

# THE DECLINE OF THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS FOR URBAN GROWTH: Evidence from Los Angeles

MARK PURCELL  
*University of Washington*

**ABSTRACT:** *This article explores growth politics in the United States by examining the case of Los Angeles. Recent observers of Los Angeles have noted that growth interests in the city increasingly lack the political coordination to effectively accomplish their projects. One writer has even announced the collapse of the growth machine in the region. Such an assertion is extraordinary, given the power most authors ascribe to growth coalitions and given Los Angeles' strong pro-growth history. The article presents evidence that the machine has not collapsed, but the political consensus for growth has eroded severely over the past 15 years by a variety of factors. The article then argues that the same general processes that have caused the demise of the growth consensus in Los Angeles are in place in other cities and will likely have similar effects on growth politics there. The article ends by detailing some implications that the end of the growth consensus might have for local politics in the United States.*

**T**he growth machine thesis has been an important current in urban political theory over the past 20 years. Many authors of this literature have noted the central role that struggles over urban growth play in the politics of cities (Calavita, 1992; Jonas, 1991; Leitner, 1990; Logan, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Pincetl, 1992; Swanstrom, 1985; Vogel & Swanson, 1989). The growth machine thesis argues that cities are ruled by a coalition of local business and local government—a growth machine—that comes together to pursue an agenda of urban growth and intensification of land use. This growth coalition, for most authors, dominates city politics because it is able to establish and maintain a political consensus that growth is good for all. Once this consensus is established, the growth machine is able to go about its projects without difficulty, producing urban space according to a pro-growth agenda.

In this article I argue that over the past 15 years in Los Angeles the political consensus for growth has steadily deteriorated. It is no longer taken as self-evident in Los Angeles that growth is good for all. A growth coalition still exists, and it still pursues an agenda of local growth, but it is no longer able to dominate the politics of urban land use to the extent it once did. The article details why this breakdown has taken place. It suggests that the conditions that have led to the decline of the growth consensus in Los Angeles are in place in many other US cities, especially those most affected by the processes associated with globalization. If the hegemony of the growth machine in US cities is eroding, then other, non-machine players—such as slow-growth advocates like residents and environ-

---

*\*Direct all correspondence to: Mark Purcell, Department of Geography, University of Washington, Box 353550, Seattle, WA 98103. E-Mail: mpurcell@u.washington.edu.*

mental groups—will have a new opportunity to advance their agenda and shape future development patterns. Because struggles over growth are more than anything struggles over the geography of the city, this political opportunity portends a possible turn from a geography of land-use intensification and the consumption of land for profit and toward other spatial visions for the city.

## GROWTH MACHINES AND THE RELUCTANT METROPOLIS

The growth machine thesis is most fully articulated in Logan and Molotch's *Urban fortunes*. They argue that "the pursuit of exchange values so permeates the life of localities that cities become organized as enterprises devoted to the increase of aggregate rent levels through the intensification of land use" (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 13). Those writing from a regime theory perspective have tended to agree that the politics of most cities are dominated by a coalition of local government and local business interests that is able to shape urban outcomes according to its interests (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1993; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Analysts outside regime theory have similarly argued that city politics are dominated by growth coalitions (Gottdiener, 1985; Mollenkopf, 1983; Weiss, 1987). The key to the coalition's hegemony, Logan and Molotch have argued, is a city-wide political consensus for growth.

Although they may differ on which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their growth consensus to eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community. The issues that reach public agendas (and are therefore available for pluralists' investigations) do so precisely because they are matters on which elites have, in effect, agreed to disagree (Molotch & Lester, 1974; Molotch & Lester, 1975; Schattschneider, 1960). Only under rather extraordinary circumstances is this consensus endangered (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 51).

Others agree that establishing consensus is a central task of the growth machine (Vogel & Swanson, 1989; Whitson & Judd, 1991). In the context of a political consensus for growth, growth machines have little trouble achieving the outcomes they desire. Stiff opposition is rare because of a general agreement that growth is good for all.

Most authors, however, do note the existence of opposition to the growth coalition (DeLeon, 1992; Downs, 1988; Ferman, 1996; Swanstrom, 1985; Trounstein & Christensen, 1982). Even Logan and Molotch admit that slow- and no-growth oppositions organized around the use value of land rather than its exchange value arise to oppose the tangible detriments to the quality of life (traffic, pollution, overbuilding, etc.) that unrestricted growth can bring. Some even suggest that "if by chance opposition to growth should aggregate to a sufficient level, it can fundamentally affect the ability of growth networks to carry out their objectives" (Gottdiener, 1985, p. 223). However, in the end most observers conclude that growth coalitions tend to persevere relatively intact and dominate city politics despite the existence of pockets of opposition. The central theme in the literature is that growth interests win out in the end because opposition to growth tends to be fragmented and parochial, limiting its ability to challenge the growth consensus (Fainstein & Hirst, 1995).

The twentieth-century history of Los Angeles seems to offer little challenge to the growth machine thesis. The city was seemingly conjured by powerful landed interests who profited greatly from its extraordinary growth. Growth interests built what is today one of the busiest ports in the world where none had existed; they brought water from all over the state to an area that receives about 15 inches of rainfall a year; they ruthlessly acquired the terminus of the Southern Pacific Railroad from San Diego to channel the flow of migrants from the midwest; they used extensive boosterism to sell the city as a tropical utopia to the population centers back east; and they built a grandiose downtown of skyscrapers where none had existed (Fogelson, 1967; Jacobs, 1966; Mayo, 1933; McWilliams, 1946; Sonenshein, 1989). Fearing unions would hurt the city's chances for growth, local business had a long and violent history of hostility toward organized labor and prided itself on being the open-shop alternative to San Francisco (Greenstein, Lennon, Rolfe, 1992; Rieff, 1991). Moreover, from about

1975–1985 Mayor Tom Bradley led a staunchly pro-growth coalition that dominated city politics in all the ways the growth machine thesis would predict.

In light of this history, it is surprising that in 1997 William Fulton claimed that the growth machine in Los Angeles had “collapsed under its own weight” (Fulton, 1997, p. 16). Fulton’s book, *The Reluctant Metropolis*, is a wide-ranging and insightful catalog of the local growth machine’s increasing inability to marshal support for a pro-growth agenda. He details the woeful inability of the Metropolitan Transit Authority to construct a citywide rail project. He uses the example of the Eastside reservoir to show the difficulty the Metropolitan Water District has had in securing extralocal water resources for the Los Angeles region. He chronicles the incompetent attempts of the downtown elite to place arts and cultural facilities in the central city. And he describes the highly successful slow-growth movement that emerged in the Santa Monica Mountains in the 1980s. Fulton’s main argument is not that growth interests are ceding power to slow-growth activists. It is rather that growth in the region has reached its limit and the pro-growth coalition can no longer maintain the alliances necessary to continue the intensification of land use in the city. Los Angeles, according to Fulton, has reached a stage in its development in which land use is so intensive that the negative impacts are beginning to overwhelm the pro-growth arguments of the landed elite.

