

Chapter 2

Racial Structure, Segregation, and Crime

Is this actually the case? Are African American neighborhoods more crime-ridden than all other types of communities? Are white communities by far the safest? Do levels of crime in Latino areas and racially mixed areas fall between those for white and African American communities? To date, we do not have solid answers to these questions other than for individual cities such as Columbus, Atlanta, and Miami (see, for example, Krivo and Peterson 1996; Kubrin and Wadsworth 2003; McNulty 2001; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Shihadeh and Shrum 2004; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite 2003). These studies highlight for the settings they examine how communities are privileged (whites) or harmed (African Americans and Latinos) by the extensiveness of crime. However, we do not know whether these patterns are unique to the cities studied or whether they extend to urban areas throughout the United States.

In this study, we take up the challenge of exploring how patterns of neighborhood crime vary across communities of different colors for a representative set of cities across the nation. Do patterns of violent and property crime comport with what casual and scientific observers of cities believe they know about the differential distribution of urban crime for the country as a whole? The national portrait provided to answer this question shows stark neighborhood inequalities that are broadly consistent with casual impressions, particularly for violent crime. In the remaining chapters, we attempt to account for these dramatic ethnoracial differentials. We contend that the crime patterns observed are so stark that they demand recognition of the interconnections between racial structure and local crime-generating conditions. We draw on structural race theories and research, as well as arguments and evidence from structural approaches in criminology and urban sociology, to articulate such a racialized perspective.

Patterns of Race and Crime

Frequently cited statistics from a variety of sources show that there is a close connection between race and crime across *individuals* in the United States. For example, in 2007 African Americans represented 39 percent of persons arrested for violent crime and 30 percent of those arrested for property offenses, but they made up only 13 percent of the U.S. population (U.S. Department of Justice 2008a). The rate of homicide offending and victimization was six to seven and a half times higher for African Americans than for whites each year from 2000 to 2005 (Pastore and Maguire 2009a). Murder is the leading cause of death for African American males between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, and the second leading cause of death for Latino males of these ages (National

VIOLENT CRIME in a predominantly African American neighborhood on the East Side of Columbus, Ohio, was a whopping 22.9 per 1,000 residents in 2000, a rate that was over twice the citywide average of 9.8. During that year, residents of this moderately poor neighborhood with nearly 4,000 residents fell victim to seventy-eight reported violent incidents, including two murders and twelve rapes.¹ Just six miles away in a moderately poor white community, the picture was somewhat rosier. There the violent crime rate was less than half the rate in the African American neighborhood at just 10.6 offenses per 1,000 population. The forty-eight total reports of violent victimization included no killings and just six rapes. In faraway Los Angeles, the pattern was much the same. A white neighborhood in the northern part of the city registered the typical rate of violence for white areas of just over five reported incidents per 1,000 residents.² Across town, a Latino community of similar economic status approached twice this level of violent crime: almost ten incidents per 1,000 residents were reported to the police in 2000. In this same sprawling city, an African American neighborhood with somewhat more poverty than the Latino community had a level of violence that far exceeded that in Los Angeles areas of other colors: more than thirty acts of criminal violence were reported to the police per 1,000 people.

Both casual and scientific observers of cities are convinced that these types of statistics reflect the reality of urban life in the United States for whites, African Americans, Latinos, and other groups. Most would say that, at one extreme, whites tend to live in neighborhoods where crime, particularly violent crime, is relatively uncommon. At the other extreme is the clear impression that African Americans reside in communities where reports of serious violent crime are all too frequent and property offenses are comparatively common. If considered at all, Latino neighborhoods and more mixed areas are thought to have less crime than African American localities, but to be far more plagued by this problem than areas where whites predominate.

Center for Health Statistics 2009).³ African Americans and Latinos are more likely than whites to be victims of a range of violent and property crimes; rates of violent victimization are 23.9 per 1,000 for whites, but 28.4 and 32.9 per 1,000 for Latinos and African Americans, respectively (Pastore and Maguire 2009b). Property victimization is particularly likely among households headed by Latinos, for whom the rate is 211.7 per 1,000 compared with rates of 185.6 for African Americans and 156.7 for whites (Pastore and Maguire 2009c).

These types of statistics indicate that nonwhite *individuals* are over-represented among the ranks of crime victims and offenders. However, they do not tell us whether or how ethno-racial differentials affect communities of distinct colors. One source of evidence on the disproportionality in crime across places with varying racial and ethnic compositions is research on total, violent, and property crime for large aggregate units, including cities, metropolitan areas, counties, states, and nations. Travis Pratt and Francis Cullen (2005) have assessed the scores of journal articles (more than two hundred) published between 1960 and 1999 on aggregate crime. Many of these provided data on how racial concentration is linked to rates of offending or victimization. Pratt and Cullen find considerable evidence that crime is disproportionately concentrated in cities and other large ecological units where relatively more African Americans reside. Notably, the percentage of black (or nonwhite) residents is among the four strongest and most stable macro-level predictors of crime.

Studies that have directly examined ethno-racial inequality in crime across neighborhoods within cities show patterns that are consistent with those described at the start of this chapter for Columbus and Los Angeles. Rates of crime are higher in local areas where African Americans are more heavily concentrated and, conversely, lower where African Americans constitute a smaller portion of residents, whether in Atlanta, Baton Rouge, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, New York, Philadelphia, or Seattle (Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006; Hipp 2007; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Logan and Stults 1999; Massey, Condran, and Denton 1987; McNulty 2001; McNulty and Holloway 2000; Messner and Shrum 1986; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Shuhadeh and Shrum 2004). Often the differentials within individual cities are quite stark. For example, Douglas Massey, Gretchen Condran, and Nancy Denton's (1987) early study of Philadelphia showed that murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault rates were an average of 2.1 to 2.7 times higher in black than in white neighborhoods. Violence was particularly extreme in the seventy-five "established" black areas—neighborhoods that had remained predominantly black from 1970 to 1980. Differences in property crime by neighborhood color existed but were much less pronounced; burglary,

larceny, and motor vehicle theft were 23, 16, and 31 percent higher, respectively, in all black than all white areas in Philadelphia.

More recent research shows similar patterns. McNulty's (2001) study of block groups in Atlanta in 1990 found that rates of murder were a startling six times higher in predominantly black neighborhoods than in predominantly white neighborhoods, and nearly four times as high in racially mixed areas as in white areas. Rape and robbery rates in African American areas were over three times those in white neighborhoods, and aggravated assaults were about twice as common in the former than the latter. The racially mixed neighborhoods in Atlanta had more than two times the levels of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault as white areas. Similarly, neighborhood maps of Seattle for 2002 through 2003 demonstrated that the areas with the greatest concentrations of violence corresponded with disproportionate concentrations of nonwhites (Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006).

Only one study has examined levels of violence across neighborhoods of distinct colors for more than a few cities. John Hipp (2007) reports rates of aggravated assault and robbery for areas of distinct race-ethnic composition for nineteen cities spread throughout the country. These data show the familiar pattern found for individual cities: notably lower rates in white neighborhoods than in areas with any other ethno-racial composition. Such disproportionality means that the average white household lives in a neighborhood with substantially less crime than is the case for the typical African American household. This is also clearly illustrated in John Logan and Brian Stults's (1999) analysis of metropolitan Cleveland for 1990. Property crime rates were over one and a half times higher in the neighborhoods of black households than in those of white households, and rates of violent crime differed by a magnitude of nearly five.

A few studies have compared crime in Latino neighborhoods with rates for other areas. María Vélez (2006) shows that, in Chicago in 1990, homicide rates in Latino neighborhoods, at 0.43 per 1,000, were about one-half those for African American areas (0.84 per 1,000). In El Paso, Miami, and San Diego, Latino neighborhood homicide rates were 40 to nearly 70 percent lower than in African American communities (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001). Also, aggravated assault and robbery in Miami were most pronounced in African American neighborhoods; rates were somewhat lower in Haitian communities and lowest in Latino neighborhoods. White areas were not studied (Martinez and Nielsen 2006).

Racialized patterns of crime have also been highlighted in in-depth qualitative analyses (see Anderson 1990, 1999; Bourgois 1995; Carr 2005; Miller 2008; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Sullivan 1989; Wilkinson 2003). For example, Elijah Anderson (1990) details life in two urban neighborhoods

in Philadelphia, one poor and African American (Northton) and one racially mixed and middle- to upper-middle-income (the Village). A central aim of this study is to understand how residents of the two neighborhoods manage public space and coexist in the same general area. One core component of this public negotiation involves dealing with criminal assaults and the drug trade on the streets of Northton and the Village. The centrality of drugs and violence to Philadelphia's African American neighborhoods is shown even more poignantly in *Code of the Street* (Anderson 1999). In this book, Anderson documents the lives of young men in depressed and racially isolated neighborhoods who are unable to rely on the police and who therefore develop codes for street life that call for the use of violence to protect themselves, their self-respect, and others. Deanna Wilkinson (2003) examined violent events among African American and Latino male youth and young adults in two very poor neighborhoods in New York City. Like Anderson, she demonstrates that widespread interpersonal violence emerges as a means for young people to manage everyday life in communities where disenfranchised minority youth feel that they cannot rely on the police for protection. In particular, carrying weapons and taking on a tough demeanor, which set the stage for violent encounters, are seen as necessary to achieving respect in a context where legitimate opportunities for status are severely lacking.

Jody Miller's (2008) dramatic portrait of the life of girls in a neighborhood in North St. Louis shows that the pervasive violence in extremely impoverished African American areas is not limited to males. In a context where resources and high social status are limited, street respect takes on critical importance. Violence against young women, particularly sexual violence at the hands of males, becomes intricately interconnected with attempts to define masculinity and gain respect. As Miller notes (2008, 192), "Urban African American young women face widespread gendered violence that is a systematic and overlapping feature of their neighborhoods, communities, and schools." Nikki Jones (2009) also discovered that participation in violence by African American girls in inner-city Philadelphia is necessary for self-protection and to gain respect.


Other qualitative neighborhood studies show that concerns about violent and property crime go beyond heavily disadvantaged African American areas. Mary Pattillo-McCoy (1999) draws attention to the heightened risk of crime and violence in a middle-class black community in Chicago stemming from its location near other African American areas that are more troubled. Race-based patterns of segregation that limit the neighborhood residential options of even middle-class African Americans produced this situation. In contrast, Patrick Carr (2005) demonstrates that residents of a white working-class neighborhood in Chicago are able to fend off potential encroachments of crime, violence, and gangs from

nearby areas by participating in organizations that form alliances with institutions, such as the city council and the police, that can intercede in conflicts and provide problem-solving resources such as zoning rules and recreation programs that serve as mechanisms of social control. Carr suggests that nonwhite and impoverished neighborhoods may lack experience with and access to such public-sphere goods and services.

How representative are the patterns of crime reported in past research? The consistency of the results suggests that what is assumed to be broadly true about criminal inequality across neighborhoods of distinct colors is correct. Yet the evidence is piecemeal and may not be representative of the diverse types of cities and neighborhoods found throughout the United States. To undertake a more systematic assessment we conducted the National Neighborhood Crime Study, in which we collected data for a sample of large U.S. cities. The NNCSS includes crime data reported to police departments for neighborhoods in 91 cities with populations of 100,000 or more persons for the year 2000. Drawing on these data, we present portraits of violent and property crime across neighborhoods of distinct colors for nearly 9,000 local areas throughout the United States to provide the broad documentation that has been lacking to date. We make comparisons across five types of ethno-racial neighborhoods: predominantly white, predominantly African American, predominantly Latino, minority, and integrated. (See chapter 3 for formal definitions of the neighborhood types.)


Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present these comparisons for rates of violent crime (murders and robberies) and property crime (burglaries, larcenies, and thefts of motor vehicles), respectively. Rates are defined as the total number of violent or property crimes in a neighborhood per 1,000 persons residing in the area. The figures present mean rates for each ethno-racial neighborhood type, as well as the values that include the middle 50 percent of all rates (twenty-fifth percentile and seventy-fifth percentile). The end points of each line show the fuller range of rates for each neighborhood type by indicating the values below and above which only 10 percent of all cases fall (tenth percentile and ninetieth percentile). First and most striking, inequality in *violent crime* across different-color neighborhoods is dramatic (figure 2.1). The average rate of criminal violence for African American neighborhoods of 10 per 1,000 population is five times that for white areas, where the mean is just 2 per 1,000 residents. The average violence rate for minority areas (7.1 per 1,000) is over three and a half times that for white neighborhoods. And typical Latino (4.9 per 1,000) and integrated (4.8 per 1,000) communities have nearly two and a half times as much violent crime as their white counterparts. Thus, differentials in mean rates for neighborhoods in a broad and representative set of places are at least as great as those found for black and white areas in Philadelphia

Figure 2.1 Violent Crime Rates for Neighborhoods of Different Colors



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 2.2 Property Crime Rates for Neighborhoods of Different Colors



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

(Massey, Condran, and Denton 1987) and Atlanta (McNulty 2001) for earlier periods. We also observe large gaps in average violence rates between Latino and African American neighborhoods, as do Vélez (2006) and Ramiro Martinez and his colleagues (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Martinez and Nielsen 2006) for just a few cities (Chicago, El Paso, Miami, and San Diego).

Figure 2.1 also shows the degree of overlap in levels of violent crime across the five neighborhood types. The contrast between African American and white areas is particularly striking. Only about 20 percent of African American neighborhoods have levels of violence that are as low as the rates found in 90 percent of white communities (ninetieth percentile). Rates of violence are so great in many African American areas that a full one-quarter experience levels that also exceed those in most other nonwhite or integrated communities. There is considerable overlap in violence levels among Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods (although rates rise higher in minority neighborhoods than in the other two types of communities). There is also greater correspondence in the levels of violence for these three types of areas with white localities than for African American neighborhoods. However, this overlap belies the point that more than one-quarter of white areas have rates of violence that are lower than those found in 90 percent of Latino, minority, and integrated communities.

Turning to property crime in figure 2.2, note first that rates are considerably higher for property crime than for violent crime, as is consistently the case in the United States (U.S. Department of Justice 2008b). Moreover, inequality in property crime across ethno-racial neighborhoods is much less pronounced than for violent offenses. Average property crime rates vary from a low of 50 per 1,000 population in Latino areas to a high of 77 per 1,000 residents in African American neighborhoods (a difference of slightly more than 50 percent). Consistent with the similarity in means, there is also substantial overlap in neighborhood rates of property offenses. Indeed, the Latino and minority distributions overlap almost completely with whites' and with each other. Nonetheless, about half of white neighborhoods (median = 39.2) have property crime rates below those in virtually all (90 percent) African American areas. The only other pattern of note is that rates for integrated neighborhoods tend to reach the higher levels observed for African American areas.

The dramatic inequality found in these national data, particularly for violent crime, highlights the need for a racialized perspective to understand ethno-racial differentials in neighborhood crime. Indeed, our statistical evidence calls for a framework that articulates the social context of racial stratification that generates such inequality. Certainly, neighborhood ethno-racial composition itself is not the cause of the observed

criminal differentials. Appropriate interpretation of the sources of these gaps must come from a social theory that specifies the structural conditions that produce them (Bonilla-Silva and Zuberi 2008; Zuberi 2001; Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008a, 2008b). In the following sections, we present such a theoretical framework. Our perspective emphasizes how a racialized society produces highly inequitable environments that create and re-create divergent levels of crime across neighborhoods that are distinct in their racial and ethnic makeup.

The Racial Structure of Society

Many social science and legal scholars contend that race is a key organizing principle within and across societies (Bobo 2004; Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2003; Feagin 2000; Marable 2004; Omi and Winant 1994). This view has taken on increasing prominence in recent decades as scholars have theorized and studied "the qualitative differences between white and non-white groups' encounters with U.S. society [or] to put it another way . . . the extent to which U.S. society is racially structured from top to bottom" (Omi and Winant 1994, 49–50). Among critical race legal theorists, "realists" contend that racism is not merely a set of unfavorable thoughts, words, and attitudes toward some groups, but rather the means by which society allocates privilege and status in a racially hierarchical manner (Delgado and Stefancic 2001). Such an orientation has also been applied by social scientists writing about various topics, including politics, education, religion, and methods of research (see, for example, Bobo 2004; Bonilla-Silva 2001, 2003; Dawson 1994; Edwards 2008; Forman and Lewis 2006; Lewis 2003; Marable 2003; Matsueda and Drakulich 2009; Zuberi 2001; Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008b).

What does it mean to argue that society is racially structured? Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2001, 2003) provides a widely cited answer to this question. He contends that U.S. society and many other societies are racialized social systems in which political, social, economic, and ideological aspects of society are partially structured along racial lines. This organization is hierarchical, with one racial group (or groups) being dominant and the clear beneficiary of societal rewards. Other groups are subordinate and concomitantly disadvantaged. Specifically,

the race placed in the superior position tends to receive greater economic remuneration and access to better occupations and prospects in the labor market, occupies a primary position in the political system, is granted higher social estimation (e.g., is viewed as "smarter" or "better looking"), often has the license to draw physical (segregation) as well as social (racial etiquette) boundaries between itself and other races, and receives what W. E. B. Du Bois called a "psychological wage." (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 37)

This type of social system is maintained through the racial distinctions made in everyday interactions and institutional practices. These actions vary over time and across place and may be more or less overt (for example, Jim Crow laws, housing discrimination, inequitable school funding, and differential law enforcement). However, racial inequality in opportunities and rewards is a constant in a racialized social system. Such race-based differences are self-perpetuating because groups that receive varying rewards have distinct group interests. The privileged racial group has much to gain from keeping its superior position and just as much to lose from the elimination of racial inequality. Therefore, those in a dominant position act to maintain their benefits by preserving rather than challenging the status quo. Subordinate groups seek to change their position in the system but often lack the power to do so.

