Social Capital and Status Attainment

A Research Tradition

This chapter presents a research tradition reflecting the proposed linkage between social capital and instrumental action. Specifically, it investigates how social capital enhances the likelihood of getting better jobs. It thus falls within the general research paradigm known as the status attainment process.

Status attainment can be understood as a process by which individuals mobilize and invest resources for returns in socioeconomic standing. The theoretical and empirical work for understanding and assessing the status attainment process can be traced to the seminal study reported by Blau and Duncan (1967). The major conclusion was that even accounting for both the direct and indirect effects of ascribed status (parental status), achieved status (education and prior occupational status) remains the most important factor accounting for the individual's ultimate attained status. The study thus set the theoretical baseline for further modifications and expansions. All subsequent theoretical revisions and expansions must be evaluated for their contribution to the explanation of status attainment beyond those accounted for by the Blau–Duncan paradigm (Kelley 1990; Smith 1990). Several later lines of work, including the addition of sociopsychological variables (Sewell and Hauser 1975), the recasting of statuses as classes (Wright 1979; Goldthorpe 1980), the incorporation of “structural” entities and positions as both contributing and attained statuses (Baron and Bielby 1980; Kalleberg 1988), and the identification of comparative development or institutions as contingent conditions (Treiman 1970) have significantly amplified rather than altered the original Blau–Duncan conclusion concerning the relative merits of achieved versus ascribed personal resources in status attainment.

1 A significant portion of this chapter was adapted from Lin (1999b) with permission.

In the last three decades, a research tradition has focused on the effects of social capital on attained statuses. The principal proposition is that social capital exerts an important and significant effect beyond that accounted for by personal resources. Systematic investigations of this proposition have included (1) developing theoretical explanations and hypotheses; (2) developing measurements for social capital; (3) conducting empirical studies verifying the hypotheses; and (4) assessing the relative importance of social resources compared to personal resources in the process of status attainment. These investigations have been carried out in North America, Europe, and Asia, in multiple political economies, and have involved scholars of many nations and cultures. The accumulation of and advances in theory and research have considerably expanded the intellectual horizon of sociological analysis in status attainment, and thus in social stratification and social mobility. It probably also represents the most prominent research area where explicit, systematic application and analysis of the theory and methods of social capital for instrumental actions has occurred. To a great extent, this research tradition has directly contributed to the development of the theory of social capital itself.

The purposes of this chapter are to (1) review the theoretical and empirical foundations of these lines of investigation; (2) summarize sampled studies and results; and (3) propose issues and directions for future research. Before proceeding with these tasks, I wish to identify the limitations of this review. It will focus on social capital — embedded resources in the networks accessed and used to attain statuses; as such, it does not review the effects of properties of social networks per se (e.g., density, centrality, bridging) unless they implicate accessed resources (what influence these characteristics may exert on the access and use of embedded resources). Second, the outcome of this focus is the status attained rather than whether a job search is successful. The latter has a substantial literature of its own and is better summarized elsewhere (e.g., Granovetter 1995). This chapter will touch on aspects of job searches to the extent that they affect attained statuses. Finally, only the literature available in English will be reviewed. I am aware of an expanding literature in Europe, but unfortunately, my language limitations do not allow for coverage here.

Formative Studies and Theoretical Foundations

Contributions of social network analysis to status attainment can be traced to the seminal study conducted by Mark Granovetter (1974), who interviewed 282 professional and managerial men in Newton,
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valued resources such as wealth, status, and power. This structure has a pyramidal shape in terms of accessibility and control of such resources: the higher the position, the fewer the occupants; and the higher the position, the better the view it has of the structure (especially down below). The pyramidal structure suggests advantages for positions closer to the top, in terms of both number of occupants (fewer) and accessibility to positions (more). Within these structural constraints and opportunities, individuals act for expressive and instrumental purposes. For the latter (attaining status in the social structure being one prime example), the better strategy would be for ego to reach toward contacts higher up in the hierarchy. These contacts would be better able to exert influence on positions (e.g., a recruiter for a firm) whose actions might benefit ego's interest. This reaching-up process might be facilitated if ego uses weaker ties, since these are more likely to reach out vertically (presumably upward) rather than horizontally relative to ego's position in the hierarchy.

Three propositions have thus been formulated: (1) the social-resources proposition—social resources (e.g., resources accessed in social networks) exert influence on the outcome of an instrumental action (e.g., attained status), (2) the strength-of-position proposition—social resources, in turn, are affected by the original position of ego (as represented by parental resources or previous resources), and (3) the strength-of-ties proposition—social resources are also affected by the use of weaker rather than stronger ties.

Social Resources and Social Capital: A Theoretical Convergence

This theoretical development occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when parallel but independent discussions on social capital (Bourdieu 1980, 1983/1986; Coleman 1988) were emerging as well. While social capital refers to a variety of features in the social structure, according to different scholars (e.g., community norms—Coleman 1990; group solidarity—Hechter 1983, Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; participation in voluntary and civil organizations—Putnam 1995a, 1995b), it eventually became clear (Lin 1982, 1995a; Flap 1996; Tardos 1996; Burt 1997; Portes 1998) that social capital refers primarily to resources accessed in social networks. Further, the theory also focuses on the instrumental utility of such resources (capital as investment or mobilization). The convergence of the social resources and social capital theories complements and strengthens the development of a social theory focusing on the instrumental utility of accessed and mobilized resources embedded in social networks. It places the significance of social resources

Massachusetts. The data suggested that those who used interpersonal channels seemed to land and more satisfactory and better (e.g., higher-paid) jobs. Based on this empirical research and substantiated by a review of job-search studies, Granovetter proposed (1973) a network theory for information flow. The hypothesis of the strength of weak ties states that weaker ties tend to form bridges that link individuals to other social circles for information not likely to be available in their own circles, and such information should be useful to the individuals. However, Granovetter never suggests that access to or help from weaker rather than stronger ties would result in higher-status jobs thus obtained (1995, p. 148). Clues about the linkage between strength of ties and attained statuses came indirectly from a small world study conducted in a tri-city metropolitan area in upstate New York (Lin, Dayton, and Greenwald 1978). The task of the participants in the study was to forward packets containing information about certain target persons to others they knew on a first-name basis so that the packets might eventually reach the target persons. The study found that successful chains (those packets successfully forwarded to the targets) involved higher-status intermediaries until the last nodes (dipping down in the hierarchy toward the locations of the targets) compared to the unsuccessful chains. Successful chains also implicated nodes that had more extensive social contacts (who claimed more social ties) and yet tended to forward the packets to someone they had not seen recently (weaker ties). The small world study thus made two contributions. First, it suggested that access to hierarchical positions might be the critical factor in the process of status attainment. Thus, the possible linkage between strength of ties and status attainment might be indirect: the strength of weak ties might lie in their accessing social positions higher in the social hierarchy, which have the advantage in facilitating instrumental action. Second, the study implicated behavior rather than a paper-and-pencil exercise, as each step in the packet-forwarding process required actual actions from each participant. Thus, the study results lend behavioral validity to the results of previous status attainment paper-and-pencil studies.

Based on these studies, a theory of social resources has emerged (Lin 1982, 1990). The theory begins with an image of the macro-social structure consisting of positions ranked according to certain normatively

2 On the surface, this hypothesis might be seen as simply the inverse of the long-known hypothesis that stronger ties are formed among those who share similar characteristics and lifestyles, known as the homophily principle or the like-me hypothesis (Homans 1950; Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; Laumann 1966; Lin 1982). What the strength-of-weak-ties argument contributed, however, was a challenge to the taken-for-granted and attributed value given to strong ties, or the homophily principle: strong ties, which promote group solidarity, are socially valuable. By shifting our attention to the weaker ties, Granovetter alerted us that weak ties, which promote access to different and new information, are socially valuable as well.
in the broader theoretical discussion of social capital and sharpens the
definition and operationality of social capital as a research concept. The
tree propositions previously stated (i.e., social capital, strength of posi-
tion, and strength of ties) remain valid in the framework of social capital,
although other propositions have subsequently been proposed (see
Chapter 5). The following discussion will reflect the merged notions of
social capital and social resources and will examine the research con-
ducted on the three propositions: (1) the social-capital proposition
(Proposition 1 in Chapter 5): better embedded resources accessed in the
social networks lead to better attained status; (2) the strength-op-
oposition proposition (Proposition 2 in Chapter 5): the better the struc-
tural position of origin, the better the attained status; and (3) the
strength-of-weak-ties proposition (Proposition 4 in Chapter 5): the
weaker the ties, the better the attained status (in the instrumental action
of a job search). At the empirical and research levels, social resources are
used; at the general theoretical level, social capital is employed.

Research Models and Evidence

Research on the relationships between social resources and status attain-
ment examines two processes, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. One process
focuses on the access to social capital - resources accessed in the ego's
general social networks. In this process, human capital (education, ex-
periences), initial positions (parental or prior job statuses), and ego's social
ties (e.g., extensity of ties) are hypothesized to determine the extent
of resources the ego can access through such connections (network
resources). Further, network resources, education, and initial positions
are expected to affect attained statuses such as occupational status,
authority positions, sectors, or earnings. We may describe this model as
the accessed social capital model.