## THE EROSION OF THE GROWTH CONSENSUS IN LOS ANGELES

Fulton’s argument, though compelling, relies too heavily on the premise that the city has been built to capacity, and there is simply no room left for additional growth. In fact, there are a number of concrete conditions that have hampered the growth machine and weakened the consensus for growth. These conditions include: (1) the fall of the Bradley regime, (2) the globalization of land-based interests, (3) a slow-growth resistance, (4) the geographical fragmentation of local land-based interests, and (5) changes in city government that have diminished its ability to act as a partner for growth. Moreover, Fulton’s assertion that the machine has “collapsed” is overstated. The evidence I present suggests that the machine has not collapsed, but that over the last 15 years it has been increasingly unable to maintain the consensus that growth is a self-evident good.

Nevertheless, the growth coalition continues to accomplish projects. Regional growth interests are moving along with the Alameda corridor project to update the rail infrastructure between the Port of Los Angeles and downtown. Developers in the northwest San Fernando Valley are proceeding with the massive Porter Ranch development. If it is completed, the project will be one of the largest developments in the city’s history, with its planned 3,400 residences and 6 million square feet of office space on 1,300 acres (Martin, 1996; Schwada, 1991). Building has begun on the mammoth Playa Vista project, a mixed-use development that will sit on top of one of the last remaining wetland ecosystems in Southern California. And growth on the fringes of the metropolis continues in exurbs such as Santa Clarita, Ventura, and Moreno Valley. But the consensus for growth is much less iron-clad. In most of the cases above, opponents struggled long enough to significantly hamper, delay, or downsize the projects. Unanticipated delays of five years or more are not uncommon. At Playa Vista, for example, well-organized legal challenges from environmental groups led to more than 10 years of delay and caused developers to scale back the project and to agree to extensive and expensive restoration of the surrounding wetlands.

Such struggles simultaneously cost time and money, and they can often diminish a developer’s margins to the point where the project is no longer feasible and is abandoned. Furthermore, resistance to growth has frequently focused on larger development projects such as Playa Vista, Porter Ranch, or the proposed expansion of Universal Studios. If such projects were completed on time and according to their original plans, these projects would serve as growth poles—they would stimulate further growth in their areas. The delays and downsizing of these projects have not only affected the projects themselves, but they have diminished each project’s capacity to act as a growth pole for future development. In order to understand in more detail why the growth machine is no longer able to maintain a clear growth consensus, I now turn to an examination of the five specific conditions described above.

## The Fall of the Bradley Regime

The erosion of growth consensus in Los Angeles must be seen in light of the preceding era when a strong growth coalition dominated city politics. Between 1975 and 1985, a stable electoral coalition led by Mayor Tom Bradley joined forces with the regional business elite to form an archetypal growth machine. Bradley's electoral coalition was an ethnic alliance between African American and liberal Jewish groups. The coalition was complex and had different phases, but it served as a consistent pro-growth partner to downtown and regional business interests throughout its tenure (Sonenshein, 1989; Sonenshein, 1993). Beginning in about 1975, the coalition undertook an aggressive redevelopment campaign of investment in the downtown area (Saltzstein & Sonenshein, 1991). The forest of skyscrapers that dominate downtown today are the result of this program. Bradley was able to overcome the significant structural weakness in mayoral authority in Los Angeles by aggressively pursuing and securing large federal subsidies both for redevelopment and for social services. His strategy was made possible by the federal government's policy of investment in American cities during the late 1970s (Brintnall, 1989). Having secured money from outside the city (which is largely controlled by the City Council), Bradley was able to wield considerably more influence than the mayor's office would otherwise have afforded. During this period (until about 1985), the City Council remained electorally quite stable, and the large majority of its members were growth proponents whose campaign funds were provided by the same downtown business interests that were allied with Bradley. In short, for about ten years between 1975 and 1985 the growth machine thrived as a partnership between the Bradley coalition and regional business.

After about 1985, however, the health of the Bradley coalition began to fail. Since 1978, Proposition 13, the ballot measure that cut property taxes in the state by about one-third, had restricted the availability of state and local revenue for Bradley to pursue his redevelopment and social programs. The situation was made worse when the federal government withdrew from urban spending under the Reagan administration (Brintnall, 1989; Peterson & Lewis, 1986; Wolman, 1986). As federal grant programs were cut back and the state and local treasuries became increasingly unreliable, Bradley's money dried up. As his money dried up, his influence waned and the restraints of Los Angeles' weak mayor system loomed larger. Also important was the changing geography of land development in the early 1980s. Early on, Bradley's coalition concentrated on downtown redevelopment. After about 1983, however, high-rise development spread outward to other areas of the city (Fulton, 1997). Two of the most heavily developed areas during this period were on the Westside and along the Ventura corridor. These areas were the stronghold of the affluent and well organized homeowners associations that would become the core of the slow-growth resistance. Moreover, a powerful coalition of federal representatives headed by Congressmen Waxman, Berman, and Levine picked up the slow-growth banner and provided valuable federal political clout to the cause (Davis, 1990). For these reasons, the pro-growth Bradley coalition began to splinter. By 1987 the pro-growth consensus that had reigned for the last ten years was faltering. At the groundbreaking for a new downtown skyscraper that year Bradley could be seen pleading for a dying growth consensus: "All cities," he said, "must grow to survive and prosper. Every city that has ever tried to do otherwise has died" (Fulton, 1997, p. 43). But Bradley's coalition was weakening along with the political consensus for growth. By 1989, Bradley narrowly won reelection over loose cannon and late entrant Nate Holden, who had only two years earlier defeated Homer Broome, Bradley's choice for the tenth district council seat (Saltzstein & Sonenshein, 1991). By 1993, his health beginning to fail, Bradley decided not to run again.

Bradley's electoral coalition has not been replaced. In 1993, pro-business millionaire Richard Riordan defeated thirteenth-district Council member Michael Woo in a close race. Riordan won on a tough-on-crime platform (in the post-1992 uprising era) that relied heavily on the electoral clout of conservative white voters in the San Fernando Valley to defeat the relatively visionless liberal opponent Woo. Riordan is unreservedly pro-business. His speeches read like a text on growth machine ideology. He argues that growth is good for all, that with business ingenuity it is possible to make Los Angeles into a great and prosperous city for the 21st century. However, he lacks the charisma and

populist appeal of Bradley, and his electoral coalition is not nearly as stable. He has not found a replacement for the lost federal money of the early Bradley era (other than limited instances of raising money from his former partners), and is quite clearly restrained by the structural limits of the mayoral office. He prefers to operate behind the scenes and retains many of his business confidants as unofficial advisors. Council-Mayor tensions, which had been muted under the Bradley regime, have reemerged to become a central feature of city politics. Despite their skirmishes, it is clear that in the post-Bradley era the City Council has resumed control of the city. The Council's control has hampered growth, largely due the structure of city government and the emergence of the importance of ethnic constituencies. In short, the clear growth consensus that dominated city politics from 1975–1985 has eroded, and no other political consensus has grown up to take its place.

### Globalization

Much has been written on the processes of globalization, deindustrialization, and the shift to a service-based economy and how those processes affect the social and economic conditions in cities (Bluestone & Harrison, 1982; Castells, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Sassen, 1991; Sassen, 1994). Comparatively little has been written on the effect of these processes on urban politics. Sassen asks in her final chapter, “what happens to city politics when the leading economic forces are oriented to the world market?” (Sassen, 1991, p. 325). It is an interesting question, but one she never addresses.

Logan and Molotch (1987) conceive of the growth machine as made up of local government and a local, land-based business elite. This business elite is not simply the capitalist class in the city, rather it is something more specialized. It is the business elite whose primary economic interests are directly tied to the exchange value of land *in that city*. Examples include developers, real estate brokers, construction interests, property financiers, etc. Other interests that are place-bound and generally benefit from local growth include local media, utilities, and universities. In general, this landed elite benefits when aggregate rents rise, and they have a keen interest in the intensification of land use all across the city. Hence Logan and Molotch call this group “place entrepreneurs” or, more often, “rentiers” (1987, p. 29). Cox and Mair have addressed this place-based elite by suggesting “the idea of local dependence,” an idea that highlights “the dependence of various actors—capitalist firms, politicians, people—on the reproduction of certain social relations within a particular territory” (Cox & Mair, 1988, p. 307). Of course, the other component of the growth machine, local governmental elites, are perhaps still more locally dependent than rentiers. Their formal power applies only within a certain territory, and their capacity to raise revenue is largely confined to jurisdictional boundaries. They also have an interest in the economic development of a particular place.

If growth machine partners are locally dependent, what happens when it must operate in an increasingly global world-system of economic flows? In this light, Sassen's unanswered question becomes still more interesting. In Los Angeles, the evidence is that globalization processes have worked to both assist and hinder the growth machine in maintaining a growth consensus. As investment capital becomes increasingly mobile, there are more investment options available. All cities in this climate must compete to attract capital investment (Leitner, 1990; Peterson, 1981). Thus, tax breaks, direct public subsidies, infrastructural improvements, etc. are proposed so that capital interests will not choose to invest elsewhere. This dynamic can be clearly seen in the Los Angeles City Council's attempts to lure the SKG movie studios into becoming the anchor tenant for the Playa Vista project. The letters in the company's name stand for Spielberg, Katzenberg, and Geffen, three of the most powerful names in the entertainment industry. The city offered SKG a lucrative package of financial and legal benefits to lure it to Los Angeles. The project was opposed by environmental groups because it was to be built on fragile wetlands. Other opponents questioned the wisdom of giving such large public outlays to a development of unclear economic benefit to the city. The City Council, led by purported slow-growth champion Ruth Galanter and leftist activist Jackie Goldberg, countered that SKG could locate in the city of Burbank (a major television and film production center) and that Los Angeles needed to offer SKG both generous incentives and locational choice so that it would not jump to another city. The project and its incentives were approved

with only one dissenting vote. Increased capital mobility, or at least the perception of it among decision-makers, has made growth consensus easier to build and has made opposition to growth easier to overcome.

On the other hand, globalization can undermine the classic arguments used to marshal support for growth. When land titles are held by firms that have operations in many different places around the world (and are thus not locally dependent on Los Angeles alone), the energy of the growth machine will most likely sag because the intensification of land use in Los Angeles is of much less importance to these globalized firms than it is to a rentier class that is entirely locally dependent (Kantor, 1987). Concomitantly, the time and effort these firms spend in maintaining a growth consensus in Los Angeles will be less. It is plausible that in the era of globalization, the idea of a rentier class that is wholly dependent on intensification of local land use and that will make a full-time effort to ensure local growth is becoming increasingly obsolete. Logan and Molotch have provided one of the most extensive analyses of how the growth elite is weakened by globalization. They discuss “the increasing international concentration of productive activities in the hands of fewer firms” (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 201). This concentration, which Sassen (1991) also highlights, means that decisions about capital investment in cities are increasingly made extra-locally by firms with only partial interest in the city. The authors go on to make the somewhat vague argument that this delocalization

has important effects not only upon the way places are used but also upon the relations between rentier and capitalist groups. The movement disrupts old patterns of achieving harmony among the classes through land-use decisions, and this, in turn, makes siting more difficult than in the past (Logan & Molotch, 1987, p. 202).

Their argument is ultimately an analysis reminiscent of the classic elite theory in urban politics: that delocalization disrupts the social linkages—prep schools, clubs, charities, churches—among economic elites that bind them and help them form strong growth coalitions (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Harding, 1995; Hunter, 1953). In addition, they argue that the concentration of functions means more businesses in a given locality will be branch operations of large firms rather than entirely indigenous firms. These branch operations, they assert, have fewer “multiplier effects” for the following reasons: employment is often recruited outside the local area, raw materials are more often purchased in other places, and employees are more likely to be replaced by the technological advances that large firms can afford. Thus, branch operations bring fewer real economic benefits to the place in which they locate, meaning the standard argument that growth trickles down to benefit all is more difficult for growth interests to make, and a citywide growth consensus is more difficult to maintain.

This last process can be clearly seen in Universal Studios’ ongoing attempt to expand its entertainment complex in the southeast San Fernando Valley. Universal was recently bought by the Canadian multinational Seagram, and the new management has made the decision to shift investment from studio production to theme park entertainment (Reckard, 1999). The expansion of Universal Studios in the Valley is one element of this new strategy. The project has been opposed by an alliance of local homeowners and organized labor. Homeowners groups worry that expansion will bring noise, traffic, and congestion to their neighborhoods. Labor groups have joined the opposition to give them leverage in their ongoing struggle to boost wages at Universal. Universal representatives have countered with a classic pro-growth argument, saying that the expansion will bring a needed stimulus to the Los Angeles economy. A spokesperson for Universal said, “What’s really important here is that we’re adding jobs and that we want to make an investment right here at home” (Robinson-Jacobs, 1998, p. B1). The opposition coalition replied that because Universal is owned by a multinational conglomerate, much of the economic benefits of expansion will flow to widely dispersed shareholders and will not remain in Los Angeles. Low wage jobs will be the only local benefit, and even these might be filled by outsiders attracted by the new employment. However, residents in the area will bear the negative impacts of the project, such as noise, traffic, and pollution. Opposition groups re-

jected Universal's argument that growth is good for all. They argued that growth will benefit some and hurt others, and so they undermined a fundamental tenet of a pro-growth political consensus. As is the case in Playa Vista, the Universal expansion will likely go through. However, because it has been subject to stiff opposition throughout, the end result will be significantly scaled-down from Universal's initial vision, and it will be built only after long and costly delays.

### **Resistance to Growth**

The weakening that globalization has caused in the local growth machine has been augmented by the rise of a widespread slow-growth movement in the region. This movement has been growing in the region since about 1985, and it has won significant victories in its struggle against the growth coalition. Although growth projects continue to be approved, the slow-growth resistance has played a key role in eroding the regional growth consensus. The groundwork for the rise of the slow-growth movement was laid in 1978 with the passage of Proposition 13, which limited property taxes to 1% of a property's value and limited assessment increases on a property's value to 2% per year (Stocker, 1991). Proposition 13 was a ballot initiative that drew significant strength from an extensive grassroots effort, the heart of which lay in the San Fernando Valley and its powerful homeowners associations (Davis, 1990; Lo, 1990). Proposition 13 was opposed by the most powerful business and government interests in the state, and its surprisingly resounding victory emboldened Proposition 13 activists to go on to address other concerns. In 1985, the Federation of Hillside and Canyon Associations, a coalition of about 50 homeowners groups, successfully sued the city, claiming it was ignoring its own general plan by allowing high-rise development beyond the established limits (Davis, 1990). In 1986, Proposition U down-zoned by half most of the commercial land in the city of Los Angeles (Connell, 1986). The measure was opposed by the classic growth machine interests: the Building Industry Association, the mostly pro-growth City Council, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, and the *Los Angeles Times*. Despite that opposition, the measure passed easily by a more than 2-to-1 margin. In 1989, Pasadena voters approved a growth control initiative that capped commercial and housing development in the city (Pincetl, 1992). It passed convincingly. The city of Monterrey Park has passed numerous propositions restricting growth and has elected many slow-growth proponents to the City Council. Here slow-growth politics also have a racial basis because many capital interests in the city are Chinese-American (Fong, 1994; Horton, 1989). Still, however, the growth controls and the election of slow-growth politicians in Monterrey Park have come over the explicit objections of the growth machine. Taken together, these measures have significantly impeded development in the region, but more importantly they point to an important constituency in city politics that does not accept the principle that growth is good for all.

An important reason for the rise in slow-growth activism in Los Angeles has been the spread of real estate development into the affluent Westside and the Southern San Fernando Valley (especially the Ventura Boulevard corridor). The upper-middle-class and well-organized homeowners groups that live in these areas led the charge in the slow-growth movement. The acutely negative affects of development—noise, traffic, crowds—have arrived in areas of the city where people had very high expectations for their quality of life, saw their residential privilege as an inalienable right, and were not about to put up with the various nuisances that can accompany intensive development (Purcell, 1997). There is little debate that slow growth forces, spurred by these homeowners groups, have won numerous victories in the region. Nevertheless, this slow growth resistance does not constitute the collapse of the growth machine. Slow growth forces are rather a challenge that the growth machine is managing to overcome. While admitting that “growth-control regulations . . . have become increasingly common despite the opposition of real-estate and business elites,” Warner and Molotch “do not find that growth control marks a wholesale replacement of one kind of urban regime by another. The growth machine chugs on, sustained by the fortunes that are at stake . . .” (Warner & Molotch, 1995, pp. 378, 401).

Warner and Molotch do not examine Los Angeles directly, but they examine three areas, Santa Barbara County, Santa Monica City, and Riverside County, that are within the larger Los Angeles

region. Warner and Molotch's argument is echoed by Pincetl, who argues that growth resistance, while making inroads in some places, is essentially fragmented and parochial; it does not constitute a large-scale and coordinated challenge to growth interests (Pincetl, 1994). She argues that land-use planning has never been extensively coordinated at the regional level; authority for planning has remained with the myriad localities (usually cities) (Teaford, 1997). This parochialism, she argues, dooms slow-growth to remain a sporadic nuisance rather than a fundamental challenge to growth interests. Similarly, the rise of a significant slow-growth opposition in Los Angeles does not constitute a replacement of the growth machine by a "slow-growth machine." However, the presence of a well-organized and durable opposition has contributed greatly to the breakdown of a region wide growth consensus. Without such a consensus, every project in which growth interests engage is subject to challenge and delay. In short, the effect of the slow-growth movement has been to reopen the debate on what role growth should play in Los Angeles' future, a debate that was all but closed during the Bradley era.

The importance of the slow-growth opposition can be seen in the recent struggle over whether city funds would be used to help build a new downtown sports arena. The Los Angeles Kings and the Los Angeles Lakers play in the outdated Great Western Forum in Inglewood. Their ownership was eager to move the teams to a new arena, and they chose a site downtown on the northeast corner of the city's new convention center (a recent project of the downtown growth interests that has been a financial failure). The builders entered into negotiations with Steve Soboroff, an unofficial advisor to the Mayor. As has occurred in many cities around the country, Soboroff offered the builders a sweetheart deal, replete with tax exemptions, municipal bonds, \$1-a-year rents, etc. (Keating, 1997). All seemed to be running smoothly until City Council member Joel Wachs decided to oppose what he called the city's "giveaways to wealthy developers" and demanded that the arena be built at no cost to the taxpayers. However, Wachs was only one vote on a council of fifteen (the City Council would have the final say on the deal), and he was joined in opposition only by Council member Nate Holden. So Wachs threatened to launch a city ballot measure that would mandate voter approval by referendum of any public subsidy toward the construction of a new sports facility within the city limits. To give weight to his threat, he took his message to the institutions of the slow-growth movement. He began speaking to cheering audiences at community and homeowners association meetings, whipping them into a frenzy by condemning the use of taxpayer funds to subsidize millionaire developers. The developers and Soboroff decided that Wachs was a real threat. They began asking if they could have equal time at these meetings to present their side of the story. They argued that the economic benefits the arena would bring to the city would far outweigh any public subsidy. They further claimed that without the public money the project would not be economically profitable, and thus, presumably, would have to be built in another city. Their classic pro-growth message was loudly rejected at the homeowners meetings as the developers were booed and shouted down. The arena spokesmen used a well-worn, pro-growth argument on people who had for years rejected the basic premise that growth is good for all. The developers feared the fight over Wachs' initiative would delay the project to the point of default, and they eventually accepted a deal that involved a transfer of virtually no city money to the developers. The Council approved the new plan with only one dissenting vote (the indefatigable Holden).