Bonilla-Silva's core contention is that the foundation of racial inequality is structural rather than individual in nature. Differential outcomes across ethno-racial groups are not produced by individual actions based on prejudice or racial animus. Rather, they result from social relations and practices that are racially patterned, whether intentionally or not. Bonilla-Silva is not the only scholar who emphasizes the structural underpinnings of racial inequality. Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994, 60) underscore that, in the United States, individuals are "inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure." At the macro level, this has substantial implications for interpreting the meaning of race in society and for framing political "projects" that seek to uphold or attack the racial order.⁴ Joe Feagin (2000) describes the United States as a "total racist society" with deep historical roots that are systemic in nature. For him, this means that racism is structured into every part of society, including the economy, criminal justice, politics, education, religion, and the family. This core racist reality is reproduced by institutional and individual discrimination and through relationships of oppression that create distinct interests for whites (the dominant group) and blacks (the oppressed racial group on which Feagin first focuses). Manning Marable (2003) holds a similar view when he describes the American state as having been founded on a racial foundation that continues to underpin the social and political structure of the United States. Thus, he notes, persistent racial inequalities in social outcomes are the product of structural barriers against nonwhites alongside pervasive white privilege in access to power and resources.⁵

The racialized social structure is clearly seen in the organization of opportunities and resources that maintain white privilege and minority oppression in a wide range of institutions. Schools, the labor market, politics, criminal justice, health care, and the like are structured in ways that reinforce a hierarchy of access and rewards across populations of color, with whites garnering the highest-quality institutional

resources. This includes disproportionate opportunities to attend the best schools, obtain prestigious jobs, gain political and legal representation, and gain access to high-quality medical care. As a result, whites typically accrue the greatest rewards from institutional resources—for example, higher income, better education, superior health, more efficient police service, and greater wealth. To illustrate, public schools are generally funded at the local level by property taxes. This produces large differentials in school resources across communities with varying economic and racial compositions (Grant-Thomas and Powell 2009; Powell 2007). The typical school in a predominantly white community has better physical facilities, more experienced teachers, more advanced course offerings (such as Advanced Placement high school classes), and lower student-teacher ratios than is the case in urban minority areas (see McKoy and Vincent 2008; Reskin 2004; Roscigno 1998; Solorzano and Ornelas 2002). The individual and community consequences of such inequalities are striking. Vincent Roscigno (1998) shows that many of these factors are associated with higher achievement in mathematics and reading. School segregation is additionally connected with achievement: students in high schools that are nearly completely white have significantly higher school performance, and those in schools with predominantly black student bodies have lower test scores, than individuals in more racially mixed schools.

Ethno-racial inequality in education feeds into the labor market, where it contributes to differentials in levels of employment, occupational status, and earnings (Conrad 2001; Holzer 2001; Kaufman 2001). However, the labor market itself provides inequitable opportunities and outcomes that go beyond the inputs that emanate from school systems (and other institutions). For example, racial segregation in the labor market is pronounced (see, for example, Jacobs 2001; Kaufman 2001; King 1992; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Robert Kaufman (2001, 2010) shows that about one-fifth of whites (or blacks) would have to change their jobs for these two racial groups to have the same distributions across labor market positions. This level of job segregation holds *after* accounting for differences between racial (and gender) groups in characteristics such as education, marital status, urban residence, and regional location (see also Anderson and Shapiro 1996; Doodoo and Kasari 1995). Such segregation has a large influence on inequality in earnings. Racial labor market segregation accounts for about one-third of the lower earnings of black men compared to white men and produces more than a \$2,000 difference in the earnings of black versus white women (Kaufman 2001).

Racial stratification is also evident in the operations of criminal justice institutions (see, for example, Chan and Mirchandani 2002; Jiwani 2002; Marable, Steinberg, and Middlemass 2007; Mauer 2009). Though

the form and degree vary, racialized patterns of justice occur at every stage of processing, including lawmaking, policing, prosecutorial and judicial proceedings, and imposition and release from punishment. The criminal justice laws and procedures that have served as tools for the preservation of whites' advantage over other race and ethnic groups from the colonial period forward include: legal slavery; the criminalization of behaviors that are common among subordinate groups but not among whites, such as running away during slavery, Jim Crow laws, and crack versus powder cocaine laws; differential policing in racial profiling, arrest decisions, and the use of deadly force; the imposition of harsher penalties for crimes if committed by racial minorities, especially if they involve white victims (see, for example, Spohn 2009; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2007); and the use of lynching as punishment for presumed violations or to deter those who might threaten whites' interests, often with the tacit approval of criminal justice agencies (Delgado 2009; Gonzales-Day 2006; Pfeifer 2004; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Drug laws and policies exemplify the criminal justice mechanisms that serve to control "other" populations and preserve white privilege during times of perceived threat from encroachments by subordinate groups. Several early drug laws are illustrative. The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 were responses to perceived threats to dominant groups from nonwhite populations during periods of economic downturn or shifts in power relationships between whites and nonwhites. Drug use by Chinese workers, blacks in the South, and Mexican workers in the West symbolized the problems associated with labor surpluses during difficult economic times, shifting cultural patterns, and, in the case of the 1970 act, the possibility that existing drug laws would imprison the "cream of white youth" (see Musto 1973; Peterson 1985; Provine 2007; Reasons and Perdue 1981). Consistent with earlier periods, recent drug law policies have been described as a "race-conscious war on urban black and, to a lesser extent, Latino communities" (Marable 2007, 5; see also Provine 2007). One of the main features of the Reagan administration's "War on Drugs," launched in 1986, was substantially longer prison terms for the possession and sale of crack cocaine—a drug commonly used by black inner-city residents, though they were a small portion of the illicit drug-using population—than for these same actions with powdered cocaine, which, along with marijuana, was the illicit drug of choice of white users, who were also the overwhelming majority of drug users. Another feature of the drug war was aggressive policing, such as "buy and bust" strategies, massive street sweeps, the establishment of "drug-free zones," and the like. These types of policies have all had a disparate impact on minorities and

their communities (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pflingst 2006; Greene, Pranis, and Ziedenberg 2006; Marable 2007).

A variety of contemporary policing and prosecutorial policies, such as "three strikes" laws, "truth in sentencing" legislation, and juvenile transfer to adult courts, also have a disproportionate impact on African Americans and Latinos (Bortner, Zatz, and Hawkins 2000; Chen 2008; Ehlers, Schiraldi, and Lotke 2004; Fagan and Zimring 2000). Further, Latinos are racialized in criminal justice by being associated with immigrant communities that, in some places, have been constructed as sites of crime and other social problems (Romero 2006; Zatz and Smith 2008). As such, whether they are citizens or not, Latinos may be more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, and subjected to other criminal procedures to deal with perceived problems associated with immigration.

Racially differentiated opportunities, punishments, and rewards in education, the labor market, and criminal justice do not operate completely independently of one another or of other institutions in creating and perpetuating the racial order (see, for example, Grant-Thomas and Powell 2009; Reskin 2004). Rather, advantages or disadvantages in one or more institutions can be mutually reinforcing as they further privileges for whites and detrimental outcomes for African Americans, Latinos, and others. As already noted, whites have disproportionate access to communities with the best public schools. Higher-quality educational programs in elementary through secondary schools improve the likelihood of high school completion, which, in turn, substantially reduces the chance of ending up in prison (Western 2006). Superior community educational resources also improve access to college, thereby increasing prospects for obtaining jobs with higher prestige, earnings, and benefits. Residence in local areas with "good schools" has effects beyond direct and indirect educational benefits; because home values are greater in such communities, residents accrue more wealth through equity in their residence (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Shapiro 2004). Wealth can help to finance college and other investments that garner continued returns through retirement and across generations (Conley 1999; Shapiro 2004).

In contrast, African Americans, Latinos, and other nonwhites experience significantly lower life chances throughout a host of institutions. These disadvantages accumulate and help solidify the position of these groups at (or near) the bottom of the social hierarchy. For instance, segregation increases the likelihood that African Americans will live in local areas with low-quality school districts (McKoy and Vincent 2008). The resulting concentration of African Americans in communities with struggling schools creates the opposite spiral of that observed for whites. Constrained school access increases high school dropout rates and reduces levels of college attendance, both of which lead to higher rates

of incarceration (Western 2006). Young people emerging from such environments are more likely to end up in low-prestige jobs with associated low incomes. The quality of local schools and the concentration of African Americans (or Latinos) are also associated with lower home values and less potential to accumulate housing wealth, with its attendant benefits (see, for example, Flippen 2004).

The racialized policies and practices of the criminal justice system also reverberate through other institutions in ways that create enormous harm for nonwhite individuals and communities. To date, they have contributed to widespread growth in the prison population, which has disproportionate numbers of African Americans and Latinos (Clear 2007; Marable 2007; Western 2006). Notably, approximately two-thirds of persons incarcerated for a drug offense in America's state prisons and three-quarters of those incarcerated on federal drug charges are either African American or Latino; these figures far exceed the proportion of these groups among the U.S. population, as well as among drug users and sellers (Marable 2007; Mauer 2009; Western 2006). Following from imprisonment are poor job prospects (especially if one is African American), relatively low earnings, voting disenfranchisement (in many states), and diminished civic participation (Manza and Uggen 2006; Pager 2007; Western 2006). Difficulties in the labor market, in turn, affect a host of additional life chances, including family formation, marital stability, residential location, homeownership with attendant implications for wealth accumulation and school quality, and voting and other forms of civic participation (Western 2006). High rates of imprisonment also have devastating consequences for communities that experience vicious cycles of residents churning in and out (Clear 2007). When incarceration and the churning of offenders reach very high levels, these processes heighten social disorganization and reduce social capital, which, in turn, increase crime. Because African Americans and Latinos are vulnerable to racialized criminal justice policies, disadvantaged communities populated by these groups feel these effects most acutely. To the extent that social disorganization is heightened, the disparate policies of the criminal justice system make it at least partially responsible for the very crimes that it purports to reduce.

The argument that racially inequitable patterns are embedded within and across institutions does not preclude the possibility of variation in achievement *within* racial groups. Nor does it call into question evidence of upward mobility and growth in the middle class among African Americans, Latinos, and other groups (Bean et al. 2001; Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Shapiro 2004; Smith and Horton 1997; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2005). Indeed, after the civil rights movement and related legislation, the proportion of black households

with middle-class incomes increased through the early 1980s (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2005). In addition, the percentage of black individuals employed in professional and managerial occupations grew from 4.7 percent in 1960 to 8.4 percent in 2007 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1962, 2009b).⁶ Frank D. Bean and his colleagues (2001) show appreciable gains from 1979 through 1998 among *native-born* Latino households with middle-class incomes. This group also saw a 44 percent increase in the level of college completion (from 10.7 percent to 15.4 percent) over the same period.

These gains for African Americans and Latinos notwithstanding, middle-class status does not have the same meaning for whites and for racial-ethnic minorities in the United States. For example, the circumstances of families and individuals in the black and Latino middle classes are considerably more precarious than those for the white middle class. African Americans are concentrated in lower-middle-class occupations and have less wealth and fewer other economic resources to fall back on than whites do (Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Shapiro 2004; Smith and Horton 1997; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2005; see also Lacy 2007). College-educated native Latino males also received much lower income returns to their education than native white males, and they contributed to the support of larger households (Bean et al. 2001; Bean and Stevens 2003). Thus, social position, even for middle-class African Americans and Latinos, reflects the systemic ways in which race permeates U.S. society.

Residential Segregation: A Structural Mechanism

The goal of this book is to show the critical role of the hierarchical racial system described here in generating ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime patterns. In the United States, residential segregation and the organization of the housing market that supports continued segregation are key mechanisms that undergird the existing hierarchy and lead to neighborhood differences in outcomes, including crime (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Massey and Denton 1993). Here we articulate the sources and levels of ethnic and racial residential segregation in the United States and explain how it is linked with structurally inequitable neighborhood environments for whites, African Americans, Latinos, and others. Our key contention is that residential segregation is the linchpin that connects the overall racial order with dramatic racial and ethnic differentials in violent and property crime across communities. It does this by reinforcing the complicated web of social and institutional inequalities that privilege white neighborhoods compared to African American, Latino, and

other types of neighborhoods. Segregation is thus at the heart of why the social worlds of people in the United States are so divergent by neighborhood color, and hence why neighborhood crime is so racialized.

What forces underlie residential segregation in urban areas of the United States? The long U.S. history of housing market discrimination by race and place created and has reinforced race-ethnic segregation (Charles 2003; Gotham 2002a, 2002b; Massey and Denton 1993; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Ross and Turner 2005; Yinger 1995). Historical policies and practices, including restrictive covenants and Federal Housing Administration/Veterans Administration (FHA/VA) lending policies (such as redlining and minimum unit and lot standards), supported the development of white neighborhoods and suburban localities (see, for example, Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993). FHA and VA loans provided major financing for the expansion of homeownership that took place before and, in particular, after World War II. These agencies required unit and lot evaluations that favored the financing of new suburban houses, thereby encouraging out-migration from central cities to suburbs. They also used neighborhood racial composition as a standard for evaluating the suitability of loans and redlined African American neighborhoods. Combining these criteria, the agencies awarded very few loans to predominantly African American areas, and most FHA and VA home financing went to white suburban communities. Additionally, real estate blockbusting ensured that inner-city neighborhoods rapidly turned from white to black (Gotham 2002a, 2000b; Hirsch 1983; Orser 1994; Seligman 2005). Kevin Gotham (2002a, 97; see also Gotham 2002b) shows poignantly how real estate agents in Kansas City, Missouri, used unscrupulous scare tactics to encourage whites to move out of neighborhoods because "the black race was moving in," whether such in-movement of blacks was occurring or not. These actions produced rapid turnover from white to black because they instilled fear among whites regarding falling property values and rising crime. Such "blockbusting" was highly profitable for realtors who encouraged whites to sell at low prices and then offered these same units to African American households at higher prices (Hirsch 1983; Orser 1994; Seligman 2005).

Although these types of practices are now illegal, discriminatory actions that help to maintain segregated residential patterns persist (Bond and Williams 2007; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Ross and Turner 2005; Ross and Yinger 2002; Squires and Kubrin 2006). These practices include: African Americans and other nonwhites receiving less information than whites about available housing; nonwhite and white renters and homebuyers being steered to neighborhoods with racial compositions that reflect their own race or ethnicity; and persistent discrimination in mortgage lending (such as higher rates of interest, more loan denials, and greater

use of subprime loans for minorities than for whites). The most direct evidence of housing discrimination comes from large audit studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1989 and 2000 (Ross and Turner 2005; Yinger 1995). The audit methodology involves sending pairs of matched white-black and white-Latino individuals to respond to newspaper advertisements for housing units for rent or sale and then assessing the differential treatment of "comparable" individuals. Housing discrimination against African Americans declined between 1989 and 2000. However, African Americans still received worse treatment than whites in the various stages of a housing search. Perhaps most alarming were dramatic increases in racial steering for African Americans. By comparison, discrimination against Latinos did not decline appreciably between 1989 and 2000. And indeed, Latinos experienced more negative treatment than whites in renting housing throughout the period. Of additional importance was a rise in the withholding of advice and assistance from this group in obtaining the financing required to purchase a home (Ross and Turner 2005).

Racial differentials in mortgage denial and interest rates, as well as dramatic increases in subprime and manufactured housing (in other words, "mobile homes") from the 1990s on have also been documented (Krivo and Kaufman 2004; Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Ross and Yinger 2002; Williams, Nesiba, and McConnell 2005). African Americans and Latinos are much more likely than comparable whites to have their mortgage applications denied, and when approved, they are charged higher interest rates (Krivo and Kaufman 2004; Oliver and Shapiro 2006; Williams et al. 2005). In addition, growth in the risky subprime and manufactured housing loan markets since the early 1990s has been especially great for African Americans at all income levels and for households in nonwhite neighborhoods (Squires and Kubrin 2006; Williams et al. 2005). While increases in conventional home lending lead to reductions in segregation, the expansion of specialized high-risk lending has either no such effect or in fact the opposite effect (Bond and Williams 2007). Thus, shifts in the nature of mortgage markets over the last decade and a half have both reinforced and increased black-white metropolitan segregation.⁷

Differences in the value and appreciation of housing across groups and neighborhoods of different colors also contribute to the persistence of residential segregation. Chenoa Flippen (2004) demonstrates that housing values appreciate more slowly in neighborhoods where the African American population is large or where it grows rapidly after homes are purchased. A high concentration of Latino residents also substantially reduces housing appreciation. Indeed, "the lower appreciation of minority-owned homes costs them literally tens of thousands of

dollars in housing equity, the adverse effects of which accumulate over the life course and contribute to the dramatically lower asset accumulation of minority families" (Flippen 2004, 1545). These negative economic costs of living in minority neighborhoods reinforce patterns of segregation over the short and long run. Dramatically reduced housing wealth among African Americans and Latinos limits their abilities to move to white areas, where housing is more expensive (Shapiro 2004).

The persistence of white racist attitudes provides another leg supporting continued racial residential segregation (see Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2003, 2006; Krysan and Bader 2007; Krysan, Farley, and Couper 2008). For example, Camille Charles (2000, 2003, 2006, 2007) shows that there is an unquestionable racial hierarchy of residential preferences in which all nonblack groups (not just non-Hispanic whites) view blacks as their least desired neighbors. Racial stereotyping reduces openness to integration with other groups and increases the desire for same-race neighbors. These relationships are most pronounced for whites (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2000, 2003). Furthermore, in *Won't You Be My Neighbor* (2006) Charles provides critical empirical evidence that these attitudes matter; individuals who have a stronger preference for integration, whether they are white, black, Latino, or Asian, actually live in neighborhoods with more out-group members.⁸ Maria Krysan, Reynolds Farley, and Mick Couper (2008, 7) conclude that "race—and a desire to avoid living with African Americans—continues to shape Whites' perceptions about housing options" in ways that support the persistence of racial residential segregation (see also Farley, Couper, and Krysan 2007; Farley et al. 1978; Farley et al. 1994; Krysan 2002a, 2002b; Krysan and Bader 2007). In videotaped experiments conducted in neighborhoods of varying social classes, Krysan, Farley, and Couper (2008) found that whites rate identical-looking areas as having lower-quality schools and being significantly less expensive, less safe, and less likely to appreciate in value when blacks are shown there compared to when only whites are represented. Where whites would consider living is also strongly associated with the presence of more whites, and such households are particularly resistant to residing in areas where they are not the overwhelming majority (Krysan and Bader 2007).

The variety of practices described here are heavily responsible for the dramatic levels of residential separation of whites and African Americans and the modest levels of segregation of whites from both Latinos and Asians (see, for example, Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilkes and Iceland 2004). In the average metropolitan area in 2000, nearly two-thirds (65.2 percent) of African Americans (or whites) would have to move to a different neighborhood to achieve an even residential distribution—that is, one in which every neighborhood has the

same percentage of African Americans and whites as in the entire metropolitan area (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004). Further, nearly 70 percent of metropolitan blacks live in areas that fall in the high range of segregation. Although still high, black-white segregation has steadily declined since at least 1980, when over 73 percent of blacks (or whites) would have had to move to a different neighborhood to achieve perfect integration.⁹ Of note, the largest decreases have been in metropolitan areas with small black populations, where the potential for white contact with African Americans is modest (Krivo and Kaufman 1999; Logan et al. 2004).

The residential segregation of Latinos and Asians from whites is less dramatic and has changed little over the years. In 2000 just over half (51.6 percent) of Latinos and more than two-fifths (44.2 percent) of Asians would have had to change neighborhoods to achieve residential evenness with whites (Logan et al. 2004); these average segregation levels were nearly identical to those of two decades earlier. Stability in segregation for Latinos and Asians apparently stems from the large influx of immigrants into the United States from Central America, South America, the Caribbean, and many parts of Asia since 1965 (for support for this pattern for Latinos, see Logan et al. 2004). New immigrants often move into communities where persons from their country of origin have already settled (Alba and Nee 2003; Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Zavodny 1999; but see, for example, the discussion of newer settlement patterns in Light and von Scheven 2008). The continuing flow of in-migrants maintains segregation for the Latino and Asian populations as a whole, even while longer-term immigrants and individuals from later generations move away from ethnic concentrations (Iceland 2009; Rosenbaum and Friedman 2007).

Why is the persistence of racial and ethnic residential segregation in the United States so critical to the maintenance and reproduction of a racialized hierarchy of the neighborhood conditions that ultimately lead to crime? One answer lies in how neighborhoods provide residents with access (or the lack thereof) to a wide range of important social and institutional resources (see, for example, Logan and Molotch 1987) and the extent to which separate is still not equal more than fifty years after the overturning of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (Carr and Kuitzy 2008; Massey and Denton 1993).¹⁰ These resources include schools, political representation, many government services, housing wealth, and local businesses that provide jobs, goods, and services. A couple of examples will suffice to illustrate how these important neighborhood resources are inequitably distributed across communities of different colors in the United States. The tight connection between residential location and where children attend school is often in the forefront of decisions about where to live. The wide variance in the physical and academic quality of schools is closely connected

to the economic and racial composition of areas (Reskin 2004; Roscigno 1998; Solorzano and Ornelas 2002). Differences are especially large across school districts (Grant-Thomas and Powell 2009; McKay and Vincent 2008; Powell 2007), and parents with resources are willing to pay higher housing prices for access to schools with higher test scores and school ratings (Black 1999; Figlio and Lucas 2002). There may also be significant gaps in expenditures across elementary schools *within the same school district* depending on the poverty and minority composition of students (Condon and Roscigno 2003). In short, the connection between the whiteness of the student body and school quality is strong in the minds of white parents and dramatically influences where they choose to live (Johnson and Shapiro 2003; Shapiro 2004).

As a second example, within a racially structured society a range of organizations, such as businesses and lending agencies, make decisions about where to invest—or disinvest—partially based on the racial composition of neighborhoods. Predominantly white areas often receive more—and more highly valued—economic and social investments, while nonwhite communities are more likely to be neglected or targeted for disinvestments or placement of disruptive institutions (Squires and Kubrin 2006; Squires and O'Connor 2001; Vélez 2006). Elvin Wyly and Steven Holloway (1999) report that, during the 1990s, middle-income white neighborhoods in Atlanta received more than four times as many home loans as middle-income black neighborhoods and that the total dollar amount of these loans was more than five and a half times greater for white areas than for black areas. Large public housing projects (and current forms of subsidized housing redevelopment) are disproportionately sited in disadvantaged neighborhoods and almost exclusively in African American communities (Hirsch 1983; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Kanaiaupuni 1993; Pattillo 2007). Deborah Wallace and Roderick Wallace (2001) describe substantial acts of disinvestment in New York's "planned shrinkage" of firehouses during the 1970s, which destroyed large segments of property in poor African American and Puerto Rican areas. Such acts are not relics of a bygone era. For example, New York City recently approved Columbia University's plan to expand high-end development into Harlem, which will bring new affluence into this neighborhood but leave untouched much of the public and low-income housing and impoverishment found in portions of this area (Beveridge 2008; see also Freeman 2006).

Another reason why segregation helps to maintain racially stratified neighborhoods lies in how it concentrates the inequalities produced in and by other institutions into racially distinct communities of privilege or disadvantage (Jargowsky 1997; Krivo et al. 1998; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Eggers 1990; Massey and Fischer 2000). Under conditions of

residential segregation, the racial and ethnic differences in income and poverty that emanate from the labor market produce large differences in the economic status of white, African American, and other ethno-racial neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993). In particular, segregation concentrates white advantages within white neighborhoods. Conversely, African American areas are mired in multiple disadvantages because segregation concentrates the higher levels of African American poverty, joblessness, and the like within predominantly black neighborhoods. With more modest segregation, levels of disadvantage in neighborhoods of most colors reflect the positions of such groups in the social hierarchy—most often between blacks and whites.

Research confirms the connection between segregation and the concentration of poverty and other disadvantages within particular neighborhoods for blacks and other nonwhite populations (Jargowsky 1997; Krivo et al. 1998; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Eggers 1990; Massey and Fischer 2000). Thus, for metropolitan areas in 1980 and 1990, poverty rates for African Americans, Asians, and Latinos were all more highly concentrated in places that were more segregated (Jargowsky 1997; Massey and Eggers 1990; Massey and Fischer 2000). Greater segregation also leads to a heightened concentration of African American levels of female-headed families and jobless males (Krivo et al. 1998; but see Quillian 2003). Racial segregation's influence on white-concentrated disadvantage is strikingly different: it generally has no effect and can even benefit this group by reducing the concentration of poverty and female-headed families. Further, racial residential segregation increases the concentration of white affluence (St. John 2002).

In sum, within the United States there is a clear *racial-spatial divide*. By this we mean a social arrangement in which substantial ethno-racial inequality in social and economic circumstances and power in society is combined with segregated and unequal residential locations across major racial and ethnic groups. This racial-spatial divide is hierarchical, with whites in the most advantaged and powerful positions and African Americans in the most disadvantaged and least powerful positions. Other groups, including Latinos and Asians, occupy varying and perhaps more fluid positions in between the two sides of this divide (see, for example, Bonilla-Silva and Glover 2004). As a whole, this socio-spatial organization provides a significant structural mechanism that imprints inequality across groups in local settings that are critical contexts for social action. The racial-spatial divide also provides visible signals to those who manage institutions and resources about the relative value and risks associated with locating in different neighborhoods in an urban area. Although these signals reflect both racial composition and nonracial factors (for example, levels of poverty or street disorder), the racial-spatial

divide ensures that ultimately decisions about where to locate or invest will map onto the racially segregated geographic landscape. As such, racial-spatial inequality is created and re-created in a self-reinforcing manner. The dramatically racialized structural circumstances of the racial-spatial divide provide the context for ethno-racial inequality in crime across neighborhoods. In the following sections, we outline specifically how differentials in structural context set the stage for such neighborhood differences in crime.

The Racial-Spatial Divide and Crime

How do racialized neighborhood patterns that are supported through segregation connect with racial and ethnic differences in levels of crime? The racial-spatial divide uniquely situates neighborhoods with distinct ethno-racial compositions in terms of the local conditions that encourage (or discourage) and control (or fail to control) crime (Anderson 1990, 1999; Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo, and Browning 2006; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shaw and McKay 1969; Wilson 1987, 1996). Disadvantage is the local condition that is most starkly differentiated by the predominant color of residents. This characteristic is also at the core of social disorganization arguments regarding the role of local structural sources of crime (Shaw and McKay 1969) and is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of aggregate criminal involvement (Peterson and Krivo 2005; Pratt and Cullen 2005).

Neighborhoods that are highly disadvantaged have heightened crime rates for two broad reasons. First, processes that encourage criminal behavior are particularly prevalent in areas where disadvantage abounds (see, for example, Anderson 1990, 1999; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo, and Browning 2006; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987, 1996). Within a context of limited opportunities, theft and other property crimes may occur in an effort to secure resources and luxuries that are not otherwise attainable. Activities such as prostitution, drug trafficking, shoplifting, theft and sale of stolen property, and other opportunistic crimes may become regular sources of "income" and a means of acquiring wanted goods and services (Baskin and Sommers 1998; Venkatesh 2006).¹¹ Violence as "self-help" may also be used in these crimes, or in other social situations where conflict arises, as participants seek to protect themselves and their possessions rather than engage the police or other authorities (Black 1983; Carr, Napolitano, and Keating 2007; de Haan and Nijboer 2005; Goffman 2009; Jones 2009; Miller 2008; Topalli, Wright, and Formango 2002; Venkatesh 2006; Wilkinson, Beatty, and Lurry 2009).

As a result of these processes, crime becomes a relatively common aspect of everyday life in more highly disadvantaged communities. As such, residents may be socialized to engage in criminal activity through modeling the actions of others (Anderson 1990, 1999; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo, and Browning 2006; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilkinson 2003). They witness more illegal behavior and have a greater number of role models who do not restrain their criminal "impulses" or their anger and frustration. The need to adapt to the heightened possibility of criminal victimization and violent encounters often requires that residents be ready, or appear to be ready, to use violence to defend their lives and property. As more people adopt defensive and threatening postures and behaviors such as carrying weapons, the use of violence for defensive purposes increases (Massey 1995). Widespread joblessness and irregular employment may intensify the influence of role modeling and adaptation processes. Many who reside in disadvantaged neighborhoods are idle for much of the day. Idle individuals may spend significant amounts of time in settings where unconventional role modeling and defensive posturing are reactively prevalent—in local taverns and pool halls or on street corners. They are involved in "situations of company" that may be conducive to property crime and violence (Crutchfield 1989; Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006).

Second, more highly disadvantaged neighborhoods also have more crime because the mechanisms of social control that normally discourage criminal involvement are especially lacking in such contexts. Social control can be difficult to achieve at both the informal and formal levels. Informally, and consistent with social disorganization perspectives, highly disadvantaged communities have more trouble than advantaged areas in organizing to promote common goals, and this undermines their abilities to control crime (see, for example, Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Shaw and McKay 1969). For example, neighbors may be less likely to serve as eyes and ears for one another, to supervise one another's children, or to act collectively in response to trouble in the neighborhood. In this event, efforts to prevent and respond to crime would be less effective. Further, such areas are characterized by a high degree of social isolation from mainstream society (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Peterson, Krivo, and Browning 2006; Wilson 1987, 1996). As a consequence, residents have less exposure to conventional role models and are less likely to have jobs. There are fewer "old heads" who provide lessons in staying away from crime and out of trouble, and those who remain no longer have prestige and credibility (Anderson 1990, 1999; Wilkinson 2003). Disadvantaged neighborhoods also have relatively few working- and middle-class families to serve as social buffers cushioning the effects of uneven and poor economic conditions (Wilson 1987, 1996). This impedes the ability of communities to sustain basic institutional struc-

tures and various sources of social control (Carr 2005; Peterson, Krivo, and Harris 2000; Small and McDermott 2006; Wilson 1987, 1996).

Formally, diminished social control may result from ineffective police protection. At times this is evident in an insufficient supply and deployment of officers, failure to respond to calls from residents, or slow and irregular responses. In impoverished nonwhite communities, policing is also ineffective because it is (or is believed to be) racialized or even harmful (see, for example, Carr, Napolitano, and Keating 2007; Goffman 2009; Jones 2009; Miller 2008; Solis, Portillos, and Brunson 2009; Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Wilkinson, Beaty, and Lurry 2009). Thus, residents are unwilling to ask police to resolve disputes or address victimization. As a result, the costs associated with engaging in crime are lessened and the possible deterrent effect of the law is reduced. In short, residents of disadvantaged communities lack adequate financial, social, and institutional resources to effectively prevent and fight crime (see, for example, Bursik and Gasmick 1993).

Disadvantage is not the only neighborhood factor that affects local crime rates. Levels of residential instability, rates of external investment, and the degree of immigrant concentration are also important. According to social disorganization theory, greater residential instability increases crime by undermining social control (Kornhauser 1978; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Residents of more unstable communities find it difficult to develop common values and realize common goals. High population turnover inhibits the formation of social networks and weakens attachments to local communities. This hinders efforts to mobilize local residents to provide informal social control of neighborhood life (see, for example, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Shaw and McKay 1969). However, greater stability is not always associated with greater informal social control. In the wake of deindustrialization, many residents fled some of the worst, and often African American, inner-city areas (Beveridge 2008; Jargowsky 1997; Price-Spratlen and Guest 2002; Wilson 1987). As a result, the poor and others constrained from moving are left behind in communities that now see little change in their residents. This *entrenched* stability may signal weaker rather than stronger social organization, making it difficult for residents to work together to control crime.

As noted in the previous section, outside agents respond in distinct ways to varying communities of color: external investors favor white neighborhoods and often neglect African American and other nonwhite areas. Communities that receive sizable investments have good housing, an array of social services, and economic infrastructures that provide opportunities and resources that serve to prevent crime. Substantial outside investments also signal that communities have powerful political and economic connections that they can draw on to bring in resources to

fight crime and other threats (Squires and Kubrin 2006; Vélez 2001, 2006). In contrast, a relative absence of external investments creates major challenges for an area's physical appearance and institutional viability. Such communities have difficulty repairing dilapidated housing, recruiting home buyers, sustaining existing businesses, and attracting new businesses. As a result, physical deterioration and disorder, both of which have been linked to crime, continue unchecked (Kelling and Coles 1996; Skogan 1990; see also Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Taylor 2001). Further, limited outside investments may increase criminogenic conditions such as poor economic opportunities, weak local social ties, and deteriorated community institutions like schools and churches (Taylor 2001).

The prevalence of immigrants is another condition that varies substantially across ethno-racially distinct neighborhoods and is relevant to crime. Historically, scholars have argued that immigration *contributes* to crime and violence by bringing to areas a cultural diversity that makes communication and the sharing of common goals difficult (Martinez 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). This factor, coupled with limited resources, has been expected to weaken community organization and the ability of residents to work together to control crime. Yet recent studies challenge this contention by demonstrating consistently *lower* rates of violent crime in communities with more immigrants (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Martinez 2002; Sampson 2008; Vélez 2006). The exact reasons for this relationship are not fully understood. However, immigrant communities can provide in-group connections and support ethnically based institutions that together integrate residents and counter otherwise common social problems in resource-poor environments. Ramiro Martinez (2002) also argues that Latino and immigrant communities have relatively high levels of labor market attachment (albeit employment in menial jobs), a factor that should reduce involvement in crime (see also Vélez 2006). Further, residents may use their countries of origin as frames of reference in evaluating their life circumstances: as deprived as conditions may be in U.S. barrios and other immigrant areas, conditions may be even worse in their home countries. This point of comparison could counteract the higher crime that might result if immigrants compared their circumstances to those of other populations in the United States (Blau and Blau 1982; Messner and Rosenfeld 2001).

Considerable research shows clear links of disadvantage, residential instability, and immigration with neighborhood crime (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Shaw and McKay 1969; see also reviews by Peterson and Krivo 2005; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Sampson 2006). Yet this work has some important limitations. First, the role of community investments has received little empirical attention

(but see Squires and Kubrin 2006; Vélez 2001, 2006); we do not know whether such investments actually reduce crime. Second, research has seldom explored the connections between glaring divergence in local conditions and crime across communities of distinct colors (for exceptions for criminal violence, see Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006; Krivo and Peterson 1996; McNulty 2001). It is therefore unclear whether and how race, place, and crime are linked in contemporary urban areas. Third, analysts have not examined and interpreted differential patterns of crime in terms of the deeply embedded racial and ethnic histories of privilege and oppression that create and re-create neighborhood inequality. This is a fundamental problem for attempts to provide a sound explanation of ethno-racial criminal inequality because the racialized reality of neighborhood structures is not a matter of neutral happenstance. Instead, this reality is intricately embedded within much broader forces of social organization that are structured by race and class. Considering the racial-spatial divide as a core concept for organizing and interpreting our analyses provides a more in-depth and meaningful understanding of ethno-racial disparities in crime than heretofore available (see also Peterson and Krivo 2009a).