Another process focuses on the mobilization of social capital in the
process of status attainment - the use of social contacts and the resources
provided by the contact in the job-search process. As can be seen in
Figure 6.1, contact status used is seen as the mobilized social capital in
the status attainment process. It is hypothesized that contact status, along
with education and initial positions, will exert a significant and impor-
tant effect on the status of the job obtained. Contact status, in turn, is
affected by education, network resources, and the tie strength between
ego and the contact. Strength of ties may be measured either with a per-
ceived strength (e.g., intimacy of the relationship) or with a role cate-
gory (e.g., kin, friends, and acquaintances). We shall call this model the
mobilized social capital model.

In both types of analysis, other factors may be added to the basic
model, including age, gender, race/ethnicity, indicators of job experience
or tenure, the work sector, and the industry or organization, either as
control variables or as opportunity/constraint factors. We turn now to a
brief review of the literature, which will proceed first with the mobilized
social capital model, as it received initial research attention, followed by
the accessed social capital model and models incorporating both access
and mobilization processes. A summary of the studies and findings
appears in Table 6.1.

Mobilized Social Capital

The initial empirical examination of the mobilized social capital model3
was conducted by Lin and his associates (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981;

3 The fact that this estimation procedure studies only a subsample of labor force partici-
pants who use personal contacts in job searches raised concern about the selectivity bias
on the estimations. It has been shown that in surveys of community labor populations,


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Social Resources Effect (Outcome Var.)</th>
<th>Position Effect</th>
<th>Tie Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilized social capital model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn (1981, USA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsden and Hurlbert (1988, USA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensel (1979, USA)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeGraaf and Flap (1988, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moerbeek, Ute, and Flap (1995, the</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wegener (1991, Germany)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Requena (1991, Spain)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbari (1996, Italy)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsing and Sun (1988, Taiwan)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hsing and Hwang (1992, Taiwan)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bian and Ang (1997, Singapore)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volker and Flap (1999, East Germany)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bian (1997, China)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Access social capital model               |                                        |                 |            |
| Name generator methodology                |                                        |                 |            |
| Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert (1986, USA)| Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Sprengers, Tazelaar, and Flap (1988, the Netherlands) | Yes                                  | Yes             | Yes*       |
| Barbiri (1996, Italy)                     | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Boxman, DeGraaf, and Flap (1991, the      | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Netherlands)                              |                                        |                 |            |
| Boxman and Flap (1990, the Netherlands)    | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Burt (1992, USA)                          | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Burt (1997, 1998 USA)                     | Yes*                                   |                 |            |
| Position Generator Methodology            |                                        |                 |            |
| Lin and Dumin (1986, USA)                 | Yes                                    | Yes             | Yes*       |
| Hsing and Hwang (1992, Taiwan)            | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Volker and Flap (1999, East Germany)      | Yes                                    | Yes             |            |
| Angelusz and Tardos (1991, Hungary)       | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Erickson (1995, 1996, Canada)             | Yes                                    |                 | Yes*       |
| Erickson (1998, Canada)                   | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Belliveau, O'Reilly, and Wade (1996, USA) | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Joint accessed/mobilized model            |                                        |                 |            |
| Boxman (1992)                             | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Flap and Boxman (1996, 1998, the         | Yes                                    |                 |            |
| Netherlands)                              |                                        |                 |            |
| Volker and Flap (1997, Germany)           | Yes                                    | Yes             |            |
| Lai, Lin, and Leung (1998, USA)           | Yes                                    | Yes             | Yes        |

--- not reported.

* Conditional confirmation; detail in text.

Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel (1981). The study used data from a representative community sample in metropolitan Albany, New York, of more than 400 employed men, and confirmed that contact status exerted effects on attained status beyond and after accounting for parental status and education effects. It also confirmed that contact status was affected positively by the father's status and negatively by the strength of ties between ego and the contact. The results provided the initial confirmation of all three propositions of the social capital theory. Ensel (1979) extended the investigation to both men and women in a study of employed adults in New York State. While confirming that contact status significantly affected attained status, he found that male contacts were much more likely to reach higher-status contacts than female contacts. Further, women were more likely to use female contacts in job searches, while men overwhelmingly used male contacts. When women did use male contacts, their disadvantage in reaching higher-status contacts as compared to men was significantly reduced. This study was one of the first to provide direct evidence that men, being positioned advantageously in the hierarchy, had better social capital than women. Secondly, women's disadvantages in mobilizing male contacts, and thereby accessing better social capital, accounted in part for their inferior status attainment.

Further replication and extension of the model were done by Marsden and Hurlbert (1988), who analyzed the transition to current jobs for 456 men in the 1970 Detroit Area Study. This confirmed that contact status (occupational prestige and sector) exerted the strongest effects on attained prestige and sector, respectively. The authors also found that the contact's prestige and position in the core sector were related to the prestige and sector of the prior job, respectively, confirming the strength-of-position proposition. On the other hand, the authors did not confirm the strength-of-tie proposition; contact status was not associated with the strength of ties between ego and the contact.

Extension of the model to other societies quickly followed. De Graaf and Flap (1988) lent further support to the social resources proposition in their analyses of 628 males in a 1980 West German survey and 466 males in a 1982 Dutch survey. They did not examine the strength-of-position or the strength-of-tie propositions for social resources. The Netherlands Family Survey of 1992 provided data on male-female com-
comparisons in the social capital effect. Moerbeek, Ultee, and Flap (1995) used father’s occupation as the indicator of social capital when the father was mentioned as the social contact, and found that it exerted a positive and significant effect on the statuses of first and current/life jobs for both men and women. Wegener (1991) analyzed a 1987 data set from Germany of 604 men and women aged forty-two and thirty-two, and found that contact status significantly affected the prestige of the job found, confirming the social resources proposition. However, the strength-of-ties proposition and the strength-of-position hypotheses were not examined. Barbieri (1996), reporting a study of 500 newly hired persons in the administrative area of Milan, Italy, confirmed the social-resources proposition by finding that contact status significantly affected present job status, having already accounted for effects from father’s status, education, and first and previous job statuses. Further, he found that father’s status indirectly affected contact status through education, lending some support to the strength-of-tie proposition. When Barbieri subdivided the sample into those who used strong versus weak ties, he found no advantage of using weaker ties in the association between contact status and attained status. In fact, there was some evidence that stronger ties increased the association between contact status and statuses of first and previous jobs. Requena’s (1991) study in Spain provided the only disconfirming evidence for the social resources proposition, as it showed that greater social resources did not provide better jobs, even though they did affect income attainment. He speculated that the lack of social-resources effects was due in part to the rigid bureaucratization of Spain’s employment policies and practices.

Systematic tests of the theory have been carried out in Asia as well. A series of studies were conducted by Hsung and others in Taiwan, which is also a capitalist state. One study (Hsung and Sun 1988) surveyed the labor force in the manufacturing industry, and another (Hsung and Hwang 1992) examined the labor force in a metropolitan area (Taichung). Both studies supported the social resources proposition that contact status significantly affects the status of obtained first and current jobs after accounting for father’s education and occupational status, education, and, in the case of the current job, prior job status. Hsung and Hwang (1992) also found modest support for the strength-of-position argument, but father’s education and occupational status had only a modest effect on contact status for the first job and no significant effects on the current job’s contact status. For strength of ties, a composite measure (closeness with contacts, frequency of visits, frequency of calls, and content of the relationship) indicated only a slightly negative relationship with the first job’s contact status and no relationship with the current job’s contact status. In addition, in 1994, Bian and Ang (1997) conducted a study of 512 men and women in Singapore that strongly confirmed the social resources proposition; contact status significantly affected obtained status. Helper status was strongly related to the current job’s occupational status, along with age, education, and prior job status. For all respondents, weaker ties reached higher-status contacts. However, the weakest ties (not intimate at all) had no effect on contact status, a finding similar to that of a 1988 Tianjin study that will be described shortly. For those who reached helpers indirectly, the association between tie strength and contact status was negative. However, stronger ties between the intermediary and the helper were more likely to result in reaching a higher-status helper.

A major extension of the research paradigm has examined the propositions in different political economies, such as state socialism. Bian (1997), in a 1988 study conducted in Tianjin, China, including 1,008 men and women, found that helper’s job status (measured by the hierarchical level of his or her work unit) was strongly associated with attained work unit status in the job change, along with education and prior job status. The overall effect of the tie strength between ego and the helper on the helper’s status was insignificant. Further analyses showed that medium-strength ties reached helpers with better status; this was true for the tie strength between ego and intermediaries, as well as between intermediaries and helpers. Moreover, in a retrospective panel study conducted by Volker and Flap (1999) in Leipzig and Dresden, two cities in the former German Democratic Republic, the occupational prestige of the contact person had strong and significant effects on both the first job and job prestige in 1989. Thus, the social resources proposition was confirmed. However, strength of ties (measured by the intensity of the relationship between ego and the contact) had no effect on contact statuses or on attained occupational status and income. Neither father’s education nor occupational prestige affected contact status for the 1989 job search. However, education had a significant effect on contact status. Since the father’s status had direct effects on education, these results confirmed the indirect effect of the strength of positions, mediated through education.

Accessed Social Capital

Two methods are used to measure accessed social capital: name generators and position generators. The name generator method is the more common method and has been used extensively in the network literature. The general technique is to pose one or more questions about ego’s contacts in certain role relationships (e.g., neighborhood, work), content areas (e.g., work matters, household chores), or intimacy (e.g., confi-
Table 6.2. Position Generator for Measuring Accessed Social Capital: An Example

Here is a list of jobs (show card). Would you please tell me if you happen to know someone (on a first-name basis) who has each job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>1. Do you know anyone who has this job?*</th>
<th>2. How long have you known this person (no. of years)?</th>
<th>3. What is your relationship with this person?</th>
<th>4. How close are you to this person?</th>
<th>5. His/her gender</th>
<th>6. His/her job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If you know more than one person, think of the one person whom you have known the longest.

Social Capital and Status Attainment

Name-Generators Studies. Campbell, Marsden, and Hurlbert (1986) examined the associations between network resources and socioeconomic statuses with name-generator data from the 1965–1966 Detroit Area Study and found that the resource compositions of networks (mean and maximal education, mean and maximal prestige) were significantly associated with attained statuses such as occupational prestige and family income. In the Milan study, Barbieri (1996) also constructed three measures for social capital from name-generator data and found them to affect present job status after accounting for parental statuses, experience, human capital (years of schooling), and first and previous job statuses. Further, social capital was affected by father’s status, confirming the strength-of-position proposition.

Several studies have assessed the associations between accessed social capital and attained statuses among certain labor populations. Access to social capital by the unemployed was the focus of a study conducted by Sprengers, Tazelaar, and Flap (1988). Among a group of 242 Dutch men aged forty to fifty-five who were unemployed in or before 1978, those with better social capital were more likely to find jobs within a year after unemployment, especially those with access to social capital through weak ties. Those with better social capital did not find a better occupational status or a higher income when they found reemployment. However, better social capital increased optimism about job opportunities, which in turn increased the intensity of the job search, leading to more and better jobs. Further, it was found that the more restricted the labor market, the more intense those with greater social capital tended to be in job searches. After a year of unemployment, those with better social capital among strong ties (relatives) also tended to have a better chance of being rehired in the next one to three years. The study also found that those with better education, former occupations, and higher incomes also tended to have better social capital, confirming the strength-of-position hypothesis. Focusing on 1,359 top managers of large companies in the Netherlands, Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap (1991) found that both education and social capital (measured with work contacts in other organizations and membership in clubs and professional associations) had direct effects on income. The job-search activities of 365 persons in the Netherlands who finished vocational training were also studied by Boxman and Flap (1990) in 1989. Data were obtained from job seekers and employers, as well as from contacts used by the job seekers. Preliminary analyses showed that for income, the more important predictors were gender (in favor of men), social capital, career perspective, and company-specific skills.

Early promotion and better bonuses were the outcomes assessed by Burt (1992) for managers in a large electronic components and com-
puting equipment firm. Using the extent to which each ego was embedded in a constrained network (fewer contacts, more dense relations, and more contacts related to a single contact) as a measure of social capital, he found that there was a negative association between structural constraints and early promotion. That is, he suggested that access to diverse resources in one's networks enhanced the opportunity to locate useful information and influence for promoting one's position in the firm. For men in senior positions in the investment banking division of a large American financial organization, a similar negative association between constrained networks and bonuses was found (Burt 1997).

Position-Generators Studies. Lin and Dumin (1986) analyzed the data from an Albany, New York, study in which twenty occupations were sampled from the U.S. 1960 census listing of occupations, with all occupations ranked according to job prestige scores. At equal intervals on the job prestige scale scores, occupations were identified. From this group, the most popular (frequency of occupants) occupation was selected. Each respondent was asked if he had any contact (person he knew on a first-name basis) in each of the positions. If more than one contact was indicated, the respondent was asked to focus on the most familiar one. For each accessed position, the respondent identified the contact's relationship (relative, friend, or acquaintance). From the data matrix, Lin and Dumin constructed two social resources access measures: the highest status accessible (the position accessed with the highest prestige score) and the range of statuses accessed (the difference between the highest and lowest accessed statuses). Analyses showed that the two measures were positively and significantly related to current occupational status. Further analysis showed that respondents' original positions (father's occupational prestige score or white-blue and high-low occupational groupings) and these two measures were positively and significantly related, confirming the strength-of-position hypothesis. When Lin and Dumin analyzed the relationships between the three types of ties (relatives, friends, acquaintances) and the access variables, they found that friends as well as acquaintances provided the best access to both the highest-status position and the range of accessed statuses.

Hsung and Hwang (1992) also incorporated network resources in their Taichung study, as cited earlier. Adapting the position-generator methodology with twenty occupations, they failed to find significant effects for the highest status accessed and for the difference between the lowest and highest occupational statuses accessed. However, they did find significant effects on the first job status of a measure of the "total amount of network resources," which was based on the sum status scores of all occupations accessed. This measure, however, did not have any effect on current job status. Volker and Flap (1999), in their Germany study, used the position-generator methodology to ask respondents to identify, among thirty-three occupations, whether they knew anyone in any of the occupations, and if so, what their relationships were (relatives, friends, and acquaintances). For 1989 occupational status, the effect of the highest status accessed was positive and significant, controlling for fathers' education and occupation, the respondents' own education and sex, and the prestige of their first job. This variable also had a positive and moderately significant ($p < .10$) effect on 1989 income when 1989 occupational prestige was added to the equation along with all other independent variables. This result confirmed the social resources proposition. Further, Volker and Flap found that both relatives and acquaintances accessed better occupations (upper-white-collar or higher prestige) than friends. On the other hand, acquaintances accessed a greater range (the difference between the highest- and lowest-prestige jobs) of occupations than either relatives or friends. Since the highest occupational prestige accessed turned out to be the best predictor of attained status, the effects of weak ties were not found (as relatives and acquaintances were almost equally likely to access high-prestige occupations). The father's occupational prestige was positively related to the highest occupational prestige accessed in general, as well as for each group of occupations accessed through relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Thus, the strength-of-position proposition was confirmed. In pre-1989 Hungary (1987–1988), Angelusz and Tardos (1991) also used the position generator to identify "weakly tied" relationships or resources. This variable was found to be significantly associated with wages, after accounting for the effects of sex, education, residence, and age.

In her study of the private security industry (161 guard, investigation, and security companies) in Toronto in 1991–1992, Erickson (1995, 1996) used Wright's (1979) class dimensions (control of property, control of organizations, and control of skill) to select nineteen job positions. Data were gathered from 155 employees, 46 supervisors, 80 managers, and 112 owners. Erickson found that social capital (diversity in accessing various positions) contributed to job autonomy and authority, which in turn generated better job returns. The major conclusions are that (1) accessed social capital helps people to rise to higher positions (in comparisons between managers versus lower-level employees and owners versus employees) and (2) social capital pays off even if people do not use a contact to get a job (see Recruitment and Social Capital in the next section). In another study on social capital, Erickson (1998) differentiated two types of social capital: global and local. Local settings refer to geographic areas (neighborhoods), ethnic areas (ethnic communities and enclave economies), or organizations (schools, voluntary organizations,
social movements, or firms). In a telephone survey of 352 participants in the Toronto Local Employment and Trading System (LETS), Erickson asked the respondents to identify contacts in a list of thirty occupations both inside and outside the LETS system. Analyses showed that local social capital was associated with income in the LETS system (the local economy), while global social capital was not associated with income in the general economy, pointing to the fact that social capital's effect is more contingent in the global economy system.

Joint Effects of Accessed and Mobilized Social Capital

Since there are two types of social capital in the process of status attainment, a logical step would be to examine accessed and mobilized social capital in a single study. The theoretical question posed is the extent to which accessed social capital facilitates social capital: that is, whether having more accessed social capital increases the likelihood of mobilizing better social capital. The structural opportunity and advantage implied in this hypothesis is apparent. However, it is also to be expected that the correspondence will not be overwhelming: not all persons accessed with rich social capital are expected to take advantage of or be able to mobilize social capital for the purpose of obtaining better socioeconomic status. An element of action and choice should also be significant. Several studies have lent support to this hypothesis.

For example, in their study of vocational training graduates, Bozman and Flap (Boxman 1992; Flap and Bozman 1996) showed that contact status (mobilized social capital) affects attained occupational status, whereas accessed social capital does not. The Germany study (Volker and Flap 1996) is another study in which both accessed and mobilized social capital were measured. It was found that the highest occupational prestige accessed using the position-generator methodology was significantly and positively related to the status of the contact person used in the 1989 job search, but its direct effect on 1989 job prestige, while positive, was only modest in significance (p < .10). The contact person's prestige had a much stronger effect. In fact, its direct effect on 1989 job prestige was stronger than education once the prestige of the first job was also incorporated (and was the most significant predictor).

Lai, Lin, and Leung (1998) also examined the joint effects of accessed and mobilized social capital on status attainment using the Albany data (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981). Incorporating both the network resources measures from the position generator (Lin and Dumin 1986) and the contact resources (contact status in the job search) in structural equation models, they showed that current job status is significantly and directly affected by education (achieved status) and by contact status.

Social Capital and Status Attainment

Contact status, in turn, is affected by parental statuses (ascribed status), education, network resources, and weaker ties with the contact. Thus, it is clear that mobilized social capital directly influences status outcome and mobilized social capital is affected by accessed social capital, along with ascribed and achieved statuses.

Issues and Research Directions

Research has provided consistent support for the proposition that social capital, in the form of social resources, makes a significant contribution to status attainment beyond personal resources. This association persists across societies (different nation-states and political economies), industrialization and development levels, labor market populations (recent graduates, new hires, job changers), different economic sectors (industries, organizations, positions in organizations), and status outcomes (occupation, authority, sector, promotion, bonuses). The association remains significant across differential conceptualization (accessed versus mobilized capital) and measurement (name generators versus position generators). Yet, there remain important issues to be conceptualized and studied in the future. In the following subsections, a number of these issues will be briefly identified and discussed.

Informal and Formal Job Search Channels

It is clear by now that the use of informal channels by itself offers no advantage over other channels, especially formal channels, in attained status. In fact, if anything, informal channels tend to be used by the disadvantaged: women, the less educated, and the less skilled. The statuses attained therefore tend to be lower. Yet, among those who use informal channels, social resources (contact statuses) make a major difference. Several issues remain. First, is it really true that the advantaged do not need to use informal channels, as they possess greater human capital and can apply directly to high-status positions? The evidence is mixed. For some jobs that have specific requirements (dealing with technology and hardware, for example), credentials regarding skills and training in the formal application may be sufficient to obtain positions. However, for other critical jobs (high-level managerial and human-interfaced positions), formal credentials are often insufficient to convey the social skills and resources so essential for occupants' performances. The necessary informal or shadow channels through which such information is conveyed, yet not detected in survey instruments, remain an important methodological challenge. Secondly, for the disadvantaged, social capital
is restricted (the strength-of-position argument). Within this restricted range of resources, there is little information on whether the disadvantaged are also less likely to mobilize the optimal resources available to them, thus creating double jeopardy. Knowledge about the choice behaviors of the advantaged and the disadvantaged will be helpful in sorting through the structural constraints and choice constraints.

Strength of Ties or Network Locations?

While the social resources proposition and the strength-of-position propositions have been consistently confirmed (see Table 6.1), much ambiguity has resulted regarding the strength-of-ties proposition. Strength of ties in and of itself should not be expected to exert a direct effect on status outcomes (Granovetter 1995), and much research evidence points to the absence of a direct association (e.g., Bridges and Vilkemex 1986; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988; Forse 1997). The modified proposition that weaker ties might access better social resources also lacks consistent empirical support (see Table 6.1). Yet, social capital is theorized to contain both structural effects and agency effects; further specifications of network or tie choices within structural constraints may eventually turn out to be meaningful. Several lines of investigation have provided some leads. For example, it has been argued that the effect of strength of ties on social resources accessed or mobilized may be contingent on the original status. Some studies have pointed to the ceiling effect of tie strength: at or near the top level of the hierarchy, it is strong ties that tend to yield successful job attainment (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Erickson 1995, 1996). Also, the weakest ties are clearly not useful (Bian 1997; Bian and Ang 1997), since ties with no strength offer no incentive for exchanges. On the other hand, the strongest ties, by the same token, may be useful despite the restricted range of resources accessed. There ties, by definition, represent commitment, trust, and obligation and therefore the motivation to help. Willingness and effort to search for other ties using these strong ties may be critical under institutional uncertainties or constraints (e.g., under state socialism: Rus 1995, Bian 1997; or tight market situations: Sprengers, Tazlala, and Flap 1988). Organizational constraints and opportunities may also condition the relative utility of weaker or stronger ties (Lin 1990).

Another source of possible clarification suggests a possible modification in the conceptualization of the strength of ties in network terms. For example, strength of tie may be reflected in the length of the links between ego and the alter whose resources are eventually accessed. If each link is assumed to be of equal strength, then the strength of the tie between ego and the alter may become an inverse function of the length of the links between them; the longer the chain of connection, the weaker the tie. While the multiple links necessarily weaken the degree of obligations, trust, and reciprocity between ego and the ultimate alter, such a chain also extends the reach for resources not present in the proximal areas of ego in the networks. To the extent that heterogeneous or rich resources are present in distant parts of the network, the chain length or weaker ties may in fact become useful. Further analysis along this line (e.g., Bian 1997) will clarify the utility of both the bridge effect and the strength-of-tie effect.

Other considerations point to locations in the social networks. The utility of social ties may be more dependent on the locations of the actors in the social networks or on the hierarchical structure rather than the strength of ties (e.g., Lin and Dumin 1986; Angelusz and Tardos 1991; Burt 1997). Positions at or near strategic locations, such as bridges or structural holes, may provide a competitive advantage to actors accessing heterogeneous and thus rich resources.

These findings and considerations have led to further articulation of the propositions for the theory of social capital, as reflected in Chapter 5, where network positions, in conjunction with structural positions, provide the key to predict how likely an instrumental action is to lead to better social capital.

Further Development of the Position Generator

In order to ascertain the causal sequence, the time framework of the contacts needs to be specified. For example, the generator may wish to ask, "When you were looking for the first (or current) job, did you know of anyone who had this kind of work?" Also, it is important to sample the positions from a meaningful hierarchy in a given society. In addition to occupational status or prestige, work units, sectors, authority, or autonomy may confer important statuses in certain societies. Catering to the significance of meaningful statuses/classes in a given society is thus an important consideration in identifying the positions in the generators (Erickson 1995).

Inequality of Social Capital

Differential access to social capital deserves much greater research attention. It is conceivable that social groups (gender, race) have different access to social capital because of their advantaged or disadvantaged structural positions and social networks. Thus, for example, inequality of social capital offers fewer opportunities for women and minorities to mobilize better social resources to attain and promote careers. For the
disadvantaged to gain a better status, strategic behaviors require accessing resources beyond their usual social circles (e.g., women) using male ties (Ensel 1979) to find sponsors in the firm (Burt 1998) and to join clubs dominated by men (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997); or for blacks to find ties outside their own neighborhood or those employed (Green, Tigges, and Browne 1995); or for scholars of Mexican origin to find ties of non-Mexican origin or to establish ties with institutional agents such as teachers and counselors (Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995; Stanton-Salazar 1997). Systematic data on inequalities in social capital will provide an explanatory framework for inequality in social stratification and mobility and offer behavioral choices to overcome such inequalities. The next chapter, in fact, will describe one such effort.

Recruitment and Social Capital

The relationships between social capital and status attainment apply to both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. So far, research literature has primarily concentrated on the supply side—the status attainment process from job seekers' perspective. The demand side of the model—the recruitment process from the organization's perspective—has only begun to emerge (Boxman and Flap 1990; Boxman, De Graaf and Flap 1991; Erickson 1995, 1996; Burt 1997; Fernandez and Weinberg 1997). There are reasons to believe that social capital is important for firms in selective recruitment, as firms must operate in an environment where social skills and networks play critical roles in transactions and exchanges. This is especially true of certain types of positions. Thus, we may anticipate that certain positions require more social capital than other positions in a firm. First, top-level executives are expected to possess rich social capital, as they need to deal with and manage people both within and outside the firm. In fact, we may postulate that at the highest level of management, social capital far outweighs human capital for occupants. Thus, it can be hypothesized that firms such as IBM and Microsoft are more likely to recruit experienced managers with social skills rather than computer expertise for their CEOs, and that top universities need presidents who have the social skills to negotiate with faculty, students, parents, and alumni, and to raise funds rather than produce distinguished scholarships. Second, we should expect positions that deal with persons (e.g., nurses) rather than machines or technologies (e.g., programmers) to be filled with occupants who have better social capital. Third, positions at the edge of the firm are more likely to be filled by those with better social capital than others (e.g., salesperson, public relations personnel, or managers at remote sites; Burt 1997). Firms with more needs for such positions, therefore, should be expected to use informal sources in recruitment more extensively. Such hypotheses will help empirical specifications and testing.

Social Capital and Status Attainment

The relationship between social capital and human capital is theoretically important. Some scholars (Bourdieu 1983/1986; Coleman 1990) have proposed that social capital helps produce human capital. Well-connected parents and social ties can indeed enhance the opportunities for individuals to obtain better education, training, and skills and knowledge credentials. On the other hand, it is clear that human capital induces social capital. Better-educated and better-trained individuals tend to move in social circles and clubs rich in resources. The harder question is: given both, which is more important in enhancing status attainment? Several studies cited in this chapter suggest that social capital may be as important as or even more important than human capital (education and work experience) in status attainment (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn 1981; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988), while others show the opposite (Hsung and Sun 1988; DeGraaf and Flap 1988; Hsung and Hwang 1992). Industrialization probably is not the explanation, as the former group includes studies conducted in the United States and the latter in the Netherlands and Taiwan. More likely, there is an association between specific educational institutions and methods of job allocations and searches. As Krymkowski (1991) showed in a comparative analysis of data from the United States, West Germany, and Poland in the 1970s, both West Germany and Poland showed stronger associations between social origins and education and between education and occupational allocations than the United States. Yet, there is no clear evidence that the educational system in Taiwan resembles the West German and Dutch systems more than it does the U.S. system. The contrasting results from these countries thus remain to be explained. Still more intriguing are the possible interactions between human capital and social capital. Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap (1991) found that human capital had its greatest effect on income when social capital was low, and human capital had its least effect on income when social capital was high. Further, in the study of Dutch managers, Flap and Boxman (1998) found that for top managers, social capital led to higher income at all levels of human capital, but the returns on human capital decreased at higher levels of social capital. If these patterns can be confirmed, they would suggest that human capital supplements social capital in status attainment. That is, when social capital is high, attained status will be high, regardless of the level of human capital; and when social capital is low, human capital exerts a strong effect on attainment. Or,
given certain minimal levels of human and social capital, social capital is the more important factor in accounting for status attainment.

