Case 1 - The Cuban Missile

 

A Game Theoretic -- Joint Decision-making problem

 

The Cuban Missile Crisis as a game of Chicken

 

Choices for both nations

1) Back Down (BD)
2) Do Not Back Down (NBD)

Preferences for each

NBD, BD>	BD, BD>	BD,NBD>	NBD,NBD
4,2	3,3	2,4	1,1

 

 

		Soviet Union
		BD	NBD
U.S.	BD	(3,3)	(2,4)
	NBD	(4,2)	(1,1)

The problem in this "game" is one of

 

COMMITMENT

That is somehow signaling in a credible way to your opponent that you will not back down (NBD) and it is up to the opponent to save both parties

 

That is by commiting credibly to NBD you in effect change the game to

 

	BD	NBD
NBD	(4,2)	(1,1)

 

---

 

Case 1 - The Cuban Missile

 

The Governmental Politics Approach

 

Focus - A group of high level decision-makers, typically leaders of organizations, are engaged in a competitive game --

The Group decision is seen as the outcome of a game among these players - It is the product of (and explained by) the pulling and hauling of politics

The choice is the product of

1) the reasons for actions - linked to the players goals
2) and the routines of organizations to enact alternatives --packages of tools and missions or standard operating procedures (SOPs)
3) the power and skills of the players - their control of information, argumentative skill, structural power position

 

So - we need to

1) isolate who plays
2) what determines their position -
a. role organization
b. political coalition
c. ideology and beliefs

3) what determines a players impact on the decision
a. power position
b. skill - expertise
c. experience

4) How the game among the players is structured

 

The decision is explained in this approach by displaying the above components

Note - this approach requires far more detailed evidence that the rational actor model

 

 

	Initial Positions
Diplomatic	Air Strike	Uncommitted
Stevenson	Acheson	McNamara
Ball	Ntize	Bundy
	McCone	Sorenson
	Dillon	R. Kennedy
	J.C.S.	(Rusk)
	(J.F.K.)

 

JFK - opposed to doing nothing and saw the missile trade as too weak a response - note as well that no one else was in favor of doing nothing

Strong and powerful air strike coalition

The uncommitted need to jump on board the air strike or find a more viable alternative -- Construct the blockade option

McNamara, Bundy, Sorenson, R. Kennedy, Rusk join Stevenson and Ball in new coalition for a blockade

Revealing the "game" then can be seen in one of two ways that are of course connected

1) A competition among the two groups to persuade their Boss (JFK) that their option is best

2) Building an argument that their solution will solve the problem and that the other position has serious flawed problems

 

 

The Blockade Group case ---

 

Positive

 

A Blockade is aggressive and tough
It puts the initiative and responsibility for the next move on the Soviets
It is safer than an air strike
It does not rule out an air strike later
It gives time for the Soviets to understand their mistake and back down
It signals U.S. resolve and determination

 

Negative aspects of the alternative

 

An air strike is very risky and could be escalatory
An air strike may well not solve the problem since it is possible that some missiles will not be destroyed and thus it may require an invasion - an option with additional problems

An air strike makes the U.S. the aggressor and JFK like Tojo - Pearl Harbor

 

 

 

The Air strike Group Case

 

Positive

 

Removes missiles (almost all)
Some risk but fairly safe since the U.S. holds but a tactical and overall strategic advantage over the Soviet Union
Is aggressive and tough and demonstrates resolve and determination
Can help to destabilize Castro and help lead to his downfall and could lead to a Castro reaction that could warrant U.S. military intervention

 

Negative

 

Blockade does not remove missiles soon to be operational - only prevents additional materials from entering

Blockade gives away the element of surprise making future military action more difficult

Blockade creates its own set of problems with our allies that may make future military action more difficult

Blockade is a soft response, which gives the Soviets time to obtain a more palatable (for them) negotiated settlement - such as a missile trade

 

Keys to why the Blockade group "won"

 

1) Small but significant probability that the air strike would not remove all the missiles and would probably require an invasion

2) Belief among key actors (JFK, RFK, McNamara, and Rusk that the blockade opened up possibilities to solve the crisis without ruling out others later and

3) it was less risky than the air strike but politically palatable

4) The coalition that formed around the blockade was closer to the President ideologically and personally

 

 

Hawks	Doves/Owls
Nitze	McNamara
Taylor	R. Kennedy
Dillon	T. Sorenson
McCone	A. Stevenson
Acheson	D. Rusk
	McG. Bundy

 

 

---

 

 

Cuban Missile Crisis -- Cognitive/Pyschological Approach

 

The Psychological Approach to Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Introduction.
Psychologist Bligh's argument in a nutshell.

