
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

LOCATION: SMITH 109
SEMINAR 4:30-7:20 THURSDAYS

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OFFICE HOURS: MONDAY 10:00-17:00, AND BY
APPOINTMENT; GOWEN 35

Course Description

Catalog Description

This seminar will introduce students to quantitative approaches to international conflict and cooperation. We will survey recent research into 1) arms races, proliferation, and weapons trade; 2) power and its role in world affairs; 3) the role of preferences in decision-making in foreign policy; 4) the role of alliances in international conflict; 5) the linkage between domestic and international conflict; 6) economic relations and international conflict, specifically trade, foreign aid, and foreign investment; 7) diffusion of conflicts; 8) domestic constraints on foreign conflict; 9) political geography of war and peace.

Motivation

This is a topics course which will focus on quantitative approaches to international conflict and cooperation. The basic theme of the course is that international politics embodies interdependencies and these need to be defined and examined carefully. Rather than take every topic back to its roots and develop a reading list too enormous to print, let alone read, however, we will mainly examine the most recent research for its synthesis of the state of the art in a variety of areas of contemporary scholarship. It is about an article a day. Most of this research is embodied in scholarship that will be available in electronically available journals.

Process

The course is essentially organized as a reading group. Each week we will dissect and discuss the assigned reading. One individual will be a leader of discussion in each week; another will be assigned write a synthesis of our reading and discussion subsequent to each seminar. Each week we will also discuss student projects. The final project in this class is to be a 20 page research paper on a topic to be decided by the second week. More details on the paper will be distributed in class.

I will lecture for about one-half hour to open each class, giving an overview of the topic and some intellectual history of how it developed. This will set the context for our further discussions of the more recent items on the syllabus.

Books

All the reading is available electromajically. So take your book budget and join a social science organization, instead. Its quite cheap while you are a starving student; you might even join one in a different social science discipline (Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, Geography, or gasp Statistics).

Grading

Weekly assignments will be 40% of the final grade; the remaining 60% will be determined by the final project. No incomplete grades will be issued in this class.

Course Outline, in approximately nine moving parts

Week 1: March 29, 2007

Organizational Meeting.

Week 2: April 5, 2007

Decision Making in an Interdependent World

These readings examine the main approach to understanding decision making in international politics, along with some critiques of it in the realm of national security. This debate, which I'll summarize, has seen

a cyclical history. What is new here? I'll lay out an intellectual history of the luddites and the loggers.

Readings

1. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1985. "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model." *American Political Science Review* 79 (1):156-177.
2. Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3):379-414.
3. Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2).
4. Niou, Emerson and Peter Ordeshook. 1999. "Return of the Luddites." *International Security* 24(2).
5. Walt, Steven. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23(4):5-48.
6. Frank C. Zagare. 1999. "All Mortis, No Rigor." *International Security* 24(2).
7. Walt, Steven. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23(4):5-48.
8. Reiter, Dani. 2003. "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1):27-43.
2. Beck, Nathaniel, Gary King and Langche Zeng. 2004. "Theory and Evidence in International Conflict: A Response to de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski." *American Political Science Review* 98(2):379-389.
3. Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan Katz and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4):1260-1288.
4. Clark, David and William Reed. 2003. "A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome." *Journal of Politics* 65(1):69-91.
5. de Marchi, Scott, Christopher Gelpi and Jeffrey D. Grynaviski. 2004. "Untangling Neural Nets." *American Political Science Review* 98(2):371-378.
6. Reed, William. 2000. "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):84-93.
7. Signorino, Curtis. 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 92 (2):279-298.

Week 3: April 12, 2007

Testing Theories of International Conflict and Cooperation

These readings raise questions about how to go about empirical investigations of theoretical and strategic models of conflict. I'll give an overview of a history of empirical and systematic approaches to understanding international relations.

Readings

1. Beck, Nathaniel, Gary King and Langche Zeng. 2000. "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture." *American Political Science Review* 94(1):21-35.

Week 4: April 19, 2007

Alliances

Alliances, entangling and otherwise, have long been an important aspect of international relations. Or, have they? I'll go through the basic history of the study of alliances, from Liska, to Ward, to Walt, to Leeds, and suggest ways in which alliances represent ossified interdependencies. The major question for this week is whether alliances have important consequences for world politics, and if so, what they are.

Readings

1. Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson. 1994. "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1):4-15.
2. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. "Regime Type and Commitment: Why Democracies Are Actually Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):775-795.

3. Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3):427–429.
4. Morrow, James D. 2000. "ALLIANCES: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Reviews* 3(1):63–83.
5. Signorino, Curtis and Jeff Ritter. 1999. "Tau-b or Not Tau-b." *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1):115–144.
6. Siverson, Randolph M. and Harvey Starr. 1994. "Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1):145–161.
2. Siqueira, Kevin and Todd Sandler. 2006. "Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6):878–898.
3. Mintz, Alex and Chi Huang. 1991. "'Guns' vs. 'Butter': The Indirect Link." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(3):738–757.
4. Michael D. Ward. 1999. "Lost in Space: Political Geography and the Defense-Growth Trade-off." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43:793–816.
5. Ward, Michael D. and David R. Davis. 1992. "Sizing up the Peace Dividend: Economic Growth and Military Spending in the United States, 1948–1996." *American Political Science Review* 86(3 September):748–755.
6. Cusack, Thomas R. 2006. "Sinking Budgets and Ballooning Prices: Recent Developments Connected to Military Spending," *WZB SP II 2006 - 04*.