Concluding Remarks

This brief chapter can only provide an abbreviated presentation of the rich and sizable research literature on social capital and status attainment. Many studies are currently being conducted in many parts of the world and have not been covered here. Nevertheless, it should be apparent that this research tradition has contributed significantly to the development of the social capital theory itself, as well as providing detailed and varied empirical data for its verification and continuous evolution. The research enterprise truly exemplifies the importance and fruitfulness of the continuing interplay and reciprocal feedback between theory and research.

Inequality in Social Capital
A Research Agenda

This chapter examines a critical issue in social capital research — inequality in social capital, or the extent to which social capital is unequally distributed across social groups in a community or population. First, I will consider some general issues and approaches to the analysis of inequality in all types of capital. These considerations will lead to formulations of research agenda, and data from urban China will then be used to illustrate them. The chapter will conclude with a brief statement about the future research agenda.

Theoretical Considerations

Social inequality is a major research issue; its etiology demands attention. From the capital theoretic perspective, we may make the initial proposition that inequality in different types of capital, such as human capital and social capital, brings about social inequality, such as in socioeconomic standing and quality of life. Given this proposition, we may further explore the processes leading to inequality in capital. In this formulation, the plan is to identify the specific mechanisms that lead to inequality in capital, which in turn affects social inequality. Thus, the research task is twofold: identification and verification of mechanisms leading to inequality in capital, and demonstration of the linkage between inequality in capital and social inequality among social groups. The initial proposition, linkage between capital inequality and social inequality, has been the guiding theory regarding different types of

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1 I want to acknowledge Marc Magee’s assistance in this analysis. The study reported here was supported in part by a grant from the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation. An earlier version was presented at the twenty-eighth Sino-American Conference held on June 12-14, 1999, at Duke University.
capital (Chapters 1–6). This chapter explores the formulation of processes accounting for inequality in capital, including social capital. It is argued that capital inequality may result from two processes: capital deficit and return deficits. Capital deficit refers to the consequence of a process by which differential investment or opportunities result in relative shortage (in quantity or quality) of capital for one group compared with another. For example, families may invest more in the human or social capital of their sons compared to their daughters. Or different social groups may be embedded in different social hierarchies or social networks that facilitate or constrain their members' capital acquisition.

Return deficit is the consequence of a process by which a given quality or quantity of capital generates a differential return or outcome for members of different social groups. For example, males and females, with a given quality or quantity of social capital, receive differential returns in status attainment—such as positions in organizations, occupational prestige, or earnings.

Inequality in capital between social groups may be due to capital deficit, return deficit, or both. Consider the problem of gender inequality in the labor market. A substantial literature suggests that a gendered labor market accounts for differential earnings for males and females in different occupations (Treiman and Terrell 1975; Bose and Rossi 1983; Bielby and Baron 1986; Jacobs 1989; England, Farkas, Kilbourne, and Don 1988; Reskin 1988, 1993; Kilbourne, England, Farkas, Beron, and Wein 1994; Reskin and Roos 1990; England 1992a, 1992b; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Yet, little theory or research has refined the empirical finding of a gendered occupational structure, and has systematically explored the mechanisms that account for different group members’ differential allocations in structural positions, and the subsequent returns or rewards to members of different social groups (see Tam 1997 for a competing argument). From the capital theoretic perspective, we may offer two possible explanations for these possible relationships.

The capital deficit explanation focuses on the differential acquisition of capital. One process may be differential investment; it hypothesizes that families invest differentially in capital for male and female children. We may speculate that in most societies, families anticipate a labor market and an economy that provide differential returns for males and females wish to be competitive by investing more capital in sons than in daughters. Thus, it may be expected that males are favored over females for both education (human capital) and extensity of social networks (social capital). A second process may be differential opportunities; prevailing social structure and institutions (rules and practices or culture; see Chapter 11) differentially afford opportunities for males and females in developing capital. Male children are encouraged and rewarded for extensity and heterogeneity of social ties, while female children are constrained or even punished for doing so. These two processes result in differential capital deficit; females will acquire less capital in terms of quality and quantity. Capital deficit, in this formulation, is expected to account for the differential placements and rewards received by males and females.

Return deficit explanation, on the other hand, focuses on the return to capital—in the labor market, for example. The argument is that it is the return to capital in the labor market that differentiates males and females. In this case, it may be assumed that even when males and females have relatively equal (quality or quantity of) capital, they have different status outcomes in the labor market. That is, the labor market differentially rewards males and females for their capital. Given the same quality or quantity of capital, males will generate greater rewards than females in the labor market, such as positions in the organization, occupational titles or prestige, and earnings. Three different explanations may be offered for this scenario. In one, females may not use or mobilize the appropriate capital for the instrumental action of attainment in the labor market. For example, they may not use the best social ties and thus the best possible social capital in the attainment process, either because they are cognitively unable to identify the best possible social ties and social capital or because they hesitate to mobilize such social capital due to perceived lack of resources or capacity to return the favor. Alternatively, the appropriate social ties are mobilized, but for real or imagined reasons, these ties are reluctant to invest their capital on ego's (the female's) behalf. These ties may suspect that employers would be more resistant to female candidates and would not take their recommendation or influence seriously. Such wasted influence would be a cost rather than a prize for their investment in the candidate. Not “putting out” may also be the cultured or institutionally expected understanding, as even for the females and their families, less effort is expected from social ties on behalf of ego. A third explanation for a return deficit may be the differential responses from the labor market's structure itself: employers respond differentially to male and female job/promotion candidates even if they present similar human and/or social capital—a bias shared by organizations in an institutional field (an institutional field is a social community in which the organizations share a set of prevailing values and practices; see Chapter 11 and Lin 1994b).

In summary, we can propose the following mechanisms for social inequality from the perspective of capital theories:

1. Capital deficit is due to (a) differential investment or (b) differential opportunity.
2. Return deficit is due to (a) differential mobilization of appropriate capital resulting from cognitive deficiency or reluctance to mobilize; (b) differential effort by intermediary agents; or (c) differential responses by organizations and institutions to the mobilized capital.

3. Return deficit may or may not occur independent of capital deficit. Certain social inequalities may be due to capital deficit distributed in different social groups. Other types of inequality may be due mainly to return deficit: social groups may have a similar quality and quantity of capital and yet may generate differential returns. For still other types of inequality, both capital deficit and return deficit may account for inequality among social groups. These mechanisms may also vary in different communities or societies.

The preceding can thus be seen as hypotheses regarding inequality in different types of capital (e.g., human, institutional, and social capital), among different social groups (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, religion), for different labor markets (e.g., economic, political, educational), and for different societies. The remainder of the chapter employs a recently collected data set from urban China to illustrate how such specification and analysis can be undertaken to shed light on the inequality in social capital between males and females. While the focus will be on social capital, the data also permit some analysis of the two groups' human and institutional capital. The data cannot be used for specification and analysis of all the possible mechanisms mentioned previously. However, it is hoped that the analysis will demonstrate how fruitful such a "decomposed" approach can be in shedding light on the critical issue of inequality in social capital and its consequences for male and female attainment in the urban Chinese labor market.

### The Study, Sample, and Data

Three research questions are asked in this exploratory study: (1) Do males and females have different social capital? (2) If so, is this difference due to capital deficit, return deficit, or both? (3) What are the consequences of inequality of social capital for males and females in getting ahead in the labor market? The data used here are derived from a 1998 survey of eighteen cities. Fifteen of these cities were sampled from a stratified probability sample of all cities. Stratification was based on region (coastal, central, and interior) and economic status (high, medium, and low). Three additional cities were sampled from three outlier regions (Pingliang, Ge'erme, and Tacheng). Appendix 7.1 presents the cities and the sample sizes from these sites. City-level data were also collected for multilevel analyses. However, the present study, a preliminary analysis, concerns only individual-level data.

The sample consists of 3,050 respondents, aged nineteen to sixty-nine inclusive, who were participating or had participated in the labor force of these eighteen cities at the time of the survey. The basic characteristics of these respondents appear in Table 7.1. The sample consists of 43.5 percent males and 56.4 percent females. The average age is forty-one.