The existence of a large and institutionalized constituency that rejected the growth machine's pro-growth rhetoric gave Wachs the leverage to eliminate the public giveaway. The victory did not prevent construction of the arena. The new Staples Arena was approved and is under construction. Moreover, important issues like the relocation of the people now living in the area proposed for the arena's new parking lots, and the traffic, noise, and pollution impacts on the working-class, immigrant, and minority neighborhoods nearby, were almost entirely unaddressed during the debate. Nevertheless, the terms of the deal are much less lucrative than those the developers originally sought, and the deal is much less lucrative than it would have been if a strong consensus for growth were still in place in Los Angeles. The common fear surrounding sports teams in recent years has been that the teams are mobile and will move to another city if their terms are not met. In the case of the arena, the developers and the team owners were apparently not only committed to the Los Angeles region, they

were committed to the downtown site over other options in the metropolitan area. They were committed to the extent that they accepted Wachs' terms and forewent public subsidies. In addition, the developers' initial arguments—that the deal would be financially unworkable without public giveaways and that they would jump to another city if they did not get their terms—were exposed as false (Rofe, 1997; Shuster, 1997). Because slow-growth activists successfully challenged pro-growth claims, future developments may well face even stiffer opposition when public subsidies are involved.

### **The Geographical Fragmentation of the Local Growth Elite**

Even without such external resistance, however, there are structural conditions within the machine that have served to weaken the growth consensus in Los Angeles. We have seen how globalization can contribute to such a weakening. Another structural threat to the growth machine is a geographic fragmentation of growth interests. The most salient aspect of this fragmentation is a split between growth interests that operate on a region-wide scale (and are generally based downtown) and growth interests that operate on a more parochial scale. As an example of such a split, this section will analyze the friction between regional growth interests and rentiers whose operations cover only the San Fernando Valley.

Los Angeles is famous for its sprawling geography. The city of Los Angeles, the region's largest city, covers 469 square miles. By comparison, New York City covers 308 square miles, and the city of Chicago covers only 227 square miles. Recalling Cox and Mair's (1988) idea of local dependence, we can say the city of Los Angeles is so large territorially that the place on which rentiers of the local growth machine are locally dependent is not just one place, but many places. To be sure, there are important growth interests whose local dependence is region-wide. But there is also an array of more parochial growth interests that are locally dependent on just one of many smaller places within the Los Angeles urbanized region. Consequently, there is in some ways more than one growth machine operating in the city. More precisely, there is a geographical tier structure to the local growth machine: regional interests serve as an umbrella under which a wide array of smaller groups operate. In part because of the sheer size of the region, the regional growth interests are only partly able to hold together these widespread groups.

The San Fernando Valley is a good example of a smaller place within the region that hosts a local growth elite. The Valley is part of the city of Los Angeles. With over one million people, if the Valley were a separate city it would be the sixth largest in the country. The Valley's growth interests are mostly locally dependent on the Valley only. Groups such as the United Chambers of Commerce of the San Fernando Valley, the Valley Industry and Commerce Association, the Economic Alliance of the San Fernando Valley, the San Fernando Valley Convention and Visitors Bureau, and the San Fernando Valley Association of Realtors provide the institutional backbone of Valley growth interests. Clearly, the Valley growth elite share a more general interest in region-wide growth with external growth interests, and they do work to promote regional growth. However, there are important ways in which the interests of the Valley growth elite are at odds with both other parochial growth elites and the regional growth elite. It is not uncommon for Valley elites to engage in a public war of words with the regional establishment, often accusing them of ignoring the Valley's economic leaders and treating them like underlings. Valley rentiers have long been frustrated with the channeling of the city's capital investment into the downtown area and not into the Valley. An example of such conflict is seen in a recent friction over tourist maps. The Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce, which serves as a region-wide booster, printed tourist maps of Los Angeles to promote area tourism. The maps made little mention of tourist sites in the Valley. Valley rentiers were furious at the omission and took it as another in a series of slights against the Valley (McGreevy, 1997). If the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce promotes investment in the region but channels that investment only to non-Valley areas, the Valley growth elite receives an indirect benefit but never receives direct investment in the Valley. Because they do not feel they can rely on the regional growth elite to bring direct investment to the Valley, the Valley growth interests have established institutions to ensure direct capital investment in the Valley.

Though some degree of such geographical interest variation, and hence competition, exists among the growth elite in all cities, the fracture is considerably more acute in the Valley for several reasons: the vast land mass of the city, the Valley's geographical and historical isolation, and the strong institutional divisions that allow the growth machine to conduct business as many growth machines rather than as one. The split has become so acute, in fact, that over the last three years, members of the Valley growth elite have been working with Valley homeowners in a campaign to detach the San Fernando Valley from the city of Los Angeles. The Valley business groups seek greater control over growth in the Valley. Specifically, they hope to establish a more laissez-faire city government (and one that they control) so that they can more effectively compete for regional capital investment.


The regional growth elite has opposed secession from the outset. It fears secession will cause further jurisdictional fragmentation and make the geography of land-use control more difficult and expensive to negotiate. Furthermore, the regional elite worries that secession will worsen the city's image among global investors, an image that has already been heavily tarnished by a violent uprising, destructive wildfires, a devastating earthquake, and frequent flooding. More significant than the periodic squabbles over investment dollars, the issue of Valley secession represents a severe split between Valley and regional growth elites. Should the Valley secede, it would erect an imposing political wall between Valley rentiers and their regional counterparts, and it would further complicate attempts to revive a regional consensus for growth.

### **City Government as a Failing Partner in the Growth Machine**

The Valley secession movement is the largest and most advanced in the city, but it is not alone. Secession movements have sprung up in many other districts of the city, including San Pedro, Venice, Mt. Washington, South Central, and the Westside. All secession movements cite an unresponsive, arrogant, and inefficient city government as important reasons for their desire to secede. The perception that city government is failing in its responsibilities is extremely widespread, so much so that the city recently launched an extravagant two-year effort to reform the city's charter. With much talk of a city government for the 21st century, both the Mayor and the City Council launched competing charter reform commissions to create, as the City Council's commission has it, a charter and a government that is "leaner, smarter, better." Throughout the debates on how best to reform the charter, there was a clear consensus that the city's government was badly in need of repair.