Body.
A. Who are the players in the Cuban missile crisis?

B. What facts do the players agree on?

C. How are the facts perceived differently by different players?
I. Balance of power.
II. Risks of Soviet slip-up and US aggression.

D. Why do different players perceive facts differently?
I. Different goals.
II. Different assumptions.
III. Different formative periods.

Conclusion.
What are the strengths and limitations of the psychological approach?

INCOMMENSURABLE VIEWS,
OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

 

Hawks:
1. relatively understandable
2. predictable
3. controllable
4. safe

 

Doves:
1. inexplicable
2. unpredictable
3. uncontrollable
4. dangerous

 

Hawks and Doves disagreed about:
1. POWER Their understandings of the relative U.S. and Soviet positions in the crisis

2. PERCEPTIONS on their perceptions of the risks

3. POLICY on their policy prescriptions

 

Key Issues

	Hawks	Doves
Power	Cuban Missiles significantly change military calculus-must be removed	Cuban Missiles not militarily significant - just a political threat
	But Soviets vastly outnumbered on nuclear level (17 to 1 advantage for the U.S.) and useful in making Russians back off	No advantage to the U.S. because strategiv imbalance gives us no leverage over the Soviets
Perceptions	Risk of nuclear war exists but probability of success high and risk of disaster low	Risk exists and is possible - must be avoided at all costs
	Risk of inadvertent action or deliberate escalation after U.S. attack low	Risk of inadvertent actiona dnd deliberate escalation high
Policy	High degress of confifence of Soviet rationality	Less certain of Soviet intentions and more concern about inadvertent actions -- look at recent history
	No qualms about an air strike - necessary to take forceful and decisive action	High degree of responsibility "weight of the world on our shoulders"

 

Why these differences?

 

Changing world from U.S. nuclear dominance to mutual vulnerability

 

Hawks do not see this change
· Schooled in Cold War
· Deeply anti-communist
· Saw Soviets as responding to force alone
· Powerful faith in nuclear coercion
· U.S. has both conventional and nuclear superiority in this area of the

world

End result: U.S. settled for less than it should have in this crisis

 

Doves are very aware of new world
· Experience of hawks irrelevant this case
· Nuclear exchange is possible--first time in history that both sides

vulnerable
· Misstep could be fatal
· Anxiety and tension affects clear thinking
· Information about Soviet objectives lacking
· Personally responsible for fate of world

 

End result: Advocate less threatening course of action--ultimately successful

 

---

Case 2 Classic Policymaking -- Vietnam

 

A Vietnam Chronology --- Getting into Vietnam

 

1. Fall 1961 - Kennedy commits U.S. as limited partner to S. Vietnam - Sends Approx. 15,000 U.S. military advisers to assist, train, and fight

 

2. 1962-3 - Pacification and Strategic Hamlets - Trying to help the client state win its political and military struggle against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese

 

3. Fall 1963 - Faced with growing political and military failure of U.S./S. Vietnamese policy in Vietnam - U.S. gives up on Diem - coup then assassination - J.F.K assassination and beginning of LBJ Presidency

 

4. 1964 - Secret covert operations begin against North Vietnam --OPLAN 34- Election Politics - Congressional Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin ---

 

5. September 1964-Fully developed plans to begin a plan of graduated sustained pressure on North Vietnam - via overt sustained bombing

 

6. December 1964 - LBJ agrees in principle to begin plan of overt sustained bombing - to raise the costs of the war on N. Vietnam and to raise morale in the South -- but need political stability in the South first

 

7. Jan to Early Feb. 1965 - Continued Government instability (more coups) in the South coupled with serious military setbacks in the South -

 

8. The attack on Pleiku - changing arguments among High level policy makers - decision to start a plan graduated sustained pressure - Rolling Thunder starts March 2, 1965 - a major step into Vietnam - internationalizing the war

 

9. Base Protection - Enclaves - The beginning of the flow of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam

 

10. One small chance for negotiations and peace - Ball and Acheson have their chance for setting negotiations going with the North Vietnamese - April 1965

 

11. By June 1965 - There are about 80,000 U.S. combat troops in Vietnam - The U.S. is bombing many targets in both North and South Vietnam. U.S. combat troops are sustaining casualties

 

12. But the military situation in the South is constantly getting worse - The North, in response to U.S. actions has drastically stepped up infiltration and is fighting in large units with tanks and artillery. They are destroying at a rapid rate large units of U.S. trained and supported South Vietnamese military units

 

13. U.S. military Commander Gen. W. Westmoreland - fears that S. Vietnam will be cut in half and that the South will collapse both militarily and politically - In early June he makes a request for 44 U.S. combat battalions (approx. 100,000 more U.S. combat troops-

 

14. LBJ and his advisers must decide on whether to escalate the War or not -- Strangely, they see it was a decision of whether to go to war or not

---

1965 Vietnam Decisions - Who's Who

 

President -- L. B. Johnson

Sec. of State - Dean Rusk

Sec. Of Defense Robert McNamara

Under Sec. Of State - George Ball

Ambassador to Saigon - Maxwell Taylor

Special Asst. for National Security McGeorge Bundy

Mil. Commander/Vietnam - William Westmoreland

Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Wheeler

Asst. Sec. Of of State - William Bundy

 

July 1965 Policy Recommendations - Vietnam

 

1. R. McNamara - a revised version of the Westmoreland Troop request - 100-120,000 more U.S. Combat Troops - more to follow as needed, call of U.S. reserves, ask Congress for a supplemental military appropriation

 

2. George Ball -- No More Troop Increases - Look for ways to withdraw via negotiations with N. Vietnam - S. Vietnam a loser - the situation will only get worse - the U.S. must cut its losses

 

3. William and McGeorge Bundy - Hold troops a current levels (80,000) for two months to see how well U.S. forces do and how the South and North Vietnamese respond to significant U.S. combat involvement

 

George Ball - Arguments for Getting Out of Vietnam

U.S. cannot win
War will be too costly
Vietnam not essential
In the long term, better to cut our losses and pull out - will show better judgment and leadership

Why? --
Because the U.S. will end up just like the French
Fighting a guerrilla war it cannot win - U.S. will win all the battles, but a combination of terrain, popular support for the guerrillas, a weak S. Vietnamese government, and a determined enemy ensure a war that will drag on for years with rising U.S. causalities and increasing international and domestic pressures to withdraw

 

Dean Rusk counter argument

"The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world."

So Given these states Rusk argued that is was not necessary to defeat the Viet Cong.

"It is said we are "losing": this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind in the effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But this does not mean that the Viet Cong are "winning"; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Vietn Cong can be denied victory, even if pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect."

 

The U.S. must be the "good doctor," in Vietnam - It must get bloodied and do everything it can to help the patient (even if essentially terminal) so that U.S. global credibility can be maintained. The U.S. enemies (Soviet Union and the PRC) must not believe that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" who can be pushed around in other parts of the world with no resistance. So fighting in Vietnam is a way to signal U.S. resolve to our enemies and to a avoid a major crisis the road and possibly World War III

 

Ball the Odd man out -

LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, the Bundy Brothers, and high level military officials all agreed on escalation knowing full well the consequences

No one argued that the war would be easy.
Everyone understood that there would be considerable U.S. casualties
Everyone know the war would last a long time and that victory while possible was not very likely

Why? -- U.S. credibility and leadership
and Domestic politics - protecting the President

 

The Tragedy of Vietnam

 

Soldiers and citizens of the U.S., and South and North Vietnam

10 more years of war

Responsibility -- LBJ and his advisers - A war of their own making ---

Entraped by their own conceptions of the Cold War

 

Case 3 "Bad" Policymaking - The Iran/Contra Affair

Problems

Iran

- We had no diplomatic relations
-Iran was supporting terrorism (put on State Dept. terrorist list in 1983)
-Iran was doing better in the war with Iraq than expected (and we were supporting Iraq)
-there was a “power struggle” underway in Iran and it was feared that the Soviets could capitalize on the unrest to
increase their influence

Nicaragua

-the Sandinista government had close ties to Cuba and the USSR
-it was supporting leftists in El Salvador and possibly Honduras and Costa Rica, too- raised the specter of communist
revolutions in 3 or 4 Central American countries
- it was a communist government on the Central American mainland, always a bad thing

Lebanon

- hostages

Nicaragua Policy

December 1, 1981 Presidential finding: “to support and conduct paramilitary operations against Nicaragua”

1. to get the Sandinistas and Cubans to stop funding the FMLN in El Salvador
2. to force the Sandinistas to either democratize or be overthrown

Sept. 19, 1983; US policy is stepped up with a new presidential finding

July 1985, Oliver North’s policy memo: (p. 50 reader)
1. we can’t invade Nicaragua
2. Nicaraguans like our policy and Congress will fund it
3. the Contras are finally coming together
4. the Sandinistas are unpopular
5. the Soviets won’t intervene to stop a US invasion nor to stop the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government

--Owen’s response (p. 53 in reader)

Iran Policy

Policy statement June 17, 1985 (p220 reader)
The Facts, according to the statement:
1. domestic power struggle could cause Iran to “disintegrate”
2. Soviets could step in to take advantage of the turmoil
3. we need access to Gulf oil

Assumptions:
1. Iran might fall
2. we can shape events with the right policy

So... we should:
1. encourage our allies to help Iran, including with the provision of arms to aid their war effort
2. we should increase contacts and provide support for Iranian moderates

Caspar Weinberger’s response:
“This is almost too absurd to comment on... the assumption here is that Iran is about to fall and we can deal with that on
a rational basis; like asking Qadhafi to Washington for a cozy chat.”

The Assumptions Underlying Iran-Contra

Iran
1. Iran could fall, and the Soviets could step in to increase their influence.
2. we could shape events by supporting moderates
-assumes our contacts were negotiating in good
faith

Nicaragua
1. Soviets/Cubans were behind Sandinista actions
2. Contras are “good people” and have support inside Nicaragua

Hostages:
1. Iran can control Hezbollah
2. our channels to Iran were trustworthy

Iran-Contra

Goals:

Central America:
to contain the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and weaken Cuban/Soviet influence in Central America

To help the government in El Salvador with its battle against a left-leaning insurgency

Iran:
to make contacts with “moderates” in Iran and restore Iranian-American diplomatic relations
To prevent the Soviets from increasing their influence in Iran

Lebanon:
to obtain the release of American hostages in Beirut and avoid a Carteresque hostage affair

The Plan:
1. supply and support the counterrevolutionary guerrilla movement in Nicaragua (the Contras)
2. Use Iranian influence with Hezbollah (party of God) in Lebanon to win the release of American hostages
3. Restore relations with Iran and give McFarlane & Reagan “their own China”
4. Sell arms to Iran for a profit; use the profits to support the Contras and to 1)get around Congressional restrictions on
aid to the Contras and 2) get around the Reagan administration’s own policy statement against dealing with “terrorist
nations”

“Using the Ayatollah’s money to support the Nicaraguan resistance… I think it was a neat idea.”
-Oliver North, 1987

The Iran/Contra Affair Chronology

1981

The long war 1981-88 between Iran and Iraq begins with an Iraqi invasion

The Reagan administration begins an aggressive policy to support the regime in El Salvador and later couples this with an aggressive campaign to isolate the Sandinistas. So begins a bitter political and policy struggle with Democrats in Congress

December - Presidential finding authorizing covert CIA actions against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua

1982

First Boland Amendment - Prohibits federal funds to be used to overthrow the government of Nicaragua

1983

U.S. Congress restricts aid to the Contras to 24 million dollars

1984

February - McFarlane (national security adviser) tells Reagan that money is running out for the Contras