The City Context of Neighborhood Crime

Neighborhood crime is unquestionably affected by the internal character of areas. However, local communities are embedded in distinct city settings that also have implications for crime. Consider two neighborhoods that are equally disadvantaged and similar in other important ways, such as the level of residential instability. One is located in Chicago and the other in Houston, cities that are quite distinct from one another. Chicago is more highly segregated and more socioeconomically disadvantaged than Houston. Because both of these city characteristics are associated with heightened crime, neighborhoods with the same levels of disadvantage should have more crime if located in Chicago than in Houston.

We consider citywide segregation and socioeconomic disadvantage along with the urban macroeconomic character as three city conditions that are relevant for understanding neighborhood crime overall and across communities of different colors. We have already described how racial residential segregation affects the neighborhood conditions that are more directly related to crime. Here we explicate how the overall extent of segregation for a city may influence neighborhood crime beyond its contribution to conditions within local areas of the city. When groups are residentially segregated from one another, they do not share common local interests and are less likely to work together to solve community problems (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009). Historically, white ethnic groups have

rarely been segregated from one another to the extent that contemporary African Americans are separated from other groups (Massey and Denton 1993). For example, ostensibly Italian or Jewish neighborhoods contained a mix of different ethnicities that together benefited from efforts to garner political, social, and economic resources. Such common interests are lacking in today's ethno-racial context: with high levels of black-white segregation, it is uncommon for members of these groups to share local residential space. Rather, "the geographic isolation of blacks . . . force[s] nearly all issues to cleave along racial lines" (Massey and Denton 1993, 155). The result is racial and spatial divisions that undermine both the motivation and the coalitions necessary to implement strategies to improve the social and institutional structures that affect crime. Because the segregation of Latinos from whites is not as great as it is for African Americans (Iceland 2009; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Massey and Denton 1993), Latinos are more likely to share space with whites and to have common interests from which to work. As such, the segregation of Latinos may be less consequential for neighborhood crime.

Segregation may also intensify the impact of different views on causes and solutions to crime problems. For instance, African Americans are likely to view crime as resulting from factors such as limited opportunities and discrimination (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Young 1991) and to support structural solutions like economic investments and government programs to rectify these problems. By contrast, whites tend to view crime as stemming from the choices and propensities of individuals and thus favor dealing with it through efforts that foster individual deterrence and incapacitation via incarceration (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Gilliam, Valentino, and Beckmann 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Young 1991). In a segregated context, these very different worldviews on what is responsible for crime may make it difficult for whites and blacks to respond collectively to this problem. It may be especially difficult for whites to consider expending scarce resources to address the broad structural underpinnings of urban crime, such as joblessness and poverty.

Finally, in highly segregated cities substantial portions of the population may be detached from social institutions or may view certain institutions (including criminal justice agencies) as illegitimate (Hagan et al. 1998; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005). Broad detachment and high levels of perceived illegitimacy could contribute to crime by creating a general disregard for the law, undermining citizen cooperation in crime control, promoting crime as a form of self-help, and contributing to a lawless atmosphere (LaFree 1998; Messner and Rosenfeld 2001; Rosenfeld 2002; Tyler and Huo 2002).

City-level macroeconomic conditions also contribute to crime throughout an urban area. Characteristics such as the types of jobs available

and the level of socioeconomic disadvantage in a city may influence urban neighborhood crime rates. These relationships may be indirect, as when city conditions affect neighborhood crime through their impact on community resources and other local social conditions. For example, employment opportunities affect distributions of income, poverty, unemployment, and workers with unstable secondary-sector jobs within neighborhoods, and these types of disadvantage have been linked to crime (Crutchfield 1989; Crutchfield, Glusker, and Bridges 1999; Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006; Krivo and Peterson 2004; Parker 2004; Peterson and Krivo 2005; Pratt and Cullen 2005).

Over and above these indirect influences is the potentially direct impact on crime rates of the macroeconomic character of the city in which neighborhoods are located. William Julius Wilson (1987, 1996, 2009) has brought considerable attention to the ways in which deindustrialization, the movement of employment to the South and the West, and the shifting of much manufacturing abroad have harmed the economic and social bases of many urban areas. These transformations have led to large declines in well-paid, stable manufacturing jobs and to substantial increases in poor and otherwise disadvantaged populations in some cities (Parker 2008; Wilson 1987). Places with a small manufacturing base and large economically disadvantaged populations have a weak foundation for supporting a wide array of the beneficial governmental services for neighborhoods that would help to prevent or combat institutional decay, physical and social disorder, and other conditions that underlie crime. They have fewer police resources for prevention and enforcement activities; less support for local programming, such as recreation centers to provide alternative activities for youth who would otherwise "hang out" in situations of company conducive to crime; and fewer services that reduce the signs of physical disorder, such as litter, poor lighting, and abandoned property, that signal that a neighborhood is not in anyone's control (Kelling and Coles 1996; Skogan 1990). Private entities also have fewer resources to invest in the development efforts of local communities and less reason to believe that their efforts would pay off. Thus, the very assets that should contribute to safer neighborhood environments by shoring up the physical and social infrastructure that helps keep crime at bay are absent.

The National Neighborhood Crime Study

The racial-spatial divide described in this chapter presents considerable challenges for evaluating the connections between neighborhood structural conditions, ethno-racial composition, and crime. Because social conditions are typically very dissimilar for white, African American,

Latino, and other neighborhoods, aspects of community context overlap substantially with race-ethnic composition. As a result, it is difficult to compile data and analyze appropriately whether ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood crime is a product of highly divergent local conditions, as we argue, or instead is due to unmeasured differences associated with racial composition. To deal with this problem, researchers must examine neighborhoods that are racially and ethnically distinct but relatively similar in socioeconomic and other conditions. Such an investigation is not straightforward, however, because there are few highly impoverished and otherwise disadvantaged white urban neighborhoods, particularly ones that are as disadvantaged as many African American communities in the United States. Nor are there very many African American neighborhoods that are as affluent and highly advantaged as is common for white areas (Krivo and Peterson 1996; McNulty 2001; Sampson 2009; Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush 2008; Sampson and Wilson 1995).


Two recent studies of Chicago highlight the substantive and methodological problems that stem from U.S. racial neighborhood stratification (Sampson 2009; Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush 2008). Robert Sampson (2009) compared per capita income distributions for white and black neighborhoods in Chicago in 2000. He showed that not a single predominantly white neighborhood had an income level as low as that in the typical black community. Conversely, only a very small proportion of Chicago's African American neighborhoods had per capita income levels as high as those for any white area. This is an important finding because it reflects the significantly racialized structures that we discuss in this book. It also illustrates the problem of analyzing the outcomes of ethno-racial neighborhood inequality within a single city where comparably situated white and African American neighborhoods are virtually nonexistent. As Sampson (2009, 265) notes, "Trying to estimate the effect of concentrated disadvantage on whites is . . . tantamount to estimating a phantom reality." In light of this problem, Robert Sampson, Patrick Sharkey, and Stephen Raudenbush (2008) limit their analysis of the role of concentrated disadvantage in the verbal ability of Chicago children to black youth, because no white children in their sample lived in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods (the top quarter of the distribution for Chicago). Thus, racial-ethnic inequality in outcomes could not be examined.¹²

We conducted the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS) to address this comparability problem by assembling neighborhood crime and other social data for a broad range of cities across the country (Peterson and Krivo 2010). By including local areas in numerous cities, we obtained a sample with a sufficient number of racially and ethnically distinct, but otherwise comparable, neighborhoods to address the linkages of interest. The NNCS is the only study that includes this type of sample.

Crime data were obtained directly from police departments because the central repository of crime information in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, provides data only for entire agencies such as cities, counties, or similar units. The FBI does not collect data for smaller areas within jurisdictions, such as neighborhoods. Prior to the NNCS, studies of neighborhood crime relied on reported violations for a single city or a small number of cities (see, for example, Crutchfield, Matsueda, and Drakulich 2006; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Kubrin and Wadsworth 2003; Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008; McNulty 2001; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Shihadeh and Shrum 2004; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite 2003). John Hipp's (2007) study of crime for neighborhoods based on a convenience sample of nineteen cities is the sole exception. These types of samples have limited our ability to explore the role of the U.S. racialized residential landscape in generating crime. In addition, these small- and convenience-sample studies have helped us understand the structural sources of crime in a few cities such as Atlanta, Chicago, Columbus (Ohio), and Seattle, but they tell us little about whether the patterns identified for these places generally hold for U.S. urban areas.

The NNCS includes reported crime counts obtained from police departments and detailed sociodemographic data from the U.S. census and other published sources for 9,593 census tracts—that is, neighborhoods—within a representative sample of 91 large U.S. cities (central cities and suburbs with populations over 100,000) for 2000.¹³ The sample of cities was selected from all incorporated places with a population of at least 100,000 in 1999.¹⁴ Cities were chosen randomly within census regions (the Northeast and Midwest combined, the South, and the West) and are distributed throughout the country, as shown in figure 2.3. We contacted the police department in each selected city to obtain data on reported crime incidents for seven FBI index offenses (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft)¹⁵ for 1999 to 2001 for the census tracts within each jurisdiction.¹⁶ We combined census tract crime counts with data on social and demographic characteristics for each tract and for the cities in which the tracts are located from the 2000 census. The NNCS data include cities and large incorporated suburbs in all regions of the country, both those with a declining economy and those with a healthy economy, and places that vary in their levels of racial residential segregation. The sample is highly representative of large cities (at least 100,000 population). Table 2.1 reports the mean values for the crime rate, black-white residential segregation, poverty, racial composition, and region for the ninety-one cities in the NNCS and for all large U.S. cities for 2000. These data show that for each of the dimensions except

Figure 2.3 Cities in the National Neighborhood Crime Study



Source: ESRI (2006).

region, the NNCS sample cities differ, on average, by at most 10 percent from the population of places with over 100,000 residents. The regional distributions of our sample and of all large U.S. cities are relatively comparable. Our sample slightly overrepresents places in the Northeast and Midwest and somewhat underrepresents cities in the West.

In this book, we examine 8,931 census tracts across 87 cities for which complete information is available for the crimes analyzed. (See table 2A.1 for a list of the cities included.) Given our primary interest in comparing crime patterns across local areas with distinct ethno-racial compositions, we categorize neighborhoods as predominantly white, predominantly African American, predominantly Latino, minority, or integrated. Neighborhoods are defined as predominantly white, African American, or Latino if the respective group constitutes at least 70 percent of the tract population. With these classifications, whites and African Americans include only non-Latinos; Latinos include people who identified with any census racial category.¹⁷ Areas are designated as minority when the combination of African Americans and Latinos makes up 70 percent or more of the population, but neither group alone is more than 70 percent. All other tracts are considered integrated neighborhoods because they have a greater balance of racial and ethnic groups. The sample includes 3,115 white neighborhoods, 1,467 African American neighborhoods, 679 Latino

Table 2.1 Mean Values for Selected Characteristics of U.S. Cities with Populations over 100,000 and NNCS Sample Cities, 2000

Characteristic	All Large U.S. Cities	NNCS Cities
Index crime rate per 100,000	6,104.4	6,374.5
Black-white segregation	43.9%	47.5%
Poverty rate	15.1	15.4
Percentage white	53.9	54.8
Percentage African American	17.4	18.6
Percentage Latino	19.8	19.1
Region		
Northeast-Midwest	28.2	36.3
South	32.7	35.2
West	39.2	28.6

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010), the 2000 census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007), Federal Bureau of Investigation (2001), and the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research (2009).

neighborhoods, 645 minority neighborhoods, and 3,025 integrated neighborhoods. Note that there are almost as many integrated areas as there are predominantly white areas. The group of integrated neighborhoods is also larger than any of the three types of predominantly nonwhite (African American, Latino, or minority) neighborhoods. Readers may be concerned that integrated areas include a "mishmask" of many distinct types of communities. Indeed, such neighborhoods vary in terms of which groups reside together. About 40 percent each are dominated by either African Americans and whites or Latinos and whites; the remainder are more diverse. Despite these differences in population composition, the three types of integrated communities are extremely similar to each other in levels of disadvantage, residential instability, and external investments. They differ, however, in that African American-white areas have a much lower presence of immigrants than all other integrated neighborhoods. There is also variation in crime rates: the most violent crimes and property crimes occur in integrated contexts that have more African Americans. However, the overall pattern of results and the story emanating from the findings about race and crime are essentially the same for the three types of integrated areas as for the combined set.

Measures of Crime and Context

We examine the racialized social context of crime in urban neighborhoods using average annual counts of violent and property crimes reported to the police over the three-year period from 1999 to 2001.

(See table 2A.2 for more detail on definitions of these and all other measures.)¹⁸ Violent crimes include homicide and robbery. Property crimes include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.¹⁹ As noted, the key neighborhood factors examined are residential instability, residential loans, immigrant prevalence, and socioeconomic disadvantage. The measure of residential instability is an index that combines the prevalence of renters and of residents who moved to the neighborhood recently.²⁰ The level of residential loans taps external investments into local communities and is measured as the total dollar amount of home loans issued (originated) in the census tract.²¹ Immigrant prevalence is an index comprised of the relative size of the foreign-born population, the percentage of recent immigrants to the United States, and the percentage of households that are linguistically isolated (no one speaks English well). Disadvantage combines the prevalence of six neighborhood factors: poverty, joblessness, low-wage jobs, female-headed families, lack of professional workers, and absence of college graduates. We control for the presence of young males in all multivariate analyses because this group is disproportionately involved in crime. Residential loan information is from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 2001). Data for all other social and economic factors are taken from the U.S. census.

Our models of violent and property crime include several contextual characteristics of the cities in which the neighborhoods are located: black-white residential segregation, city disadvantage (measured in a parallel fashion to the neighborhood disadvantage indicator), and the prevalence of manufacturing employment. Racial residential segregation is measured with the widely used Black-White Index of Dissimilarity (D) for census tracts. D measures the extent of deviation from evenness of blacks and whites across areas within each city. It ranges from 0 to 100, with values representing the percentage of blacks (or whites) who would have to change their tract of residence to achieve perfect integration. For example, in Chicago, the most segregated city in our sample, the Index of Dissimilarity is 85.2: just over 85 percent of blacks (or whites) in this city would have to move to a different Chicago neighborhood for the city to become completely integrated. The segregation data were acquired from the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research (2009).²²

In addition to the three theoretical conditions, we control for a set of city factors owing to their well-known relationships with crime rates: population size, percentage of African Americans, percentage of recent movers, percentage of foreign-born, percentage of young males, and regional location. In the next chapter, we begin the analysis by describ-

ing the extent of residential separation of whites, African Americans, and Latinos in the neighborhoods in the selected U.S. cities and detailing the patterns of differentiation in neighborhood conditions across the five ethno-racial neighborhood types.

Conclusion: The Next Step

In this chapter, we have set the stage for our empirical findings in three ways. First, we made it clear that levels of violent and property crime vary substantially across neighborhoods comprising different race-ethnic groups in urban areas in the United States. This variation reveals a hierarchy in which predominantly white neighborhoods experience by far the least crime and African Americans areas by far the most crime, although this pattern is clearer and more stark for violent crimes than for property offenses. Accounting for these differences is the core goal of this book. Second, we framed our empirical exploration by integrating a broad racialized perspective on society with a criminological approach drawing on social disorganization theory and insights from urban sociology. Our approach holds that inequalities in the social and economic conditions of racial and ethnic groups and their communities are integral parts of a U.S. social order in which whites are privileged at the expense of other groups. This societal organization produces African American, Latino, and other nonwhite neighborhoods that suffer from the host of structural disadvantages that are central to the generation of crime. Thus, differences in rates of crime across neighborhoods of different colors are a critical consequence of a racially stratified society that should be understood in this light. Third, we described the unique data set, the National Neighborhood Crime Study, that we use to explore the racially structured underpinnings of criminal inequality in both violent and property offenses. The unprecedented breadth of the NNCS sample of neighborhoods across cities permits a closer and more accurate look at race, place, and crime than has ever before been possible. In discussing the NNCS, we also outlined how we measure the key factors examined and conduct the analyses that follow.

Having set the stage in these ways, we can now proceed to our four-part empirical tale. The next chapter tells the first two parts of this tale. We begin by describing the residential separation of whites, African Americans, and Latinos. We then proceed to highlight how this separation is connected with dramatic differentiation in the social and economic character of neighborhoods. Taken together, the data presented make very clear the divergent social worlds of racial and ethnic groups in the urban United States.

