Deterrence

I. **Deterrent Effects**
    A. General vs. Specific
    B. Marginal vs. Absolute
    C. Variables
II. **Routine Activities Theory & Hotspot Policing**
III. **Specific Deterrence: Minneapolis Domestic Assault Experiment**
    A. Study Design
    B. Results
    C. Replication Studies
IV. **General Deterrence: Perceptual Studies**
    A. Survey Design
    B. Results
    C. Conclusions

Notes:

Learning Objectives

1. Understand relationship between rational choice & deterrence
2. Distinguish general versus specific deterrence
3. Distinguish marginal vs. absolute deterrence
4. Know the variables in deterrent effects
5. Understand routine activities & hotspots policing
6. Understand the design & results of the Minneapolis experiment
7. Understand the design & results of survey studies of general deterrence

Notes:

Notes:

Deterrence Doctrine

- Based on rational actor assumption
  - In the aggregate, individuals act rationally
  - At the margin, individuals act rationally
  - Individuals respond to incentives
- General vs. specific Deterrence
- Marginal vs. absolute deterrence
- Variables in deterrent effect
  - Certainty: Probability of punishment
  - Severity: Amount of pain or suffering inflicted
  - Celerity: Swiftness of penalty

Notes:

Routine Activities Theory (Rational Choice)

- Crime Results from Opportunities
  - Motivated Offenders
  - Suitable Targets
  - Capable Guardians
- Hot Spots Policing (Police as Guardians)
  - Identify high crime spots on a map, and send police there
  - Seems to reduce crime
  - Displacement question

Violent Crime '96-'98

Legend
0.28 - 3.92
3.93 - 9.70
9.71 - 20.31
20.32 - 51.02
51.03 - 127.03

Specific Deterrence

- If we punish an offender, will that deter him or her from future crime
- How do we study this?
  - Compare criminals who are incarcerated then released to those who receive probation
  - But those sent to prison are probably more crime-prone than those who receive probation
- Experimental design: equivalent treatment and control groups

Notes:

Importance of Equivalent Treatment and Control Groups

Control Group

Treatment Group

Minneapolis Domestic Assault Experiment
(Sherman & Berk ASR 1984)

- Randomized Experiment (police officer pad color):
    - Separate: Order offender from premises.
    - Advise: Mediation between parties.
    - Arrest offender.
- Criteria for Inclusion in Experiment:
    - Misdemeanor assaults.
    - Victim and offender present.
    - Probable cause of assault.

Notes:

Minneapolis Domestic Assault Experiment

- Follow up offenders (re-arrest & self reports)
- Compare arrested with non-arrested
- Hypothesis: Specific deterrence vs. labeling
- Problem: departures from randomization

Notes:

Minneapolis Domestic Assault Experiment: Results

- Small but significant deterrent effect (24 month follow-up period).
- Rearrest:
  - Arrest: Lowest recidivism
  - Advise: Middle recidivism
  - Separate: Highest recidivism
- Self-report:
  - Arrest   19% recidivism
  - Separate   33% recidivism
  - Advise   37% recidivism

Notes:

Minneapolis Domestic Assault Experiment: Conclusions

- Arrest had a specific deterrent effect.
- Caveats
  - Problem with randomization
  - Need for replication
- New legislation (mandatory arrest) ignored caveats.
- NIJ funded replications.

Notes:

Replications of the Domestic Assault Experiment

- Omaha, Milwaukee, Dade County, Colorado Springs
- Inclusion criteria:
    - Misdemeanor
    - Probable cause
    - No danger
    - No serious records
    - Both present
- Randomization by dispatcher (e.g., Milwaukee)
    - Standard arrest (held until morning or bail – avg. 11 hours).
    - Short arrest (released on recognizance – avg. 3 hours)
    - Police warning only

Notes:

Replications: Findings

- Overall, no consistent deterrent effects.
  - In nearly all of the replications.
  - Slight labeling effect in some studies.
- Conditional hypothesis: arrest deterred married and employed.
  - For single and unemployed, arrest <u>increased</u> recidivism (stigma).
  - More to lose if married or working.

Notes:

"Deterring Delinquents" Matsueda, Kreager, Huizinga (2006) ASR

Crime = prob x value (rewards) > prob x value (costs)

- Survey of high risk youth in Denver
  - Interview annually
  - Self-reported delinquency and crime
  - Perceived risk of arrest

- Rational choice hypotheses:
  - Do perceived costs and rewards affect future crime?
  - How are perceived risks formed? Rooted in reality?

Notes:

Formation of Perceived Risk of Arrest

- Deterrence theory: Perceptions should be rooted in reality
- Experiential Learning
  - Baseline estimate of perceived risk (overestimate – shell of illusion)
  - New information
  - Update estimate using new information
- Information on Perceived Risk
  - Experienced certainty: arrest/crime for each person
  - Unsanctioned offenses: number of crimes for non-arrested
  - Crimes of peers

Notes:

Model of Formation of Perceived Risk of Arrest

New Information

Delinquent Peers $_{t-1}$

Experienced Certainty $_{t-1}$

Unsanctioned Offenses $_{t-1}$

Baseline Perceived Risk $_{t-1}$

**Updated** Perceived Risk $_{t-1}$

Notes:

Notes:

Rational Choice and Deterrence

- Rewards:
  - Excitement
  - Being seen as cool
- Cost:
  - Getting arrested

Certainty (probability): What are the chances of getting _____ for theft (violence)?

Severity (value): How good or bad is this?

Notes:

Effects of Perceived Risk of Arrest on Crime

Rational Choice

Risk of Arrest t-1

Excitement $_{t-1}$

Seen as Cool $_{t-1}$

Opportunities $_{t}$

Prior Delinquency

Future Delinquency

Violence t-1
Theft t-1

Violence t
Theft t

Notes:

Conclusions

- We find a deterrent effect but not big
  - Increase perceived risk by ten percent may reduce theft by 3 percent and violence by 5 percent
  - Decrease probability of being seen as cool by ten percent may reduce theft by 6 percent and violence by 7 percent

- Already have one of the highest arrest and imprisonment rates among Western nations
- Increasing this by ten percent is draconian
- Some level of arrest and incarceration is essential
- Deterrence is unlikely a panacea for the crime problem

Notes: