POLS 321
 Reading Assignments  Lecture Outlines  Related Links
Course Introduction
Lecture Notes for Course Introduction
American Foreign Policy - Course Themes
1. Policy Making -- Problems and Solutions
2. Cold War - Post Cold War (same policy or different)
3. Post World War II Foreign Policy
a. Creating an Empire
b. Running an Empire
c. Now What?
U.S. Foreign Policymaking
U.S. policymakers confront or create Problems.
The construction of Solutions to Problems is Policymaking
Sometimes out of the search for specific solutions to specific problems and sometimes big doctrines emerge
Big Doctrines are those policies that are applied by different policymakers to many cases or problems.

Why an American Empire and what kind of empire?

The role of Client States
 
U.S. Foreign Policy - Client States as a Mechanism to Implement Foreign Policy
A. The advantages of having clients rather than, say, imperial provinces are twofold:
1. The administrative and political costs of administering clients are considerably less than those occasioned by direct rule
2. Having clients is significantly more flattering to one's self-image as a free political unit than to have subjects.
Counterbalancing these benefits, of course, is an obvious disadvantage
1. Clients, by virtue of their formal independence, are often obstreperous and able to manipulate the patron for their own ends.
2. Client state networks also require considerable resources to maintain.
For several decades, the United States has had the single largest network of client states. They fall into several, quite distinctive, categories.
1. States with whom the U.S. has a formal military alliance.
2. States with whom the U.S. has intimate military ties, furnishing extensive military aid and maintaining close links with the indigenous armed forces.
3. Pro-Western states with whom the U.S. has economic and military ties.
4. Formerly neutral but pro-Western states with whom the U.S. maintains not only significant economic connections but, increasingly, military links as well
B. Definition of Client States
What these types of states all have in common is that the maintenance of their type of regime (though not by any means the individual leaders or political groupings comprising any given regime) is
a) Considered by the U.S. government as a legitimate matter of concern, which
b) Is worth considerable political and, if need be, economic and military efforts, should it be seen as endangered. In addition, the dominant political forces in each of these states also
c) Consider that characteristics a) and b) are themselves normal and legitimate. This, then, is a more complete definition of client states.
The United States acquired its clients in several waves (see article for details)
 

C. Why Does the U.S. Acquire Clients?
U.S. foreign policymakers have consistently believed that U.S. political, economic, and security interests of the day require order and stability.
Order and stability is indicated via the existence of states with regimes which know their place in this order and which uphold its current principles. Such regimes must be defended; otherwise order is by definition threatened. This defense is partly against external threats.
To U.S. policymakers, the principal threats to such regimes are internal. Accordingly, existing clients must be scanned and surveilled on a regular -- ideally, a daily - basis
This is precisely the role of the enormous U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy as it is implanted in each U.S. client.
D. Why the U.S. predilection for seeing the world in terms of clients?
At some point the patron-client relationship became part of the U.S. foreign policy repertoire (part of expansion in the 1800s and obtaining colonies at the turn of the century) and, once established provided an easy template for U.S. policy makers to employ.
Part of the answer seems to be bureaucratic inertia. The foreign policy bureaucracy learned how to set up clients. Once it stumbled onto this policy, it did not need to innovate.
It is also the case that the acquisition and maintenance of client states has proven in many instances to be a successful policy.
E. What does the US do for Client States
Most U.S. clients are states with perfectly stable regime types. They do not require obtrusive surveillance or (except for economic and military aid) significant assistance.
Some regimes are seen as considerably more endangered. In such cases, U.S. officials engage in active policies aimed at buttressing the regime. These policies go well beyond transferring resources; they frequently involve daily advice to politicians, bureaucrats, the military, and various other political forces in the country. At times, however, the client is faced with a problem for which its own resources, even buttressed by U.S. aid, are insufficient. In those cases, U.S. intervention may be resorted to.
go to top of page
I. Lecture Notes for Constructing America's World
Period when the U.S. figures out if and how to run an Empire and
what it takes to be a global leader
Three Main Areas of Policy