Appendix

Table 2A.1 Cities Included in the National Neighborhood Crime Study

Akron, Ohio	Louisville, Kentucky
Albuquerque, New Mexico	Madison, Wisconsin
Alexandria, Virginia	McAllen, Texas
Arlington, Texas	Memphis, Tennessee
Aurora, Illinois	Miami, Florida
Austin, Texas	Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Boston, Massachusetts	Minneapolis, Minnesota
Buffalo, New York	Naperville, Illinois
Carrollton, Texas	Nashville, Tennessee
Chandler, Arizona	New Haven, Connecticut
Charlotte, North Carolina	Newport News, Virginia
Chicago, Illinois	Norfolk, Virginia
Chula Vista, California	Oakland, California
Cincinnati, Ohio	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
Cleveland, Ohio	Ontario, California
Columbus, Ohio	Overland Park, Kansas
Coral Springs, Florida	Pasadena, California
Dallas, Texas	Pasadena, Texas
Dayton, Ohio	Pembroke Pines, Florida
Denver, Colorado	Phoenix, Arizona
Des Moines, Iowa	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Detroit, Michigan	Plano, Texas
Eugene, Oregon	Portland, Oregon
Evansville, Indiana	Rockford, Illinois
Fort Collins, Colorado	San Bernardino, California
Fort Wayne, Indiana	San Diego, California
Fort Worth, Texas	Santa Rosa, California
Fullerton, California	Seattle, Washington
Garden Grove, California	Simi Valley, California
Glendale, Arizona	St. Louis, Missouri
Hampton, Virginia	St. Petersburg, Florida
Hartford, Connecticut	Stamford, Connecticut
Hialeah, Florida	Sterling Heights, Michigan
Houston, Texas	Tampa, Florida
Inglewood, California	Tempe, Arizona
Irving, Texas	Toledo, Ohio
Jacksonville, Florida	Topeka, Kansas
Kansas City, Missouri	Tucson, Arizona
Knoxville, Tennessee	Virginia Beach, Virginia
Lexington, Kentucky	Waco, Texas
Lincoln, Nebraska	Washington, D.C.
Livonia, Michigan	Waterbury, Connecticut
Long Beach, California	Worcester, Massachusetts
Los Angeles, California	

Table 2A.2 Operationalizations of Variables

Variables	Operationalizations
Dependent variable	Three-year (1999 to 2001) average number of homicides and robberies per 1,000 tract population and motor vehicle thefts per 1,000 tract population
Violent crimes	Three-year (1999 to 2001) average number of burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts per 1,000 tract population
Property crimes	Tract level (N = 8,931)
Independent variables	Neighborhood ethno-racial composition
Residential instability ($\alpha = .69$)	Dummy variables for type of area White neighborhood, 1 = 70% or more non-Latino white (else = 0) (reference) African American neighborhood, 1 = 70% or more non-Latino black (else = 0) Latino neighborhood, 1 = 70% or more Latino (else = 0) Minority neighborhood, 1 = 70% or more Latinos and non-Latino blacks (else = 0) Integrated neighborhood, 1 = any other race-ethnic combination (else = 0) Average of the standard scores for two variables Percentage of occupied housing units that are renter-occupied
Residential loans	Percentage of population age five and over who lived in a different residence in 1995 Total dollar amount of loans issued in 2000 (in thousands of dollars) Average of the standard scores of the following three variables Percentage of the total population that is foreign-born Percentage of the total population that is foreign-born and arrived in the United States in 1990 or later
Immigrant prevalence ($\alpha = .96$)	Percentage of households in which no one age fourteen or over speaks English well


(Table continues on p. 48.)

Table 2A.2 Continued

Variables	Operationalizations
Disadvantage ($\alpha = .93$)	Average of the standard scores for six variables Percentage of population age sixteen to sixty-four who are unemployed or out of the labor force (joblessness) Percentage of employed civilian population age sixteen and over working in professional or managerial occupations (reverse-coded in index) Percentage of population age twenty-five and over who are college graduates (reverse-coded in index)
Percentage of young males	Percentage of the population that is male and age fifteen to thirty-four
City level ($N = 87$)	Index of Dissimilarity across census tracts within the city between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks
Segregation	Average of the standard scores for six variables Percentage of population age sixteen to sixty-four who are unemployed or out of the labor force (joblessness)
Disadvantage ($\alpha = .95$)	Percentage of employed civilian population age sixteen and over working in professional or managerial occupations (reverse-coded in index) Percentage of population age twenty-five and over who are college graduates (reverse-coded in index) Percentage of households that are female-headed families Percentage of employed civilian population age sixteen and over employed in the six occupational categories with the lowest average incomes (low-wage jobs) Percentage of population that is below the poverty line
Percentage of young males	Percentage of the population that is male and age fifteen to thirty-four
Population	Total city population
Percentage African American	Percentage of the population that is non-Latino black
Percentage movers	Percentage of the population age five and over who lived in a different residence in 1995
Percentage foreign-born	Percentage of the population that is foreign-born
Percentage young males	Percentage of the population that is male and age fifteen to thirty-four
South	1 = South (0 if else)
West	1 = West (0 if else)

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 3.1 Whites, African Americans, and Latinos Living in Each of the Five Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Types



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Only 15 percent of African Americans live in neighborhoods with a large representation of Latinos (minority or Latino areas); 18 percent of Latinos live in areas in which African American residents are numerous (minority or African American areas). Although neighborhood ethno-racial segregation is typical for whites and African Americans, notable portions of all three groups live in integrated neighborhoods. More than one-third of whites and one-quarter of African Americans reside in such areas, while 40 percent of Latinos live in integrated neighborhoods.

Nearly forty years ago, the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)—the so-called Kerner Commission Report—warned that we were moving toward two societies, one black and one white. More recently, Massey and Denton (1993, 15) have described the U.S. residential system as an “American apartheid” in which actions and practices systematically isolate African Americans, as happened to South Africans, “within a narrowly circumscribed portion of the urban environment . . . [that] forces blacks to live under extraordinarily harsh conditions.” Unlike in South Africa, America’s

Chapter 3

Divergent Social Worlds

THE STARK reality of U.S. society is that whites, African Americans, and Latinos live in strikingly different social worlds. These divergent communities of color reflect the entrenched inequalities found in a racially structured society in which whites are highly privileged compared to other populations. Groups of varying colors commonly live in separate residential areas that are far from similar in key social conditions that put communities at peril for, or protect them from, a host of social problems. In this chapter, we provide a portrait of white, African American, Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods in large U.S. cities that documents just how different these types of communities are from one another. As we have argued, such differences in social conditions provide the backdrop for crime, one key urban social problem that is highly variable across areas of different colors.

The Distinct Colors of Residence

The separate neighborhoods in which whites, African Americans, and Latinos commonly reside are shown clearly in figure 3.1 for our sample of urban areas. The figure reports the percentage of each group that lives in predominantly white, African American, Latino, minority, or integrated areas. A full 60 percent of whites in the large cities we study live in communities in which their neighbors are mainly (70 percent or more) fellow whites, and half of African Americans reside in areas where most residents are African American. Latinos are less segregated from other groups, but one-third have predominantly Latino neighbors. This level of concentration is especially striking, and far greater than would be randomly expected, in a context where fewer than half of all residents are white and only slightly more than 20 percent are African American or Latino, respectively.

Residential separation into predominantly same-race neighborhoods is greatest for whites, for whom a mere 5 percent live in areas with very large numbers of African Americans or Latinos. However, residential divisions are not limited to those distinguishing whites from nonwhites.


apartheid did not develop exclusively out of prescriptive legal statutes, though legally supported policies and practices such as restrictive covenants, redlining, and the placement of public housing were at the heart of the historical processes that created segregated African American ghettos (Gotham 2002a, 2002b; Haynes 2008; Hirsch 1983; Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Orser 1994; Seligman 2005). These deliberate practices existed with the tacit approval of whites. Thus, by 1980, in many metropolitan areas the residential separation of African Americans from whites was so great across multiple dimensions of segregation that Massey and Denton described it as a pattern of hypersegregation. Indeed, sixteen large metropolitan areas that housed one-third of all U.S. African Americans were hypersegregated in 1980.

Massey and Denton analyzed only fifty of the largest metropolitan areas. Since their book *American Apartheid* was published in 1993, other social scientists have updated their analysis and expanded the sample (Denton 1994; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Wilkes and Iceland 2004). These more recent studies show that residential segregation between blacks and whites has declined somewhat since 1980, but still persists at very high levels. In fact, in both 1990 and 2000, twenty-nine metropolitan areas in the United States were hypersegregated. These included places in all regions of the country, although the most extreme levels are found in the Northeast and Midwest. Residential separation from whites is considerably less extensive for Latinos than for African Americans (see, for example, Logan et al. 2004). Only two metropolitan areas showed Latino-white hypersegregation in 2000 (Wilkes and Iceland 2004).

Our data on the overall concentration of the white, African American, and Latino populations in same-race versus other types of neighborhoods provide clear evidence of how general patterns of segregation play out. They do not, however, fully illustrate Massey and Denton's (1993) contention that the urban United States is an American apartheid that presents uniquely high levels of isolation for African Americans. The distinct and extraordinary isolation of African Americans is shown dramatically in figure 3.2, which displays the percentages of each of the three ethno-racial groups living in neighborhoods made up almost completely (more than 90 percent) of residents from the same group. Over one-third of African Americans live in neighborhoods that are almost exclusively African American. A clear majority of whites and a sizable portion of Latinos live in predominantly same-race areas (figure 3.1), but their separation into exclusively single-group-dominated communities is not nearly as extreme as it is for African Americans. Only 14 percent of whites and 9 percent of Latinos reside in areas with over 90 percent of their own group.

If segregation was neutral in its social consequences, the separation of ethno-racial groups into different neighborhoods would not be a critical concern. However, the effects of segregation are by no means neutral. In

Figure 3.2 Whites, African Americans, and Latinos in Neighborhoods with 90 Percent or More of the Same Race-Ethnicity



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

the next section, we turn to a description of just how consequential segregation is in the U.S. racial context.

Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Inequality

Table 3.1 shows the dramatic ethno-racial inequality associated with residential separation for six widely used indicators of social and economic status—poverty, joblessness, low-wage jobs, female-headed families, professional workers, and college graduates. The table presents average levels of these characteristics separately for the white, African American, Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods in our study. The results show three overarching patterns of neighborhood differentiation. First, white neighborhoods are especially privileged across all aspects of disadvantage. Fewer than 10 percent of residents of white areas are impoverished, and only about one-quarter of the working-age population lacks a job (either voluntarily or involuntarily).¹ In addition, levels of low-wage employment (12.2 percent) and female headship (8.6 percent) are modest. At the same time, high-status workers and college graduates are prevalent in white communities. Somewhat fewer than half of those who are employed work in high-status jobs, and a full 40 percent of all adults are college graduates.

Table 3.1 Mean Values for Socioeconomic Variables for Neighborhoods of Different Colors

Neighborhood Characteristic	African American Areas			Latino Areas			Minority Areas			Integrated Areas		
	White Areas	African American Areas	Latino Areas	Latino Areas	African American Areas	Minority Areas	Minority Areas	Latino Areas	Latino Areas	African American Areas	Integrated Areas	
Poverty	8.6%	31.7%	28.9%	28.9%	31.7%	28.3%	28.3%	28.9%	31.7%	17.9%	17.9%	
Joblessness	23.5	47.8	47.1	47.1	47.8	45.0	45.0	47.1	47.8	32.4	32.4	
Low-wage jobs	12.2	26.3	25.1	25.1	26.3	25.1	25.1	25.1	26.3	18.4	18.4	
Female-headed families	8.6	35.7	18.6	18.6	35.7	24.8	24.8	18.6	35.7	14.7	14.7	
Professional workers	44.2	21.2	13.1	13.1	21.2	18.9	18.9	13.1	21.2	31.6	31.6	
College graduates	39.8	9.9	6.7	6.7	9.9	10.2	10.2	6.7	9.9	24.4	24.4	
Number of cases		3,115	1,467	679	1,467	645	645	679	1,467	3,025	3,025	

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Second, there are dramatic consequences for those living in areas with large concentrations of subordinate-group members (African American, Latino, and minority neighborhoods). Average levels of low-status characteristics are generally two to three times higher in the three types of nonwhite neighborhoods (African American, Latino, and minority) compared to white neighborhoods. Almost one-third of residents in the typical African American community are poor. Poverty rates approach this level (approximately 28 percent) in average Latino and minority areas. Even more dramatically, nearly half of the working-age population in the nonwhite areas has no job, and about one-quarter of those who work have positions in the lowest-wage occupations. Reflecting societal differentials in family structure, African American neighborhoods stand out in the high prevalence of female-headed families (36 percent). The two remaining indicators show the opposite side of this portrait. Professional workers are half as common in areas populated by African Americans as in white areas, and there are only one-quarter as many college graduates in the former as in the latter. Latino neighborhoods are even worse off in terms of these two characteristics. Only 13 percent of employed residents work in professional jobs, and a mere 7 percent are college graduates. Minority areas are more similar to African American communities in their average levels of the high-status characteristics.

Third, integrated neighborhoods provide environments that are a combination of those found in white and predominantly nonwhite areas; levels of social and economic characteristics fall between those evident in these two sets of communities. Detrimental conditions are more widespread in integrated neighborhoods than in predominantly white neighborhoods but are notably less prevalent than in African American, Latino, and minority communities. They also have a dearth of high-status indi-

viduals when compared to white areas. Yet integrated neighborhoods have substantially more professional workers and college graduates than any of the three types of nonwhite areas.


These comparisons are telling regarding the extent of ethnic and racial neighborhood inequality. However, the values only describe the average point in the distribution for each community condition. They do not indicate whether or how varying levels of the factors overlap, which is a particularly critical concern when we compare neighborhoods of different colors in the United States. For example, African American neighborhoods not only differ from other types of local areas in their typical socioeconomic character, but in many places they also diverge so much from white communities that the most advantaged African American areas are no better off than the typical white neighborhood (Krivo and Peterson 2000; McNulty 2001; Peterson and Krivo 2005; Sampson 2009; Sampson, Sharkey, and Raudenbush 2008; Sampson and Wilson 1995). And "the 'worst' urban neighborhoods in which Whites reside are considerably better off than those of the average Black community" (Sampson and Bean 2006, 12).

Examination of the distributions for each of the socioeconomic characteristics grouped into low, high, and extreme levels for differently colored neighborhoods is instructive. These data show the character of the divergent social worlds in which whites and other groups reside even more strikingly than the averages. In fact, there is very little overlap in the residential conditions of whites and the conditions faced by people living in African American, Latino, and minority neighborhoods. Integrated communities share the advantages of white areas and the disadvantages of their nonwhite counterparts. This is the case for all six of the average social conditions described in table 3.1. In figures 3.3 and 3.4, we present these results graphically for two of the disadvantage characteristics, poverty and professional workers, as illustrative of this general pattern. (For the remaining four conditions, see figures 3A.1 to 3A.4.)

Figure 3.3 displays levels of poverty for the five types of neighborhood color. Poverty is categorized into low, high, and extreme levels following a widely used convention in research on poverty concentration: less than 20 percent, 20 to 39 percent, and 40 percent or more (Jargowsky 2003; Jargowsky and Bane 1990, 1991). The results in the figure are stark. Low poverty levels are pervasive in white neighborhoods, with almost all areas (over 90 percent) falling into this category. Further examination of the distribution of white neighborhoods with low poverty reveals that most have rates below 10 percent, and a striking 37 percent have fewer than 5 percent poor residents (results not shown). Extreme poverty characterizes a mere 1 percent of white communities.

The contrast with African American, Latino, and minority neighborhoods could hardly be more extreme. Only about one-quarter of each of

Figure 3.3 Neighborhood Types with Varying Levels of Poverty




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

these three types of nonwhite areas has a low poverty rate. For African American areas, a very similar number have extreme poverty as have low poverty. Fewer Latino and minority areas (16 and 15 percent, respectively) than African American neighborhoods (25 percent) have extreme poverty levels. Further, a clear majority of all three nonwhite neighborhood types are highly impoverished. Overall, a paltry 7 percent of white communities are highly or extremely poor, while fully three-quarters of African American, Latino, and minority areas reach these high levels. Integrated neighborhoods are more like white neighborhoods, although poverty is more pervasive there than for the most privileged population in the United States. Nearly two-thirds of integrated areas have low poverty, and only 5 percent are extremely poor. Still, a sizable 31 percent (compared to 6 percent for white areas and well over 50 percent for each of the predominantly nonwhite neighborhoods) fall into the high poverty category.

Figure 3.4 presents the data for the prevalence of workers in professional occupations. Here we again see the unquestionably privileged status of white communities: nearly 60 percent reach the threshold of having many professional workers (40 percent or more), and only 7 percent have few professionals (fewer than 20 percent) living in the area.²

Figure 3.4 Neighborhood Types with Varying Levels of Professional Workers




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

The contrasting patterns for African American, Latino, and minority neighborhoods are pronounced: at most, 4 percent of these communities have a large number of professionals. At the other extreme, half of African American neighborhoods, 60 percent of minority areas, and a whopping 89 percent of Latino neighborhoods are characterized by a low number of high-status workers. The integrated neighborhoods are situated between the levels of this aspect of advantage (or disadvantage) found in white and nonwhite areas.

Constellations of Disadvantage

To this point, we have described the different social worlds found in white, African American, Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods for individual dimensions of disadvantage. In reality, however, poverty, joblessness, high-status work, and other conditions do not exist apart from one another. Rather, they overlap, albeit to varying degrees, across ethno-racial groups and local communities. We take this point into account by examining how all six characteristics come together to create contexts of overall disadvantage (or advantage) that vary across neighborhoods.

Figure 3.5 Disadvantage Distributions for White and African American Neighborhoods




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
 Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

The portrait drawn when looking at constellations of community conditions reveals that the divergent residential worlds of whites, African Americans, and Latinos are even more distinct than we have already seen. Figures 3.5 through 3.8 illustrate the comparative disadvantage distributions for white versus African American, white versus Latino, white versus minority, and white versus integrated neighborhoods. Disadvantage is measured for each neighborhood as an index that combines poverty, joblessness, low-wage jobs, female-headed families, nonprofessional workers, and noncollege graduates. A value of 0 on the disadvantage index represents *average* disadvantage relative to the mean for all neighborhoods in the large cities studied here. More negative values (to the left of 0) reflect an increasingly lower prevalence of adverse conditions. As the index becomes more positive (to the right of 0), the values symbolize an ever greater complex of disadvantages.