The perception that city government is failing can also be inferred from recent trends in voter turnout in the city. In 1997, for example, only 31.7% of the city's registered voters turned out for the April primary election. Several council members ran unopposed and were reelected to their seat by a vote total that amounted to less than 20% of the district's voters and less than 5% of the district's residents. In 1999, only 17.3% of registered voters turned out for the non-mayoral primary election. Turnout in mayoral elections has declined greatly over the past 30 years, from 65% in 1969 to 23% in 1997 (see Figure 1). Such voter apathy combined with the perception of government ineptness points to a legitimacy crisis in city government (Habermas, 1975). That legitimacy crisis is made worse by an equally severe fiscal crisis for the city (O'Connor, 1973). Such crises are not unique to Los Angeles, but have been particularly marked here because of the legacy of Proposition 13 (Kaufman & Rosen, 1981; O'Sullivan, Sexton, Sheffrin, 1995; Sears & Citrin, 1985). As the money has become more scarce, less has been available for distribution, and more areas have had to forego desired collective consumption goods. Continual struggles with Sacramento for more state allocations attempt to address this problem, but the reality is that a very shaky fiscal situation exists for both city and county government.

The structure of city government in Los Angeles is another impediment to a healthy growth machine. City government is dominated by a 15-member City Council that plays both a legislative and management role. In 1965, Edward Banfield wrote that the Mayor in Los Angeles is "almost too weak to cut ribbons," and although the powers of the position have expanded since, most decisions are still ultimately controlled by the City Council (Banfield, 1965, p. 80; Saltzstein & Sonenshein, 1991). The 15 council members are elected by district. As a result, the city is in many ways a feder-



Source: Office of the City Clerk

FIGURE 1  
Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections, City of Los Angeles, 1957–1997

ation of 15 smaller cities, each headed by the district council member. This strong ward structure has emerged, ironically, out of a city charter written in 1925 as a compromise between progressive reformers and ward boss-machine interests (Fogelson, 1967). One of the most important powers the Council wields is authority over land use. For land use decisions in a given district, the other 14 members generally defer to the will of that district's council member. Thus, in practice each council member has considerable control over land use in his or her district. The map of land use authority in the city is therefore quite variable and highly dependent on the politics of the elected council members. A council member who is closely tied to the development industry, such as Hal Bernson in the 12th district, is an asset to growth. On the other hand, a council member who rose to power on the votes of slow growth homeowners, such as Cindy Miscikowski in the 11th district, is much more antagonistic toward land development.

This fragmented geography of formal land use authority was less relevant during the pro-growth heyday between 1975 and 1985. During that period, the Council had a strong pro-growth majority and was tremendously stable electorally (Saltzstein & Sonenshein, 1991; Sonenshein, 1986). After that period, however, the Council underwent two changes. First, the success of the slow growth Proposition U helped vault slow growth candidates into council seats. The most striking change in this respect was the victory of Ruth Gallanter, an environmental activist who defeated Council president and pro-growth stalwart Pat Russell in the 6th district by a narrow margin. Second, after 1986 several non-white council members were elected by constituents in the city's majority non-white districts. Between 1985 and 1991, Latino Council members Richard Alatorre and Gloria Molina were elected in the 14th and 1st districts, Asian-American Michael Woo was elected in the 13th district, and African Americans Nate Holden, Rita Walters, Mark Ridley-Thomas were elected in the 10th, 9th, and 8th districts. Clearly these new council members were not immune to the same growth politics as their predecessors, but they also had an added responsibility to an ethnic constituency, a responsibil-

ity that complicated their relationship to growth, especially when a given project had a negative impact on members of their constituency. In short, before 1985 the ward structure of city government had been muted by a strong pro-growth coalition; but after 1985 the rise of slow-growth and non-white candidates helped the ward structure to re-emerge. In essence, post-1985 Los Angeles is not the politically uniform playing field that land-development interests would prefer. Rather it is an uneven terrain of political influences, jealously guarded jurisdictions, and personal idiosyncrasies. Los Angeles is in some ways fifteen different cities, each with its own land-use regime and relationship to growth. The geographical variation makes city government a more unpredictable partner for the growth coalition, and it is a system that provides distinct advantages for an often parochially defined slow-growth opposition. The many and growing difficulties of the Los Angeles city government have made an important contribution to the decline of the regional consensus for growth.

## CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The evidence presented here points to the conclusion that Fulton overstates the case when he claims the growth machine has collapsed in Los Angeles. However, over the last 15 or so years, the hegemony of the growth machine in Los Angeles has waned to the point where it is unable to complete one of its most important duties: maintaining a political consensus for growth. The unquestioned enthusiasm for what Logan and Molotch call “value-free development” has broken down in Los Angeles. It has yet to be replaced by another consensus. Without a pro-growth consensus, large scale land development very often proceeds only after protracted struggle. As this struggle has become more acute, growth politics have increasingly become a contested terrain in a city where growth has long gone unchallenged.

It is likely that this breakdown in the consensus for growth in Los Angeles is part of a wider trend. The Los Angeles case suggests a similar breakdown for other cities in the United States. I am not advancing the questionable argument that Los Angeles is a harbinger for urban America. Rather, I am suggesting that many of the conditions that have led to the erosion of the growth consensus in Los Angeles are in place in other cities as well. Most all cities in the United States have been affected by the processes of globalization and the increasingly common condition where local firms that make land investment decisions operate on a scale much wider than just the metropolis. In some cities this condition is more acute than in others, and one would expect those cities with a higher proportion of supra-local firms to exhibit a greater breakdown in the growth consensus. Furthermore, slow-growth movements are advancing in many US cities. Portland, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Albany, Tucson, to name a few, are all places where an important slow-growth movement has developed and has won political victories (Crocker & Haeckel, 1993; DeLeon & Powell, 1989; Ferman, 1996; Leo, 1998; Logan & Rabrenovic, 1990; Marston & Towers, 1993; Nelson & Moore, 1993). The extent to which such movements succeed in eroding the growth consensus depends on, among other factors, their degree of institutionalization and the number and significance of their past successes.

Much has been made of the “edge city” phenomenon and the geographical deconcentration and sprawl of US cities (Fishman, 1987; Garreau, 1991; Teaford, 1997). Los Angeles’ sprawl and the development of outlying urban centers is characteristic of other American cities as well. Cities like Phoenix, Chicago, Boston, Denver, and Atlanta are subject to similar sprawl and peripheral concentrations. As these outlying urban centers develop, a similar geographical fragmentation of the local growth elite is likely to arise as it has in Los Angeles. The more the metropolis devolves geographically the harder it will be for regional growth machines to bring together the geographically diverse economic interests into a political consensus for growth.

