. These ways of thinking and modes of invention are entirely closed off when we assume as given the idea that state-led planning is necessary and good.

And those questions about the state open up other questions as well. What about the human practice of planning that is not captured by the state? If we do not reduce planning to state-led planning, what then does planning, more generally, mean? Certainly there is no role for state-led planning in Deleuze and Guattari's new land, but what about planning more generally? We might conclude that Deleuze and Guattari would reject all forms of planning, seeing the practice in every form as an apparatus of capture that attempts to control, shape, and channel desiring-production into specific arrangements, to force it to flow in particular directions that have been worked out in advance, that *follow a plan*. This line of thinking would argue that planning necessarily, always and everywhere, undermines the autonomy of desiring-production and prevents it from achieving the full production it is capable of. If we understand Deleuze and Guattari this way, we would read their normative political agenda as a desire to escape and undermine all forms of planning, and to imagine and bring about other modes of social and political action beyond planning (Deleuze & Guattari, 1977, p. 311). And of course we would need to set ourselves to discovering what those modes would be like.

Or, we might conclude that Deleuze and Guattari do not reject *all* forms of planning beyond the state, that there might be some role for the practice of planning in the new land. In that case, it would be possible to conceive of something like "Deleuzoguattarian planning," although we would need to invent a less jarring term. Jean Hillier (2007, 2008) has argued that such planning is possible. She sees it as planning that takes its own plans to be provisional and constantly changing, rather than fixed and unalterable, what she calls a "becoming-planning" (2005, p. 273). It is a planning that is sensitive to its tendency to be an apparatus of capture, and so adopts "a concern for indeterminate essences rather than contoured, ordered ones; for dynamic or emergent properties rather than fixed ones; and for allowing intuition and uncertainty, multiplicity and complexity rather than systematic certainties" (2005, p. 292). Critics have worried that this kind of planning is

just Lindblom's "incrementalism in a new guise", as Hillier has acknowledged (2008, p. 38). More charitably, we might say that her Deleuzoguattarian planning is critical pragmatist planning pushed just a bit further (Forester, 1993; Hoch, 1996; see also Healey, 2008).

Either way, her Deleuzoguattarian planning does not yet have it right. It does not yet perceive, articulate, or embrace the revolutionary power of Deleuze and Guattari's normative political vision as I have expressed it here. Hillier thinks there can be Deleuzoguattarian planning within the state apparatus. Clearly there cannot. A planning that took their normative vision seriously would be far more unsettling to traditional ideas of planning than Hillier's is. It would not be merely planning that is more open to difference and change and more sensitive to its function as an apparatus of capture. Rather it would be planning that entirely refuses the state and capitalism, that devotes its energy to kindling fires for a generalized explosion, to building revolutionary connections among escaped elements beyond the state and capitalism, so that they can grow strong enough to achieve a breakthrough, to spill out beyond the limit of our current society and into a new land. And after the breakthrough, in the new land, planning would need to operate in a way that might seem strange. In the new land, elements in flight must remain in flight. Planning would need to be an activity that works tirelessly to ward off new forms of organization, institution, and hierarchy. It would have to be planning that does not stand outside the activity of people and try to coordinate it. Certainly in the new land action would be taken, but no organ, or institution, or committee, or planning department can take it. Decisions must emerge from the whole body of society. Planning would have to be conceived of as a power that is immanent to society, that is not done intentionally by any specialized group, but by everyone acting together to coordinate activity. A flock of starlings. The human brain.

It is probably clear from the discussion above that my own position is to agree with Deleuze and Guattari that we should aspire to much more than merely state-led planning, that we should devote our energy to moving beyond that practice. But I think there is real value in an exploration of what planning would be like in the new land, and whether that would be something we could call "planning" any longer. But again, my position in these debates is a question that is entirely premature. Our exploration of Deleuze and Guattari's ideas is in its infancy, and we are just beginning to understand the implications of their political philosophy. I have argued that Deleuze and Guattari have the potential to invigorate the planning discourse, but that must happen through sustained debates about what their argument is, what it means for planning. Whichever of the many ways we choose to engage their work, my plea is for planners to multiply their connections with Deleuze and Guattari, to increase the intensity with which we as a discipline and profession occupy ourselves with the challenge and inspiration these relentlessly creative scholars have to offer.

Notes on contributor

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Notes

1. The arguments in this last book, *What is Philosophy?*, overlap significantly with those in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, but they are less overtly political (though not apolitical by any means). Because my aim in this paper is to present their normative political vision, I therefore focus less on *What is Philosophy?*

2. Healey's mention is extremely glancing, which is at least somewhat surprising given the article is about pragmatism in planning, and Deleuze and Guattari are very clear about their commitment to a pragmatist philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 139ff).
3. Rajchman is also a favorite source for Hillier, who similarly draws extensively on secondary sources in her analysis of Deleuze and Guattari's thought.
4. That dangerous spirit is partly borne of their fondness for Nietzsche, who wanted to incite more "philosophers of the dangerous 'maybe'" (1989a, Part 1, Section 2).
5. In speaking of power, Deleuze and Guattari use the word *puissance* to mean a power that initiates, creates, produces (*potentia* in Latin). They use the word *pouvoir* to mean a power that limits, constrains, rules (*potestas* in Latin). See Brian Massumi's introduction to the Minnesota edition of *A thousand plateaus* (1987).
6. Up to this point, Deleuze and Guattari's vision is very similar to that of Jacques Rancière, for whom democratic action (politics) can interrupt the existing order (police) for a time, but can never eliminate or move beyond it (Rancière, 1995, 1999).
7. In *What is philosophy?* (1994) Deleuze and Guattari explore this argument in the register of philosophical concepts, which for them are multiplicitous assemblages that ask what a system is capable of, how it can produce connections that bring about transformations.
8. This idea is no doubt an important influence on Michael Hardt who, when writing about the global anti-capitalist movements at the turn of the second millennium, speaks of expanding networks of "mutual adequation" (Hardt, 2004, p. 232).
9. This emphasis on emergent organization again underscores that in many ways Deleuze and Guattari are closer to the anarchist tradition than to Marxism and its preference for state-party organizational structures.
10. This idea of a "work in progress" is a favorite of Hillier's, one she takes from Deleuze and Guattari and refers to often (e.g. Hillier, 2008, p. 44). But she never gives any sense of the profoundly revolutionary project they have in mind when they use the term.
11. For example, they suggest, through Nietzsche, a radical rethinking of our idea of the self. We currently believe that we are a subject, an autonomous entity capable of action and desire. But that idea, they argue, is a lie. "I" do not desire. Rather the idea that "I" exists at all is the result of desiring-production (Deleuze, & Guattari, 1977, pp. 23, 26, 1986, p. 18). In *Beyond good and evil*, Nietzsche writes,

I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact . . . a thought comes when 'it' wishes, and not when 'I' wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'think.' It thinks; but that this 'it' is precisely the famous old 'ego' is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, and assertion, and assuredly not an 'immediate certainty' (Nietzsche, 1989b, p. 24).

In short, for Deleuze and Guattari the ego is an apparatus of capture.

12. The argument comes straight from Marx's "On the Jewish question."
13. Recall the concrete examples of Paris, Budapest, Beijing, Chiapas, Madrid, and Athens, above.
14. The classic example is "creative destruction," as in the Rust Belt, whereby capital disinvests in a location with low return on investment and reinvests in a location with higher returns.
15. Both of which are false.

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