### Table 7.1. Summary of Sample Characteristics (N = 3,050)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percentage of males</th>
<th>Percentage of females</th>
<th>Gender Significance Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender - male</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martial status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced or widowed</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence at 16 years of age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big city</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-sized city</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countryside</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College or more</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience (number of years)</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (number of years)</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-the-job training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of types</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of certificates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At time of current job</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>28.16%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At time of first job</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>8.06%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
and there is no significant difference in age between the male and female respondents. Nine of ten respondents were married, 6.7 percent were single, and 3.3 percent were divorced or widowed. About half (52 percent) of the respondents lived in large cities when they were sixteen years old. Female respondents were slightly more likely to have lived in large cities than males.

**Deficit in Human and Institutional Capital**

This study examined three types of capital: human, institutional, and social. Human capital is indicated by education, work experience, tenure, and on-the-job training. Education is measured by years of education. As can be seen in Table 7.1, about a third of the respondents had less than high school education, 41 percent of them had high school education, and a quarter of them had college or higher education. Males were better educated than females. Males also had somewhat longer work experience (an average of 22.3 years) than females (21.1 years), but there was no difference in tenure or in number of years at the current work unit. Males were also more likely to have received on-the-job training (in terms of the number of different types of training and the number of certificates received from training) than females. In short, then, males showed substantial advantage over females in human capital.

**Institutional capital** is capital associated with the identification and association of prevailing ideology and power (Lin 1994b, 1995b; see also Chapter 11). It is indicated by membership in the Communist Party, ownership of the work unit, and rank of the current position. Party membership was coded as (1) not a member, (2) a Party member when entering the current job, and (3) a Party member when entering the first job. As can be seen in Table 7.1, a significantly higher percentage of males (36.2 percent) than females (19.9 percent) were Party members, and male Party members had been in the Party relatively longer than females.

Until recently, ownership of the work unit differentiated workers in the Chinese dual labor market (Lin and Bian 1991; Bian 1994). However, in the 1990s, a more diverse and marketized labor market emerged. A small but increasingly significant market was created by joint ventures (although most of the Chinese partners in these firms were state or collective enterprises or institutes), private firms, and household (self) enterprises. Of these types of work units, collectives are most disadvantaged, as they do not have the security and status of the state work units or the economic and market benefits of the joint ventures. Currently, private and household enterprises tend to be small in both size and scale of economy. As can be seen, a significantly larger percentage of females (15.5 percent) than males (9.2 percent) were employed in the collectives.

Rank of current position is another indicator of institutional capital, since these positions command differential resources in the state and collective enterprises where over 90 percent of the respondents work. Again, there was a significant difference in the ranks occupied by males and females. Over four-fifths (84 percent) of the females held no rank titles compared to less than two-thirds (64.7 percent) of the males. Close to a quarter (23.6 percent) of the males held ranks at and above departmental level compared to less than one-tenth (8.3 percent) of the females.

In short, then, males held an overwhelming advantage over females in institutional capital.

---

**Table 7.1 (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percentage or Mean</th>
<th>Gender Significance Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current job characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work unit ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint venture</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank of position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group leader</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section level</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section chief</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department level</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department chief</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division level</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division director</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau level</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly salary</td>
<td>663.7</td>
<td>739.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-end bonus</td>
<td>1,114.4</td>
<td>1,231.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ns: not significant.
The third type of capital studied was social capital. I employed the position-generator method for measurement (for a review of this method, see Chapter 6). Two types of social capital were constructed: general social capital and political social capital. The instrument used is reproduced in English in Appendix 7.2.

For general social capital, thirteen occupations were sampled from a full list of all occupations to represent different levels of socioeconomic status (SES) (see Bian 1994 and Lin and Ye 1997 for the occupational socioeconomic scale development and status scores for various occupations in China). These were university professor (SES score of 91), mayor (83), head of a bureau (76), lawyer (72), journalist (68), head of an enterprise (67), chief of a section (60), elementary school teacher (58), worker (45), administrative personnel (45), electrician (44), farmer (30), and housemaid (11). The position generator question was: “Of your relatives, friends, and acquaintances, is there anyone who has the jobs listed in the following table?” If the response was “yes,” the respondent was asked if she or he knew this person at the time when she or he was looking for the current job. If the response was again affirmative, the respondent received a score of “1” for that position and was asked a series of questions concerning the relations between the respondent and the position occupant. If the respondent knew more than one occupant of the position, we asked him or her to think of the first occupant who came to mind. Information regarding indirect access (access through intermediaries) was also obtained but was not used in the present study.

From these data, three variables were constructed: (1) the number of positions accessed, (2) the prestige score of the highest accessed position, and (3) the range of the prestige scores of positions accessed (the difference between the highest and lowest prestige scores among accessed positions). These were indicators of access to general social capital.

Since political connections may remain significant in state socialist China, the instrument also listed three Party cadre positions: (1) provincial or city Party secretary, (2) Party secretary of a bureau, and (3) Party secretary of a factory or institute; these positions formed a political power hierarchy. Again, three variables were constructed: (1) the number of positions accessed, (2) the rank score of the highest accessed position, and (3) the rank scores range of positions accessed. Variations of the three scores, as will be seen, were very limited, but results suggest that they were meaningful.

### Table 7.2. Access to Two Types of Social Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Sample Gender</th>
<th>Percentage or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of positions accessed</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige of highest accessed position</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of prestige of positions accessed</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access positions (prestige score)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professor (91)</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor (83)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of bureau (76)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer (72)</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist (68)</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of enterprise (67)</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of a section (60)</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elem. school teacher (58)</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker (45)</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative personnel (45)</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician (44)</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer (30)</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housemaid (11)</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Variable                                      | Sample Gender | Percentage or Mean |
|                                               |               |                   |
|                                               |               |                   |
| Political social capital                      |               |                   |
| Number of positions accessed                  | .62           | .72               |
| Prestige of highest accessed position         | .59           | .69               |
| Range of rank of positions accessed          | .11           | .15               |
| Access positions (rank score)                |               |                   |
| City secretary (3)                            | 4.0%          | 5.5%              |
| Bureau secretary (2)                         | 8.4           | 11.5              |
| Factory secretary (1)                        | 49.9          | 56.1              |

Table 7.2 presents the basic statistics on the two types of social capital variables. First, we summarize general social capital. As can be seen, the average number of accessed positions was 6.7 out of 13 sampled positions, with males accessing an average of 7 positions and females 6.5, for a statistically significant difference. The highest prestige among accessed positions was 75 (about the position of the head of a bureau), with males again having a significant advantage over females (76 versus 74.2). The range of prestige scores between the highest and lowest prestige scores of accessed positions was 40, with males advantaged over females (41.3 versus 39). It is clear that males had significantly better general social capital than females on all three indicators.
The most accessible position was worker (94 percent of the respondents), followed by chief of a section (82 percent), electrician (79 percent), elementary school teacher (75 percent), farmer (72 percent), administrative personnel (71 percent), and head of an enterprise (62 percent). There was a sharp drop in accessibility from over half of the respondents to less than a third of the respondents. The next cluster of accessed positions included lawyers (28 percent), journalists (27 percent), housemaids (26 percent), and heads of bureaus (24 percent). The least accessible position was mayor, accessed only by 10 percent of the respondents. This pattern reflected the differentials in social contacts among a representative sample of urban respondents who showed, not surprisingly, greater contacts and therefore access, to others who occupied positions either similar to their own or slightly higher or lower than theirs, in the prestige hierarchy's middle rankings.

The advantage of males over females was reflected in most of the sampled positions. As shown in Table 7.2, male respondents were more likely than females to access every position except elementary school teachers, workers, farmers, and housemaids, all of which were on the lower half of the prestige ranking scale. Thus, the males had an advantage in reaching positions similar to or better than theirs in the prestige hierarchy.

As for political social capital (also shown in Table 7.2), males had the advantage over females on all three variables. They accessed more cadre positions, higher-ranked cadres, and a larger range of positions. At each hierarchical level, males also had greater access.

To assess whether the three variables for each type of social capital could be considered as a cluster, or indicators of a single dimension perhaps called “access to social capital,” we performed a factor analysis on the three variables. The analysis (principal component and varimax rotation), as shown in Table 7.3, resulted in a three-factor solution for each type of social capital.

For general social capital, the first factor had an eigenvalue of 2.47, while the second and third factors had very small eigenvalues. These results strongly suggest a single dimensionality among the three variables. When we restricted solutions for factors having eigenvalues greater than 1.0, the factor loadings of the three variables on the single factor were all very high (.84, .96, and .92). Thus, a factor score was constructed with differential weights assigned to the three variables where the range variable received the greatest weight (.13 for number of positions accessed, .63 for the range variable, and .25 for the highest prestige of an accessed position). When separate analyses were conducted for males and females, similar patterns emerged. Thus, the decision was to use the same scoring weights to construct a general social capital score for all respondents.

For political social capital, a three-factor solution also showed concentration of variance explained in the first factor and similarity in the solution patterns for both males and females. Factor scores of the three variables on the first principal factor again yielded almost identical patterns for males and females. However, unlike general social capital, where the range variable carried the strongest weight or coefficient in the score, the number of positions accessed and the highest rank had high coefficients. This is understandable, as the range was extremely limited and overlapped substantially with the other two variables.