1. Economic -- Economic growth - free trade access to global markets and materials (Capitalism)

2. Political -- Order, Stability, Freedom to determine political regimes, collective security,
anti-communism, promoting Democracy
3. Security -- Order, Stability "Containment"
Problems Solutions
Poland – Governmental Selection None
Greece-Turkey –aggression/subversion Truman Doctrine – containment - military aid
West European Economic and Political Instability

Marshall Plan

Economic Aid
Berlin –1948 War scare - Containment NATO – Formal Military Alliance


1. Greece/Turkey and the Truman Doctrine
Administration chooses to make a big deal out of the Civil War in Greece
Containment and the role of World Policeman is born
Truman "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" 3/12/47
2. Marshall Plan
A pragmatic approach to addressing the problems of Western Europe
supply capital, tools, food to restore Europe
eonomic non-militaristic, non-ideological - humanitarian, common sense
August 1947 - European Recovery Plan -- $28 billion -- December 1947 to Congress 17 billion --
something for everyone --
Humanitarian
Economic - Foreign markets, avoid depression, very good for U.S. businesses
Pol/mil - stems pol and economic chaos and instability in W. Europe
Marshall Plan and incredible success -- poured 13 billion into Europe - about 90 billion in current dollars -- template for future - creating economic/pol stability and growth - applied with less success other places
3. NATO
last phase - the security part
Why did policymakers see military commitments to Europe as necessary
answers in part found in the famous scholarly article by "X" (George Kennan) -- led to belief in the necessity of military commitments
"the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet Policy"
essential misinterpretation -- from pol/economic - military
key to NATO - formalization of western alliance - entangling alliance - commitment to Europe - a formal presence and role in Europe - institutional commitment

High level U.S. foreign policy maker - (Lovett) -- departure from the past - "The U.S. had sought peace through weakness now it seeks peace through strength."
High Times for the Truman Adminstration.
A string of major foreign policy successes
A major come from behind victory 1948 Presidential Election
Success in May of 1949 in overcoming the Soviet effort to isolate and break Berlin - blockade given up
Communist revolution in Greece had failed - M. Plan working, Berlin was relieved, West allied against the Soviet threat -- "America, Winston Churchill proclaimed "has saved the world"
BUT
Three big problems on the horizon
1 Republicans bitter at election loss -- pursue a destructive but effective strategy against Truman and the democrats
2 "Loss" of China
3 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb
The Plan to Run the World and Win the Cold War -- NSC-68
NSC - 68
Why? Policy of Global Leadership in place but little Capability to do the Job
Realization of Problems
Europe - Conventional Soviet Threat
S. Korea - Lacking capability to protect clients states
Loss of Nuclear Monopoly
Growing political and military problems in the developing world --- Vietnam
Structure of NSC- 68
The enemy - The Soviet Threat and Rhetoric
Basic Strategy
U.S. Intentions - Containment
Containment via Aggregate superior military strength
The Present Risks
Possible Courses of Action
1. continue current policies
2. isolation
3. war
4. a more rapid buildup of the pol, eco, and mil strength of the free world than provided under 1 above

Why no general War -- no first use of nuclear weapons

Key Policy Features of NSC- 68
How to Win the Cold War
1. Negotiate with Soviets from position of strength
2. No Direct War
3. Build Economically and outlast the Soviet Union
4. Contain by combination of aggregate superior military strength and the construction of a strong periphery (foreign military and economic aid - advisers - military presence oversees)
5. develop intelligence and covert operations capabilities (develop the CIA)
6. Develop strong unified democratic West
7. Build up military strength
8. develop domestic internal security and civil defense programs
9. reduce the Federal deficit and defer domestic programs
10. Increase taxes
Raising overall security spending by three fold from approx 14 Billion to 35 billion
How to sell this politically? -- Cut desirable domestic programs, raise taxes to increase security --
Policy makers have no answer
go to top of page
 