March - CIA chief W. Buckley kidnapped in Beirut

April- CIA implicated in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors
May - Clarriadge (CIA) tells Contras that O. North (NSC) will take his place if Congress cuts of aid

Money solicited from Saudi Arabia to support the Contras

Additional kidnapping in Beirut

August - McFarlane asks for reassessment of U.S. policy toward Iran

October - Boland II - Bans any agency or entity involved in intelligence activities from spending money to aid the Contras

More Kidnappings

1985

January - June - Several kidnappings

June - NSC staff forms a new policy toward Iran - Sec of Defense Weinberger writes that it is "almost too absurd to comment on."

July - After meeting with hostage families and frustrated Reagan approves "in principle" the sale of TOW missiles to Iran

August - McFarlane and Reagan meet about Israeli proposal to sell missiles to Iran - Dispute later about whether President approved the sale

North flies to Costa Rica to discuss construction of an airstrip to be used to resupply the Contras

August 20th - Israel sends the first shipment of missiles to Iran

September - U.S complains that no hostages were released

September 14 - More missiles sent to Iran

November - Beginning of the private organization called the Enterprise

CIA ships 18 Hawk missiles to Iran -- officers later claim they thought cargo was "oil drilling parts"

December 5 - President sign retroactively a finding authorizing the arms sales operation

December McFarlane resigns and J. Poinexter appointed new National Security Adviser

December 6th - North tells Israeli officials he plans to use profits from the arms sale to support the Contras

December 7th - Famous meeting among high level national security officials on the arms shipments to Iran - very different versions recalled about this meeting

1986

January 17th - Reagan authorized arms shipment to Iran to improve relations with moderates and to release the hostages - the order authorizes the CIA to assist third parties and friendly countries in shipping the weapons

February 17th - 500 TWO missiles sent - no hostages freed
U.S. officials meet with Iranians and demand that hostages be freed

February 27 - more missiles sent - no hostages freed

March - Resupply effort to the Contras from airbases inside Costa Rica goes smoothly

April 4 - Famous O. North memo about diverting 12 million in arms profits to Contras - Poindexter claims he never showed it to Reagan

June 26 - Congress reverses itself and approves 100 million in military and non-lethal aid to the Contras

June - August - More missiles send = some hostages released but more kidnapped

August 6 - North testifies before the House Intelligence committee that he did not raise money for the Contras or offer them military adviser - Later at the Iran Contra hearing he admitting lying

October 5th - Cargo plane of the North/Secord -Enterprise operation operating from Costa Rica is shot down over Nicaragua - a operative E. Hassenfus is captured by the Sandinistas

October - more kidnappings - more hostages released more missiles sent

November 3rd - Story of arms sales to Iran breaks in a Lebanese newspaper

November 5-6 - White House issues denial and then the U.S. press confirms account

November 12-19 - North and White House officials prepare inaccurate chronologies of the Iran arms sales process

November 19 - Reagan press conference - he make serious errors that are corrected by staff immediately afterward

November 21 - W. Casey (CIA Director) appears before Congress and testifies about the CIA role in the arms shipments in 1985

Attorney General Edwin Meese is concerned about the confusion and varying accounts of the arms sales within the administration and wants an internal investigation

North told by justice officials that they will inspect his files the next day - He and his assistant F. hall begin shredding documents

November 22-25 - Investigation discovers a memo to the President about the diversion of funds (the North memo) - On the 24th - the White House notified on the 25th - the famous news conference where Meese reveals the diversion memo - Poindexter resigns and North is dismissed

The political and legal part of the affair begins ---and does not end until President Bush pardons Weinberger just as he leaves office in January 1993.

Crimes with which the Reagan administration was charged:

1. Raising private and foreign funds for the Contras:
? violated the Boland amendment prohibiting “direct or indirect” military support for the Contras

2. Shipping of missiles to Iran in 1985:
? violated Arms Export Control Act by not authorizing via Presidential finding
? violated Intelligence Oversight Act by not notifying Congress

3. Diverting funds to the Contras:
? misappropriation of federal funds
? violated the Boland Amendment

4. The Cover-up:
? conspiracy to defraud the government;
? obstruction of justice

---

Lectures for 2/22, 2/25, 2/27 will discuss in detail a number of the documents from the Iran-Contra Document book. I recommend that you bring the document book with you to class to make it easier to follow along. Unfortunately, it will be difficult to view the documents in class.