It is clear that inequality between urban Chinese males and females in social capital as of 1998 was due at least in part to capital deficit. This capital deficit by females prevailed in all three types of capital: human capital, institutional capital, and social capital.
Further Analysis for Social Capital Deficit

How, then, is social capital related to the other two types of capital—human capital and institutional capital? Would such relations account for the relative deficit of social capital for females? Human capital and social capital, as conceptualized (see Chapter 2), are expected to be related. It would be interesting to assess whether such a relationship varies for males and females. As argued elsewhere (Chapter 11), institutional capital is significant in the labor market for both organizations and individuals as they attempt to match and interact with the larger society's prevailing values and practices. In Chinese society, even in the 1990s, the Communist Party held much of the valued resources and exercised power over much of the population. Whether such institutional capital was differentially related to social capital for males and females, especially to political social capital, deserves research attention.

Kin versus Nonkin Ties

In addition to these two types of capital, the nature of social ties evoked in accessing social capital was considered. The question posed was: do different types of social ties lead to differential access to social capital? As conceived by the network location scholars (see Chapters 3 and 5), ties that serve as bridges in the networks might be more useful in accessing better-embedded resources in the social structure. No direct measure was possible in the survey instrument to assess whether each position accessed was a bridge in the shared networks. However, the survey did ascertain the relationship between the respondent and the occupant of the position accessed (see Appendix 7.2). A simple kin versus nonkin classification was constructed. I use this measure to represent stronger versus weaker ties. In the Chinese context, kin ties represent extensive yet strong ties (Lin 1989). This does not argue that only kin ties are strong; even in the Chinese context, other social ties (e.g., coworkers, school alumni, regional ties) may also be strong (Bian 1997; Ruan 1998). Thus, this measure is a relatively weak and conservative estimate of tie strength. The initial hypothesis is that, following Granovetter’s argument (1973, 1974), *weaker ties* (i.e., *nonkin ties*) *tend to access better general social capital*.

However, the cultural context of Chinese society presents an alternative consideration. Much has been said about the significance of familial ties among the Chinese (Fei, 1947/1992). Some have ventured to suggest that familial ties constitute the meaningful core social structure in a Chinese society (Lin 1989). Because the Chinese definition of family extends beyond the immediate nuclear family to include multiple generations and multiple clan and marital linkages, it may well be that such extensive networks provide sufficient access to many parts of the society. Further, in a society where formal institutions block many forms of legitimate access to resources, trust is paramount when interpersonal relations are evoked for utilitarian purposes. There is evidence (Bian, 1997) that stronger ties rather than weaker ties are preferred when seeking effective help in job searches. Thus, accessing power positions (Party cadres) in a state socialist system may signal informal access to resources that cannot be accessed through formal channels and processes. Such relationships are better if they remain informal and "invisible" so that exchanges can continue in the constrained structure. To maintain such informal ties would probably require commitments to relations (see Chapter 9) beyond casual exchanges and transactions. Thus, stronger ties might network well here. Given these considerations, it may be postulated that in Chinese society, kin ties present a certain advantage in political exchanges. We therefore propose the alternative hypothesis that *kin ties rather than nonkin ties access better political social capital*. We will submit these two alternative hypotheses to empirical examination.

In Table 7.4, the relative advantages or disadvantages of kin versus nonkin ties in accessing the positions are examined. In general social capital (the first thirteen rows of Table 7.4), females were more likely than males to use kin ties to access most positions. The only exceptions were elementary school teachers and housemaids, where males used kin ties as much as or more than females for access. In other words, males were more likely than females to use nonkin ties to access most positions. When it came to accessing elementary school teachers and housemaids, males were just as likely to use kin ties—probably their spouses. Since we know that males are advantaged in accessing social capital, these data strongly hint that nonkin ties are more likely to access better social capital. This speculation is confirmed when we examine the zero-order correlations between the use of kin ties and the three variables of general social capital. As can be seen in the next three rows of the table, all coefficients were negative, indicating that the use of kin ties was negatively related to the number of positions accessed, the range of prestige scores among accessed positions, and the highest prestige score of an accessed position. Thus, we conclude that nonkin ties are more advantaged in accessing the general social capital. If nonkin ties represent weaker ties, then this result confirms the strength-of-weak-tie argument proposed by Granovetter.

The lower panel of Table 7.4 examines the relationship between the use of kin ties and access to political social capital. While there was no
Table 7.4. Access to Social Capital by Kin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General social capital Access positions (prestige score)</th>
<th>Percentage Using Kin Ties</th>
<th>Gender Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political social capital Access positions (prestige score)</th>
<th>Percentage Using Kin Ties</th>
<th>Gender Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association (r) between</th>
<th>Percent Using Kin Ties</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of positions accessed</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of prestige scores</td>
<td>-.16***</td>
<td>-.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest prestige score</td>
<td>-.20***</td>
<td>-.17***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, I conducted a multivariate analysis in which access to social capital was regressed on the nature of social networks (percentage of kin ties in the access to social capital), human capital (education), and institutional capital (party membership) simultaneously. Different equations were constructed for the two types of social capital (general and political) and for males and females. Also, for each equation, age, marital status (married), and household size (logged) were controlled for. As presented in Table 7.5, access to social capital for both males and females was affected by human capital (education), as expected. Institutional capital (Party membership) had only a slightly positive effect on social capital. Network effects were significant but, as shown earlier, were more complex. Use of kin ties had negative effects on general social capital, whereas use of kin ties had positive effects on political social capital. Also, the network effects were more significant for females than for males.

We may summarize the findings thus far regarding the distribution of social capital for females and males— the issue of capital deficit. There was a substantial capital deficit for females. Males showed access to a

Table 7.5. Determinants of Access to Social Capital (Partial Regression Coefficients, with Standardized Coefficients in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Variable</th>
<th>Access to General Social Capital</th>
<th>Access to Political Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males (N = 1,004)</td>
<td>Females (N = 1,393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.10 (.06)</td>
<td>.05 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.79 (.02)</td>
<td>.98 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size (log)</td>
<td>-1.26 (-.04)</td>
<td>2.79** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.84*** (.21)</td>
<td>3.1*** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>1.01 (.04)</td>
<td>1.67* (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent accessed</td>
<td>-7.29*** (-11)</td>
<td>-11.36*** (-20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through kin</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .01; ** p < .001.
greater number of occupational and political positions, to higher positions in the hierarchies, and to a greater variety of positions. Social capital was found to be significantly related to human capital. Because males had higher educational attainment than females, there was a corresponding advantage in their social capital as well. There did not seem to be much difference in whether institutional capital (Party membership) affected social capital for females and males. Weaker ties (nonkin ties) facilitated access to general social capital, and stronger ties (kin ties) enhanced access to political social capital. Females seemed to rely more on such network ties to access social capital than males. Whether such differential access to social capital translated into advantages or disadvantages in generating returns in the labor market will be examined next.

Return on Social Capital

The next analytic tasks were to assess the effects of social capital on status attainment. Four attainment variables were used: (1) work sector (work unit ownership), (2) rank of position, (3) job prestige, and (4) monthly income (logged). As seen in Table 7.1, the work sectors in which the respondents were currently employed included the state sector, the collective sector, joint-venture enterprises, private enterprises, and the self-employed. Working in the state was a distinctive advantage (Lin and Bian 1991; Bian 1994) and was considered by many as the primary target of status attainment, rather than job or income per se. While the rapid transformation since the late 1980s in the social stratification system and in the reconstruction of state enterprises might have affected the work preferences of workers, the state sector—especially with its dominance in agencies, organizations, and institutes—might still offer advantages over the emerging private and joint-venture sectors in areas such as job security, housing discounts, health care, and pensions.

Rank of position (also seen in Table 7.1) reflects an array of positions along a hierarchical structure. For the present analysis, these positions were converted into an ordered set ranging from “1” for non management to “9” for bureau or higher level. The occupational groupings, as shown in Table 7.1, were also examined as dummy variables. In both multinomial and logistic regression analyses, these groupings showed linear relationships (in terms of estimate coefficients), in either ascending or descending order, with other key variables (e.g., sector, rank, and income), farming, and manufacturing alternately showing the lowest coefficients. Thus, for parsimony, it was decided that the current job of each respondent would be converted into a prestige score, according to the scheme developed by Lin and Ye for China (1997). Two measures of income were used: the current monthly salary and the current monthly income, which included both salary and bonus.

These variables are seen as a sequential set of statuses of attainment: an individual first enters a work sector, assumes a ranked position in the organization, occupies a job, and earns an economic return. The analyses will focus on each of these attainments variables as the endogenous (dependent) variables in the sequence. As the analysis proceeds to later endogenous variables in the sequence, preceding endogenous variables also become exogenous variables. The first set of analyses assessed the effects of human capital (education, training, and certificates), institutional capital (Party membership), and social capital (general and political) on landing in one of the work sectors in the current job. Since there were five sectors (state, collective, joint venture, private, and self-employed), multinomial logistic regressions were employed to estimate the odds-ratio likelihood of being in a particular sector given these exogenous variables. As shown in Table 7.6, the state sector is the (missing) reference sector. Thus, these estimates showed the relative effects of human capital, institutional capital, and social capital on each of the other sectors compared to those in the state sector. Separate analyses were conducted for males and females. Age and urban residence at age sixteen were also controlled for.