Week 5: April 26, 2007

No class meeting this week.

Week 6: May 3, 2007

Arms Races and Political Economy of Defense

This week I will give a brief overview of the arms race modeling tradition, beginning with Lewis Fry Richardson, coupled with an introduction of the role of military spending in macroeconomic models used for policy. The basic question is whether nuclear proliferation and terrorism are examples of this kind of action-reaction phenomenon in international relations?



Readings

1. Downs, George, David Rocke and Randolph M. Siverson. 1985. "Cooperation and Arms Races." *World Politics* 38(1):118–136.

Week 7: May 10, 2007

Power and Power Transitions

This week I will give an overview of how power has been an important concept in political science from early days to the present. Especially in the post World War II era, notions of national power have proven important in theory, but elusive in application. The guiding question for this week is *What is power?* and to paraphrase Jim Morrow, "why don't we write it down?" What is baby power, anyway?

Readings

1. DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6):675–704.
2. Doran, Charles F. 2003. "Power Cycle Theory in Comparative Perspective: Economics, Philosophy of History, and the 'Single Dynamic' of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft." *International Political Science Review* 24(1):1349.
3. Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2):269–305.

4. Feng, Yi. 2006. "Sources of Political Capacity: A Case Study of China." *International Studies Review* 8(4):597–606.
5. Kim, Woosang and James D. Morrow. 1992. "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36(4):896–922.
6. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *American Political Science Review* 88(3):593–607.
7. Ward, Michael D. and Lewis L. House. 1988. "A Theory of Behavioral Power of Nations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(1):3–36.
6. Ward, Michael D. and Peter D. Hoff. 2007. "Persistent Patterns of International Commerce." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2):157–175. Available at faculty.washington.edu/mdw

Week 8: May 17, 2007

Economic Interdependence

I'll give an overview of the *dependencia* literature as a starting point, then summarize the basic idea of economic interdependence, with an eye to the question of whether our empirical models capture or assume away as a nuisance this interdependence.

Readings

1. de Groot, Henri L. F., Gert-Jan Linders, Piet Rietveld and Uma Subramanian. 2004. "The Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns." *Kyklos* 57(1):103–124.
2. Dorussen, Han. 1999. "Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4):443–462.
3. Edward, Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade? Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 94(2):305–321.
4. Goenner, Cullen F. 2004. "Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(5):589–605.
5. Keshk, Omar M. G., Brian M. Pollins and Rafael Reuveny. 2004. "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 66(4):1153–1179.
3. Maoz, Zeev and Bruce M. Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 87(3):624–38.
4. Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97(4):585–602.
5. Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2):267–292.
6. Oneal, John R., Bruce M. Russett and Michael L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3):371–393.
7. Ray, James. 1998. "Does Democracy Cause Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:27–46.
8. Rousseau, David, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul Huth. 1996. "Assessing the

Week 9: May 24, 2007

Liberal Peace

Everybody knows about the democratic peace. But what is the real idea behind this movement, and does it hold up to scientific scrutiny? I'll give an overview of Kant, Babst, and Russett, but the burning question to discuss is whether we know more about the consequences of smoking or democracy?

Readings

1. Cederman, Lars-Erik. 2001. "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4):470–502.
2. Doyle, Michael W. 2005. "Three Pillars of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 99(3):463–466.
3. Maoz, Zeev and Bruce M. Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 87(3):624–38.
4. Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory." *American Political Science Review* 97(4):585–602.
5. Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2):267–292.
6. Oneal, John R., Bruce M. Russett and Michael L. Berbaum. 2003. "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47(3):371–393.
7. Ray, James. 1998. "Does Democracy Cause Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:27–46.
8. Rousseau, David, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul Huth. 1996. "Assessing the

Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988." *American Political Science Review* 90(3):512-33.

9. Ward, Michael D., Randolph M. Siverson and Xun Cao. 2007. "Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace." Available at faculty.washington.edu/mdw

8. Ward, Bakke, Greenhill. to be supplied; if we finish it.

9. You should also look at the Political Instability Task Force web site and familiarize yourself with the material therein: <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/>. In particular, download and read the article, "A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability," Jack A. Goldstone, Robert Bates, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, which is available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/PITFglobal.pdf>.

Week 10: May 31, 2007

Civil Conflicts

My overview will focus on what a civil war is (answer to the question you just had: yes, it is) and then provide a historical and geographical summary of civil wars. Our discussion will focus on the causes of civil wars, as well as detail a bit about the post-civil war consequences.

Readings

1. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4):563-595.
2. Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97:75-90.
3. Ghobarah, Hazem Adam, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. 2003. "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People-Long After the Shooting Stops." *American Political Science Review* 97(2):189-202.
4. Goldstone, Jack A. and Jay Ulfelder. 2004-05. "How to Construct Stable Democracies." *The Washington Quarterly* 28(1):9-20.
5. Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992." *American Political Science Review* 95(1):33-48.
6. Kalyvas, Stathis. 2003. "The Ontology of 'Political Violence': Action and Identity in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(3):475-494.
7. King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Improving Forecasts of State Failure." *World Politics* 53(4):623-658.