The white-African American neighborhood comparison shown in figure 3.5 indicates that very few white areas have above-average disadvantage (greater than 0). We find an increasing percentage of white

Figure 3.6 Disadvantage Distributions for White and Latino Neighborhoods




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
 Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

neighborhoods as we move toward lower and lower levels of disadvantage; over one-quarter of these communities have extremely low levels. African American communities are in the exact opposite situation. Most have above-average disadvantage (greater than 0), and as we move toward the higher end of the disadvantage distribution we generally see an increasing proportion of African American areas. A striking 26 percent of black neighborhoods have the most extreme level of disadvantage. In fact, the figure has a decidedly V-shaped appearance because the largest share of white neighborhoods have very low levels of disadvantage while the largest share of African American neighborhoods have high to extremely high levels of overlapping disadvantages.

Figure 3.6 compares white and Latino communities. As already shown in figure 3.5, white areas have levels of disadvantage that are mainly in the low end of the disadvantage distribution. Conversely, most Latino neighborhoods have above-average disadvantage. Both Latino and African American areas are much more disadvantaged than white communities, but the circumstances of these two nonwhite populations are far

Figure 3.7 Disadvantage Distributions for White and Minority Neighborhoods




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
 Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

from identical. (See figure 3A.5 for a direct comparison of the distributions for African American and Latino neighborhoods.) A very large portion of African American neighborhoods are represented at the most extreme disadvantage levels, while Latino communities are heavily clustered at high levels. At the same time, fewer Latino areas than African American areas are privileged in having below-average levels of the index. A total of 5.5 percent of the African American neighborhoods versus only 1.3 percent of the Latino neighborhoods are in the lowest five categories of disadvantage. Such African American-Latino differences loom large in recent discussions seeking to account for crime rates that are lower in Latino areas than in African American areas. Martinez (2002) and Vélez (2006) point to lower levels of concentrated disadvantage among Latino neighborhoods compared with African American neighborhoods as one possible explanation for this pattern.

Figures 3.7 and 3.8 compare white neighborhoods with minority and integrated areas. The distribution of disadvantage for minority areas is

Figure 3.8 Disadvantage Distributions for White and Integrated Neighborhoods



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
 Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

more similar to those for predominantly African American and Latino neighborhoods than to that for heavily white areas. The pattern for communities with a substantial mix of the two nonwhite groups reflects the blending of the populations, with disadvantage concentrated at very high levels, but not the most extreme levels. Figure 3.8 shows that integrated neighborhoods are more similar to white communities than to predominantly nonwhite areas. A notable portion of integrated neighborhoods have below-average disadvantage, as is common for white areas. Yet the conditions of integrated neighborhoods are affected by the presence of nonwhites; nearly half have above-average disadvantage compared to only about 11 percent of white areas.

On the whole, racial and ethnic groups reside in qualitatively distinct social worlds in the United States. Therefore, any description of the social and economic character of neighborhoods that ignores the role of race and ethnicity is highly distorted. Indeed, it is quite misleading to describe neighborhoods in terms of "average" disadvantage because the vast majority of areas do not have values near 0. Rather, neighborhoods

Table 3.2 Number of Extreme Disadvantages for Neighborhoods of Different Colors

Neighborhood Color	None	Only One	Two or Three	Four or More
White areas	88.9%	4.6%	5.5%	1.0%
African American areas	2.8	12.3	28.6	56.4
Latino areas	3.2	3.8	41.5	51.4
Minority areas	5.9	15.0	31.5	47.6
Integrated areas	56.4	16.5	18.4	8.7

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

commonly are either white and possess few disadvantages or nonwhite (African American, Latino, or minority) and possess many disadvantages. "Average" levels of deprivation are found mainly in integrated areas. This type of neighborhood is by no means rare (about one-third of the sample); nevertheless, it is far from the norm.

We also compare the *number* of disadvantages that are extremely high across the five ethno-racial community types (table 3.2). At one end of the spectrum, most white areas (89 percent) do not have extreme levels for a single disadvantage characteristic. Integrated neighborhoods are also well off in this regard: 56 percent have no extremely high disadvantages. Only about 3 percent of African American and Latino communities and 6 percent of minority areas are privileged enough that they have no extreme disadvantages. At the other end of the spectrum, we reveal a common pattern of *hyperdisadvantage*—at least four of the six aspects of disadvantage are extreme—among predominantly nonwhite urban neighborhoods. This is the case for over half of African American and Latino neighborhoods and 48 percent of minority communities. In addition to hyperdisadvantaged communities, 29 percent of African American areas, 42 percent of Latino areas, and 32 percent of minority areas have two or three disadvantages that are extremely high. Thus, a full 85 percent of all African American areas are extremely disadvantaged in at least two ways, as are 93 percent of Latino communities, and this is the case as well for nearly 80 percent of minority neighborhoods. Such entrenched disadvantage is rare among white and integrated communities. Virtually no white and very few integrated communities are hyperdisadvantaged. In fact, a mere thirty-one of the over three thousand white neighborhoods in our sample are extremely disadvantaged in four or more ways. And only 7 percent of white and 27 percent of integrated local areas are either hyperdisadvantaged or nearly so, having at least two characteristics at the extreme. Clearly, it is no exaggeration to conclude that minorities and whites live in divergent social worlds.

Other Aspects of Community Character

In addition to disadvantage, urban crime scholars emphasize the roles of residential instability, external investments, and immigrant concentration in accounting for variation in neighborhood crime. How do neighborhoods of color differ across these three characteristics? Table 3.3 addresses this question. Recall that residential instability combines the prevalence of renters and short-term residents. The level of external investment is indicated by the value of home loans. Immigration includes the size of the foreign-born, recent immigrant, and linguistically isolated populations.

As a whole, there is far less ethno-racial differentiation in aspects of residential instability than in either residential loans or immigration. White neighborhoods have many fewer renters than all other types of areas—36 percent for white areas versus 54 to 60 percent for other community types. These gaps reflect long-standing discriminatory housing market practices that limit homeownership for nonwhites, especially for blacks (see, for example, Pager and Shepherd 2008; Ross and Turner 2005). African American neighborhoods have relatively fewer recent movers (41 percent, which is 8 to 15 percent less than in other types of areas). This too is likely due to housing discrimination as well as urban decline. With nonblacks avoiding—or being steered away from—heavily African American neighborhoods, residential mobility into African American areas is low (see, for example, Quillian 2002). Further, many urban African Americans have few options for leaving troubled inner-city neighborhoods. In this sense, they are "stuck" in heavily African American communities. This is not the case for the vast majority of whites, who have more neighborhood options and more resources to facilitate moves (see, for example, Charles 2003; South, Crowder, and Pais 2008). For the other neighborhood types, the presence of recent movers is closer to levels in white areas because of the inflow of new immigrants. Greater mobility within Latino, minority, and integrated areas combines with higher percentages of renters, yielding overall above-average residential instability (0.18 in Latino neighborhoods to 0.28 in integrated areas).

Community investments in the form of residential loans are highly inequitable across communities of distinct colors. While the typical white area received over \$22 million in residential loans in 2000, the average African American neighborhood got less than one-quarter of this amount (just under \$5 million). Latino and minority neighborhoods are also relatively investment-poor, with an average of \$6.5 million and \$9.3 million in loans, respectively. Integrated areas are better off than all of the

predominantly nonwhite areas in the amount of residential loans (a mean of \$14 million), but lag well behind white neighborhoods.

Racially and ethnically distinct communities vary in the presence of immigrant characteristics in predictable ways. Foreign-born residents, recent immigrants, and the linguistically isolated are most common in predominantly Latino neighborhoods. At the other end of the spectrum, African American areas have very few residents with immigrant characteristics. White, minority, and integrated neighborhoods fall in between the two extremes, with immigration having a stronger presence in the latter two types of areas, owing to the concentration of Latinos.

Conclusion: Linking Divergent Social Worlds and Criminal Inequality

The data presented in this chapter illustrate clearly the dramatic nature of the racial-spatial divide in the urban United States. At issue in this book is whether and how this divide provides the structural underpinnings for racial and ethnic inequality in levels of crime. In chapter 2, we presented a broad overview of violent and property crime rates across distinct ethno-racial neighborhood types. Comparing the rank order of the crime levels across these areas to the order of levels of local contextual characteristics suggests that the hierarchy of crime is indeed closely related to the hierarchy of local circumstances, at least for violent offenses. Specifically, African American neighborhoods have the highest rates of violent crime and also have by far the most disadvantage, the lowest external investments, and the fewest immigrants of all race-ethnic communities. Latino and minority neighborhoods have lower violent crime rates than African American areas, and they have high—but much less extreme—disadvantage levels compared to African American neighborhoods (see figures 3A.5 and 3A.6). Latino and minority areas also have a large immigrant presence, which serves to reduce violence relative to their African American counterparts (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld 2001; Martinez 2002; Sampson 2008; Vélez 2006). Integrated neighborhoods have less disadvantage and considerably higher levels of residential investment than African American, Latino, and minority areas, but their structural circumstances are less favorable than those for their white counterparts. Criminal violence in integrated areas falls between the rate for the African American and minority areas and the rate for white neighborhoods, as do levels of disadvantage and residential investments. As a last point, white areas unquestionably have both the lowest violence rates and the best neighborhood circumstances. Thus, from the comparisons of averages of violence and neighborhood

Table 3.3 Mean Values of Residential Instability and Immigrant Characteristics for Neighborhoods of Different Colors

Neighborhood Characteristic	African American Areas	Latino Areas	Minority Areas	Integrated Areas
Residential instability	-.248	.181	.201	.282
Percentage renters	36.1	60.8	59.8	54.4
Percentage movers	51.6	49.8	50.9	56.3
Residential loans (in thousands of dollars)	22,073	4,919	9,340	14,003
Immigrant characteristics	-.464	-1,934	.630	.259
Percentage foreign-born	8.8	47.9	26.9	21.3
Percentage recent immigrant	3.7	21.5	12.5	10.2
Percentage linguistically isolated	2.4	31.6	14.7	9.4

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).


conditions, it appears that racialized community structures are key sources of neighborhood criminal inequality for this type of crime.

Variation in mean property crime rates across neighborhoods of distinct colors does not correspond in a clear fashion with the pattern of structural differentiation in the conditions that undergird crime. Levels of property crime are highest for African American areas, but they are not much greater than those found for integrated communities, even though these two types are quite dissimilar in their structural conditions. For example, integrated neighborhoods receive over three times the amount of loan dollars as African American communities and have much lower levels of disadvantage. Property offenses are also somewhat more common in white than Latino areas. This would not be expected from the patterning of the theoretical community factors, especially given how much less disadvantage there is in white areas.

While informative, the evidence presented to this point does not account for the ways in which neighborhood conditions are linked with one another, and hence it does not allow for an evaluation of their net associations with violent and property crime. Nor does the evidence take into account the relevant criminogenic characteristics of the cities where our sample neighborhoods are located—for example, citywide residential segregation, level of socioeconomic disadvantage for the urban area, and the macroeconomic character that prevails. In the following chapter, we present results from statistical models of neighborhood violent and property crime that simultaneously consider the roles of a full set of relevant neighborhood and city structural characteristics. This approach shows us which factors, at the city and neighborhood levels, are broadly important in predicting local levels of the two types of crime. It also addresses the question of whether racialized neighborhood structures are independently responsible for ethnic and racial neighborhood criminal inequality.


Appendix

Figure 3A.1 Neighborhood Types by Levels of Joblessness




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 3A.2 Neighborhood Types with Varying Levels of Low-Wage Jobs




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 3A.3 Neighborhood Types with Varying Levels of Female-Headed Families




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 3A.4 Neighborhood Types with Varying Levels of College Graduates




Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Figure 3A.5 Disadvantage Distributions for African American and Latino Neighborhoods



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
 Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

Figure 3A.6 Disadvantage Distributions for African American and Minority Neighborhoods



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Note: Disadvantage Index values represent the midpoint of equal-size categories.

Chapter 4

The Links Between Racialized Community Structures and Crime

ARE THE divergent social worlds of racially distinct neighborhoods the source of dramatic racial and ethnic neighborhood inequality in violent and property crime? Is crime so low in white neighborhoods because of their enormous socioeconomic privilege? Are the often hyperdisadvantaged conditions of African American local areas responsible for their heightened violent and property offending? Is crime somewhat lower in Latino and minority neighborhoods than in African American ones because the presence of immigrants serves as a countervailing force to high disadvantage? Are integrated areas a middle ground in crime because they fall in the middle in their social and economic character? And do neighborhoods in cities that are more segregated, disadvantaged, and economically declining have worse crime problems?

These important questions have gone unanswered because of the lack of sound national data on neighborhood crime across a diverse set of cities. Here we answer them using the novel National Neighborhood Crime Study, whose breadth of data allows for an unprecedented look at the connections between race, place, and crime. As detailed in this chapter, the extraordinarily divergent social worlds we have already described are at the heart of neighborhood ethno-racial criminal inequality. Yet surprisingly, even after accounting for such divergence, highly *advantaged* nonwhite neighborhoods still have more violence than comparably advantaged white communities.

Structural Conditions and Violent Crime

In chapter 2, we pointed to research showing that city conditions are connected with city rates of violence and that neighborhood conditions and neighborhood violent crime are linked within selected urban areas (see review by Pratt and Cullen 2005). However, we do not know whether

and how relationships cross the two levels of city and neighborhood. Therefore, in this section we address two critical questions. Is the character of the city in which neighborhoods are located independently related to neighborhood violence? And are neighborhood structural conditions broadly associated with violent crime across a large set of cities after accounting for variation in city context?

To answer these questions we use multivariate models that examine both neighborhood and city characteristics as predictors of neighborhood violent crime rates. City black-white residential segregation, disadvantage, and manufacturing employment (as an indicator of macroeconomic character) are the key city factors. We also control for city population, region, and the percentages of African Americans, recent movers, foreign-born individuals, and young males. Residential instability, residential loans, immigration, and disadvantage are the core neighborhood conditions we consider, along with the type of race-ethnic neighborhood composition. Neighborhood age structure is controlled. The models account for the fact that different neighborhoods within a given city share commonalities that are not fully captured by measured variables. They also rely on a specification that deals with the relatively rare nature of crime as an outcome.¹ Variables are scaled so that coefficients for the city-level factors (such as segregation) can be interpreted as effects on the average neighborhood violence rate within the city, net of the neighborhood conditions.²

Table 4.1 presents results from a model of neighborhood violent crime that includes both the city and neighborhood characteristics. Ethno-racial neighborhood type is included in the model, but the results for this factor are not presented in table 4.1. Findings for racial and ethnic community composition receive major attention in later tables. Each value in table 4.1 represents the percentage change in the rate of neighborhood violent crime for a one-standard-deviation unit change in the respective characteristic.³ A standard deviation change represents a meaningful but not overwhelming shift in a variable. For example, a difference of one standard deviation in the percentage of African Americans in the city equals 17 percent. This is a large difference in the relative size of the African American population, but one that is clearly observed across cities in the United States. Indeed, it reflects the gap in the size of this population between places such as Denver and Los Angeles, which are about 10 percent African American, and Pittsburgh and Nashville, which are around 27 percent African American. A starred percentage indicates that a condition has a statistically important relationship—that is, one that is clearly different from 0 and is not due to chance.⁴

Are characteristics of cities independently related to neighborhood violence? Residential segregation and manufacturing employment are

Table 4.1 Effects of City and Neighborhood Characteristics on Neighborhood Violent Crime Rates

Characteristic	Percentage Change in Neighborhood Violence
City conditions	
Segregation	28.9%*
Disadvantage	3.7
Percentage manufacturing	-12.5*
Population size	6.9*
Percentage African American	30.2*
Percentage movers	0.5
Percentage foreign-born	7.1
Percentage young males	1.4
South	-21.7*
West	12.2
Neighborhood conditions	
Percentage young males	2.0
Residential instability	29.8*
Residential loans	-8.8*
Immigration	-11.2*
Disadvantage (at the mean)	58.9*

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Note: Values represent the percentage change in the neighborhood violent crime rate for a one-standard-deviation unit change in the characteristic for all variables except South and West. For the region variables, values represent the percentage difference in the neighborhood violent crime rate between the South or West and other areas of the country. Ethno-racial neighborhood type is controlled.

* $p < .05$

both important contributors to violence in local areas. Neighborhoods located in cities where black-white segregation is greater have notably higher levels of violent crime. Thus, segregation of urban environments adds to violence over and above the ways in which it concentrates deleterious conditions in African American and other nonwhite neighborhoods and advantageous circumstances in white areas. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation-higher level of segregation (18 points on a 100-point scale) is associated with a nearly 30 percent higher rate of neighborhood-level violence. Thus, the typical neighborhood in a place such as Kansas City, Missouri, or Dallas (segregation value = 66) would have 30 percent more violence than the same neighborhood in a city like New Haven (segregation value = 48). This connection is sizable and suggests that racial residential segregation is indeed harmful to the creation of safe communities. As we argued earlier, city segregation undermines

the ability of communities to come together to solve problems. When the public is racially and spatially divided, groups do not have common local interests, and hence the motivation and coalitions required to improve the social and institutional structures that affect crime are likely to be absent.