Truman - The Korean War 1950-1953
1. How to Sell NSC-68
2. N. Korea Invades June 26, 1950
Problem -- Solution and the Co-evolution of
Policy
A. Defining the Problem --- "Soviet inspired and
supported"
B. World War III?
C. Implementing Containment - Helping a Client State facing external aggression
D. Quickly up the military escalatory ladder till U.S. combat troops deployed with combat mission for an indefinite period of time

3. Policy Chaos - Summer till Fall - Containment or
rollback (liberation) --- Rollback it is and across the 38th parallel
4. Winter 1950-1951 - Limited War or all out War - the Struggle between Truman and MacArthur
5. Why no "peace" untill 1953
The Korean War Legacy
Permanent Cold War - Hostility toward the Soviet Union and Communist China
permanent tension and risk
Clashes on the periphery
Political Destruction of the Truman Presidency and the "lesson of Korea"
U.S. rearmament 1949 11.1 Billion
1952 57.7 Billion
1953 35.0 Billion
U.S. Troops deployed to Europe
Containment practiced in Asia
Expanded military establishment and permanent arms industry - the mil/ind complex
Problems - unpopular limited wars, and the psychology of containment

 

II. Understanding How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made -

Case 1 "Good" Policymaking - The Cuban Missile Crisis
Case 1 - "Good Policymaking" The Cuban Missile

Cast of Characters
J. F. Kennedy - President
R. McNamara - Sec. of Defense
D. Rusk - Sec. of State
J. McCone - Director of the CIA
McG. Bundy - Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
P. Nitze - Asst. Sec. of Defense
M. Taylor - Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
T. Sorensen - Special Council to the President
A. Stevenson - Ambassador to the United Nations
G. Ball - Under Sec. of State
R. Kennedy - Attorney General
D. Dillon - Sec. of the Treasury
D. Acheson - "Wise Man"
Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
Rational Choice Approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis
We the analyst or observer assume
1. the individual or group making a decision pursues one set of specified goals and objectives - Policy makers agree up preferences concerning goals and outcomes (unified goals and objective)
2. The policy making group evaluates all available alternative courses of action (full information)
3. The policy making group assesses the consequences for each possible course of action - how likely various outcomes are given an alternative course of action in conjunction with how much the group values the outcome --- (expected utility maximizing decision rule)
4. The choice among the alternative courses of actions is that which the group evaluates as maximizing their goals and preferences over outcomes -- They choose the best alternative course of action given their preferences and the constraints imposed by the situation
Cuba -- The problem - Soviets deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba which will soon become operational
The group sees the deployment of these missiles as unacceptable - the Soviets must remove them
How is the question and at what risk
Objectives ---
1. Removing the missiles
2. Avoiding a military conflict with the Soviets that could well escalate to a nuclear war
3. The political necessity for Kennedy and the U.S to win this showdown
Alternative courses of action
1. Do Nothing
2. Negotiate - Trade missiles (Cuba and Turkey)
3. Surgical Air Strike
4. Military Invasion
5. Blockade - Quarantine
 

 

 

 

 

     Goals    
     Remove Missiles  Avoid Nuclear War  Political Victory, look aggressive
   Do Nothing  LP  HP  LP
 Actions  Negotiate  MP or HP  MP or HP LP 
   Surgical air Strike  HP  MP or LP  HP
   Mil Invasion  HP  MP or LP  HP
   Blockade  MP  MP  MP or HP

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
A Game Theoretic -- Joint Decision-making problem
The Cuban Missile Crisis as a game of Chicken
Choices for both nations
1) Back Down (BD)
2) Do Not Back Down (NBD)
Preferences for each
 NBD, BD>  BD, BD>  BD,NBD>  NBD,NBD
 4,2  3,3  2,4  1,1
     Soviet Union  
     BD  NBD
 U.S.  BD  (3,3)  (2,4)
   NBD  (4,2)  (1,1)