---

III. The End of the Cold War, and Post Cold War Foreign Policy

Three narratives to justify war and the use of military force

1. War as Politics and Politics as Business - cost benefits analysis --- using the most effective approach to achieve political and economic ends - including force weighting political and economic gains vs. cost of war

Oil
Geopolitics
Nuclear weapons
Balance of power concerns

2. Fairy tale and the Just War

Victim - Kuwait

Villain - Iraq

Hero - U.S.

Human rights, war crimes
Protecting democracy
Thwarting dictators
Personalized politics

3. War as a competitive game

Winners and losers - connection to chess and sports examples
personalization and credibility
Perceived and actual effects of winning or losing outweigh the actual cost/benefit calculations

Some rules of thumb - as the level and degree of military commitment increases then

a. costs and benefits more scrutinized and greater disagreement between the administration and the public but more consensus within the administration

b. rhetoric in the fairy tale metaphor -- more harsh, more emotional, more definitive and black and white

b. competitive game narrative enters and grows and increasingly dominates the cost/benefit approach

All follow in the Gulf case - Think about the extent these hold or not in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia

III. The Gulf War - Post-Cold War characteristics

Overt Western Involvement in the Middle East

A new coalition for collective security - UN (NATO), Russia, and US -- also a significant portion of the developing world including Arab states

Who pays the bill for collective security - not who lead

---

The Four Futures

F1 Standing Up for Democracy (crusaders)

Based on the democracy-peace "finding" coupled with dictatorship-aggression presumption

"enlargement of democratic states"

All will be well in the end - harmony of interests among democratic/capitalist states after a short messy and potentially costly transition period to rid the international system of dictatorships

Idealist- principled policy

Policy
1. support democracies
2. punish and pressure dictatorships via alliances, arms transfers, economic sanctions and use of force if necessary

World characterization

Post cold war - simply replace the Cold war script by inserting dictatorships (or terrorist) for communist states

F2 - Charting a Stable Course (Hegemonic Leader)

Based on Realism

Power politics (power, wealth, security)
Multipolarity and international anarchy

"power politics works the same for dictatorships and democracies"

alliances - regional balances of power "Every nations for itself"

Policy

1. Maintain "western" alliances
2. Protect U.S. Middle East Interests
3. Use arms transfers to balance regional power
4. Use military force, covert means based upon the principle of balancing power

World Characterization

Return to the balance of power, realist IR and foreign policy world of the Concert of Europe system 1815-1914

F3 Cooperating Globally (McWorld)

Based on Global interdependence -- and dependence
Complex interdependence - economic, technical, environmental, and security

"internationalist"

international institutionalist - for effectiveness and efficiency
cooperation in all parties interest

create institutions to facilitate cooperation -- building trust

Policy

1. Build UN and collective security
2. UN peacekeeping force
3. more arms control regimes
4. U.S. arms and economic embargos as sanctions
5. UN mediate disputes
6. World development via IGOs and NGOs - helps all

World Characterization

International institutions - creates a transnational web
Construction of structures to generate efficiency, order, cooperation

F4 - Building U.S. Economic Strength (Economic Nationalism - isolation)

Based upon world of increased economic competition (still anarchic) and not cooperative

System is anarchic - still a struggle for power but the currency of power is more economic and military or security in nature

National economic power is paramount

National interests clash and democracy, human rights, equality take a back seat

Policy

1. U.S. reduce alliances
2. Reduce military spending
3. Reduce military presence in the world
4. Nonintervention
5. More organized national economic policies
6. Protect sovereignty
7. Compete successfully

World Characterization

World based upon a new mercantilism
Regional/national economic competition
Politics not relevant - democracies/dictatorships not relevant
Stability relevant only in markets - in some instances a lack of stability can hurt competitors