The macroeconomic character of the larger urban area is also related to neighborhood violence. In particular, a stronger manufacturing base in a city is associated with lower violence for neighborhoods. A one-standard-deviation-higher percentage of workers (a difference of five percentage points) in this type of industry is related to a 12.5 percent lower rate of neighborhood violent crime. Cities with a viable manufacturing economy have many good jobs for residents and a strong tax base for local governments. This means that individuals and institutions have more resources to invest in local communities and hence to support the conventional opportunities for residents that encourage people to stay out of trouble. Manufacturing cities are also more capable of maintaining services such as police, recreation centers, and other functions that help keep crime at bay. The level of citywide socioeconomic disadvantage has only a slight association with neighborhood violence, and one that is not statistically significant net of other city and neighborhood factors. Apparently, city disadvantage and violent crime are linked exclusively through the way in which disadvantage is distributed across neighborhoods.

Beyond the key factors, neighborhood violence is greater in larger cities and in those with more sizable African American populations. The relationship between population size and violence is well established in studies of cities. In contrast, it is surprising that the percentage of African Americans in the urban area is connected with violence when segregation, city disadvantage, and a host of other structural conditions within urban places, as well as disadvantage and racial composition at the neighborhood level, are taken into account. This result may itself reflect aspects of the racialized nature of social and political processes within U.S. cities that are difficult to measure across a broad set of places. For example, many cities with large black populations, such as Detroit and Cleveland, are plagued with substantial financial and institutional problems stemming from long periods of disinvestment and political neglect. This all-encompassing decline has made it extremely difficult to overcome spirals of decay that encourage the spread of problematic outcomes like crime.

The remaining city condition associated with neighborhood violence is location in the South. Neighborhoods in southern cities have nearly 22 percent *less* violent crime than their counterparts elsewhere. Lower violence in southern neighborhoods is unexpected in light of previous theory and research suggesting that there is a southern culture of violence that condones violent behavior as a way of addressing grievances

under particular circumstances (see, for example, Nelsen, Corzine, and Huff-Corzine 1994; Parker and Pruitt 2000; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). The unanticipated result reflects the particular cities included in the NNCS. Our sample is representative of large cities overall and within regions. Yet given the size of our city sample, states with very few places over 100,000 population, including large parts of the South, are sometimes not represented in our data. In fact, there are no cities in the sample from the several Deep South states. This may explain the regional effect observed here.

The results presented in the bottom portion of table 4.1 explore whether the associations of neighborhood characteristics with violence found in single-city studies hold in a national sample. In fact, all four of the theoretical structural conditions are statistically connected with rates of violent crime, and they have moderate to very strong influences. Violence within neighborhoods is higher in more residentially unstable and highly disadvantaged areas, while it is lower in places that receive more residential investments and have more immigrants. In particular, a one-standard-deviation-greater level of residential instability is associated with a 30 percent higher level of violent crime. This finding is consistent with social disorganization theory, which contends that more unstable communities have more difficulty coming together to achieve common goals, including crime reduction. More residential loans reduce rates of violence across a large sample of neighborhoods throughout the United States. A notable increase in the amount of loan dollars (one standard deviation) is connected with a nearly 9 percent lower rate of criminal violence. This finding underscores the importance of local investments for shoring up neighborhoods in ways that keep criminal violence at bay. Neighborhoods with a standard-deviation-higher level of immigration have about 11 percent less violence. This finding supports a growing number of recent studies that highlight the beneficial impact of immigrant presence for keeping crime down.

As noted in chapter 2, disadvantage is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of neighborhood violence (see, for example, Peterson and Krivo 2005; Pratt and Cullen 2005). The results presented here for a national sample of local areas provide further support for this conclusion. However, the influence of disadvantage on violence may taper off as disadvantage becomes increasingly widespread (Krivo and Peterson 2000; McNulty 2001) because once disadvantage becomes very high, ever greater levels may not further differentiate communities in ways that are influential for crime. To illustrate using poverty (one component of disadvantage), consider a 10 percent difference in the poverty rate when going from a low of 10 percent poor to 20 percent poor, compared to a shift from a very high 40 percent poor to 50 percent

poor. The former change is likely to have a strong impact on community social organization, and hence violent crime. By contrast, the neighborhood with the very high 40 percent rate is probably already so steeped in disorganization that the same poverty increase would matter little for crime. The NNCS data support this argument. Greater neighborhood disadvantage is associated with more violence, but this effect is weaker for higher compared to lower disadvantage. As shown in table 4.1, when disadvantage is at the average level, one-standard-deviation-more disadvantage is associated with a nearly 60 percent higher rate of violent crime. When disadvantage is very low (one standard deviation below the mean), the same increase results in a 90 percent higher rate of violence (results not reported in table 4.1). And when disadvantage is a similar amount *above* average, a one-standard-deviation increase in this factor leads to just 33 percent more violence. Thus, although the linkage between disadvantage and violence is substantial at all levels, higher and higher deprivation is connected with less and less change in criminal violence.

Accounting for Ethno-Racial Inequality in Neighborhood Violence

The core argument of this book is that racialized neighborhood structures are critical in producing ethnic and racial inequality in neighborhood crime. We contend that racial and ethnic residential segregation is a key structural mechanism that helps to sustain an overall racial hierarchy in the United States. In this segregated context, dramatic inequalities in social conditions are produced and persist across urban neighborhoods that differ in their ethno-racial composition. The variation in circumstances is fundamental in setting the stage for crime and therefore should account for ethno-racial inequality in neighborhood violence.

In this section, we evaluate this argument by exploring differentials in violence across white, African American, Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods using the same type of multivariate analysis as reported in table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents these results. The values in this table represent the ratios of the neighborhood violent crime rate for the average African American, Latino, minority, or integrated area to that for the average white area. Our baseline model (row 1) considers ethno-racial differences in violence while simultaneously holding constant city conditions and local-area age-sex composition, but no other neighborhood characteristics. We then add in succession each of the neighborhood factors that is considered to be a major contributor to local violence (rows 2 to 5). Residential instability is considered first, followed by residential loans, immigration, and disadvantage in turn. To the degree that

Table 4.2 Ratios of Violent Crime Rates for African American, Latino, Minority, and Integrated Versus White Neighborhoods

Accounting For:	African American Area/		Latino Area/		Minority Area/		Integrated Area/	
	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area
Baseline model	4.27*	2.49*	2.49*	3.45*	2.25*	2.25*	2.25*	2.25*
Plus residential instability	3.82*	2.46*	2.46*	3.12*	2.02*	2.02*	2.02*	2.02*
Plus residential loans	3.28*	2.13*	2.13*	2.80*	1.92*	1.92*	1.92*	1.92*
Plus immigration	3.26*	2.25*	2.25*	2.87*	1.95*	1.95*	1.95*	1.95*
Plus disadvantage	1.65*	1.29*	1.29*	1.53*	1.36*	1.36*	1.36*	1.36*

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Note: The baseline model includes ten city characteristics (segregation, disadvantage, manufacturing, population, percentage African American, percentage recent movers, percentage foreign-born, percentage young males, South, and West) and neighborhood age-sex structure. Shading highlights the substantial degree of change in the violence ratios from the baseline model to the final model that includes neighborhood disadvantage.
* $p < .05$

racialized social conditions contribute to ethnic and racial inequality in violent crime, the reported violence ratios should fall closer to 1 as each additional neighborhood factor is taken into consideration.

Beginning with the baseline model, differentials in violent crime rates are striking when aspects of the city context and the percentage of young males in the neighborhood are controlled. For the average city, violent crime in African American neighborhoods is just over four and a quarter times that for white neighborhoods (row 1). This very large gap is only slightly less than the differential in mean rates without any factors controlled, where the violent crime rate for African American areas is five times that for white areas (reported in figure 2.1). For the other three neighborhood colors, the excess of average violence compared to whites is also large and barely altered from that for the gross means reported in figure 2.1. Violent crime in Latino areas is about two and a half times higher than in the average white neighborhood. The ratio is similar for integrated areas, where mean violence is about two and a quarter times that for white areas. Minority areas have three and a half times as much violence as typical white neighborhoods.

How much does each neighborhood condition account for these differentials in violent crime? We answer this question first for residential instability (row 2). Although this factor has a strong relationship with neighborhood rates of violent crime (see table 4.1), residential instability accounts for only a small share of differences from white area violence for each distinct neighborhood color. When this community condition

is added, the excess of violent crime in African American, minority, and integrated neighborhoods compared to white neighborhoods is reduced by only a modest amount—about 10 percent in each case. For African American areas, the gap is still very large, but the mean falls below four times that for white areas. For minority and integrated neighborhoods, the ratios now drop to slightly more than 3 and 2, respectively, after controlling for differences in residential instability. Finally, the Latino-white gap in neighborhood violence is unaffected by variation in levels of instability.

Next we incorporate external investments, as reflected in greater amounts of residential loan dollars. For each type of neighborhood, residential loans reduce the violence differentials further (comparing rows 2 and 3), with change being more substantial for African American and Latino areas than for either of the other two types of areas. For African American and Latino neighborhoods, the differentials from white communities are reduced by about 15 percent. Thus, the substantial deficits in the infusion of resources into these two types of nonwhite neighborhoods (reported in table 3.3) is a modest, but not unimportant, part of the story underlying violence gaps. This is somewhat less the case for minority and integrated areas. Variation in investments reduces the gap in violence between minority and white neighborhoods by 10 percent and produces a reduction of only 5 percent for integrated areas.

Turning to neighborhood immigration, Latino areas are the most distinguished from other types of communities in the prevalence of immigrant characteristics (table 3.3). Thus, immigration should be a major factor accounting for violent crime in Latino compared to white (and other) neighborhoods. Bear in mind, however, that immigration operates to reduce violence and hence is one condition that keeps Latino rates down and closer to those in white areas. When immigration is held constant in the model, its levels are treated as if they are lower than actually observed in Latino neighborhoods. This would raise violence and increase the difference from white communities. We observe this pattern in table 4.2 with the Latino-white neighborhood violence ratio increasing when immigration is controlled. Thus, it appears that violent crime would be even higher for Latino relative to white neighborhoods if immigration did not work to keep violence down. The addition of immigration to the model is inconsequential in accounting for inequality in violence between African American, minority, and integrated areas compared to white areas because immigration is less common in all of these neighborhood types.

Finally, the results make it clear that socioeconomic disadvantage is the major condition accounting for the much higher levels of violence in all types of nonwhite versus white neighborhoods. Incorporating dis-

advantage reduces the African American-white ratio by about half. Rates of violence are, on average, 65 percent higher in African American than white neighborhoods after accounting for the large difference in disadvantage between the two types of communities. The remaining differential is still substantial, but it is far short of what is otherwise observed—African American rates that are three to more than four times those for white areas. The incorporation of disadvantage leads to similarly large reductions in the Latino-white and minority-white ratios. These differentials are diminished by 43 and 47 percent, respectively, compared to the model without disadvantage. Disadvantage has a smaller but still strong impact on the integrated versus white violence differential. When all characteristics are accounted for, violent crime is an average of about one-third higher for integrated than white neighborhoods.

Clearly racialized neighborhood structural factors go a long way in accounting for inequality in levels of violent crime across areas with distinct ethno-racial compositions. If dramatic differences in social circumstances by race did not exist in the United States, African American neighborhoods would have average rates of violence only 65 percent higher than for white neighborhoods, not 327 percent higher (14.27 – 1.00] × 100). Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods would have average rates just 29, 53, and 36 percent higher, respectively, than for white areas, not more than two or three times as high (as shown in row 1). Thus, even with such large reductions, racial privilege in violent crime rates for white communities remains and is consequential in magnitude.


The Further Importance of Racialized Disadvantage

Thus far we have demonstrated the centrality of disadvantage as a structural condition underlying criminal violence. Earlier work suggests, however, that the relationship between disadvantage and violence varies across race-ethnic groups and areas because of the differential positions of groups in society. Along with Thomas McNulty, we have shown that disadvantage is more strongly connected with white than African American rates of violence (Krivo and Peterson 2000; McNulty 2001). This results from whites living in the privileged situation of low disadvantage. Increases in this condition are meaningful in distinguishing criminogenic structural contexts, but this is not the case for African Americans, who commonly live in areas where disadvantage is very high and changes in levels do not produce strong qualitative distinctions in structural environments. In other words, predominantly white and African American areas are in non-overlapping parts of the disadvantage distribution where the influences of deprivation are dissimilar.

The results for disadvantage reported so far for the NNCS data appear to be consistent with these earlier findings. Broadly speaking, we have shown that disadvantage: (1) differentiates neighborhoods of distinct colors such that not all types of areas are found throughout the disadvantage distribution; and (2) has a relationship with violence that changes across its own levels. Combining these two facts leads us to expect different effects of disadvantage on violence across the differentially situated ethno-racial neighborhoods, with the relationship being strongest for white areas and weakest for African American locales. Here we will assess this hypothesis and elucidate how the results increase our understanding of the structural dynamics that lead to inequality in neighborhood violent crime.

To do so, we modified the model of violent crime (from the last row of table 4.2) to allow the impact of disadvantage to vary across the five types of neighborhoods of color (coefficients not reported, but see figure 4.1).⁵ The relationship of disadvantage with violence indeed differs across the types of areas. As expected, this linkage is most substantial for white neighborhoods, consistently the weakest for African American areas, and in between for the other types of communities. Further, in African American, Latino, and integrated neighborhoods, the influ-

Figure 4.1 Predicted Violent Crime Rates for Observed Levels of Disadvantage for Ethno-Racial Neighborhood Types



Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

ence of disadvantage on criminal violence tapers off at higher disadvantage levels.

The diminishing connection between disadvantage and violence is particularly pronounced for African American neighborhoods. In fact, when disadvantage is at or above the very high mean level that exists for this population, its association with violent crime rates is very small. As we argued, variation at the very high levels widely found in African American neighborhoods does not alter the social organization of communities in ways that are influential for violent crime. Of course, Latino and minority neighborhoods also suffer from concentrations of disadvantaged characteristics and thus should experience a similar drop-off in the association of disadvantage with violence. We find this pattern to a modest degree for Latino areas but not for minority areas. Neither of these community types has the stark prevalence of extreme disadvantage found in African American urban neighborhoods, which is why the leveling off may not be pronounced. Over one-quarter of African American areas in our sample have the most extreme disadvantage. Thus, they are unique even when compared to Latino and minority neighborhoods, where only 7.2 and 8.5 percent, respectively, are extremely disadvantaged (figures 3.6 and 3.7).

How do the differential relationships combine with variation in disadvantage levels across ethno-racial neighborhood types in producing inequality in violent crime? To answer this question, figure 4.1 provides a dramatic depiction of violent crime rates by neighborhood color and disadvantage. This figure presents predicted rates of violent crime (per 1,000 population) for neighborhoods between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of observed disadvantage separately for each neighborhood color. Thus, the figure displays net rates of violent crime within the ranges of neighborhood disadvantage widely found for each group in urban areas in the United States.

The patterns highlight that ethno-racial groups live in divergent social worlds, with clear and dramatic implications for inequality in neighborhood violent crime. Predicted violence rates for observed white areas are exclusively in the left half of the graph, where disadvantage is low, while predicted rates for observed African American, Latino, and minority areas are entirely in the right half of the figure, where disadvantage ranges from above average to extreme. Thus, even the *most* disadvantaged white neighborhoods have an average violent crime rate of 1.8 per 1,000, which is much lower than rates in the *least* disadvantaged areas of any of the three types of nonwhite neighborhoods. The range is from 3.0 in Latino to 4.3 in African American neighborhoods. When the positive effect of disadvantage combines with very high levels, violent crime reaches peak rates of 4.3 in Latino and 5.2 in minority neighborhoods. The violence rate is consistently higher in African American areas than in all other types of

areas, reaching a maximum of 5.2 per 1,000 in the large proportion of neighborhoods that have extreme levels of disadvantage. This is the case despite the fact that the influence of this factor levels off among African American neighborhoods that are extremely disadvantaged.

Predicted rates of violence for integrated areas fall squarely between those for white areas and those for the other three groups. Integrated communities tend to have levels of disadvantage that range from low to moderate. This is also generally true for levels of violence, which are just under 2 at the low end of observed disadvantage but rise to approximately 4 when disadvantage is near its highest level. Finally, and compared to other areas, white neighborhoods are decidedly privileged in the low levels of violent crime that emanate from their extremely low levels of disadvantage. Predicted rates are just above 1 per 1,000 for a large portion of white neighborhoods. Although violence is higher in more disadvantaged white areas, rates never reach levels as high as those found for other types of neighborhoods.

Some of the inequality in violence is not accounted for by where racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods are situated in their levels of disadvantage, or by the differential effects of disadvantage. Figure 4.1 shows this in notable jumps in predicted rates between white communities and each of the other four areas. Thus, it appears that white areas garner privileges that enable them to create neighborhoods that are dramatically safer than those of other groups. In contrast, much of the differentiation in violence among the other ethno-racial areas appears to be the product of how the racial structure of society places groups in divergent social worlds. This is suggested by the rather continuous picture of rates for integrated neighborhoods and the three predominantly non-white neighborhoods. Predicted rates for integrated areas flow directly down from those for the other types of communities. By implication, rates for these areas would be markedly similar if they had more comparable levels of disadvantage. As such, ethnic and racial inequality in neighborhood violence is maintained through broadly racialized forces that keep groups separate and unequal and whites more privileged than others.

Structural Conditions and Property Crime

How do the patterns of findings for property crime compare to those for violence? Property crime is much more common than violent crime, but varies considerably across neighborhoods. Thus, as with violence, we ask: Are levels of property crime responsive to the character of the city where neighborhoods are located? And are neighborhood structural conditions broadly associated with property offense rates after

Table 4.3 Effects of City and Neighborhood Characteristics on Neighborhood Property Crime Rates

Characteristic	Percentage Change in Neighborhood Property Crime
City conditions	
Segregation	4.1%
Disadvantage	6.6
Percentage manufacturing	-5.8
City population	4.7
Percentage African American	1.3
Percentage movers	2.2
Percentage foreign-born	-1.5
Percentage young males	1.0
South	-7.5
West	-6.0
Neighborhood conditions	
Percentage young males	1.0
Residential instability	27.2*
Residential loans	-9.4*
Immigration	-14.7*
Disadvantage (at the mean)	15.2*

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Note: Values represent the percentage change in the neighborhood property crime rate for a one-standard-deviation unit change in the characteristic for all variables except South and West. For the region variables, values represent the percentage difference in the neighborhood property crime rate between the South or West and other areas of the country. Ethno-racial neighborhood type is controlled.

* $p < .05$

accounting for variation in city context? In examining these questions, we use the same type of multivariate models we used for neighborhood violence. Table 4.3 presents percentage changes in rates of neighborhood property crime for a one-standard-deviation unit change in each predictor variable.

The first point of note is that none of the city characteristics has a statistically important association with neighborhood property crime. Thus, it appears that these types of offenses are equally prevalent in all types of cities. The second general pattern is that all of the central neighborhood factors are related to property crime rates in the same way as with criminal violence. Offense rates are higher in areas that are more unstable and disadvantaged. Rates are notably lower for neighborhoods that receive greater infusions of loans and have more immigrants. The

sizes of these relationships are similar to those for violent crime for three of the four conditions examined. A notably higher (one standard deviation) level of residential instability is associated with a 27 percent higher rate of property offending. Conversely, an equal amount of change in dollars invested in residential loans is associated with over 9 percent less property crime. The trade-off for a one-standard-deviation-greater level of immigration is nearly 15 percent less property crime.

The impact of disadvantage on property offending is not as strong as for violent crime. As before, however, the connection between disadvantage and property crime is stronger when disadvantage is low, and it weakens as levels increase. At mean disadvantage, a 15 percent higher property crime rate would be observed if disadvantage was one standard deviation higher. At a much lower level of disadvantage—one standard deviation below the mean—we would expect a 34 percent higher rate for a similar increase. By the time disadvantage is considerably above the average, the association is essentially zero.

In sum, the results for property crime are largely consistent with those for neighborhood predictors of violence. Neighborhood instability and disadvantage are important structural sources of both types of offending. Further, disadvantage is less strongly connected with property and violent crime when levels of this community condition are very high and there is less substantive differentiation in the social contexts that generate crime. However, disadvantage is more weakly associated with property than violence rates throughout most of the disadvantage distribution. The findings also provide evidence for the relevance of external investments in local areas as significant resources that help neighborhoods maintain viability in ways that keep property crime low, which is also true for violence. Finally, immigration's negative relationship with violent and property crime makes it clear that the presence of immigrants in local communities is highly beneficial for reducing neighborhood crime.

Accounting for Ethno-Racial Inequality in Neighborhood Property Crime

Ethno-racial neighborhood inequality in property crime is not as dramatic as for violence. There are differences in the mean levels for different types of areas, but there is much more overlap in the distributions of property offenses compared with violent offenses. Reported property offending is highest, on average, in African American neighborhoods, but the mean and spread of rates is not much different than for integrated areas. Also, average levels of property crime are similarly low for Latino and white areas. As we noted at the end of chapter 3, the simple

Table 4.4 Ratios of Property Crime Rates for Black, Latino, Minority, and Integrated Versus White Neighborhoods

Accounting For:	African American Area/White Area		Latino White Area		Minority Area/White Area		Integrated Area/White Area	
	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area
Baseline model	1.58*	1.03	1.03	1.34*	1.30*	1.30*	1.30*	1.30*
Plus residential instability	1.47*	1.04	1.04	1.27*	1.25*	1.25*	1.25*	1.21*
Plus residential loans	1.32*	0.94	0.94	1.17*	1.17*	1.17*	1.17*	1.17*
Plus immigration	1.28*	1.20*	1.20*	1.30*	1.30*	1.30*	1.25*	1.25*
Plus disadvantage	1.10	1.08	1.08	1.11*	1.11*	1.11*	1.08*	1.08*

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).

Note: The baseline model includes ten city characteristics (segregation, disadvantage, manufacturing, population, percentage African American, percentage recent movers, percentage foreign-born, percentage young males, South, and West) and neighborhood age-sex structure. Shading highlights the substantial degree of change in the violence ratios from the baseline model to the final model that includes neighborhood disadvantage. * $p < .05$

rank ordering of mean property crime rates across neighborhoods of distinct colors does not correspond well with the ordering of the levels of social conditions thought to underlie crime. Here we assess whether the roles of neighborhood factors in race-ethnic differences in property crime are masked by not simultaneously controlling for local conditions and city characteristics. Table 4.4 reports these findings from the same type of multivariate model presented in previous tables. As with violent crime, values represent the ratio of the neighborhood property crime rate for the average African American, Latino, minority, or integrated area to that for the average white area. The relevance of neighborhood conditions in generating ethno-racial inequality in property crime is reflected in the degree to which the ratios fall closer to 1 as each neighborhood factor is taken into account.

The baseline model shows that property crime rates for neighborhoods in the average city are nearly 60 percent higher for African American than white areas (row 1). The gaps are smaller when comparing minority or integrated neighborhoods to those where whites predominate. In both cases, property crime is about one-third higher than for their white counterparts. In contrast, Latino areas do not differ substantially from white neighborhoods. The net similarity in property crime rates for these two types of areas mirrors that found for the gross rates in figure 2.1. After adding residential instability (row 2), gaps in rates relative to white communities are reduced somewhat for all types of areas except where Latinos predominate; in those areas, comparable

levels still hold. Residential loans are associated with about a 10 percent reduction in property crime differentials for African American and minority neighborhoods compared to white neighborhoods (compare rows 2 and 3). Nonetheless, rates are 32 percent higher for African American areas, and 17 percent higher for minority areas, than for white areas. Increased investments through residential loans are important in keeping property crime down (as seen in table 4.3), but they do little to account for higher property crime in integrated neighborhoods compared to white ones.

Next, we add immigration. Property crime rates would be slightly closer for African American and white communities if immigration levels were similar. However, for the other three comparisons, differentials in average property crime would be greater than otherwise observed if immigration was comparable. Indeed, Latino areas would have 20 percent more property offenses than white neighborhoods if immigration was equalized. Before taking this factor into account, rates were statistically similar in these two types of areas. Accounting for immigration, minority areas have 30 percent more property crime, and integrated areas 25 percent more than white neighborhoods. These results stem from the direction of the impact of the presence of immigrants on property crime and the varying levels of immigration found across types of areas. Immigrant concentration is very high in Latino neighborhoods and modest to high in integrated and minority areas. Thus, controlling for immigration implies a lower level of immigrant concentration in these three types of communities than is typical for them. Because immigration suppresses property crime, one would observe higher levels of such crime in Latino, minority, and integrated areas, overall and relative to white areas, if there were fewer immigrants in the communities.

The final row of table 4.4 reports property crime gaps after controlling for neighborhood socioeconomic disadvantage. Property crime in African American and Latino areas is statistically indistinguishable from rates in white neighborhoods when this important condition is taken into account. Rates are only about 10 percent higher for minority areas, and 8 percent higher for integrated areas, than for comparable white neighborhoods when disadvantage is held constant. While statistically different from 0, these gaps are substantively small. In sum, local structural conditions appear to be most of the reason for differences in property crime across communities of distinct colors. This contrasts with the picture for violence, where differences in neighborhood characteristics do *not* fully account for the gaps in observed rates, even though these factors are responsible for much of the inequality in violent offending across ethno-racial neighborhood types.

Inequality in Crime in Advantaged Neighborhoods

The data presented to this point underscore the importance of racialized local conditions as structural forces that generate neighborhood ethno-racial inequality in crime. However, why do neighborhood structural differentials not completely account for the crime gaps, particularly with regard to violence? A possible answer lies in the very nature of the interconnections between race, socioeconomic position, and other structural conditions that lead to the relative absence of racially and ethnically distinct but economically comparable neighborhoods. We attempted to address this challenge by collecting NNCS data, which include a large sample of neighborhoods across the United States. Yet as the descriptive data presented in chapter 3 show so clearly, the racial-spatial divide that permeates U.S. society is so great that our results may still be partially tainted by the lack of comparability of social conditions across distinct neighborhoods of color. That is, to some extent the analyses reported to this point may still be comparing the combined privileges of white race and middle- or upper-class status in white neighborhoods with the burdens of subordinate race-ethnicity and socioeconomic status that pervade in other localities.

Here we take an additional step to address the fundamental structural comparability problem for research. Specifically, we analyze sets of local areas that are all relatively *advantaged* to assess whether non-white communities have equally low levels of crime when they are apparently as well off as their white counterparts. Put differently, are levels of violent and property crime more similar when the association between race and economic composition is less dramatic? Only two previous studies of individual cities hint at the answer to this question. Our own investigation of reported rates of violent crime in 1990 for census tracts in Columbus, Ohio (Krivo and Peterson 1996) focused on this city because it is a fruitful site for studying racially distinct but economically similar neighborhoods: it has some white high-poverty areas as well as some African American economically advantaged areas. We demonstrated that African American and white neighborhoods with similarly low, high, or extreme levels of disadvantage have comparable levels of violent and property crime. McNulty (2001) studied neighborhoods in Atlanta for 1990. He also compared rates of violence between white and black areas because there were enough African American neighborhoods with below-average disadvantage to make comparisons between racially distinct and economically similar areas. His analysis demonstrated that violent crime rates are quite similar when neighborhoods have comparably low disadvantage.

Table 4.5 Ratios of Violent Crime Rates for African American, Latino, Minority, and Integrated Versus White Low-Poverty Neighborhoods

Accounting For:	African American Area/		Latino Area/		Minority Area/		Integrated Area/	
	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area
Baseline model	3.26*	1.71*	2.55*	1.76*	2.55*	1.71*	1.76*	1.71*
Plus residential instability	3.40*	1.90*	2.61*	1.71*	2.61*	1.71*	1.71*	1.71*
Plus residential loans	3.17*	1.76*	2.45*	1.65*	2.45*	1.65*	1.65*	1.65*
Plus immigration	3.12*	1.89*	2.54*	1.69*	2.54*	1.69*	1.69*	1.69*
Plus disadvantage	2.12*	1.39*	1.70*	1.34*	1.70*	1.34*	1.34*	1.34*

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
Note: The baseline model includes ten city characteristics (segregation, disadvantage, manufacturing, population, percentage African American, percentage recent movers, percentage foreign-born, percentage young males, South, and West) and neighborhood age-sex structure. Low poverty is defined as less than 20 percent poor. Shading highlights the substantial degree of change in the violence ratios from the baseline model to the final model that includes neighborhood disadvantage.
 *p < .05

The NNCS data allow us to examine the validity of the conclusions from these two cities for a large number of U.S. neighborhoods that are white, African American, Latino, minority, or integrated and comparatively advantaged. Specifically, we focus on the subset of neighborhoods with low rates of poverty (less than 20 percent).⁶ Of the 5,495 low-poverty areas in the 87 cities studied here, 326 are African American, 149 are Latino, and 171 are minority. These low-poverty nonwhite areas include between one-fifth and one-quarter of each type of predominantly non-white area. Reflecting the overall sample and U.S. society, 2,890 of the low-poverty neighborhoods are white and 1,959 are integrated.

Table 4.5 reports the nonwhite-to-white ratios of violent crime among low-poverty neighborhoods. Despite their low poverty, violent crime rates are significantly higher for all predominantly nonwhite communities than for their white counterparts. This is unexpectedly consistent with the picture for the full set of neighborhoods. The baseline gap is greatest when comparing African American to white local areas. Rates are three and a quarter times higher for the former communities than for the latter. Minority low-poverty areas have about two and a half times as much violence as similar white neighborhoods, while Latino and integrated communities have about 70 to 75 percent more criminal violence than white areas. These differentials are substantial, but notably smaller than for the full sample of neighborhoods, where the gaps in violent

Table 4.6 Ratios of Property Crime Rates for African American, Latino, Minority, and Integrated Versus White Low-Poverty Neighborhoods

Accounting For:	African American Area/		Latino Area/		Minority Area/		Integrated Area/	
	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area	White Area
Baseline model	1.42*	0.94	1.24*	1.15*	1.24*	1.15*	1.15*	1.15*
Plus residential instability	1.49*	1.06	1.28*	1.13*	1.28*	1.13*	1.13*	1.13*
Plus residential loans	1.40*	0.98	1.21*	1.09*	1.21*	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*
Plus immigration	1.34*	1.19*	1.33*	1.16*	1.33*	1.16*	1.16*	1.16*
Plus disadvantage	1.17*	1.06	1.10	1.05	1.10	1.05	1.05	1.05

Source: National Neighborhood Crime Study (Peterson and Krivo 2010).
Note: The baseline model includes ten city characteristics (segregation, disadvantage, manufacturing, population, percentage African American, percentage recent movers, percentage foreign-born, percentage young males, South, and West) and neighborhood age-sex structure. Low poverty is defined as less than 20 percent poor. Shading highlights the substantial degree of change in the violence ratios from the baseline model to the final model that includes neighborhood disadvantage.
 *p < .05

crime range from two and a quarter to four and a quarter times those for white areas.

Looking down each column, differences across the distinct ethno-racial communities in residential instability, residential loans, and immigration are not very important in accounting for gaps in violence from white areas. Indeed, when these local conditions are included in the model, differentials in average rates of violent crime are nearly as large—or even larger for the Latino-white comparison—as when only city characteristics and neighborhood age-sex composition are controlled. Differences in disadvantage within these supposedly comparable neighborhoods are responsible for a notable portion of the remaining ethno-racial inequality in violence. Yet they by no means account for all of the gaps in violent crime. Even when only low-poverty neighborhoods are examined, African American areas have more than twice the average violent crime rate as their white counterparts. Latino, minority, and integrated neighborhoods have 1.4, 1.7, and 1.3 times as much violence, respectively, as white communities. These net gaps are even larger than those found for the full set of neighborhoods.

Table 4.6 presents the results for property crime among low-poverty neighborhoods. Among advantaged areas, ethnic and racial inequality in property crime is considerably less than for rates of violence. Latino and white neighborhoods have similar levels of property crime, except

under the scenario where immigration, but not disadvantage, is controlled. Recall that immigration suppresses crime; therefore, property offenses would rise if Latino communities had the same low presence of immigrants as other types of areas. When we take into account the four structural neighborhood conditions, property crime in low-poverty minority and integrated areas is not distinguishable from that for comparable white areas. African American low-poverty neighborhoods still have statistically higher property crime rates than is the case for white communities (final row), but the differential is just 17 percent (slightly higher than in the full sample of local areas; see table 4.4).

Conclusion: Internal Characteristics and Beyond

In this section, we asked whether there is greater comparability in violent and property crime across neighborhoods of different colors with similarly low levels of poverty. This question is more relevant for violent than property crime because *net* race-ethnic differences in property offending are so small. For violence, the answer is a resounding no. After accounting for the conditions discussed from structural race, urban, and criminological perspectives, race-ethnic gaps in violent crime are as large, or larger, for low-poverty areas as for the full set of neighborhoods. It is not entirely clear why inequalities in crime remain across race-ethnic neighborhoods. However, thinking broadly about the interconnections of race and space in U.S. society, perhaps it is not enough to limit our focus to the influence of the internal conditions of neighborhoods on inequality in crime. Broader spatial processes may also be important. Neighborhoods are situated relative to one another in ways that further differentiate the contexts that may undergird patterns of crime (Mears and Bhati 2006; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001). In the following chapter, we explore whether the spatial location of neighborhoods of distinct colors helps to provide a more complete answer to the apparently intransigent inequality in crime.

Chapter 5

The Spatial Context of Criminal Inequality

THE BASIC framework presented here emphasizes that ethnic and racial differentials in crime patterns are rooted in the racial inequality embedded in distinct conditions found across and within urban neighborhoods. The evidence is consistent with this framework whether all neighborhoods are studied or analyses are restricted to apparently more comparable low-poverty areas. However, notable gaps in violence remain unaccounted for by racialized community conditions; this is much less the case for property offenses. In this chapter, we acknowledge that the focus on differentiation in structural conditions *within* segregated white, African American, and other nonwhite neighborhoods may be too limited. Such an approach overlooks the embeddedness of neighborhoods within a broader spatial context. In fact, criminogenic neighborhood effects may not end at the borders of local communities (see Mears and Bhati 2006). Neighborhoods are located relative to one another in ways that may reduce or increase crime. And racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods in U.S. cities are highly unequal in the structural conditions of their surrounding neighborhoods.

In this chapter, we explore how inequality in the character of nearby neighborhoods contributes to patterned racial and ethnic differentials in crime and thereby helps complete the story of the structural underpinnings of such patterns. A common feature of many African American neighborhoods, whatever their internal character, is proximity to communities with characteristics typically associated with higher crime rates, such as high levels of disadvantage and residential turnover. This is also the case, to varying degrees, for Latino and other nonwhite neighborhoods. In contrast, white areas are often surrounded by neighborhoods where crime-promoting conditions are relatively absent and factors that discourage crime, such as external community investments, are prevalent.

We begin by outlining how the structural character of nearby local areas may influence crime rates within focal neighborhoods. We then