The problem in this "game" is one of
COMMITMENT
That is somehow signaling in a credible way to your opponent that you will not back down (NBD) and it is up to the opponent to save both parties
That is by commiting credibly to NBD you in effect change the game to
   BD  NBD
 NBD  (4,2)  (1,1)
Case 1 - The Cuban Missile
The Governmental Politics Approach
Focus - A group of high level decision-makers, typically leaders of organizations, are engaged in a competitive game --
The Group decision is seen as the outcome of a game among these players - It is the product of (and explained by) the pulling and hauling of politics
The choice is the product of

1) the reasons for actions - linked to the players goals
2) and the routines of organizations to enact alternatives --packages of tools and missions or standard operating procedures (SOPs)
3) the power and skills of the players - their control of information, argumentative skill, structural power position
So - we need to

1) isolate who plays
2) what determines their position -
a. role organization
b. political coalition
c. ideology and beliefs
3) what determines a players impact on the decision
a. power position
b. skill - expertise
c. experience
4) How the game among the players is structured
The decision is explained in this approach by displaying the above components
Note - this approach requires far more detailed evidence that the rational actor model
   Initial Positions  
 Diplomatic  Air Strike  Uncommitted
 Stevenson  Acheson  McNamara
 Ball  Ntize  Bundy
   McCone  Sorenson
   Dillon  R. Kennedy
   J.C.S.  (Rusk)
   (J.F.K.)  
JFK - opposed to doing nothing and saw the missile trade as too weak a response - note as well that no one else was in favor of doing nothing
Strong and powerful air strike coalition
The uncommitted need to jump on board the air strike or find a more viable alternative -- Construct the blockade option
McNamara, Bundy, Sorenson, R. Kennedy, Rusk join Stevenson and Ball in new coalition for a blockade
Revealing the "game" then can be seen in one of two ways that are of course connected
1) A competition among the two groups to persuade their Boss (JFK) that their option is best
2) Building an argument that their solution will solve the problem and that the other position has serious flawed problems
The Blockade Group case ---
Positive
A Blockade is aggressive and tough
It puts the initiative and responsibility for the next move on the Soviets
It is safer than an air strike
It does not rule out an air strike later
It gives time for the Soviets to understand their mistake and back down
It signals U.S. resolve and determination
Negative aspects of the alternative
An air strike is very risky and could be escalatory
An air strike may well not solve the problem since it is possible that some missiles will not be destroyed and thus it may require an invasion - an option with additional problems
An air strike makes the U.S. the aggressor and JFK like Tojo - Pearl Harbor
The Air strike Group Case
Positive
Removes missiles (almost all)
Some risk but fairly safe since the U.S. holds but a tactical and overall strategic advantage over the Soviet Union
Is aggressive and tough and demonstrates resolve and determination
Can help to destabilize Castro and help lead to his downfall and could lead to a Castro reaction that could warrant U.S. military intervention
Negative
Blockade does not remove missiles soon to be operational - only prevents additional materials from entering
Blockade gives away the element of surprise making future military action more difficult
Blockade creates its own set of problems with our allies that may make future military action more difficult
Blockade is a soft response, which gives the Soviets time to obtain a more palatable (for them) negotiated settlement - such as a missile trade
Keys to why the Blockade group "won"
1) Small but significant probability that the air strike would not remove all the missiles and would probably require an invasion
2) Belief among key actors (JFK, RFK, McNamara, and Rusk that the blockade opened up possibilities to solve the crisis without ruling out others later and
3) it was less risky than the air strike but politically palatable
4) The coalition that formed around the blockade was closer to the President ideologically and personally
 Hawks  Doves/Owls
 Nitze  McNamara
 Taylor  R. Kennedy
 Dillon  T. Sorenson
 McCone  A. Stevenson
 Acheson  D. Rusk
   McG. Bundy
Cuban Missile Crisis -- Cognitive/Pyschological Approach
The Psychological Approach to Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Introduction.
Psychologist Bligh's argument in a nutshell.
Body.
A. Who are the players in the Cuban missile crisis?
B. What facts do the players agree on?
C. How are the facts perceived differently by different players?
I. Balance of power.
II. Risks of Soviet slip-up and US aggression.
D. Why do different players perceive facts differently?
I. Different goals.
II. Different assumptions.
III. Different formative periods.
Conclusion.
What are the strengths and limitations of the psychological approach?