Experience and tenure were both highly correlated with age (.94 and .54). In the Chinese context, most workers still enjoy lifetime employment; and experience and tenure do not add any additional asset to

Inequality in Social Capital

Table 7.6. Determinants of the Sector of the Current Job (Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients, with State Sector as the Comparison Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Variables</th>
<th>Collective</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01*</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General social capital</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political social capital</td>
<td>-.42*</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .001.
seniority, as represented by age. Since age, training, and certificates are already in the equations, experience and tenure were excluded, as their inclusion would have simply created multicollinearity biases to the estimates.

Since most of the respondents were in either the state or the collective sector, the analyses for the remaining sectors (i.e., joint ventures, private enterprises, and self-employed) were based on small sample sizes, with unreliable estimates. Nevertheless, the patterns seem consistent. As expected, education had a negative effect in any sector other than the state sector. This effect was most pronounced for those in the collective sector. Training also showed some negative effects for those in private or household enterprises compared with those in the state sector. However, due to small sample sizes, these effects were unreliable. Party membership also had a slight but consistently negative effect on being in any sectors other than the state sector. Social capital had slight negative effects, especially for males in the collective rather than the state sector and for females in the household enterprises sector. Thus, we found moderate but consistent negative effects of human capital, institutional capital, and social capital for those not in the state sector.

Our analyses now turn to three sequential endogenous (dependent) variables: being in the state sector, the rank of the position, and job prestige. As can be seen in Table 7.7, I employed a path-analytic strategy in the analyses since these three dependent variables were considered in a causal sequence, with the assumption that entering work sectors preceded holding a rank or a position, and gaining jobs with certain prestige which, in turn, resulted in differential earnings. Again, analyses were conducted separately for males and females.

The first two columns in Table 7.7 present the results of logistic regression analyses pertaining to entrance into the state sector compared to other sectors. Being in the state sector was highly associated with education. Training and certificates were correlated with education (.24 and .21) and did not show any significant marginal effects. Being a Party member was also significantly associated with being in the state sector. Social capital showed positive but marginal effects, except for females. Females benefitted from political social capital in entering the state sector. Thus, there is little evidence that females entering the state sector suffered a return deficit in social capital.

The third and fourth columns in Table 7.7 examine the effects of these variables on gaining higher-ranked positions. In addition, sectors were entered as an exogenous variable in the ordinary regression analyses (the state sector was used as the reference sector). As can be seen, both males and females generated returns from human capital (education and age), with the benefit more pronounced for males than for females. Institutional capital (Party membership) benefited males and females equally. Political social capital had a positive effect on the ranking of the position, especially for females.

The last two columns in Table 7.7 estimate the effects of these variables, plus the rank of the position, on job prestige. Again, both males and females benefited from education. Social capital no longer had any direct effects; rather, their effects on job prestige, especially the effect of political social capital, were mediated through being in the state sector and the position ranking – also institutional capital. Position rank benefited males more than females in getting more prestigious jobs. While being in the state sector (in contrast to being in the collective sector) ben-
Table 7.8. Determinants of Salary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Variables</th>
<th>Monthly Salary (Logged)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>(-0.00)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.19***</td>
<td>.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (state sector as reference)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.12)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
<td>(-.13)</td>
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<td>.78***</td>
<td>.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.09</td>
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<td>.23</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<td>(-.02)</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
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<td>.04**</td>
<td>.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job prestige</td>
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<td>-.00</td>
<td>.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>5.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Inequality in Social Capital

institutional capital on salary for males and females. While females seemed to benefit more from human capital (education), males tended to benefit more from institutional capital. Both rank and job prestige showed much stronger effects on salary for males than for females. Being in the joint-venture sector generated the best returns for both males and females. However, being in the state sector, in contrast to being in the collective sector, greatly benefited males but not females. When the two social capital variables were added to the equations (the third and fourth columns), both males and females generated returns from general social capital. Females, however, gained added, though moderate, benefits from political social capital. Analysis for income (salary and bonus), as shown in Table 7.9, yielded results that were almost identical to those obtained for salary alone.

In summary, there is some evidence that females do not particularly suffer a return deficit on social capital in entering the state sector, gaining higher-ranked positions, or earning higher wages. In fact, they enjoy a slight edge in generating return from political social capital, getting into the state sector, and gaining higher-ranked positions and better wages. These findings do not imply that females have gained equality in rank, occupations, or wages. In fact, they fared much worse than males on these status measures in the stratification system (see Table 7.1). These findings merely suggest that females need to mobilize political social capital effectively to close these gaps somewhat.

What accounts for the effects of political social capital for females? As we already understand from Table 7.2, females suffered a deficit in both general social capital and political social capital compared to males. While social capital was associated with human and institutional capital, there was no evidence that females gained any advantage over males because of these other types of capital. In fact, females suffered from capital deficits in these two domains as well. The clue to females' ability to deflect these deficits somewhat lies in the nature of state ties accessing political social capital. As shown in Table 7.4 and discussed earlier, kin ties constitute a positive factor in accessing political social capital, and more females use kin ties than males.

In further exploring these social ties to access political social capital, it was suspected that access to factory and bureau secretaries was a key, as females were much more likely than males to use kin ties to access these key positions (Table 7.4). The data in Table 7.10 show that, especially in accessing factory secretaries, these ties tended to be through a spouse and a sibling's spouse for females. Thus, females may have gained some benefit through such strong ties in accessing local political resources, as these family ties helped some female workers move up in the work unit ranks and gain a break in wages.
Table 7.9. Determinants of Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exogenous Variables</th>
<th>Monthly Income (Logged Salary and Bonus)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party membership</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector (state sector as reference)</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.12)</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.13)</td>
<td>(-0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.77***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
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<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Joint</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
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<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(-0.03)</td>
<td>(-0.03)</td>
<td>(-0.03)</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self</td>
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<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
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<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job prestige</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General social capital</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political social capital</td>
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<td>0.06*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Multiple regression coefficients (standardized coefficients in parentheses).
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Summary and Discussion

A critical issue for social capital research is the extent to which inequality in social capital contributes to social inequality across social groups. This chapter conceptualizes this issue by proposing the analysis of two processes from the capital perspective: capital deficit and return deficit. Capital deficit is the extent to which different social groups, for reasons of investment or opportunities, have come to possess a different quality or quantity of capital. Return deficit is the extent to which a given quality or quantity of capital generates differential returns for different social groups due to differential mobilization strategies, agent efforts, or institutional responses. Since it is assumed that social inequality results from inequality in capital, it becomes important to understand inequality in capital. These formulations help clarify the mechanisms by which inequality in various types of capital, including social capital, emerges for different social groups, and how it potentially affects social inequality among members of different groups.

Data from urban China residents were used to explore these mechanisms for male and female attainment in the labor market. With the
position-generator instrument used to measure both general and political social capital, the results confirm that Chinese female workers suffer a deficit in social capital as well as human and institutional capital. Males show access to a greater number of occupational and political positions, to higher positions in hierarchies, and to a greater variety of positions. Social capital is found to be significantly related to human capital. Because males have higher educational attainment, they have a corresponding advantage in social capital as well. There does not seem to be much difference in whether institutional capital (Party membership) affects social capital for females and males.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that females do not particularly suffer from a return deficit in social capital upon entering the state sector, gaining higher-ranked positions, or earning higher wages. In fact, they enjoy a slight edge in generating returns from political social capital, entering the state sector, gaining higher-ranked positions, and earning higher wages. These findings do not imply that females have gained equality in rank, occupations, or wages. In fact, they fare much worse than males on these status measures in the stratification system. These findings merely suggest that females need to mobilize political social capital effectively to close these gaps somewhat.

One clue to why females are able to bridge the gap is due to the nature of the ties used to access social capital. Females seem to rely more on kin ties to access social capital than males do. Since weaker ties (nonkin ties) facilitate access to general social capital, females thus become disadvantaged in accessed capital. However, stronger ties (kin ties) enhance access to political social capital due to the need for trust and commitment in such relations in China. Thus, some females, relying on their spouses and the spouses of kin, might be able to gain better access to political social capital, which helps to overcome their disadvantages in entering the state sector and gaining higher-ranked positions and better wages.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, differential access to social capital deserves much greater research attention. It was suggested that social groups (gender, race) have different access to social capital because of their advantaged or disadvantaged structural positions and social networks. For the disadvantaged to gain a better status, strategic behaviors require them to access resources beyond their usual social circles (Ensel 1979), find sponsors in the firm (Burt 1998), and join clubs dominated by males (Beggs and Hurlbert 1997); find ties outside their own neighborhood or those who are employed (Green, Tigges, and Browne 1995); or find ties across ethnic boundaries (Stanton-Salazar and Dornbusch 1995; Stanton-Salazar 1997). This study, in a limited way, illustrates the viability of the capital perspective in analyzing social inequality.

### Appendix 7.1. Sampled Cities and Number of Respondents in the Urban China Study, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>1996 Relative Labor Force (10,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>326.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyuan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>144.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>304.36</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dandong</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>113.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
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<td>560.02</td>
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<td>Nanjing</td>
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<td>160.92</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>34.99</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Do you know people in your present job?</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of public or private enterprises</td>
<td>2. No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2. No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</table>