Similarly, many of the same problems that plague local government in Los Angeles are present in other cities. The fiscal crisis brought on by the decrease in federal government funds, suburbanization, and post-1970 economic restructuring has affected many American cities (Kamer, 1983; Ladd & Yinger, 1989; Muller & Rohr-Zanker, 1989; Tabb, 1984). Furthermore, the declining voter turnout in Los Angeles is mirrored in other cities (such as Louisville, San Francisco, Miami, Milwaukee, and Boston) suggesting local government’s loss of legitimacy is widespread (Branch, 1998; Chacon, 1996;

Cole, 1999; Cross, 1998; Tansey, 1998;). In addition, the rise of ethnic constituencies is obviously not unique to Los Angeles. Politicians who rise to power as the representative of a particular ethnic group often have a complicated relationship to growth interests. This dynamic is probably clearer in more ethnically plural cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, or Chicago than it is in cities where one ethnicity dominates, such as Detroit, Atlanta, and Phoenix, where political competition among different ethnicities for collective consumption goods is not so intense. In all cases, a weak local government undermines its ability to function as a strong partner in the local growth machine. The weaker the growth coalition, the less able it will be to maintain a strong growth consensus in its region.

The politics of urban growth primarily concern the investment in and development of urban land. In that respect the politics of urban growth are primarily struggles over the geography of the city. They are struggles over how to structure the city's space and for what the city's space should be used (Castells, 1983). Said another way, growth politics are a key component in the social production of urban space (Gottdiener, 1985; Lefebvre, 1991; Lefebvre, 1996; Soja, 1980). The evidence from Los Angeles suggests that the growth machine's political control has eroded and the consensus for value-free development has broken down. This breakdown means that a very powerful vision for the city's geography—that urban space should be consumed for profit—is subject to debate. This vision has been hegemonic for most of Los Angeles' Anglo history, and its decline means the opportunity has arisen for other spatial visions for the city to have significant input into the city's future. These spatial visions might stress neighborhood use values, spatial and social justice, or environmental preservation rather than the land-for-profit vision of the growth machine. Such visions, if they were to become part of the urban political orthodoxy, would have profound impacts on the spatial and social structure of the city. It is important to stress, however, that the growth machine has not collapsed in Los Angeles. There exists a political opportunity rather than a political vacuum. In order for such alternative spatial visions to have a widespread impact on the geography of the city, organized advocates would have to make a sustained effort to achieve projects that further their spatial vision for the city (Stone, 1989). That effort requires, among other things, organized institutions, a sustained ideological critique of rapid growth, and a strong and stable electoral base.

This opportunity for alternative spatial visions can be translated to other cities to varying degrees. Clearly, locally specific conditions will influence the development path taken by each city. But I argue that the conditions that have led to the decline of the growth consensus in Los Angeles are present in other cities as well. In cities where the political consensus for growth breaks down and where alternative spatial visions have strong political constituencies to advance them, urban politics become significantly more complex and more contested. As a result, they will have a much more unpredictable future.

## REFERENCES

- Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. (1962). Two faces of power. *American Political Science Review* 56: 947–952.
- Banfield, E. (1965). *Big city politics*. New York: Random House.
- Bluestone, B. & Harrison, B. (1982). *The deindustrialization of America: Plant closings, community abandonment, and the dismantling of basic industry*. New York: Basic Books.
- Branch, K. (1998). Low turnout predicted for voting. *Miami Herald* (October 1): B1.
- Brintnall, M. (1989). Future directions in federal urban policy. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 11: 1–19.
- Calavita, N. (1992). Growth machines and ballot box planning: The San Diego case. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 24: 1–24.
- Castells, M. (1983). *The city and the grassroots*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Castells, M. (1989). *The informational city*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
- Chacon, R. (1996). Iannella advocates Saturday elections. *The Boston Globe* (November 9): B5.
- Cole, J. (1999). Election 99: Counties' vote turnout unlikely to match intensity of races. *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* (April 6): 1.
- Connell, R. (1986). L.A.'s slow-growth measure wins by wide margin. *Los Angeles Times* (November 5): I–3, I–26.

- Cox, K. & Mair, A. (1988). Locality and community in the politics of local economic development. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 78(2): 307–325.
- Crocker, K. & Haeckel, D. (1993). Commercial growth management techniques in San Francisco. *Journal of Urban Planning and Development* 119(3): 137–149.
- Cross, A. (1998). A year off hasn't energized voters. *The Courier-Journal* (May 10): 1D.
- Davis, M. (1990). *City of quartz: Excavating the future in Los Angeles*. New York: Vintage Books.
- DeLeon, R. (1992). *Left-coast city: Progressive politics in San Francisco 1975–1991*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- DeLeon, R. & Powell, S. (1989). Growth control and electoral politics: The triumph of urban populism in San Francisco. *Western Political Quarterly* 42(2): 307–331.
- DiGaetano, A. & Klemanski, J. (1993). Urban regimes in comparative perspective: The politics of urban development in Britain. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 29(1): 54–83.
- Downs, A. (1988). The real problem with suburban anti-growth politics. *The Brookings Review* 6(2): 23–29.
- Elkin, S. (1987). *City and regime in the American republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fainstein, S. & Hirst, C. (1995). Urban social movements. In D. Judge, G. Stoker, & H. Wolman (Eds.), *Theories of urban politics*. Thousand Oaks: Sage: 181–204.
- Ferman, B. (1996). *Challenging the growth machine: Neighborhood politics in Chicago and Pittsburgh*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Fishman, R. (1987). *Bourgeois utopias: The rise and fall of suburbia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Fogelson, R. (1967). *Fragmented metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850–1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fong, T. (1994). *The first suburban Chinatown: The remaking of Monterey Park, California*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Fulton, W. (1997). *The reluctant metropolis*. Point Arena, CA: Solano Press Books.
- Garreau, J. (1991). *Edge city: Life on the new frontier*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Gottdiener, M. (1985). *The social production of urban space*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Greenstein, P., Lennon, N. & Rolfe, L. (1992). *Bread and hyacinths: The rise and fall of utopian Los Angeles*. Los Angeles: California Classics Books.
- Habermas, J. (1975). *Legitimation crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Harding, A. (1995). Elite theory and growth machines. In D. Judge, G. Stoker, & H. Wolman (Eds.), *Theories of urban politics*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage: 35–53.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Horton, J. (1989). The politics of ethnic change. *Urban Geography* 10(6): 578–592.
- Hunter, F. (1953). *Community power structure: A study of decision makers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Jacobs, J. (1966). *Sunkist advertising*. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of UCLA.
- Jonas, A. (1991). Urban growth coalitions and urban development policy: postwar growth and the politics of annexation in metropolitan Columbus. *Urban Geography* 12(3): 197–225.
- Kamer, P. (1983). *Crisis in urban public finance: A case study of thirty-eight cities*. New York: Praeger.
- Kantor, P. (1987). The dependent city: The changing political economy of urban economic development in the United States. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 22(4): 493–520.
- Kaufman, G. & Rosen, K. (1981). *The property tax revolt: The case of proposition 13*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
- Keating, W. (1997). Cleveland: The “comeback city”: The politics of redevelopment and sports stadiums amidst urban decline. In M. Lauria, (Ed.), *Reconstructing urban regime theory: Regulating urban politics in a global economy*. Thousand Oaks: Sage: 189–205.
- Ladd, H. & Yinger, J. (1989). *America's ailing cities: Fiscal health and the design of urban policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The production of space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writings on cities*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Leitner, H. (1990). Cities in pursuit of economic growth: The local state as entrepreneur. *Political Geography* 9(2): 146–170.
- Leo, C. (1998). Regional growth management regime: The case of Portland, Oregon. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 20(4): 363–394.
- Lo, C. (1990). *Small property versus big government: Social origins of the property tax revolt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Logan, J. (1976). Notes on the growth machine—toward a comparative political economy of place. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(2): 349–352.
- Logan, J. & Molotch, H. (1987). *Urban fortunes: The political economy of place*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Logan, J. & Rabrenovic, G. (1990). Neighborhood associations: Their issues, their allies, and their opponents. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 26(1): 68–94.
- Marston, S. & Towers, G. (1993). Private spaces and the politics of places: Spatioeconomic restructuring and community organizing in Tucson and El Paso. In R. Fisher & J. Kling, (Eds.), *Mobilizing the community: Local politics in the era of the global city*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage: 75–102.
- Martin, H. (1996). Porter Ranch development plan revived for the record. *Los Angeles Times* (December 12): A1.
- Mayo, M. (1933). *Los Angeles*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- McGreevy, P. (1997). Selling L.A. not the valley. *Daily News* (August 18): 1, 16.
- McWilliams, C. (1946). *Southern California: An island on the land*. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith.
- Mollenkopf, J. (1983). *The contested city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Molotch, H. & Lester, M. (1974). News as a purposive behavior: On the strategic use of routine events, accidents, and scandals. *American Sociological Review* 39(1): 101–113.
- Molotch, H. & Lester, M. (1975). Accidental news: The great oil spill as local occurrence and national event. *American Journal of Sociology* 81(2): 235–260.
- Muller, W. & Rohr-Zanker, R. (1989). The fiscal crisis and the local state: Examination of the structuralist concept. *Environment and Planning A* 21(12): 1619–1638.
- Nelson, A. & Moore, T. (1993). Assessing urban growth management: The case of Portland, Oregon, the USAs largest urban growth boundary. *Land Use Policy* 10(4): 293–302.
- O'Connor, J. (1973). *The fiscal crisis of the state*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- O'Sullivan, A., Sexton, T. & Sheffrin, S. (1995). *Property taxes and tax revolts: The legacy of proposition 13*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Peterson, G. & Lewis, C., (Eds.). (1986). *Reagan and the cities*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Peterson, P. (1981). *City limits*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Pincetl, S. (1992). The politics of growth control: Struggles in Pasadena, California. *Urban Geography* 13(5): 450–467.
- Pincetl, S. (1994). The regional management of growth in California: A history of failure. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 18(2): 256–274.
- Purcell, M. (1997). Ruling Los Angeles: Neighborhood movements, urban regimes, and the production of space in Southern California. *Urban Geography* 18(8): 684–704.
- Reckard, E. (1999). Feud in Florida. *Los Angeles Times* (March 14): C1.
- Rieff, D. (1991). *Los Angeles: Capital of the third world*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Robinson-Jacobs, K. (1998). More control sought over expansion at Universal. *Los Angeles Times* (October 6): B1.
- Rofe, J. (1997). Los Angeles arena deal wins cheers as taxpayers' victory. *San Diego Union-Tribune* (October 16): A1.
- Saltzstein, A. & Sonenshein, R. (1991). Los Angeles: Transformation of a governing coalition. In H. Savitch & J. Thomas, (Eds.), *Big city politics in transition*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage: 189–201.
- Sassen, S. (1991). *The global city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (1994). *Cities in a global economy*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Schattschneider, E. (1960). *The semisovereign people*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Schwada, J. (1991). Porter Ranch immune to most future growth laws. *Los Angeles Times* (December 21): A1.
- Sears, D. & Citrin, J. (1985). *Tax revolt: Something for nothing in California*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shuster, B. (1997). CRA aid to arena deal stirs some criticism. *Los Angeles Times* (October 10): B3.
- Soja, E. (1980). The socio-spatial dialectic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 70(2): 207–225.
- Sonenshein, R. (1986). Biracial coalition politics in Los Angeles. *PS* 19(3): 582–590.
- Sonenshein, R. (1989). The dynamics of biracial coalitions: crossover politics in Los Angeles. *Western Political Quarterly* 42(2): 333–353.
- Sonenshein, R. (1993). *Politics in black and white: Race and power in Los Angeles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Stocker, F. (1991). *Proposition 13: A ten-year retrospective*. Cambridge, MA: The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Stone, C. (1989). *Regime politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Swanstrom, T. (1985). *The crisis of growth politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Tabb, W. (1984). The New York City fiscal crisis. In W. Tabb & L. Sawers, (Eds.), *Marxism and the metropolis: New perspectives in urban political economy*. New York: Oxford University Press: 323–345.
- Tansey, B. (1998). Push in Contra Costa county to consolidate elections: Politicians want to lengthen terms to get vote in synch. *San Francisco Chronicle* (May 14): A22.
- Teaford, J. (1997). *Post-suburbia: Government and politics in the edge cities*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Trounstine, P. & Christensen, T. (1982). *Movers and shakers: The study of community power*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Vogel, R. & Swanson, B. (1989). The growth machine versus the antigrowth coalition: The battle for our communities. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 25(1).
- Warner, K. & Molotch, H. (1995). Power to build: How development persists despite growth controls. *Urban Affairs Review* 30(3): 378–406.
- Weiss, M. A. (1987). *The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Whitson, C. & Judd, D. (1991). Denver: Boosterism versus growth. In H. Savitch & J. Thomas, (Eds.), *Big city politics in transition*. Newbury Park: Sage: 149–168.
- Wolman, H. (1986). The Reagan urban policy and its impacts. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 21(3): 311–336.