INCOMMENSURABLE VIEWS,
OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Hawks:
1. relatively understandable
2. predictable
3. controllable
4. safe
Doves:
1. inexplicable
2. unpredictable
3. uncontrollable
4. dangerous
Hawks and Doves disagreed about:
1. POWER Their understandings of the relative U.S. and Soviet positions in the crisis
2. PERCEPTIONS on their perceptions of the risks

3. POLICY on their policy prescriptions
Key Issues
 Hawks  Doves
 Power  Cuban Missiles significantly change military calculus-must be removed  Cuban Missiles not militarily significant - just a political threat
   But Soviets vastly outnumbered on nuclear level (17 to 1 advantage for the U.S.) and useful in making Russians back off  No advantage to the U.S. because strategiv imbalance gives us no leverage over the Soviets
 Perceptions  Risk of nuclear war exists but probability of success high and risk of disaster low  Risk exists and is possible - must be avoided at all costs
   Risk of inadvertent action or deliberate escalation after U.S. attack low  Risk of inadvertent actiona dnd deliberate escalation high
 Policy  High degress of confifence of Soviet rationality  Less certain of Soviet intentions and more concern about inadvertent actions -- look at recent history
   No qualms about an air strike - necessary to take forceful and decisive action  High degree of responsibility "weight of the world on our shoulders"
     
Why these differences?
Changing world from U.S. nuclear dominance to mutual vulnerability
Hawks do not see this change
· Schooled in Cold War
· Deeply anti-communist
· Saw Soviets as responding to force alone
· Powerful faith in nuclear coercion
· U.S. has both conventional and nuclear superiority in this area of the
world
End result: U.S. settled for less than it should have in this crisis
Doves are very aware of new world
· Experience of hawks irrelevant this case
· Nuclear exchange is possible--first time in history that both sides
vulnerable
· Misstep could be fatal
· Anxiety and tension affects clear thinking
· Information about Soviet objectives lacking
· Personally responsible for fate of world
End result: Advocate less threatening course of action--ultimately successful
Case 2 Classic Policymaking -- Vietnam
A Vietnam Chronology --- Getting into Vietnam
1. Fall 1961 - Kennedy commits U.S. as limited partner to S. Vietnam - Sends Approx. 15,000 U.S. military advisers to assist, train, and fight
2. 1962-3 - Pacification and Strategic Hamlets - Trying to help the client state win its political and military struggle against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese
3. Fall 1963 - Faced with growing political and military failure of U.S./S. Vietnamese policy in Vietnam - U.S. gives up on Diem - coup then assassination - J.F.K assassination and beginning of LBJ Presidency
4. 1964 - Secret covert operations begin against North Vietnam --OPLAN 34- Election Politics - Congressional Resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin ---
5. September 1964-Fully developed plans to begin a plan of graduated sustained pressure on North Vietnam - via overt sustained bombing
6. December 1964 - LBJ agrees in principle to begin plan of overt sustained bombing - to raise the costs of the war on N. Vietnam and to raise morale in the South -- but need political stability in the South first
7. Jan to Early Feb. 1965 - Continued Government instability (more coups) in the South coupled with serious military setbacks in the South -
8. The attack on Pleiku - changing arguments among High level policy makers - decision to start a plan graduated sustained pressure - Rolling Thunder starts March 2, 1965 - a major step into Vietnam - internationalizing the war
9. Base Protection - Enclaves - The beginning of the flow of U.S. combat troops to Vietnam
10. One small chance for negotiations and peace - Ball and Acheson have their chance for setting negotiations going with the North Vietnamese - April 1965
11. By June 1965 - There are about 80,000 U.S. combat troops in Vietnam - The U.S. is bombing many targets in both North and South Vietnam. U.S. combat troops are sustaining casualties
12. But the military situation in the South is constantly getting worse - The North, in response to U.S. actions has drastically stepped up infiltration and is fighting in large units with tanks and artillery. They are destroying at a rapid rate large units of U.S. trained and supported South Vietnamese military units
13. U.S. military Commander Gen. W. Westmoreland - fears that S. Vietnam will be cut in half and that the South will collapse both militarily and politically - In early June he makes a request for 44 U.S. combat battalions (approx. 100,000 more U.S. combat troop> 
14. LBJ and his advisers must decide on whether to escalate the War or not -- Strangely, they see it was a decision of whether to go to war or not
1965 Vietnam Decisions - Who's Who
President -- L. B. Johnson
Sec. of State - Dean Rusk
Sec. Of Defense Robert McNamara
Under Sec. Of State - George Ball
Ambassador to Saigon - Maxwell Taylor
Special Asst. for National Security McGeorge Bundy
Mil. Commander/Vietnam - William Westmoreland
Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff - General Wheeler
Asst. Sec. Of of State - William Bundy
July 1965 Policy Recommendations - Vietnam
1. R. McNamara - a revised version of the Westmoreland Troop request - 100-120,000 more U.S. Combat Troops - more to follow as needed, call of U.S. reserves, ask Congress for a supplemental military appropriation
2. George Ball -- No More Troop Increases - Look for ways to withdraw via negotiations with N. Vietnam - S. Vietnam a loser - the situation will only get worse - the U.S. must cut its losses
3. William and McGeorge Bundy - Hold troops a current levels (80,000) for two months to see how well U.S. forces do and how the South and North Vietnamese respond to significant U.S. combat involvement
George Ball - Arguments for Getting Out of Vietnam
U.S. cannot win
War will be too costly
Vietnam not essential
In the long term, better to cut our losses and pull out - will show better judgment and leadership
Why? --
Because the U.S. will end up just like the French
Fighting a guerrilla war it cannot win - U.S. will win all the battles, but a combination of terrain, popular support for the guerrillas, a weak S. Vietnamese government, and a determined enemy ensure a war that will drag on for years with rising U.S. causalities and increasing international and domestic pressures to withdraw
Dean Rusk counter argument
"The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world."
So Given these states Rusk argued that is was not necessary to defeat the Viet Cong.
"It is said we are "losing": this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind in the effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But this does not mean that the Viet Cong are "winning"; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Vietn Cong can be denied victory, even if pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect."
The U.S. must be the "good doctor," in Vietnam - It must get bloodied and do everything it can to help the patient (even if essentially terminal) so that U.S. global credibility can be maintained. The U.S. enemies (Soviet Union and the PRC) must not believe that the U.S. is a "paper tiger" who can be pushed around in other parts of the world with no resistance. So fighting in Vietnam is a way to signal U.S. resolve to our enemies and to a avoid a major crisis the road and possibly World War III
Ball the Odd man out -
LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, the Bundy Brothers, and high level military officials all agreed on escalation knowing full well the consequences
No one argued that the war would be easy.
Everyone understood that there would be considerable U.S. casualties
Everyone know the war would last a long time and that victory while possible was not very likely
Why? -- U.S. credibility and leadership
and Domestic politics - protecting the President
The Tragedy of Vietnam
Soldiers and citizens of the U.S., and South and North Vietnam
10 more years of war
Responsibility -- LBJ and his advisers - A war of their own making ---
Entraped by their own conceptions of the Cold War

 

The End of the Cold War, and Post Cold War Foreign Policy

The Cold War comes to an End

Gorbachev - starts a revolution in the Soviet Union - Perestroika and Glasnost

Tells then V.P Bush in late 1988 -

"Your staff may have told you that what I'm doing is all a trick. It's not. I'm playing real politics. I have a revolution going that I announced in 1986. Now, in 1988, the Soviet people don't like it. Don't misread me, Mr. Vice President, I have to play real politics."

George Bush comes into office in 1989 and faces a first year of sweeping change

Started out with foreign policy as usual - cold war style

Détente with Soviets
improving relations with China
strong NATO and SDI
support Contras
peace process in Middle East
BUT - the world did not cooperate

 

1. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and major changes in the Soviet Union

2. The squashing of democracy in China - Tiananman Square

3. Revolution, elections, drugs, military intervention in Central America - Nicaragua and Panama

 

In the face of dramatic changes in the World, the U.S. sat on the sidelines, ran along behind change, was strapped financially, and was not willing to get out in front and lead since the future was so unclear

W. and E. Europeans charting their own course
Europeans leading the way in providing economic aid to E. Europe and the Soviet Union

U.S. chastised by allies for not getting its economy in order --- debtor nation, bad trade imbalances, big budget deficits, slow growth

 

Was the Cold War really over? Had the three "isms"
Colonialism, Fascism, and Communism been defeated?

Who was the enemy now? - terrorists, drug dealers, new ethnic nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists

How should U.S. foreign policy change? And how should U.S. foreign policy institutions change?

Should the U.S. continue to lead or focus inward?

Should there be more real collective security? Should our allies pick up more of the burden?

Is defense and security less important and economics more so?

What should be the role of the CIA and defense? - Is there a peace dividend for winning the cold war? SDI,
B-2 stealth bombers

Central America

Nicaragua - embargo, contras, the deal - disbanding the contras and elections - the election surprise
Drugs, dictator, the end of the cold war, old style colonialism, and the new world order -- U.S. military intervention in Panama - oust Noriega and the PDF

The Bush Administration and The Gulf War

 

The Cold War - Post Cold War Divide

 

I. Gulf War Foreign Policymaking
II. Justifications and Explanation
III. What is Old and What is New

 

 

I. Gulf War Foreign Policymaking

Three Phases

a. Initial Understandings and Responses

b. From defend and deter (contain) to the Offensive

 

c. Selling the War to Congress and the American Public

 

a. Confused signals to Iraq prior to the Iraqi invasion
A preoccupation with Soviet problems
First reactions - Don't exactly know what to do or how important the problem is
Then the problem and the stakes take form

1. Oil
2. Aggression
3. New world order and collective security

Response - UN sanctions - diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions --- after some work U.S forces to Saudi Arabia - deter and defend --- protect Saudi Arabia - the big oil prize but also rollback aggression and free Kuwait -
Hot confrontational trapping rhetoric

b. From defense to the offensive option

Late October decisions by the group of 5 -- build an offensive option - from 250,00 to 500,000 and all the sophisticated technology and weapons available

Why? --
Sanctions might not work and they might take too long to work -
fragile coalition,
Israel problem,
troops in the desert problem
military windows of opportunity

Decision in secret - before midterm elections and after the famous budget summit and the breach of the no new taxes pledge

c. Selling the Offensive Option

Positives --

Eventually get UN resolution use al means necessary - force to remove Iraq from Kuwait -- International U.S. led coalition

Bad public relations by Hussein - hostages -- an easy enemy to demonize

Kuwait as the innocent democratic victim

Building the force option to call Hussein's bluff - coercive diplomacy

U.S. and Presidental leadership

Negatives

What is the hurry on sanctions
What is the rush to military options
Adverse public opinion on military options

Presidential approval down from 82% in August to 59% in Mid November

Task for the administration

Finding successful formulas to speak to the public or publics

Hearings and the Congressional debates leading to support

Administration position

Have U.N. resolution and International coalition

UN resolution + international coalition + increased troops = best chance for peace and success -- Congressional support the last key piece in the equation

II. Justifications and Explanations

Iraq must get out of Kuwait or be forced out

Why? - Speaking to different publics

Aggression - and the principles of sovereignty and collective security - New global order - controlling dictators and protecting democracies

Punish and remove Hussein- can't let Hussein save face

Brutality in Kuwait - human rights and war crimes
Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the wrong hands

Oil energy costs - Hussein too much control

Dangerous change in the balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East - regional interests Israel and oil rich friends

A personalized struggle between Bush and Hussein that the leader of the global community must win - Presidential Credibility